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2007 DIGILAW 1906 (PNJ)

Tarlok Singh v. B. N. Mathur, General Manager

2007-10-30

HEMANT GUPTA

body2007
Judgment Hemant Gupta, J. 1. The petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) constituted under the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, by filing Original Application No. 727/CII/1992. 2. The petitioner felt aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal to the extent it held the petitioner to be ineligible for the grant of senior scale. The petitioner filed a Civil Writ Petition before this Court challenging the order dated 6.2.2001 passed by the learned Tribunal to such extent and sought directions to the respondents to fix his pay in the senior scale equal to his junior w.e.f. March, 1983 with all consequential benefits. The said Writ Petition was allowed by this Court and the observation made in the order dated 6.2.2001 with regard to non-grant of proforma promotion and the selection grade to the petitioner, was quashed. A direction was granted by this Court to the respondents to release proforma promotion, if not already released, to the petitioner together with all consequential benefits and selection grade from the date the same were given to the persons junior to the petitioner. 3. The petitioner has invoked the contempt jurisdiction of this Court alleging therein that the directions given by this Court have not been complied with. In reply, it has been stated that the petitioner has been promoted and has been given revised pension and arrears. However, the petitioner disputes such assertion of the respondents and asserts that in fact, more amount is due and payable and that no amount whosoever has been paid towards arrears of pay. 4. At the outset, one question which arises is whether this Court should exercise its contempt jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly when the learned Tribunal has the jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act). 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner has alleged violation of the directions issued by this Court and, therefore, the contempt petition would be maintainable before this Court alone. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner has alleged violation of the directions issued by this Court and, therefore, the contempt petition would be maintainable before this Court alone. However, on behalf of the respondents, it was argued that it is the Administrative Tribunal who has the jurisdiction in respect of all disputes in respect of recruitment and conditions of services of the persons appointed to public service and the posts in connection with the affairs of the Union including the Railways. Even though the High Court has exercised power of judicial review under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, yet the order passed by this Court has the effect of substitution of the order passed by the learned Tribunal and, thus, it is an order passed under the Act alone. In respect of any violation of the order passed under the Act, it is the Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act, who has the jurisdiction to entertain the contempt petition. 6. In Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, 1997(3) S.C.C. 261, it was held that all decisions of the Tribunals, whether created in pursuance of the Articles 323-A or 323-B of the Constitution of India, will be subject to the High Courts writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India before the Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction, the particular Tribunal falls. It was held to the following effect : "xxx xxx xxx We have already emphasised the necessity for ensuring that the High Courts are able to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of the Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. In R.K. Jains case, after taking note of these facts, it was suggested that the possibility of an appeal from the Tribunal on questions of law to a Division Bench of a High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, be pursued. It appears that no follow up action has been taken pursuant to the suggestion. Such a measure would have improved matters considerably. Having regard to both the aforestated contentions, we hold that all decisions of the Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Courts writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls. Having regard to both the aforestated contentions, we hold that all decisions of the Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Courts writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls. xxx xxx xxx " 7. Subsequently, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the Administrative Tribunal set up under the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1885, cannot have the contempt jurisdiction under Section 17 of the Act as the same has become nonest under the law. The Honble Supreme Court in "T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Government of A.P. and others, 2001(1) SCT 354 : 2001(1) SCC 516", set aside the said judgment and held to the following effect :- "xxx xxx xxx Clause (2)(b) of Article 323-A specifically empowers Parliament to enact a law specifying the jurisdiction and powers, including the power to punish for contempt, being conferred on the Administrative Tribunals constituted under Article 323-A. Section 17 of the Act derives its legislative sanctity therefrom. The power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself under Article 215 of the Constitution remains intact, but the jurisdiction, power and authority to hear and decide the matter covered by sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act having been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals, the jurisdiction of the High Court to that extent has been taken away and hence the same jurisdiction which vested in the High Court to punish for contempt of itself in the matters now falling within the jurisdiction of Tribunals if those matters would have continued to be heard by the High Court has now been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals under Section 17 of the Act. The jurisdiction is the same as vesting in the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. xxx xxx xxx We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that there is no anathema to the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction of the High Court and in that sense being supplemental or additional to the High Court but at the same time not enjoying status equivalent to the High Court and also being subject to judicial review and judicial superintendence of the High Court. xxx xxx xxx " 8. xxx xxx xxx " 8. The High Court can annul or quash the orders passed by the Tribunal in exercise of the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and also pass such orders as the facts may warrant. It may also issue such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant. The Honble Supreme Court explained the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, in case "Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, 2004(1) RCR(Civil) 147 : AIR 2003 SC 3044 : 2003(6) SCC 675". It was held to the following effect :- "xxx xxx xxx 25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions, wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory, jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction and in th,s sense it is akin to appellate, revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior Court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order, but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be, by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases, the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well." 9. No doubt the order of the Tribunal stands merged with the order passed by this Court, but it is the order passed in a service matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and thus, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to entertain the contempt petition in respect of such an order under Section 17 of the Act. In fact in T. Sudhakar Prasads case (supra), it has been held that the jurisdiction of the High Court has been taken away to the extent the jurisdiction, power and authority to hear and decide the matter is covered by Section 14 of the Act. Under Section 14 of the Act, the issue raised in the present petition falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Therefore, though this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the contempt petition under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, but keeping in view availability of forum under the Act to the petitioner, it is appropriate to relegate the petitioner to seek his remedy under the Act alone. 10. The question can be examined from another angle as well. It can be said that the Tribunal and the High Court both have the jurisdiction to entertain the contempt petition. Therefore, keeping in view the principle that if two Courts have the parallel jurisdiction to entertain a matter, then it is the inferior Court whose jurisdiction should be first enforced. Therefore, the petitioner is bound to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act. Even otherwise, the facts of the case are such which do not warrant exercise of contempt jurisdiction of this Court when the matter also falls within the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal under the Act. 11. Thus, the present contempt petition is relegated to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh for decision on merits in acccordance with law. Even otherwise, the facts of the case are such which do not warrant exercise of contempt jurisdiction of this Court when the matter also falls within the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal under the Act. 11. Thus, the present contempt petition is relegated to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh for decision on merits in acccordance with law. Parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh on 14.1 2008 for further proceedings, in accordance with law. Order accordingly.