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2007 DIGILAW 19 (AP)

Jaksani Lakshman Rao v. Ellandula Ravinder

2007-01-05

D.S.R.VERMA, P.SWAROOP REDDY

body2007
JUDGMENT Heard both sides. 2. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, dated 15-04-2003, passed by the III Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, decreeing the suit O.S.No. 8 of 1996, granting the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995 (Ex.A-1), and directing the defendant No.1 to execute and register a sale deed in respect of the suit schedule property, in favour of the plaintiff, after receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs.28,03,000/-, the defendants have filed the present appeal; while the application C.C.C.A.M.P.No. 648 of 2006, under Order 41 Rule-27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking to receive the documents filed along with the application as additional evidence in the present appeal, has been filed by the defendant Nos. 2 to 4. 3. Appellants are the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 and respondent is the plaintiff in the suit, before the Court below. 4. For the sake of convenience, in this judgment, the parties will be referred to as per their array in the suit. 5. Initially, the suit has been filed against the sole defendant i.e., defendant No.1. Subsequently the defendant Nos.2 to 4 have come on record getting themselves impleaded on the ground that the defendant No.1 has executed an agreement of sale (Ex.B-5) in their favour on 24-08-1994 for a total sale consideration of Rs. 19,50,000/-; that on the date of said agreement of sale, a sum of Rs. 2,11,000/- had been paid to the defendant No.1 as advance towards sale consideration and that the other conditions will be dealt with later. Since there is no response despite the notice issued by the plaintiff seeking execution of registered sale deed, the present suit came to be filed by the plaintiff alleging that the defendant No.1 had executed an agreement of sale (Es.A-1) on 25-05-1995 with certain terms and conditions, which also will be dealt with later. 6. Since there is no response despite the notice issued by the plaintiff seeking execution of registered sale deed, the present suit came to be filed by the plaintiff alleging that the defendant No.1 had executed an agreement of sale (Es.A-1) on 25-05-1995 with certain terms and conditions, which also will be dealt with later. 6. For better appreciation of the case, it is necessary to detail the relevant pleadings in the plaint, which are thus: Originally plot No. 278, admeasuring 5794.47 square feet equivalent to 534.24 square metres of land, situate at West Maredpally, Secunderabad, belongs to the Government of Andhra Pradesh; that originally one Nagulapalli Durgaiah was the lessee who constructed a house in the year 1945; that subsequently the said Durgaiah had transferred the leasehold rights of the suit schedule property in favour of the defendant No.1 under a transfer agreement, dated 13-06-1980 and that pursuant to the said transfer, the defendant No.1 has been in exclusive and uninterrupted possession of the suit schedule property as a lessee to the Government of Andhra Pradesh. 7. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant No.1 has executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff on 25-05-1995 (Ex.A-1) wherein and whereby it was agreed that the suit schedule property together with the leasehold rights would be transferred in favour of the plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs. 32,03,000/-; that initially a sum of Rs. 32,03,000/-; that initially a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- was paid as advance; that the balance sale consideration was agreed to be paid by the plaintiff at the time of execution of registered sale deed; that it was further agreed between the parties that if the defendant No.1 fails to get the tenant evicted from the suit schedule property within the stipulated period of three to six months from the date of said agreement of sale and execute a registered sale deed by completing all other formalities, the defendant No.1 shall pay interest at 24 per cent per annum on the advance amount paid by the plaintiff for the delayed period i.e., over and above six months; that in the month of October, 1995, though the tenant has vacated the suit schedule property, the defendant No.1 failed to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff despite the readiness and willingness expressed by the plaintiff to perform his part of obligation; that at that point of time, the defendant No.1 was negotiating with the other intending purchasers to sell the suit schedule property at an escalated price; that sensing this trend, the plaintiff got issued a notice, dated 08-12-1995, through an Advocate, to the defendant NO,1, seeking execution of a registered sale deed; that though the said notice was received by the defendant No.1 on 09-12-1995, no reply was offered; that therefore the plaintiff got issued a public notice in Deccan Chronicle and Eenadu daily newspapers informing about the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, with the defendant No.1, and also called for objections, if any, from the public with relative documents to substantiate their right/s over the suit schedule property; that in pursuance of the said public notice, dated 27-12-1995, one Sri J. Ramachandraiah and five others have sent objections, by way of a letter, dated 08-01-1996, under Ex.A-5, wherein it was alleged that the suit schedule property was a joint family property and the defendant No.1 had no exclusive right to sell away the same but they did not offer any documentary evidence, as set out in the public notice; that therefore the plaintiff sent a reply, dated 13-01-1996, treating the abovementioned objections as totally irrelevant, false and baseless; that subsequently the plaintiff got Issued another notice, dated 12-01-1996, enclosing a draft sale deed for approval of the defendant No.1 in order to execute a registered sale deed, but the defendant No.1 did not show any inclination to perform his part of obligation for execution of a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, the present suit has been filed. 8. It is the further case of the plaintiff that he was ready to deposit the balance sale consideration as and when directed and sought for the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, along with other incidental reliefs. 9. The defendant No.1 filed written statement denying the averments made in the plaint in toto. But, however, contended that as he was in need of some money for his business, he approached the plaintiff requesting to advance a sum of Rs.4,00,000/-; that the plaintiff has agreed to advance the amount but suggested the defendant No. 1 to keep the suit schedule property as security, that the defendant No.1 has expressed his inability to do so and informed the plaintiff about the existence of agreement of sale in favour of third parties; that upon the instructions of the plaintiff, the defendant No.1 has readily accepted to execute a bond for the amount to be advanced and affixed his signatures on the blank stamp paper and other blank papers and at that point of time itself, the defendant No.1 gave a copy of the agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, allegedly executed in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 to the plaintiff. 10. It is the case of the defendant No.1 that the suit schedule property was under the occupation of a College for Music and Dance, run by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, and the said College was vacated on or about 08-1 0-1995; that to facilitate completion of all necessary formalities, the defendant No.1 has executed an irrevocable General Power of Attorney in favour of the defendant No.2 and subsequently he received the entire sale consideration from time to time and consequently steps were also taken to transfer the suit schedule property in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4. 11. It is also the case of the defendant No.1 that only upon receipt of notice, dated 08-12-1995, from the plaintiff, he realized that the plaintiff had used the blank papers, which contained his signatures, to create the alleged agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995; that the defendant No.1 issued a reply, ·dated 26-12-1995, to the notice, dated 08-12-1995, issued by the plaintiff, offering to repay the loan amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- together with interest at the agreed rate of 24 per cent per annum; that by virtue of the alleged agreement of sale, the plaintiff is not entitled for equitable relief of specific performance; that the plaintiff did not express his readiness and willingness to perform the obligation on his part; that the plaintiff was trying to take advantage of the blank papers bearing the signatures of the defendant No.1 and also trying to fill them to file a suit and consequently sought for dismissal of the suit. 12. The defendant No.2 filed written statement contending that the plaintiff is aware of the execution of the agreement of sale by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4, dated 24-08-1994, in respect of the suit schedule property, and the entire sale consideration of Rs. 19,50,000/was paid to the defendant No.1 by then; that on the application filed by the defendant No.1 before the authorities concerned, transfer of leasehold land i.e., the suit schedule property in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 was effected, that on the application filed by the defendant Nos.2 to 4 the Government of Andhra Pradesh has also converted the leasehold land into freehold land and a conveyance deed was executed in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 for which the defendant Nos.2 to 4 have paid an amount of Rs.1 ,04,466/- and hence the defendant Nos.2 to 4 have become bona fide purchasers of the suit schedule property; that the sale consideration paid by them to the defendant No.1 was Rs. 19,50,000/- whereas the alleged sale consideration agreed to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant No.1 was Rs.32,03,000/- and hence the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant No.1 was negotiating with other intending purchasers and trying to sell away the suit schedule property for the escalated price cannot be accepted and that there is no cause of action for filing the suit and sought for dismissal of the suit. 13. The defendant Nos.3 and 4 have filed memos adopting the written statement filed by the defendant No.2. 14. Basing on the above pleadings, the Court below has framed the following issues for trial:- "(1) Whether the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, is true, valid and binding on the defendants? 13. The defendant Nos.3 and 4 have filed memos adopting the written statement filed by the defendant No.2. 14. Basing on the above pleadings, the Court below has framed the following issues for trial:- "(1) Whether the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, is true, valid and binding on the defendants? (2) Whether the agreement of sale, executed in favour of defendant Nos.2 to 4, dated 24-08-1994, is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff? (3) Whether the payments under the above agreement of sale are true and valid? (4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the specific performance of the agreement as prayed for? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the refund of the advance money with interest? (6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the damages of Rs. 40,500/-? (7) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per month? (8) To what relief?" 15. The Court below has also framed an additional issue, in pursuance of the order, dated 09-08-2002, passed in I.ANo. 704 of 2002, which is thus:- "Whether the plaintiff was always ready and willing to continue to be so to perform his part of the contract?" 16. I n order to substantiate their respective contentions, the plaintiff examined himself as P .W.1 and got marked Exs.A-1 to A-7 on his behalf and on behalf of the defendant Nos.1 to 4, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 examined themselves as D.Ws.1 and 2 and got marked Exs.B-1 to B-7 on their behalf. EX.X-1 was marked by the Court with consent of both parties. 17. The Court below, having considered the entire material, including the evidence, both oral and documentary, available on record, on issue No.1 held that the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 under EX.A-1 is a transaction of intended sale of suit schedule property but not loan transaction and hence the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under Ex.A-1, is true, valid and binding on the defendants, on issue Nos. 2 and 3 held that the agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, was a document brought into existence by the defendants and therefore it is not binding on the plaintiff and the payments allegedly made under EX.B-5 are not true and valid, on issue No.4 held that the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of agreement, dated 25-05-1995, under Ex.A-1, on issue No.5 held that the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of agreement and is not entitled to the refund of advance money with interest, on issue Nos.6 and 7 held that the plaintiff is not entitled to the damages and mesne profits, on additional issue held that it is established that the plaintiff was always ready and willing and continue to be so to perform his part of contract and on issue No.8 eventually decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been preferred by the defendant Nos. 1 to 4. 18. Sri N.V.Suryanarayana Murthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant Nos.1 to 4, contends that; The Plaintiff should have represented to Ex.B-6, particularly when it was the specific case of the defendant No.1 in EX.B-6 that a copy of EX.B-5 was given to the plaintiff and when it is also specifically averred in the written statement that his signatures were obtained on the blank papers and other papers for the purpose of executing a bond in lieu of the loan amount of Rs.4,00,000/- and that the said failure on the part of the plaintiff is a significant factor in favour of defendants. 19. Elaborating his submission, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that though the plaintiff initially stated in the plaint that there was no reply by the defendant No.1 to Ex.A-2, in his evidence as P.W.1 he acknowledged the receipt of EX.8-6. According to the learned Senior Counsel, this circumstance itself would indicate that the plaintiff had not come to the Court with clean hands and, therefore, EX.8-6 attains any amount of significance. Existence of EX.8-5 was made clear by the defendant No.1 in Ex.8-6, in which event it is highly impossible for the plaintiff to have EX.A-1, at a later point of time. Existence of EX.8-5 was made clear by the defendant No.1 in Ex.8-6, in which event it is highly impossible for the plaintiff to have EX.A-1, at a later point of time. Suppression of Ex.8-6, in the plaint, is fatal to the case of the plaintiff and, on the contrary, the plaintiff had resorted to coercive steps by initiating a Criminal Case under Section 420 I.P.C., which eventually resulted in acquittal. 20. The Court below failed to note that the plaintiff had denied Ex.8-5, for the first time, in his counter, in I.A.No. 93 of 1996, and despite the same no steps have been taken by him to amend the plaint. Ex.8-5, being earlier one, should prevail over the alleged subsequent agreement of sale under EX.A-1 since both the parties to EX.8-5 admit EX.8-5 as existing, true and valid, in the absence of any rebuttal evidence on the plaintiffs side, execution of EX.8-5 has to be held as proved. The plaintiff failed to satisfactorily disprove the recitals in EX.8-5 as regards the payment etc. Since the plaintiff failed to prove that EX.8-5 is invalid on the ground that it is insufficiently stamped or opposed to any statutory provision, the same is to be held as true and valid. 21. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply only to the suits in which any right to immoveable property is directly or specifically in question. Further, relying on Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the learned Senior Counsel places strong reliance on the decision of the apex Court in Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co., and another. He further submits that even if it is admitted that there are two agreements of sale, i.e., Exs.8-5 and A-1, respectively, the defendant No.1 is not precluded from selling the property by way of entering into an agreement of sale in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4. 22. The Estates Officer, who is a party to Exs.8-3 and 8-4 and transferred the leasehold rights of the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 and conversion of leasehold rights into that of freehold rights, respectively, is not a party to the present suit and hence Exs. 8-3 and 8-4 are valid and not attracted by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. 8-3 and 8-4 are valid and not attracted by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff will get title to the suit schedule property, which is the subject matter of EX.A-1, only after he gets a decree for specific performance and a sale deed is executed and registered pursuant thereto by the defendant No.1. The requirement for conversion of leasehold rights into that of freehold rights should be preceded by transfer of leasehold rights in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 or the plaintiff, as the case may be, and in view of Exs.8-3 and 8-4, the Ex.A-1, even if existing, would get frustrated, as its performance is impossible. 23. On the other hand, Sri S.Venkata Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff, contends that; No receipts were produced by the defendant No.1 to prove the alleged payments made by defendant Nos.2 to 4; that copy of alleged G.P.A., executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant No.2 for the purpose of complying with all other formalities pursuant to EX.8-5 was not produced; that EX.8-5 was prepared in haste and brought into existence only after the execution of Ex.A-1, and hence it is not a genuine document; that the defendant Nos.2 to 4 have entered into Ex.8-5, without verifying and satisfying themselves as to the title of the defendant No.1 in respect of the suit schedule property; that there is no evidence on behalf of the defendant Nos.1 to 4 that EX.B-5 was produced before the authorities concerned; that there is no reply or orders from the concerned authorities while transferring the leasehold rights in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4; that if really the balance of sale consideration mentioned in EX.B-5 was paid by the defendant Nos.2 0 4, the same ought to have been recorded in the statements of Bank Account, but the defendant No.1 has not chosen to file the relevant statement of accounts from the concerned Bank/s or to examine the Bank officials to prove the said payments; that only a sum of Rs. 2,11,000/- was said to have been paid under Ex. B-5; that there is no proof in this regard even, except the oral evidence of the defendant Nos. 2,11,000/- was said to have been paid under Ex. B-5; that there is no proof in this regard even, except the oral evidence of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 as D.Ws.1 and 2; that the defendant No.1, in fact, did not say in his evidence about the particulars of payments towards consideration, which are substantially valuable, by way of pay orders and that there are several discrepancies in the evidence as well as the circumstances, which would disprove the alleged transaction between the defendant No.1 and the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 under EX.B-5. 24. From the above rival contentions, the whole controversy revolves around the genuineness or otherwise of the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under Ex.A-1, executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the plaintiff and the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4. 25. To put it in a different way, which document i.e., whether the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under EX.A-1, or the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, that would prevail? 26. In the light of the relative contentions of both parties, the points that fall for consideration in the present appeal are:- (1) Whether there is truthfulness in the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under Ex.A-1, executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the plaintiff and the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4? (2) Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract? (3) To what relief? 27. In Re Point No.1 ;- CIRCUMSTANCES: First we shall deal with the genuineness of the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under EX.B-5. 28. In this regard, a perusal of the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the plaintiff, under Ex.A-1, would reveal that there is a specific condition at clause (5), wherein it was specifically agreed that the defendant No.1 shall get the tenant vacated from the building in the suit schedule property within a period of three to six months, which fact indicates that there was a tenant as on the date of execution of Ex.A-1 i.e., on 25-05-1995. If really, there was no tenant as on the date of execution of EX.A-1, there was no need for the parties to stipulate such a condition. 29. Now, if we take a glance at the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, which is allegedly the earlier document to Ex.A-1, it is obvious that there is no such clause incorporated, meaning thereby, there was no need for the parties i.e., the defendant No.1 and the defendant Nos.2 to 4, to incorporate a clause regarding the eviction of the tenant in the building in the suit schedule property. In other words, it goes without saying that there was no tenant as on the date of execution of EX.B-5. 30. It is undisputed fact that the building in the suit schedule property was under occupation by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, to run a College for Music and Dance, since several years even prior to the execution of EX.A-1. It is not as though the said College for Music and Dance ha~ sprouted up subsequent to the execution 01 EX.B-5 and it was in existence as on the date of execution of EX.A-1. This is a very strong circumstance against the defendants and we are of the view that this fact indicates that an attempt was made to make EX.B-5 document as the one anterior to EX.A-1 document. It is to be further noticed, in this regard, that the defendant No.1, who was examined as D.W.1, in his examination-in-chief in the shape of an affidavit, has admitted that the tenant was evicted from the building in the suit schedule property only on 08-10-1995. This is a further indicative factor that the tenant was in existence of the building in the suit schedule property certainly upto 08-1 0-1995 and as on the date of execution of the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under EX.A-1. 31. Another aspect to be gone into is regarding the alleged payments made by the defendant Nos.2 to 4 pursuant to the execution of Ex.B-5, dated 24-08-1994. It is apparent from the record that from 24-08-1994 till 29-11-1995 no further payments were made by the defendant Nos.2 to 4 to the defendant No.1. This is another improbability in our view. 32. Another aspect to be gone into is regarding the alleged payments made by the defendant Nos.2 to 4 pursuant to the execution of Ex.B-5, dated 24-08-1994. It is apparent from the record that from 24-08-1994 till 29-11-1995 no further payments were made by the defendant Nos.2 to 4 to the defendant No.1. This is another improbability in our view. 32. The most sensible aspect, in this regard, to be noticed is that though there are no receipts for the amounts said to have been paid by the defendant No.2, who is the alleged purchaser-cum-General Power of Attorney Holder and was examined as D.W.2, deposed in his examination-in-chief in the form of affidavit that a sum of Rs.2, 11,000/was paid by cash on 24-08-1994, and four pay orders for Rs.49,000/- each dated 29-11-1995, have been taken from the Karnataka Bank Limited, Secunderabad. 33. May be, this can be explained that as per the restrictions in the transactions of the said bank, four pay orders had been taken on the same day. Another two pay orders were taken on the same bank on 02-12-1995, for Rs.99,998/-. Even this also might be true for procedural reasons. However, the total amount alleged to have been paid by the defendant Nos.2 to 4 to the defendant No.1 by way of three pay orders taken for RS.3,89,001/-, Rs.5,02,001/- and RS.5,52,000/-, respectively, on Karoor Vysya Bank, Secunderabad, on 17-01-1996, is very significant to note. There is absolutely no proof whatsoever to show that the said payments were made, as noted above. In other words, mere taking pay orders, as such cannot be treated as clinching proof of actual payment, unless the payments are proved as encashed by the defendant No.1, the evidentiary value of those pay orders is minimal. Even as regards the sum of Rs.2, 11,000/-, which was said to have been paid on the date of execution of EX.B-5 i.e., 24-08-1994, and absolutely there was no proof except the statement made by the defendant Nos.2 and 1 in their evidence as D.Ws. 2 and 1, respectively. 34. It is to be further noted that even the defendant No.1 did not give these particulars as spoken to by D.W.2 either in his deposition as D.W.1 or in the written statement, filed by him. The non-furnishing of said details either in the written statement or in the deposition by the defendant No.1 is something to be noted. 34. It is to be further noted that even the defendant No.1 did not give these particulars as spoken to by D.W.2 either in his deposition as D.W.1 or in the written statement, filed by him. The non-furnishing of said details either in the written statement or in the deposition by the defendant No.1 is something to be noted. This circumstance also is adverse to the case of the defendants. 35. It is further interesting to note that the suit was filed 0 22-01-1996. The amount in bulk was paid on 17-01-1996 i.e., just few days before filing of the suit and that too subsequent to the legal notice, dated 08-12-1995, under Ex.A-2, got issued by the plaintiff, and the alleged reply notice, dated 26-12-1995, under Ex.B-6, got issued by the defendant No.1, and the publication in Deccan Chronicle and Eenadu, daily newspapers, dated 27 -12-1995, under EX.A-4. 36. Yet another interesting aspect to be noted is that in reply to the said publication, in Deccan Chronicle and Eenadu, daily newspapers, dated 27-12-1995, under EX.A-4 six persons viz., (1) J.Ramchandraiah, (2) J.Srinivas, (3) J.Krishnamoorthy, (4) J.Venkateswar Rao, (5) J.Nagaraju and (6) J.Padmaraju, who are the family members of the defendant No.1, have filed objections through a letter, dated 08-01-1996, under Ex.A-5, addressed to the counsel for the plaintiff specifically alleging, inter alia, that the subject matter was a joint family property and it was further specifically alleged that "the defendant No.1 has no right to sell the suit schedule property". 37. A reading of the said objections further makes it clear that it was already in the knowledge of the plaintiff - in what manner is not known. The abovementioned six persons are undisputedly no other than the father and brothers of the defendant No.1 but not aliens to the family of the defendant NO.1. If that is the case, when the defendant No.1 has been contesting the matter stating that he had executed the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4, it is rather incomprehensible as to how the other members of the joint family of the defendant No.1 could take such objections and in this regard the knowledge of the defendant No.1 is hard to be ruled out. Curiously, the defendant No.1 did not take this objection. Curiously, the defendant No.1 did not take this objection. Similarly, this objection would apply in case of agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, also. This is another serious aspect, which raises the eyebrow of the Court. 38. Another intriguing and untenable fact on record is that the third objector in Ex.A-4, by name J.Krihsnamoorthy, who claimed that the suit schedule property is the joint family property, is an attestor to the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under EX.B-5. Therefore, it is apparent that the defendant No.1 on one hand and his family members on the other are coming forth with two palpably divergent versions. In fact, in our view, the presence of the said J. Krishnamoorthy, who is a party to the letter of objections, dated 08-01-1996, under Ex.A-4, to the paper publication, dated 28-12-1995, and also as an attestor to the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, is a circumstance to be viewed seriously, particularly as regards the genuineness of EX.B-5. 39. Another interesting circumstance is filing of caveat petition under Section 148(a) C.P.C., under Ex.X-1, by the defendant No.1, on 18-01-1996 i.e., immediately after the alleged substantial payments made to him by the defendant Nos.2 to 4 on 17-01-1996 through the alleged pay orders, as already referred to above, just before the suit came to be filed on 22-01-1996. This further indicates that the defendant Nos.1 to 4 are quite conscious of the litigation that is likely to crop up at the instance of the plaintiff. 40. When the alleged agreement of sale, under Ex.B-5, was executed on 24-08-1994 itself, there is absolutely no reason for the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 in not paying any further amounts, as agreed, from 29-12-1994 till 17-01-1996. 41. It is the further contention of the defendants that the defendant No.1 had made an application, dated 25-03-1995, to the Estate Officer, Secunderabad, seeking for transfer of leasehold interest in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 and also conversion of leasehold rights into that of freehold rights. 42. It is to be seen that no documentary evidence had been adduced as regards the existence of application, dated 25-03-1995, to accept the statement made by the defendant No.2 in his written statement and also in his oral evidence as D.W.2. 42. It is to be seen that no documentary evidence had been adduced as regards the existence of application, dated 25-03-1995, to accept the statement made by the defendant No.2 in his written statement and also in his oral evidence as D.W.2. Further the defendant No.1 did not even aver the same in his written statement or stated in his evidence as D.W.1. 43. Of course, at this stage i.e., during the course of hearing of the present appeal, the defendant Nos.2· to 4 have filed an application C.C.C.A.M.P.No.648 of 2006 under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking to receive certain documents as additional evidence - office copy of application, dated 25-03-1995, is one among them, which contains the alleged endorsement of the office of the Estates Officer, Secunderabad, about the date of receipt of the same. It appears that the said application was allegedly accepted by the Estates Officer, Secunderabad, and transfer agreement was executed in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 and then the Estates Officer, Secunderabad, has forwarded the said letter along with his report recommending the case of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 for conversion of leasehold rights into that of freehold rights to the Commissioner of Land Revenue, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, who accepted the same and granted permission as per the proceedings, dated 04-10-1996, requesting the Estates Officer, Secunderabad, to execute a conveyance deed after following the due procedure. 44. By virtue of the proceedings of the Commissioner of Land Revenue, the Estates Officer had sent the original Conveyance Deed for conversion of leasehold, rights into that of freehold rights in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 along with a covering letter, dated 14-10-1996, to the Sub-Registrar, Marredpally, Secunderabad, to register the same and after its registration, it came into existence and marked as EX.B-4. This means, the said application, dated 25-03-1995, was considered and orders were passed for execution of transfer agreement, under Ex. B-3, dated 12-09-1996, and for execution of conveyance deed, dated 14-10-1996, under Ex.B-4, after about one and half years from the date of its submission. 45. This means, the said application, dated 25-03-1995, was considered and orders were passed for execution of transfer agreement, under Ex. B-3, dated 12-09-1996, and for execution of conveyance deed, dated 14-10-1996, under Ex.B-4, after about one and half years from the date of its submission. 45. Further, the most conspicuous fact to be noticed is that even subsequent to the proceedings, dated 14-10-1996, passed by I, the Commissioner of Land Revenue, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, and the documents i.e., transfer agreement, dated 12-09-1996, under EX.B-3 ad the conveyance deed, under Ex.B-4, dated 12-09-1996 and 14-10-1996, respectively, executed by the Estates Officer, Secunderabad, the payment of substantial amounts towards consideration for about Rs.19,00,000/- was allegedly made by the defendant Nos. 2 to 4 to the defendant No.1. In fact, as per the terms and conditions of the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, all the amounts are to be paid by the defendant Nos.2 to 4 to the defendant No.1 on or before the alienation. In other words, execution of alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, by the defendant No.1, in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4, is subject to the condition that the entire payment to be made on or before the execution of registered sale deed and also transfer agreement and conversion deed, under Exs.B-3 and B-4. But, contrary to the said condition and even without the balance sale consideration being paid, transfer of leasehold right and conversion under Exs.B-3 and B-4, respectively, as per the evidence of the defendant Nos.2 to 4, were made. This utmost liberality extended by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4, and immediately filing a caveat on the very next day, in our view, is something extraordinary and amazing. 46. The abovementioned circumstances would only leave a strong impression that the alleged agreement of sale, under Ex.B-5, was brought into existence in tremendous haste and under mysterious circumstances and, in all probability, could be ante dated. 47. From a perusal of Transfer Agreement, dated 12-09-1996, under Ex. B-3, it is clear that pursuant to the proceedings issued by the competent authority i.e., the Estates Officer, Secunderabad, dated 08-08-1996, the leasehold rights were transferred in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4. Such proceedings, in normal course, would be served on the parties who make applications and basing on such proceedings only the order under Ex. B-3, it is clear that pursuant to the proceedings issued by the competent authority i.e., the Estates Officer, Secunderabad, dated 08-08-1996, the leasehold rights were transferred in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4. Such proceedings, in normal course, would be served on the parties who make applications and basing on such proceedings only the order under Ex. B-3 and the consequential order under Ex.B-4 would be passed. No such proceedings have been filed before the Court below and if they are not available steps ought to have been taken by the defendants to summon them. The failure on the part of the defendants, in this context, is again doubtful. 48. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff that as per the specific clause (2) in Ex.B-5, the vendees, i.e., the defendant Nos.2 to 4 would pay all further amounts even before the execution of registered sale deed. 49. In this context, it is necessary to note the specific averment, in the written statement of defendant No.1, which is to the effect that when he was in need of money, he approached the plaintiff and after making few trips the plaintiff has ultimately agreed to lend money for a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/-. When the defendant Nos.2 to 4 have volunteered in the alleged agreement of sale, under Ex.B-5, to pay some more amount even before the execution of the registered sale deed, there is absolutely no need for the defendant No.1 to approach the plaintiff for a loan of Rs. 4,00,000/-, that too with huge rate of interest at 24 per cent per annum. 50. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants submits that non-mentioning of the fact in the plaint about the receipt of the reply notice, by the defendant No.1, under Ex.B-6, is also a doubtful and adverse circumstance to the plaintiff. We are not in agreement with the said submission inasmuch as the plaint need not contain all minute details of not much significance, and suffice if the plaint contains the substantial and material averments. 51. In this context, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants relies upon a decision in Vinod Kumar Arora v. Smt.Surjit Kaur. 52. We are not in agreement with the said submission inasmuch as the plaint need not contain all minute details of not much significance, and suffice if the plaint contains the substantial and material averments. 51. In this context, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants relies upon a decision in Vinod Kumar Arora v. Smt.Surjit Kaur. 52. In the said decision, their Lordships of the apex Court held that interference with the concurrent findings of fact in revisional jurisdiction is justified when the findings suffer from inherent defects and that, in a special leave petition, raising a new ground with mixed question of law and fact is not permissible. 53. Since the parties in the said case had not obtained the consent in writing of the Rent Controller for converting the hall in a residential building into a clinic, their Lordships observed that, the appellant therein cannot get over the embargo placed by Section 11 by pleading that the respondent was well aware of his running a clinic in the hall and that she had not raised objection at any time to the running of the clinic. 54. In the instant case also, admittedly, the defendant No.1 had filed an application seeking transfer of leasehold rights in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 and also for conversion of leasehold rights into that of freehold rights, even during the pendency of the suit before the trial Court, and neither the defendant No.1 nor the defendant Nos.2 to 4 have filed any application, nor obtained the consent in writing of the trial Court. 55. It is the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants that there are spaces on stamp paper and other annexed ledger papers on which EX.A-1 was drafted, which shows that it was prepared in order to create an agreement of sale, which, in fact, as contended by the defendant No.1, was only meant for borrowing certain amount and the signatures on the said blank stamp paper and the ledger papers were only intended for the purpose of executing a bond. This contention is not convincing, for the simple reason that if really the plaintiff wanted a sort of guarantee, a promissory note could have been executed instead of putting his signatures on some blank bond paper and ledger papers. This contention is not convincing, for the simple reason that if really the plaintiff wanted a sort of guarantee, a promissory note could have been executed instead of putting his signatures on some blank bond paper and ledger papers. Even if really a bond was intended to be executed, again as a matter of fact, there would be no real necessity for the defendant No.1 to sign on the blank papers. 56. In this context, the most important aspect to be noticed is that it is admitted by the defendant No.1 that on all the papers, including the stamp paper, he signed. Therefore, the only contention, while admitting the signatures on all the papers, of the defendant No.1 was that the blank papers instead of creating a bond were converted into an agreement of sale, under EX.A-1. 57. It is the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants that at clause (18) i.e., at the bottom of page No.6 of Ex.A-1, there is much gap when compared to other pages of EX.A-1. Admittedly, the signature at the bottom of page No.6 of EX.A-1 appears to be at the bottom of the paper as usual but there is considerable gap between the last sentence and the signatures of the parties. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants basing on the said alleged agreement of sale, under Ex.B-5, tried to point out that the said document, under EX.A-1, is fabricated one. 58. In this regard, we have perused the original agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under EX.A-1. At page No.6, we can see the terms and conditions of the agreement. At page No.7, the schedule of the property had been drafted. If the schedule of the property is to be typed at page No.6, it would become incomplete. Therefore, from the preparation of Ex.A-1, it appears to us that the parties have intended to show the entire schedule of the property at page No.7 independently as one block. That is the reason why at page No.6 there is a space between the last sentence and the signatures of the parties. 59. Though the said argument appears to be somewhat attractive, but, in our view, it is not very unusual inasmuch as on all the remaining 5 pages of Ex.A-1, the signatures were made at the bottom of the pages. 59. Though the said argument appears to be somewhat attractive, but, in our view, it is not very unusual inasmuch as on all the remaining 5 pages of Ex.A-1, the signatures were made at the bottom of the pages. Similarly, at page No.7 also the vendor and the vendee also signed. Of course, there is some criticism about the signatures, that the words vendor and purchaser were typed on the signatures to show that the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under Ex.A-1, was fabricated. But, to our naked eyes, nothing of that sort is visible nor, according to us, it is possible. Therefore, the construction of EX.A-1 as a whole has to be looked into and considered. In case the defendants were sure of the same, they could have taken steps to get the same examined by an Expert, but they never took any steps during the trial of the suit and hence it is not open for the defendants to raise this question at this stage. 60. It is the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants that EX.A-1 contains the signatures of the attestor, who is no other than the brother of the plaintiff. But, he was not examined and, according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants, non-examination of the attestor of EX.A-1 is fatal to the case of the plaintiff. 61. In this regard, it is to be seen that EX.A-1 is an agreement of sale and the same is not required to be attested under law, as envisaged under Section 72 of the Indian Evidence Act. 62. While repelling this contention, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff contends that Sections 59 and 63 (c) of the Indian Succession Act deal with the wills which alone are to be attested specifically; while under Section 124 of the Transfer of Property Act, a gift of immovable property of whatever value can be made only by a registered instrument attested by at least two witnesses. He further contends that there is no specific provision, which states that an agreement of sale shall be attested. Therefore, when an agreement of sale is not explicitly required to be attested and, if attested for any reason, is not incumbent upon the parties to examine the attestors and non-examination of such attestors does not vitiate the very execution of the agreement of sale. Therefore, when an agreement of sale is not explicitly required to be attested and, if attested for any reason, is not incumbent upon the parties to examine the attestors and non-examination of such attestors does not vitiate the very execution of the agreement of sale. This position is further clear by reading of Section 72 of the Indian Evidence Act. 63. For this submission, there is no counter submission by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants. 64. It is rather interesting to note from the evidence of the defendant No.2, who was examined as D.W.2, which is thus:- "My vendor executed 2 agreements, Ex.A-1 and B-5 in respect of the suit schedule property". 65. This statement of D.W.2 further makes it clear that the factum of execution of agreement of sale, under Ex.A-1, by the defendant No.1 in favour of the plaintiff, was very much in the knowledge of the defendant Nos.2 to 4. If that be the case, appropriate steps ought to have been taken and appropriate claims ought to have been made by the defendant Nos.2 to 4 in respect of the suit schedule property under the alleged agreement of sale, under EX.B-5. There is nothing on record to show that the defendant Nos.2 to 4 have made any attempts to take steps in this regard. 66. Even if the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants is to be accepted, since it is the specific contention of the defendants that Ex.A-1 is a subsequent document and the same was actually meant to be a bond for the money borrowed by the defendant No.1 from the plaintiff and the same was maneuvered and converted into an agreement of sale subsequently, it is to be seen that if really the stamp paper and other ledger papers, which were immediately signed by the defendant No.1, were to be used in a different way, other than the actual purpose allegedly meant for, the plaintiff could have utilized the same in a better way instead of exhibiting his naivety by putting a later date when allegedly he has knowledge about the existence of the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4. 67. Certainly no prudent person would fabricate a document to his disadvantage inviting more problems. 67. Certainly no prudent person would fabricate a document to his disadvantage inviting more problems. In fact, the plaintiff has the opportunity of putting a date prior to the date of EX.B-5. Further, the defendant No.1, the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are relatives, of course, on the aspect of proximity of the relationship, there is some contradictory evidence on record and notwithstanding the said contradictory statements with regard to the relationship of the parties, all the parties are admittedly belonging to the business community. Therefore, it can be presumed that proper, necessary and reasonable care would be taken while entering into any transaction. This is yet another factor, which is capable of improbablising the contentions of the defendants. 68. The above are the few among many other reasons strikingly visible and touching the conscious of this Court to disbelieve the version of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 that there was an agreement, dated 24-08-1994, under EX.B-5, allegedly executed by the defendant No.1 in their favour. Therefore, the alleged agreement of sale, under Ex.B-5, is not a genuine document and, in all probability, created at a later point of time - may be even subsequent to the filing of the suit, and all possible grounds are taken to nullify the effect of the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under EX.A-1. Hence, we are of the view that though the alleged agreement of sale, under Ex.B-5, is dated earlier, cannot compete in quality with the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under Ex.A-1, in respect of the genuineness. Consequently, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants that the Ex.B-5 alone is to be accepted since it is executed earlier to EX.A-1 cannot be countenanced. 69. Doctrine of lis pendens: Since the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff has adverted to the aspect of doctrine of lis pendens, we do deal with that aspect also. 70. 69. Doctrine of lis pendens: Since the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff has adverted to the aspect of doctrine of lis pendens, we do deal with that aspect also. 70. For convenience and ready reference, it is apt to extract Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, which is thus:- "Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto:- During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suitor proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. 71. From a reading of the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is clear that any right in a suit or proceeding with regard to immovable property, which is directly and specifically in question, cannot be transferred in any manner whatsoever by either party to the suit inasmuch as it would affect the right of any other party. However, such transfer can be made with prior sanction of the Court, subject to terms as it may impose, and the same would be subject to the conclusion of the suit. 72. In the case on hand, admittedly, no such permission was obtained by the defendant No.1 from the Court below before the transfer of his leasehold rights in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 in Ex. B-3, dated 12-09-1996, and conversion of the leasehold rights into that of freehold rights in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4, under Ex.B-4, dated 14-10-1996. However, it is the contention of the defendant No.1 that the application, dated 25-03-1995, seeking transfer of leasehold rights in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 was made even prior to the filing of the suit. No definite proof, in this regard, was pressed into service during the trial of the suit. Some office copy of the said application was sought to be filed before this Court as additional evidence. No definite proof, in this regard, was pressed into service during the trial of the suit. Some office copy of the said application was sought to be filed before this Court as additional evidence. We are not inclined to take into consideration at this stage since no ostensible reason is apparent for not placing the copy of the said application before the Court below. Obviously the transactions under Exs.B-3 and B-4 were made during the pendency of the suit. 73. The suit schedule property, specifically and directly in question, is the property in the suit "between the same parties. Both the parties are equally interested in the property, but through different sources i.e., EX.A-1 and EX.B-5. The controversy as regards the genuineness or effect of these two disputed documents has to be decided only after the trial of the suit. Hence, transfer of any right pending the suit by either of the party in favour of third parties, in our considered view, is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 74. Hence, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants that since the transactions under Exs.B-3 and B-4 have been completed, pursuant to the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under EX.B-5, nothing remain to be done, cannot be countenanced. 75. Hence, we are of the considered view that the transactions under Exs.B-3 and B-4 are devoid of legal sanctity nor capable of taking away the right accrued to the plaintiff. 76. It is the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants that clause (11) of Ex.A-1, which provides for filing an application seeking transfer of lease in favour of the plaintiff and conversion of leasehold rights into that of freehold rights, has rendered impossible by reason of transfer of leasehold rights in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 under the transfer agreement, dated 12-09-1996, under Ex. B-3, and the conveyance deed, dated 14-10-1996, under Ex.B-4, converting the leasehold rights into that of freehold rights in favour of the defendant Nos. 2 to 4. The conversion of leasehold rights into that of freehold rights would be in force admittedly for one year from 14-10-1996 and it was subsequently extended for another year and there was no further extension, as such now it is impossible to convert the leasehold rights into that of freehold rights. 77. 2 to 4. The conversion of leasehold rights into that of freehold rights would be in force admittedly for one year from 14-10-1996 and it was subsequently extended for another year and there was no further extension, as such now it is impossible to convert the leasehold rights into that of freehold rights. 77. First of all, in our opinion, the acts of the defendant No.1, in collusion with the defendant Nos.2 to 4, in execution of the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, and consequently taking steps for obtaining Exs.B-3 and B-4, were only with an intention to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. Thus, the time for conversion of leasehold rights into that of freehold rights has expired by 1998-1999. Further, it is on record that conveyance deed, dated 14-10-1996, under Ex.B-4, was already executed in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4, converting the leasehold rights into that of freehold rights, which, as already discussed, would be in force, admittedly, for one year from 14-10-1996 and it was subsequently extended for another year, during the pendency of the suit, and since there was no further extension, the impediment for conversion of leasehold rights into that of freehold rights in favour of the plaintiff may not be there, as a consequence of decreeing the suit, such steps may have to be taken by the appropriate authority. 78. In Bishan Singh and others v. Khazan Singh and another, the apex Court, while dealing with a pre-emption suit under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (Head Note-B), held thus:- "It is settled law in Punjab that the rule of lis pendens is as much applicable to a suit to enforce the right of pre-emption as to any other suit. But, the rule applies only to a transfer pendente lite and it cannot affect pre-existing rights. If the sale is a transfer in recognition of a preexisting subsisting right, it would not be affected by the doctrine as the said transfer does not create new right pendente lite; but if the pre-existing right became unenforceable by reason of the fact of limitation or otherwise, the transfer though ostensibly made in recognition of such a right in fact created only a new right pendente lite." 79. But, in the preset case, the existence of pre-existing right in favour of the defendants itself is highly doubtful. 80. But, in the preset case, the existence of pre-existing right in favour of the defendants itself is highly doubtful. 80. Nextly, we would like to deal with the 'Equities'. 81. Insofar as the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants that there being equities in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 and the plaintiff came with unclean hands and using the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under EX.A-1, as an instrument of operation etc., are all of no consequence, in view of our finding on point No.1 that the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, allegedly executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4, as an 'ante dated and brought into existence by the defendant No.1 only to defeat the rights of the plaintiff, in collusion with the defendant Nos. 2 to 4. Further, a person approaching the Court shall possess clean hands, or otherwise he can be thrown out summarily. (See S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath and Lourdu Mari David and others v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy and others) Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant Nos. 1 to 4. 82. Point No.2:- Insofar as the question as to whether the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract, it is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants that, as has been held by the apex Court in Jugraj Singh and another v. Labh Singh and others, the plaintiff must plead and prove that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of essential terms of the contract. The continuous readiness and willingness, at all stages, from the date of agreement till the date of hearing of the suit need not be proved. The substance of the matter, surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the plaintiff have to be taken into consideration in judging the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. 83. The substance of the matter, surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the plaintiff have to be taken into consideration in judging the readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. 83. It is also the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants that in terms of clause (6) of the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under Ex.A-1, the plaintiff must aver his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and to pay the balance amount to the defendant No.1 and as the plaintiff has not averred his readiness and wiilingness to pay the balance amount to the defendant No.1, it should be deemed that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, as was held by the apex Court in V. Basavayya v. M. Venkayya (died) per L.RS. 84. In this case, we are not impressed with the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The defendant No.1 has started disputing the execution of agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under Ex.A-1, sometime after its execution and simultaneously stated pleading that he has executed an agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under Ex.B-5, in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4. In view of this peculiar circumstance, the plaintiff cannot be found fault with for any acts of slowness in exhibiting his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. 85. It is also the contention of the defendants that there is no clear averment in the plaint with regard to the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract and that the plaintiff never inspected the suit schedule property and as per the notice, dated 08-12-1995, under Ex.A-2, the plaintiff has demanded thirty days time for arranging the money and did not sign the statement for Income Tax Clearance Certificate. 86. From a perusal of the plaint, it is clear that the plaintiff has pleaded his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. However, thirty days time sought for by the plaintiff is as per clause (6) of EX.A-1 and as per the clause (1) of Ex.A-1, the defendant No.1 has to obtain Income Tax Clearance Certificate and other permissions from the authorities concerned. 87. However, thirty days time sought for by the plaintiff is as per clause (6) of EX.A-1 and as per the clause (1) of Ex.A-1, the defendant No.1 has to obtain Income Tax Clearance Certificate and other permissions from the authorities concerned. 87. Above all, the defendant No.1 has categorically admitted the financial potency of the plaintiff and through legal notice, dated 12-01-1996, under Ex.A-6, the plaintiff has expressed that the balance of sale consideration was ready and called upon the defendant No.1 to come for execution of a registered sale deed. According to clause (6) of Ex.A-1, the balance sale consideration is payable within sixty days from the date of eviction of the tenant from the building in the suit schedule property; provided the defendant No.1 has to complete all the formalities. But, till the date of notice, dated 08-12-1995, under Ex.A-2, the defendant No.1 did not complete all the formalities required to be completed by him. Thus, the time mentioned in the said notice is as per the terms of the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under Ex.A-1, and that the same cannot be treated as the failure on the part of the plaintiff to be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 88. In the cross-examination, the plaintiff, who was examined as P.W.1, has stated that he has the capacity to organize and arrange the money in hours. The financial position of the plaintiff is almost admitted by the defendant No.1. The suit was decreed on 15-04-2003, the lodgment schedule for depositing the amount was issued on 21-04-2003 and the plaintiff has deposited the entire amount towards entire balance sale consideration by 22-04-2003, which would show that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 89. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. Jagan Mohan Rao, the apex Court held that showing readiness and willingness is a condition precedent and the same shall be established by the plaintiff. (See also G.Rosaiah v. C. Balarami Reddy and another, Ram A wadh v. Achbaibar Dubey , M/s. P.R.Deb & Associates v. Sunanda Roy, Krovidi Kameswaramma v. Kudapa Balaramayya, M.N. Mohammad Mirza v. B.Subhan Saheb, A.C. Arulapan v. Ahalya Naik, Smt. Chand Rai (dead) by LRs., v. Smt. Kamal Rani (dead) by LRs., and Motital Jain v. Ramdasi Devi ) 90. (See also G.Rosaiah v. C. Balarami Reddy and another, Ram A wadh v. Achbaibar Dubey , M/s. P.R.Deb & Associates v. Sunanda Roy, Krovidi Kameswaramma v. Kudapa Balaramayya, M.N. Mohammad Mirza v. B.Subhan Saheb, A.C. Arulapan v. Ahalya Naik, Smt. Chand Rai (dead) by LRs., v. Smt. Kamal Rani (dead) by LRs., and Motital Jain v. Ramdasi Devi ) 90. Though the said proposition is unexceptionable, in the present case, we are convinced that the plaintiff would establish his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the agreement. 91. It is the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants that seven days time within which the defendant No.1 had to reply to the notice, dated 08-12-1995, under EX.A-2, has expired by 16-12-1998 and as such the plaintiff should have paid the entire balance sale consideration or at least a substantial part of it to the defendant No.1 and given notice fixing the date for execution and registration of sale deed, demanding the defendant No.1 to come for execution and registration of sale deed and offering to pay the balance sale consideration on the date of registration of sale deed. Instead of doing the same, the plaintiff, in fact, suppressed the reply notice, under Ex.B-6, from the defendant No.1 and gave another notice, dated 12-01-1996, under Ex.A-6, which was received by the defendant No.1 only after filing of the suit. 92. It is also the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel that even otherwise in His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Shri Sita Ram Thapar, the apex Court, while dealing with Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, held that the readiness and willingness of a party to perform the contract has to be inferred from the conduct of party and the attendant circumstances. 93. The said judgment of the apex Court, in fact, is not applicable to the present case, since we have already noticed that the plaintiff had expressed his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the agreement. Therefore, the question of drawing an inference from the facts of the present case does not arise. 94. 93. The said judgment of the apex Court, in fact, is not applicable to the present case, since we have already noticed that the plaintiff had expressed his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the agreement. Therefore, the question of drawing an inference from the facts of the present case does not arise. 94. Several other contentions were also raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants, in this regard, but, in our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, in view of the alleged agreement of sale, dated 24-08-1994, under EX.B-5, which is found to be 'antedated' and 'concocted' only to defeat the rights of the plaintiff and also in view of the fact that there were certain conditions, as referred to in Ex.A-1, which were to be complied with by the defendant No.1, it cannot be said that the plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Accordingly, point No.2 is answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 95. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants relies on the following decisions:- 1. Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's son Mathew v. Nedumbara Kuruvila's son and others, wherein the apex Court, while dealing with Section 20 of he Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), held that it is the duty of the Court to see that litigation is not used as instrument of oppression to have unfair advantage to the plaintiff. 2. R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Visweswaraswami and V.P. Temple and another, wherein the apex had dealt with the question of law - whether the appellant or temple had title to the property in the suit. 3. Abdul Khader Rowther v. P.K.Sara Bai and others, wherein the apex Court, while dealing with Article 133 of the Constitution of India, held that a plea which was not taken in the trial Court cannot be taken in appeal for the first time. 4. Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co., and another (1 supra), wherein the apex Court held that the obligations of the parties to a contract for sale of land are the same as in other ordinary contracts and consequently there is no conceivable reason why the doctrine of frustration should not be applicable to contracts for sale of land in India. 5. 5. K.S. Vidyanadam ad others v. Vairavan, wherein the apex Court, while dealing with Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), held that when there was total inaction on the part of the purchaser in violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement, the delay coupled with substantial rise in the prices of properties, it would be inequitable to grant relief of specific performance to the purchaser. 6. C.Hanumaiah v. K. Venkateswarlu, wherein this Court, while dealing with the aspect of - when can the Court can reject the vital part of the testimony of witnesses, held that the Court is not bound to accept the testimony of a witness in its entirety, but, when the Court deems the evidence basically credit-worthy and when there is no inherent flaw in the evidence in respect of a particular aspect in dispute there should be a cogent reason for rejecting a vital part of the testimony of the witnesses. (See also Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohammad Isa). 7. K.K. Bhaskara Rao v. Naduminti Suryanarayana Murthy, wherein a Division Bench of this court, while dealing with Section 19 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, held that when there are two agreements for sale of property in favour of two different vendees, the subsequent transferee is required to establish that he has purchased bona fide for value and that he had no notice of prior agreement of sale. 8. Kanda v. Waghu, wherein the Privy Council held that the trial Court has discretion to admit the public records, at a later stage, but the question to be decided should be in the light of the circumstances of each case. 9. Commr. H.R. & C.E. v. Ayyavurayya, wherein this Court, while dealing with Section 18 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (XIX of 1951), held that revision of order of Deputy Commissioner suo motu by the Commissioner, who wrongly quoted Section 61 instead of Section 18, is valid. 10. Chaturbhuj Pande and others v. Collector, Raigarh, wherein the apex Court, while dealing with Section 23 (1) and (2) and Section 3 (a) of the Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894) held that the value of trees, determination of - value of trees does not fall under Section 23, and the land includes trees standing thereon, which are component parts of land. 11. 11. Narbada De vi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, wherein the apex Court held that, in a suit for possession, when a defendant pleads tenancy on the basis of rent receipts, which were marked as exhibits, and the plaintiff admitted his signatures on the reverse of the rent receipts, they can said to be proved and the defendant need not prove the writing on the rent receipts. 12. Sita Ram v. Radha Bal, wherein the apex Court held that there are exceptional cases in which a man will be relieved of the consequences of an illegal contract into which he has entered-cases to which the maxim does not apply. 13. Pawan Kumar Gupta v. Rochiram Nagdeo, wherein the apex Court has dealt with the aspect of 'Res Judicata'. 14. Ramanivas Gupta and others v. Maliram, wherein this Court dealt with the aspect of purchase of stamp for the agreement by the vendee. 15. Sardar Amarjeet Singh v. Nandu Bal, wherein a Division Bench of this Court dealt with the delay in filing the suit by the plaintiff and upheld the dismissal of the suit, by the trial Court on the ground that there was inaction on the part of the plaintiff in taking steps to get the agreement enforced. 96. The principles laid down by their Lordships, in all the abovementioned decisions, though unexceptionable, are not applicable to the facts and circumstances in the instant case. 97. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff relies on the following decisions:- (1) V. Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal, wherein the apex Court, while dealing with Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), held that where the Court is considering whether or not to grant a decree for specific performance for the first time, the rise in the price of the land agreed to be conveyed may be a relevant factor in denying the relief of specific performance. (2) On the aspect of the transfer of the property pendente lite, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff relies on the decisions of the apex Court in Venkatrao Anantdeo Joshi v. Malatibal , Raj Kumar v. Sardar Lal and Kaulashwari Devi v. Nawal Kishore, the Kerala High Court in K.A. Khader v. Rajamma John Madathil, and the Mysore High Court in Mohd Ali V. Abdulla. 98. 98. The propositions, in the above said decisions (34 to 38 Supra), since unexceptionable, they need not be referred to in view of the findings recorded by us on merits agreeing with the contentions of the plaintiff in the earlier paragraphs of this common judgment. (3) M.M. Thomas v. State of Kerala wherein the apex Court held that the High Court as a Court of record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records and if such power is denied to the High Court, when it notices the apparent errors, its consequence is that the superior status of the High Court will dwindle down. (4) Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, wherein the apex court, while dealing with Section 151 and Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that the High Court has inherent power to review its order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (5) Puran Singh v. State of Punjab, wherein the apex Court has dealt about the extraordinary power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to issue any order, writ or direction and the power of superintendence over all Courts. (6) K. Rajesh Babu v. Superintendent of Police, wherein a Full Bench of this court held that the constraints of Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C., has dealt with the aspect of review of an order. (7) Mohd. Ataur Rehman Kahan v. Mohd. Kamaluddin Ahmed, wherein this Court has dealt with the effect of non-joinder of necessary parties in deciding the constitutional validity of the provision. (8) Venkata Narasayamma v. Venkata Rattamma, wherein this Court has dealt with the power of superintendence of the High court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 115 (c) C.P.C. (9) Delhi Development authority v. Shipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. wherein the apex court, while dealing with Section 55 (6) (b) of the Transfer of Property Act (4 of 1882), held that the buyer has right to claim interest from the date of payment of purchase money to the seller till the date of delivery of property to the purchaser or till the execution of sale deed, whichever is earlier". 99. 99. In other words, the purchaser i.e., the plaintiff, in the instant case, has right to claim interest from the date of payment of purchase money to the seller i.e., the defendant No.1 till the date of delivery of suit schedule property or till the execution of sale deed, whichever is earlier. (10) Haryana Financial Corporation and another v. Jagadamba Oil Mills and another, wherein the apex court, while dealing with Sections 29 and 30 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, held that the Courts should not place reliance on the decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. (11) Madan Gopal Kanodia v. Mamraj Maniram, the apex court held that the provisions of Order 13 Rule 2 C.P.C., clearly clothes the Court with discretion to allow production of documents, if it is satisfied that good cause is shown to its satisfaction". 100. The principles laid down by their Lordships, in all the abovementioned decisions, though unexceptionable, are not applicable to the facts and circumstances in the instant case. 101. Insofar as the application C.C.C.A.M.P.No.648 of 2006, tiled by the defendants, seeking to receive the documents filed along with the application as additional evidence in the appeal i.e., (1) Copy of application, dated 25-03-1995, alleged to have been submitted by the defendant No.1 to the Estates Officer, Secunderabad, requesting permission to transfer the leasehold rights in Plot No. 278, Marredpally, Secunderabad, in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4; (2) Copy of proceedings, dated 04-10-1996,of the Commissioner, Land Revenue, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, addressed to the Estates Officer, M.C.H. Buildings, Secunderabad, and the defendant No.2; for conversion of leasehold rights into that of freehold rights; (3) Copy of proceedings, dated 14-10-1996, of the Estates Officer, Secunderabad to the Sub-Registrar, Marredpally Secunderabad, for registration of conveyance deed; (4). Copy of Charge Sheet No. 37/1996, dated 02-07-1996, of Marredpally Police Station, Secunderabad, along with Part-II Case diary (two in number), cannot be taken into consideration, at this belated stage, and are liable to be rejected and accordingly they are rejected. Accordingly, Point No.2 is answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 102. Copy of Charge Sheet No. 37/1996, dated 02-07-1996, of Marredpally Police Station, Secunderabad, along with Part-II Case diary (two in number), cannot be taken into consideration, at this belated stage, and are liable to be rejected and accordingly they are rejected. Accordingly, Point No.2 is answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 102. Point No.3:-ln the result, the Appeal, filed by the defendants, is dismissed, confirming the impugned judgment and decree, dated 15-04-2003, passed by the Court below, and the application C.C.C.A.M.P.No. 648 of 2006, filed by the defendant Nos. 2 to 4, is also dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 103. Since the plaintiff had withdrawn the entire balance sale consideration of Rs. 28,03,000/-, which was deposited before the Court below, after passing of the impugned judgment, as per the order, dated 19-01-2004, passed by this Court, in C.M.P.No. 238 of 2004, he is directed to deposit the said amount before the Court below, within a period of three months from to-day. The defendant No.1 is directed to execute and register a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, in respect of the suit schedule property, in accordance with the agreement of sale, dated 25-05-1995, under EX.A-1, after receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs.28,03,000/, within one month after expiry of the period of three months from to-day. 104. The interim applications, if any, pending in the present appeal, are hereby closed.