JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Poonam Srivastava, J.—Heard learned Counsels for the parties. 2. The proceeding in the writ petition arise out of a release application instituted by the petitioner-landlord under Section 21( 1 )(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred as the Act) on 13.7.1982 against the contesting respondent No. 2 in respect of a shop which is in occupation of opposite party No. 2. Sri Gandhi Ashram. On the release application filed by the petitioner, the Prescribed Authority granted relief of eviction vide judgment and order dated 29.3.1988. The tenant-respondent preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the Act, which was dismissed by 3rd Additional District Judge, Barabanki vide judgment dated 30.5.1989. Both the orders were challenged in writ petition No. 5795 of 1989. The writ petition was allowed on 22.2.1990 and the case was remanded. The writ petition was allowed on a specific assertion made by the tenant that the landlord has constructed 5 new shops in Mohalla Rasoolpur, two of which were already completed and three were under construction. It was submitted by the tenant that one shop was let out to one Ramesh in which he runs his business in the name and style of Kamal Memorial Battery Service. Barabanki. While remanding the matter, this Court made an observation, that in the event the assertion by the tenant is found correct then findings recorded by the two Courts below on the question of bonafide need and comparative hardship was liable to be set aside. The stand of the applicant (landlord) was that he was evicted from the tenanted shop, winch was the only source of his livelihood, in a different proceeding. The Courts below had taken into consideration, all these aspects while comparing hardship. The order of remand dated 22.2.1990 is annexed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition. The appellate Court allowed the appeal vide order dated 25.9.1991 on a conclusion that the landlord has constructed two shops by putting shutter and one Ramesh is in occupation of the shop on a rent of Rs. 25/- per month and he is running his business of Kamal Memorial Battery Service, Barabanki. 3. The appellate Court allowed the appeal vide order dated 25.9.1991 on a conclusion that the landlord has constructed two shops by putting shutter and one Ramesh is in occupation of the shop on a rent of Rs. 25/- per month and he is running his business of Kamal Memorial Battery Service, Barabanki. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has specifically argued that the findings of the lower appellate Court is without any evidence only because certain observations were made in the remand order passed in the first writ petition filed at the instance of the tenant-respondent No. 2. The submission on behalf of the petitioner is that he used to run a readymade garment business from a rented accommodation owned by one Lalta Prasad and the petitioner was evicted by the landlord in a different proceeding, since then he has no other alternative accommodation to run his business. Besides, the need is genuine and bonafide. The balance of hardship is also in favour of the landlord-petitioner. Learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the amended paragraph 6-A of the release application wherein it is mentioned that the opposite party No. 2 Gandhi Ashram has taken four shops on a monthly rent of Rs. 240/- per month from Nagar Palika, Nawabganj, Barabanki. The respondent No. 2 has paid premium of 44,000/- and since Gandhi Ashram is a registered body under the Societies Registration Act, it has no dearth of finance and has a nourishing business whereas the landlord is not being permitted to utilize his own shop, which is occupied by the respondent. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the findings that two shops have been constructed by putting shutter is absolutely wrong. In fact the petitioner had constructed two rooms in his residential premises in a narrow lane and has put shutter in the drawing room since the marriage of his daughter was to take place on 16.11.1984. Several affidavits were brought on record to establish the fact that the room with shutters was used for Baithaka as there was no other room in the house which could be used for the said purpose. Subsequently Ramesh mentioned aforesaid was given one room for residential purpose and it is absolutely wrong to say that he is running business from the said accommodation. Subsequently Ramesh mentioned aforesaid was given one room for residential purpose and it is absolutely wrong to say that he is running business from the said accommodation. Assuming he undertakes some repairing work in the said room, it cannot be said that it will suffice the need of the petitioner to run his Hosiery business. The room let out to Ramesh is in the residential premises and not at all proper for conducting business whereas the disputed shop is situated in a commercial locality which is appropriate for his business. Photographs were also produced before the Court below but the impugned judgment was given on a presumption and an assumption that the room in question is in fact a shop. 4. I have heard the respective Counsels for the parties. Admittedly the case of the petitioner right from beginning is that he requires the shop in question for his personal use. Besides, Gandhi Ashram being a registered body and has several shops in the city, cannot insist the landlord to conduct his business from a room which is situated in a residential area. No doubt shutters have been put which gives an appearance of shop. Besides, this fact was never concealed by the petitioner. Ramesh himself has filed affidavit stating that the accommodation was taken for residential purpose, however he was also conducting the work of battery charging but the basic character of the accommodation is residential and not commercial. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision in the case of Ulfat Rai v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Bulandshahar and others, 1984 (1) A.R.C. 294. In this case, it was held that where a tenant admitted purchasing three shops during the pendency of the proceeding under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, this was a relevant factor which was rightly taken into consideration by the authority concerned while recording finding on the question of comparative hardship. In the instant case, it is clearly stated in the amended application about the fact that Ghandhi Ashram has acquired four shops within the city of Barabanki during the continuation of proceeding but this has completely been overlooked by the Court below. In the instant case, it is clearly stated in the amended application about the fact that Ghandhi Ashram has acquired four shops within the city of Barabanki during the continuation of proceeding but this has completely been overlooked by the Court below. It is also submitted on behalf of the learned Counsel that admittedly the release application was moved on 13.7.1982 whereas the room, which was let out to Ramesh, came in existence during continuation of the proceeding sometimes in the month of November, 1984 and, therefore, it was an event subsequent to the institution of the proceeding which ought not to have been taken into consideration as ruled by the Apex Court in the case of Pratap Rai Tanwani and another v. Uttam Chand and another, (2004) 8 SCC 490 . The normal rule is that in any litigation right and title of the parties are adjudicated as they existed on the date of commencement of the proceeding and subsequent event can only be taken into consideration when it has a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to the relief claimed. 6. In the instant case, the proceedings were initiated in the year 1982 and the landlord was admittedly thrown out from the tenanted shop from where he was doing his business and he is on the road since a very long time. Assuming that a room was constructed by putting shutter in residential accommodation, then the claim of the landlord cannot be thrown out. The tenant cannot insist the landlord to select his place of business. On this question reliance has been placed in the case of Virendra Kumar v. Bengali Basu and others, 1984 (2) A.R.C. 270 and Mohd. Yaqub v. 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur and others, 1984 (2) A.R.C. 401. It is not a case where the landlord was in possession in a number of shops and the release application is being pursued only with an intention to get hold of an additional accommodation with a malafide intention. In the instant case various affidavits and assertions on behalf of the petitioner-landlord are sufficient to establish that his need is bonafide. He is without any accommodation to conduct his hosiery business, which is the only source of his livelihood. In the circumstances, the findings of the appellate Court on the face of it, is against the record and settled principle of law. He is without any accommodation to conduct his hosiery business, which is the only source of his livelihood. In the circumstances, the findings of the appellate Court on the face of it, is against the record and settled principle of law. I come to a conclusion that the need of the landlord is bonafide, genuine and he requires the shop urgently. So far the question of comparative hardship is concerned, the appellate Court has grossly erred in law while not taking into consideration that Gandhi Ashram has acquired four shops in the city of Barabanki. Besides, nothing has been shown that the tenant-respondent has made any effort to look for any alternative accommodation. In view of the various decisions of the Apex Court, the comparative hardship of the tenant is not liable to be looked into since admittedly he failed to search for an alternative accommodation during the pendency of release proceedings. The Apex Court in the case of Badri Narayan Chunni Lal Bhutade v. Govind Ram Ram Gopal Mundada, AIR 2003 SC 2713 held that failure of tenant to search alternative accommodation after filing of the release application is sufficient to decide the question of hardship against the tenant, This decision has been followed by this Court in the case of Heera LaI v. 6th Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others, 2006(1) A.R.C. 142 and Hasmat Ali v. 6th Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 2006(1) A.R.C. 65. 7. Generally, whenever the writ Court considers a judgment of the lower Court to be erroneous, it is appropriate that the matter be remanded for a fresh decision but in the instant case, the release application is pending since very long time. In my view it is a fit case where the release application is liable to be allowed outright. The Apex Court in the cases of G.C. Kapoor v. N.K. Bhaseen, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 200 and also in R.E.V. Grounder v. V.V.P. Temple, 2004 A.C.J. 204 (SC) found the judgment of the Prescribed Authority and the appellate Court to be erroneous and held that since the release application was pending since very long time and therefore, outrightly allowed the release application and rejected the orders of the Prescribed Authority, judgment of the appellate Court as well as the High Court. It was held that in the matter which is pending since long time remand must be avoided. It was held that in the matter which is pending since long time remand must be avoided. In the present case, the matter is pending since 1983. The landlord has been thrown out from his shop from where he was earning his livelihood. 8. In view of the decision of the Apex Court as well as this Court, the stand taken by the tenant-respondent is baseless and without any foundation. The findings of the lower appellate Court is absolutely perverse and against the evidence on record. The release application is allowed. The judgment and order dated 25.9.1991 passed by 5th Additional District Judge, Barabanki in Rent Appeal No. 4 of 1988 is set aside. The Prescribed Authority shall ensure that the possession is handed over to the petitioner as soon as possible. There shall be no order as to cost. ————