Judgment : V. Ramasubramanian, J. While Application No.3640 of 2006 is filed by the defendants 1 to 3 in the suit Application No. 2065 of 2007 is filed by the defendants 5 and 6, for rejecting the plaint in C.S. No. 498 of 2004, under Order 7 Rule 11. 2. I have heard Mr. T.R. Mani, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants in A.No.3640 of 2006 (defendants 1 to 3 in the suit), Mr. R. Murari, learned counsel appearing for the applicants in A.No.2065 of 2007 (defendants 5 and 6 in the suit) and Mr. C. Harikrishnan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 4 in both the applications (who are the plaintiffs in the suit). 3. The suit in C.S. No. 498 of 2004 has been instituted by the respondents 1 to 4 under Section 92 C.P.C., for various reliefs including the relief of framing a scheme for the administration of the third defendant Trust. The defendants 1 to 3 and 5 and 6, seek the rejection of the plaint, under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. on the short ground that the leave to institute the suit was actually granted under Section 92 (1) C.P.C. by this Court, to six persons and that the suit, having been instituted only by four out of those six persons, was barred by law and that therefore, the suit on hand falls within the category of cases specified under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) C.P.C., to become liable for rejection. 4. Drawing my attention to the language in which Section 92(1) C.P.C. is couched, Mr. T.R. Mani, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants/defendants 1 to 3, contended with force, that the words "having obtained the leave of the Court" and the words "may institute a suit", appearing in the Section, made it clear (i) that the institution of the suit, could only be after the grant of the leave and (ii) that such institution should conform to the leave granted by the Court. Consequently, if the Court had granted leave to a group of persons under Section 92, C.P.C., for seeking a particular set of reliefs, the suit shall be instituted only by the entire group of persons to whom the leave has been granted, acting together in unison and that too only for the purpose seeking reliefs for which leave was granted. 5. 5. In this case, according to the learned senior counsel for the applicants, leave was granted under Section 92(1) C.P.C., to six persons, out of whom only four had chosen to institute the suit. Therefore, such institution, which is not in accordance with the leave granted, is wholly unsustainable in law, rendering the plaint liable to be rejected. 6. In support of the aforesaid contention, Mr. T.R. Mani, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants/defendants 1 to 3 relied upon two decisions of this Court (both by the Division Bench), a decision of the Privy Council and a decision of the Apex Court. The earliest of those decisions is the one in Maddale Bagavannarayana and Another v. Vadapalli Perumallacharyulu AIR 1916 Mad 762. In the said case, a Division Bench of this Court held that "where more than two persons interested in a trust have obtained the necessary sanction under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, any two of them cannot sue without the others." 7. In the next decision, Pitchayya and Another v. Venkatakrishnarnacharlu and Others AIR 1930 Mad. 129 : ILR LIII Madras 223, another Division Bench of this Court followed the aforesaid decision and held as follows: "As regards the maintainability of the suit, we think that the suit by some only of the persons to whom sanction was given under Section 92 would not lie. The object of requiring sanction or permission before such suits are instituted under Section 92 is to safeguard not only the rights of the public but also the rights of the institution and the trustees." Again it was held as follows: "It is also for the benefit of the institution and of the trustees, because it affords a safeguard against impecunious improper persons coming as plaintiffs and involving the trust in litigation and expense, and it is also a safeguard that the persons are substantial persons from whom if the suit fails the costs can be recovered and not merely men of straw. If two out of three or more persons to whom sanction was given can file a suit it may be that the substantial persons having got the order take no further part leaving the trustees and the institution remediless as regards the recovery of costs." 8. In Mt. If two out of three or more persons to whom sanction was given can file a suit it may be that the substantial persons having got the order take no further part leaving the trustees and the institution remediless as regards the recovery of costs." 8. In Mt. Ali Begam and Others v. Badr-ul-Islam Ali Khan and Others AIR 1938 Privy Council 184, the Privy Council held as follows: "Where the consent in writing of the Advocate General or Collector has been given to a suit by three persons as plaintiffs the suit cannot validly be instituted by two only. The suit as instituted must conform to the consent. On the other hand, if the three persons join as plaintiffs and two of them die pending suit, the suit does not become defective or incompetent." 9. The aforesaid decisions of this High Court and of the Privy Council were quoted with approval by the Supreme Court, in Narain Lal and Another v. Seth Sunderlal Tholia Jorhi AIR 1967 SC 1540 and it was held therein, as follows: "3. The decided cases show that a suit under Section 92 must be brought by all the persons to whom the sanction of the Advocate General has been given, and a suit instituted by some of them only is not maintainable. In Bhagavannarayana v. Ferumallacharyulu AIR 1916 Mad 762 (1) : 29 MLJ 231, where the sanction was given to tour persons and two of them alone brought the suit alleging that the other two had been won over by the defendants and had refused to join as plaintiffs, it was held that the suit was not maintainable. In Pitchayya v. Venkatakrishnamacharlu AIR 1930 Mad 129 : ILR 53 Mad 223, where the sanction was given to three persons, the Court held that the suit instituted by two of them was invalidly brought and the defect could not be cured by impleading the other person as a defendant. In Sibte Rasut v. Sibte Nabi AIR 1943 All 74 : ILR (1943) All 112, where four persons obtained the sanction and the suit was instituted by three of them, it was held that the suit was incompetent and the defect could not be cured by impleading the fourth as a plaintiff at the date of delivery of the judgment. In Sibte Rasut v. Sibte Nabi AIR 1943 All 74 : ILR (1943) All 112, where four persons obtained the sanction and the suit was instituted by three of them, it was held that the suit was incompetent and the defect could not be cured by impleading the fourth as a plaintiff at the date of delivery of the judgment. We may add that in Venkatesha Malta v. Ramanapallia Ramaya AIR 1915 Mad 127 : ILR 38 Mad 1192, where the sanction to sue under Section 18 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 was given by the District Judge to two persons, it was held that only one of them could not institute the suit." "4. We hold that an authority to sue given to several persons without more is a joint au-thority and must be acted upon by all jointly, and a suit by some of them only is not competent. As SIR GEORGE RANKIN said in Mt. Ali Begam v. Badra-ul-Islam Ali Khan AIR 1938 PC 184 : 65 Ind App 198 where the consent in writing of the Advocate General or Collector is given to a suit by three persons as plaintiffs, the suit cannot be validly instituted by two only." 10. The proposition of law advanced by Mr. T.R. Mani, learned senior counsel appear¬ing for the applicants/defendants 1 to 3, has stood the test of time. Therefore, there is and there can be, no element of doubt or quarrel with the said proposition of law. But the extent to which the said proposition of law is applicable to the facts of the present case, is what will ultimately decide the fate of the present applications. Hence, it is necessary to look into the facts which are necessary, nay sufficient, for determining the same. 11. The respondents 1 to 4 herein, who are the plaintiffs in this suit, joined together and filed an application in A. No. 33 of 1994, under Section 92(1) C.P.C., seeking leave of this Court to institute the present suit. When the said application was pending adjudication, two advocates jointly filed an application in A. No. 215 of 1994, seeking to implead themselves as parties to A.No.33 of 1994 and as plaintiffs in the suit. When the said application was pending adjudication, two advocates jointly filed an application in A. No. 215 of 1994, seeking to implead themselves as parties to A.No.33 of 1994 and as plaintiffs in the suit. A third advocate independently filed another application in A. No. 1901 of 1994 also seeking to implead himself in A. No. 33 of 1994 and as plaintiffs in the suit. There were also several other applications, about which we are not concerned with, at the present stage. 12. It is relevant to point out here that the two advocates, who were applicants in A. No. 215 of 1994 and the third advocate, who was the applicant in A. No. 1901 of 1994, claimed to be persons interested in the affairs of the Trust and wanted to implead themselves in order to effectively prosecute the suit on the ground that the respondents 1 to 4 herein may not prosecute the suit, after obtaining leave, to its logical end. But alter making such an allegation against the respondents 1 to 4, one of the two advocates, who were applicants in A. No. 215 of 1994 dropped out halfway through making it a case of not calling the kettle black. Consequently, only one of the two advocates who were applicants in A. No. 215 of 1994 and the third advocate, who was the applicant in A. No. 1901 of 1994 pursued the applications for impleading themselves as parties to A. No. 33 of 1994 and as parties to the suit. 13. By an order dated 212. 1995, all the applications, including the very application for leave to sue A. No. 33 of 1994 filed by the respondents 1 to 4 herein were dismissed, by a learned Judge of this Court. 14. The respondents 1 to 4 herein filed an appeal in O.S.A. No. 62 of 1996 as against the order passed in A. No. 33 of 1994, refusing to grant leave. One of the two advocates, who were applicants in A. No. 215 of 1994 filed an appeal in O.S.A. No. 128 of 1996 as against the dismissal of his application A. No. 215 of 1994. The third advocate filed O.S.A. No 129 of 1996 as against the dismissal of his application A. No. 1901 of 1994. 15. The aforesaid appeals O.S.A. Nos. The third advocate filed O.S.A. No 129 of 1996 as against the dismissal of his application A. No. 1901 of 1994. 15. The aforesaid appeals O.S.A. Nos. 62, 128 and 129 of 1996, along with several other appeals arising out of various other applications covered by the common order of the single Judge, were taken up together by the Division Bench of this Court. After an elaborate consideration of all the issues raised and contentions advanced, the Division Bench allowed all the appeals, including O.S.A. Nos. 62, 128 and 129 of 1996. Paragraph-62 of the judgment of the Division Bench dated 17. 1996 made it clear that the application for leave to sue A. No. 33 of 1994 filed by the respondents 1 to 4 herein as well as the applications for impleading filed by the advocates, in A. Nos. 215 and 1901 of 1994 were allowed. 16. The applicants herein filed Special Leave Petitions before the Apex Court and the Apex Court granted leave. But eventually, the Honble Supreme Court dismissed all the Civil Appeals, Civil Appeal Nos. 12915 to 12920 of 1996, by a judgment dated 14. 2004. Thus, the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Application A. No. 33 of 1994 granting leave to the respondents 1 to 4 herein got confirmed. 17. Consequently, the respondents 1 to 4 herein instituted the present suit, by presenting the plaint on 26. 2004. But while doing so, the respondents 1 to 4 herein did not take as co-plaintiffs, the two advocates, who were applicants in A. No. 215 and 1901 of 1994 and whose applications for impleading were also allowed by the Division Bench in O.S.A. Nos. 128 and 129 of 1996. It is on account of this fact that the applicants herein have come up with the present objection to the maintainability of the suit. 18. In essence, it is the contention of Mr. T.R. Mani, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants, that by virtue of the order passed by the Division Bench (which was also confirmed by the Supreme Court), allowing the applications in A. Nos. 215 and 1901 of 1994, the applicants in those two applications had virtually become co-applicants in the application for leave A. No. 33 of 1994. T.R. Mani, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicants, that by virtue of the order passed by the Division Bench (which was also confirmed by the Supreme Court), allowing the applications in A. Nos. 215 and 1901 of 1994, the applicants in those two applications had virtually become co-applicants in the application for leave A. No. 33 of 1994. In other words, the number of applicants, who sought the leave of this Court under Section 92(1) C.P.C., got increased from 4 to 6, by virtue of the order passed in the impleading applications by the Division Bench and that therefore, it must be taken that leave to institute the suit had been granted to six persons. If, by virtue of the orders passed in A. Nos. 33, 215 and 1901 of 1994, six persons are deemed to have been granted leave to institute the suit, all the six persons ought to have joined together in the institution of the suit. The failure of all the six persons to join together in the institution of the suit according to the learned senior counsel for the applicants, rendered the suit liable to be rejected as not maintainable in law. It is in this context that the learned senior counsel for the applicants placed heavy reliance upon the two Division Bench decisions of this Court, the decision of the Privy Council and the decision of the Supreme Court, referred to in paragraphs-6 to 9 above. 19. Before venturing to test the propensity of the said contention, it is essential to keep in mind two important things viz., (a) the history of this litigation and the conduct of the parties and (b) the noble intention underlying the principles laid down by this Court, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court in the decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the applicants. 20. Looking into the historical background of this litigation and the conduct of the parties, it appears that the applicants herein have continuously and untiringly adopted "tiring out tactics" in the past 27 years, by not allowing any litigation against them, to come up to the stage of trial, by employing all the weapons in the armoury of the Civil Procedure Code, at every stage, providing an interesting case study for students of law as to how to scuttle a litigation. For a moment 1 am not making this observation through the hat. In para 22 of its judgment, in O.S.A. No. 54 of 1996 batch of cases, the Division Bench of this Court itself observed as follows: "It is necessary for the Court to bear in mind the fact that the first defendant did not on the earlier occasions allow the plaints to be registered as suits" Again, in para 23 of the same judgment the Division Bench observed that "it is quite ev¬ident that the first defendant has been adopting the same tactics of cross examining the plaintiffs in each case." 21. From the data available, it is seen that the first applicant herein started the earliest litigation against the Trust and succeeded by de-fault, when the Trustees whose appointments he challenged, resigned. Therefore, he appears to have gained control over the affairs of the Trust and thereafter effectively thwarted all the attempts made by the first respondent herein as well as his sons, from questioning the manner in which the Trust functioned, interestingly, the first applicant has termed all the litigations initiated by the first respondent as nothing but harassment to the Trust even though the first step towards engaging the Trust in a litigation, emanated only from him. If engaging the Trust in a litigation amounts to harassment, it would not cease to be so, at the hands of the 1st applicant merely because the first applicant succeeded by default in the liti¬gation first initiated by him and he himself pre-vented the first respondent only on technical grounds from taking any litigation to its logical end. The following statistics would expose the manner in which every attempt made by the first respondent to make the Court peep into affairs of the Trust, was frustrated by the applicants: .(a) The Thanthi Trust was created on 3. 1954 by Mr. Si.Pa. Adithanan the father of the first applicant and first respondent herein. The first Trustees of the Trust were Si.Pa, Adithanar, his elder brother S.T. Adityan and the first respondent herein (B. Ramachandra Adityan). The first respondent B.R. Adityan resigned on 15. 1959 and the first applicant was inducted in his place. The founder Si.Pa. Adithanar and his elder brother S.T. Adityan also resigned on 11. 1961 and 212. 1963 respectively, paving way for the first applicant herein to take over the reins of the Trust. The first respondent B.R. Adityan resigned on 15. 1959 and the first applicant was inducted in his place. The founder Si.Pa. Adithanar and his elder brother S.T. Adityan also resigned on 11. 1961 and 212. 1963 respectively, paving way for the first applicant herein to take over the reins of the Trust. .(b) When the founder Si.Pa. Adithanar attempted to stage a come back into the Trust. by inducting himself, his son the first respondent herein and his elder brother S.T. Adityan, as Additional Trustees, on 30.6.1978, 20.6.1978 and 7. 1978 respectively, the first applicant herein fired the first salvo by filing applications for leave under Section 92 C.P.C. These applications were allowed and the suits were numbered as C.S. Nos. 352 and 253 of 1978 and the first applicant obtained interim orders of injunction against those Additional Trustees including the founder, the first respondent herein and the founders elder brother Therefore, the founders elder brother and the first respondent herein filed an application for leave to sue in A. No. 3147 of 19 78 under Section 92 C.P.C. seeking the removal of the first applicant herein. But in view of the order of injunction restraining the Additional Trustees, the Additional Trustees (including the first respondent herein) resigned. Hence, the first applicant withdrew the suits C.S. No. 352 and 253 of 1978 as they had become infructuous. Similarly, the first respondent and his paternal uncle (brother of the founder) also with draw their application for leave to sue A.No.3147 of 1978, since the said application was filed in their capacity as Additional Trustees and the same could not be prosecuted further after their resignation as Trustees. Thus, the success of the first applicant in C.S. Nos. 352 and 253 of 1978 was actually by default and not by obtaining a finding on merits. (c) In 1981, two sons of the first respondent filed an application in A. No. 165 of 1981, seeking leave under Section 92 C.P.C. On the ground that the younger of those two sons had just then attained majority and that he could not have had an interest in the Trust except to act at the behest of his father (first respondent herein), the first applicant filed A. No. 879 of 1981 for cross-examination of the applicants in A. No. 165 of 1981 even for deciding the question of grant of leave. Though it was dismissed by a single Judge, the first applicant filed an appeal in O.S.A. No. 152 of 1981 and the same was allowed by a Division Bench on 13. 1982. The Special Leave Petition filed by the sons of the first respondent (applicants in A. No. 165 of 1981) was dismissed by the Supreme Court in S.L.P. No. 6040 of 1982 with an observation that the cross-examination should confine only to the question of grant of sanction. Thereafter, the first applicant filed A. No. 3124 of 1982 under Order 11 Rule 18 C.P.C. for inspection of plaint documents to enable him to effectively cross-examine the applicants in A. No. 165 of 1981, Though it was rejected by a learned Judge, the request was allowed by the Division Bench on ap¬peal, directing the applicants in A. No. 165 of 1981 to give inspection of plaint docu¬ments to the first applicant herein. Thereafter the first applicant filed another application in A. No. 4758 of 1982 to reject A. No. 165 of 1981 under Order 11 Rule 21, C.P.C. on the ground that there was non-compliance with the order permitting inspection. This application A. No. 4758 of 1982 was allowed, as a consequence of which A. No. 165 of 1981 filed by the sons of the first respondent herein seeking leave under Section 92 C.P.C. was dismissed. The two appeals preferred against the orders in A. Nos. 4758 of 1982 and 165 of 1981 were dismissed by the Division Bench in O.S.A. Nos. 105 and 106 of 1983. The Special Leave Petitions arising out of those orders were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 11. 1993. The two appeals preferred against the orders in A. Nos. 4758 of 1982 and 165 of 1981 were dismissed by the Division Bench in O.S.A. Nos. 105 and 106 of 1983. The Special Leave Petitions arising out of those orders were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 11. 1993. .(d) Thus the application for leave to sue A. No. 165 of 1981 was nipped in the bud by a protracted legal battle spread over a period of 12 years, thanks to various provisions contained in the C.P.C. .(e) Thereafter, the first respondent and the respondents 2 to 4 joined together and filed a fresh application in A. No. 33 of 1994, seeking leave to sue under Section 92 C.P.C. Simultaneously, the sons of the first respondent filed a suit in C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 for various reliefs including a declaration that the orders passed in A. No. 165 of 1981 and confirmed by the Division Bench and the Supreme Court were null and void, on account a fraud perpetrated by the first applicant herein. .(f) The first applicant herein filed an application in A. No. 2421 of 1994 for rejecting the application for leave to sue A. No. 33 of 1994 under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. He also took out a similar application A. No. 6571 of 1994 for rejecting the plaint in C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. .(g) By a judgment dated 212. 1995 Justice GOVARDHAN, as he then was, dismissed the application for leave to sue A. No. 33 of 1994 and allowed the application A. No. 2421 of 1994 filed by the first applicant herein. Similarly, the learned Judge allowed the application A. No. 6571 of 1994 and dismissed the suit C.S. No. 1509 of 1994. But the said decision was over turned by the Division Bench in O.S.A. Nos. 54, 62 and 63 of 1996 by a judgment dated 17. 1996. The decision of the Division Bench was also confirmed by the Supreme Court by a judgment dated 14. 2004. In the result, Application No. 33 of 1994 filed by the respondents 1 to 4 herein seeking leave under Section 92 C.P.C. got allowed. Similarly, C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 filed by the sons of the first respondent also got restored, after ten prolonged years of legal battle. 2004. In the result, Application No. 33 of 1994 filed by the respondents 1 to 4 herein seeking leave under Section 92 C.P.C. got allowed. Similarly, C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 filed by the sons of the first respondent also got restored, after ten prolonged years of legal battle. (h) But unfortunately for the respondents 1 to 4, their application for leave to sue A. No. 33 of 1994, carried along with it two more applications A. Nos. 215 of 1994 and 1901 of 1991 by three advocates, seeking to implead themselves as parties to the application for leave to sue and in the suit. Though one of the two advocates, who were applicants in A. No. 215 of 1994 withdrew from the race, the other advocate pursued the matter in appeal. Their appeals O.S.A. Nos. 128 and 129 of 1996 were also allowed, permitting their impleadment as co-plaintiffs in the proceedings, .(i) In pursuance of the order passed by the Division Bench allowing the application for leave to sue A. No. 33 of 1994, which also got confirmed by the Supreme Court, the respondents 1 to 4 herein instituted the present suit C.S. No. 498 of 2004. The applicants seek the rejection of the plaint in this suit on the short ground that those two advocates, applicants in A. Nos. 215 and 1901 of 1994 have not joined as co-plaintiffs in the suit and hence the suit, as instituted, is not in conformity with the leave granted by this Court. .(j) The suit C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 filed by the two sons of the first respondent, which got restored on account of the judgment of the Division Bench also got sabotaged, with one of the two sons of the first respondent offering to withdraw from the fray. His offer came in the form of an affidavit before the Division Bench when the appeal O.S.A. No. 54 of 1996 arising out of the dismissal of the suit was being heard. The Division Bench refused to accept the affidavit. Therefore, after 2½ years of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Division Bench, one of the two sons of the first respondent who opted to go out of the fight filed an application in A. No. 31 of 2007 under Order 23 Rule 1 C.P.C., for withdrawing himself from the suit. His application was allowed on 1. Therefore, after 2½ years of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Division Bench, one of the two sons of the first respondent who opted to go out of the fight filed an application in A. No. 31 of 2007 under Order 23 Rule 1 C.P.C., for withdrawing himself from the suit. His application was allowed on 1. 2007 and the appeal filed by the other son of the first respondent, challenging the order permitting withdrawal, in S.A. No. 23 of 2007 was dismissed by the Division Bench on 3. 2007. .(k) Taking advantage of one of the two sons of the first respondent pulling out from the battle, the applicants herein have filed an application in A. No. 5183 of 2006, for rejecting-the plaint in C.S. No. 1509 of 1994 under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. .(l) The other son of the first respondent herein, who now continues the fight as a sole plaintiff in C.S. No. 1509 of 1994, also filed another suit in C.S. No. 499 of 1996 challenging the rejection of his appointment as Additional Trustee. But the applicants herein got the said suit dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. on the ground that it was virtually a suit under Section 92 C.P.C. instituted by a single person, disguised as an ordinary declaratory suit. 22. Thus, the applicants herein have opposed every application for leave to sue on one ground or the other. They have also sought the rejection of every plaint on one ground or the other. Every application for leave to sue has taken at least 10 to 12 years to ripe into a suit. While the earliest application for leave to sue A. No. 165 of 1981 was nipped in the bud after 12 years of protracted litigation, the next application for leave, to sue A. No. 33 of 1994 has ultimately riped into a suit C.S. No. 498 of 2004 after 10 years of fight. 23. Looking at the ingenious manner in which hurdles were placed in the way of any one seeking leave to sue against the Trust, it is not possible to accept the contention that the actions initiated by the respondents 1 to 4 were intended to harass the Trust. On the contrary, the harassment appears to have worked out in the reverse direction. On the contrary, the harassment appears to have worked out in the reverse direction. This can be appreciated from the manner in which the application for leave to sue filed by the sons of the first respondent was derailed by a well orchestrated “C.P.C. based plot". First A. No. 879 of 1981 was taken out to cross-examine the applicants in A. No. 165 of 1981. Though it was dismissed by the learned Judge, on 29. 1981 the appeal against the same in O.S.A. No. 152 of 1981 was allowed on 13. 1982 and the order of the Division Bench was confirmed by the Supreme Court in SLP No. 6040 of 1982. But not satisfied with the permission granted to cross-examine the applicants in A.No.165 of 1981, the applicants sought permission to inspect the original documents listed out in the plaint. It is pertinent to remember here that at that stage, the plaint was only a draft plaint and yet the applicants filed A. No. 3124 of 1982 under Order 11 Rule 18 C.P.C. for directing the applicants in A. No. 165 of 1981 to file the original documents. This application was dismissed by the single Judge. But the Division Bench allowed an appeal in O.S.A.No.160 of 1982, permitting inspection of documents. Therefore, the cross-examination of one of the applicants in A.No.165 of 1981 began. But half way through the cross-examination, the applicants herein took out an application in A.No.4738 of 1982 under Order 11 Rule 21 C.P.C. for rejecting the application A.No.165 of 1981 on the ground that there was no compliance with The order for discovery and inspection of documents. Thus, even before the draft plaint accompanying the application for leave to sue (in A.No.165 of 1981) became ripe into a regular plaint under Order 7 Rule 1 C.P.C. all other provisions of the C.P.C. were brought into play and the application for leave to sue A. No. 165 of 1981 got completely swept away in the t-sunami of the provisions contained in the C.P.C. 24. But unfortunately for the applicants, the second application for leave to sue viz., A. No. 33 of 1994, instituted by the respondents 1 to 4 herein, survived the turbulence and the present suit C.S. No. 498 of 2004 was born after 10 years. The present application to reject the same under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. is to seal its fate also. 25. The present application to reject the same under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. is to seal its fate also. 25. Thus the historical background narrated in the preceding paragraphs, clearly shows that no litigation was allowed by the applicants, either to take off or allowed to reach even the stage of trial. The present suit is the one which has managed to cross the test of fire under Section 92, C.P.C. and that too from the Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, while dealing with an application to reject the suit at this stage, on the basis of the case law cited on the side of the applicants, a great deal of caution is to be exercised, keeping in mind, the noble sentiments, with which this Court, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, lent a protective gear to Public Charitable Trusts, from being harassed by unscrupulous persons. 26. To put it in a nutshell, there is no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court. But the underlying principle behind those decisions cannot be lost sight of, while applying the principle, to the facts of the present case. The underlying principle, behind all the aforesaid decisions, appears to be that a public charitable trust should not be allowed to be plunged into a spate of vexatious litigations at the hands of unscrupulous persons. As a matter of tact, the very object of Section 92, C.P.C., requiring prior leave of the Court, before the institution of the suit, is to ensure that "impecunious improper persons do not involve trusts in unnecessary litigation and expense." This is made clear by the Supreme Court in Chairman Madappe v. M.N. Mahanthadevaru AIR 1966 SC 878 , wherein, it was held as follows: "The main purpose of Section 92(1) is to give protection to public trusts of a charitable or religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits being filed against them. That is why it provides that suits under that Section can only be filed either by the Advocate General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. That is why it provides that suits under that Section can only be filed either by the Advocate General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. The object clearly is that before the Advo¬cate General files a suit or gives his consent for filing a suit under Section 92, he would satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case either of breach of trust or of the neces¬sity for obtaining directions of the Court." 27. In this case, the order of the Division Bench in O.S.A.No.54 of 1996 dated 17. 1996 has made it clear that the respondents 1 to 4 herein have an interest in the affairs of the Trust and that the allegations made in the plaint are sufficient to grant leave. Therefore, the respondents 1 to 4 cannot be non-suited for reasons extraneous to their application for grant of leave and the order passed by the Division Bench. 28. Even it we forget for a moment the historical background of this case and just scan the ground on which rejection of the plaint is sought for, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether the leave granted by this Court in A. No. 33 of 1994 should be treated as a leave granted to four persons or as leave granted to six persons, including the two advocates whose applications A. Nos. 215 and 1901 of 1994 were also allowed by the Division Bench. If the leave granted under Section 92(1) C.P.C. by the judgment of the. Division Bench dated 17. 1996, is actually a leave granted only to four persons, who were the applicants in A. No. 33 of 1994, then the suit is maintainable and the present application for rejection of the plaint is liable to be dismissed. If the leave to sue is deemed to have been granted to six persons, forming part of a flock which should either sink or sail together, then the suit is not maintainable. Therefore, irrespective of the historical background, the question as to whom leave was granted, is a question of great significance to decide these applications, .29. The respondents 1 to 4 herein, came together to this Court in A. No. 33 of 1994. Therefore, irrespective of the historical background, the question as to whom leave was granted, is a question of great significance to decide these applications, .29. The respondents 1 to 4 herein, came together to this Court in A. No. 33 of 1994. seeking leave under Section 92 C.P.C. Alter analysing the law in extenso, the Division Bench found that the respondents 1 to 4 herein satisfied the primary requisites viz., (a) that they have a substantial interest in the affairs of the Trust; (b) that the Trust in question was a Public Charitable trust; and (c) that there were sufficient averments in the plaint, to point out a breach of such Trust. Therefore, the application for leave, filed by the respondents 1 to 4 herein in A. No. 33 of 1994 was allowed by the Division Bench and the same was confirmed by the Supreme Court. 30. When the enquiry into the application A. No. 33 of 1994 was pending, two advocates of this Court filed an application for impleading in A. No. 215 of 1994 and a third advocate filed a similar application in A. No. 1901 of 1994, seeking to jump into the band-wagon. Their applications for impleading were opposed by the very same applicants herein. But unfortunately, the respondents 1 to 4 herein could not oppose the impleading applications, in view of the allegations made against the respondents 1 to 4 that they would not prosecute the suit properly. The only way in which the respondents 1 to 4 could satisfy the conscience of this Court that they would not abandon the suit half way through, was to say no objection to the impleadment. Consequently, their impleading petitions were allowed the Division Bench. Interestingly, by a turn up events the very same applicants herein who opposed the impleadment of the advocates in the previous round of litigation, now come and contend that those advocates should have joined as co-plaintiffs in this suit. Therefore, the contention that the failure of those two advocates to join the respondents as 1 to 4 as co-plaintiffs made the suit unsustainable on law, cannot be advanced by the applicants herein. 31. In any event, the contention that leave to sue was granted to six persons and not to persons, appears to be only a legal fantasy. Therefore, the contention that the failure of those two advocates to join the respondents as 1 to 4 as co-plaintiffs made the suit unsustainable on law, cannot be advanced by the applicants herein. 31. In any event, the contention that leave to sue was granted to six persons and not to persons, appears to be only a legal fantasy. It is held in paragraph-19 of the judgment of the Division Bench in O.S.A. No. 54 of 1996 batch dated 17. 1996 that a proceeding for leave under Section 92 C.P.C. is only administrative in character and not judicial or quasi judicial. After quoting with approval from MULLAS CODE of Civil Procedure 15th edition Volume-1, the Division Bench held in paragraph-19A (1)(A) that a proceeding for the grant of leave under Section 92 C.P.C. is only administrative in character. For arriving at the said conclusion, the Division Bench analysed various decisions of various High Courts and of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also affixed its seal of approval on the decision of the Division Bench. .32. As a fall out of such a finding that the power to grant leave was only administrative in nature, the Division Bench also held in para-19B of its judgment that the provisions of Section 141 C.P.C. are not applicable to such orders. Though in the last paragraph of its judgment the Honble Supreme Court held that it was not at all necessary for the High Court to have examined the applicability of Section 141 C.P.C. in a matter of this nature, the Supreme Court merely dismissed the appeals. Civil Appeal Nos. 12915 to 12920 of 1996. In other words, paragraph-19.B(i) of the judgment of the Division Bench dated 17. 1996 was not held as incorrect or over-ruled by the Supreme Court, despite expressing the view that the High Court need not have gone into the same. In any case, the law laid down by the Division Bench in paragraph-19.A that an application for leave under Section 92 C.P.C. is administrative in nature was not overruled by the Supreme Court. 33. In any case, the law laid down by the Division Bench in paragraph-19.A that an application for leave under Section 92 C.P.C. is administrative in nature was not overruled by the Supreme Court. 33. Keeping the above in mind, if we look into the orders passed by the Division Bench in the application for leave A.No.33 of 1994 and the applications in A.Nos.215 and 1901 of 1994 for impleading, it could be seen that the leave granted, cannot be taken to be in favour of all the six persons. If the leave granted under Section 92 C.P.C. is taken to be a judgment or decree, it would result in one set of consequences. If the leave is taken to be only an administrative order, it would result in a different set of consequences. 34. If the leave granted is taken to be a judicial order, in the nature of a decree, the result would be that the applicants in A. Nos. 215 and 1901 of 1994 would first become co-applicants along with the original applicants in A. Nos. 33 of 1994. In such an event, an amendment would have been carried out to the application in A. No. 33 of 1994, impleading the two advocates, who are applicants in A. Nos. 215 and 1901 of 1994, as applicant Nos. 5 and 6 in A. No. 33 of 1994. Thereafter, the decree in A. No. 33 of 1994 would have been drafted, reflecting as if the order allowing the application was in favour of six persons. If this had happened, the applicants herein perhaps would be justified in contending that leave was granted in favour of six persons. 35. If the application for the grant of leave under Section 92 C.P.C. is taken to be only administrative in nature, the application for impleading third parties to such an applica¬tion could also be taken only to be administrative in nature. In such an event, the question of amending the decretal order in A. No. 33 of 1994 so as to include the impleaded parties as co-applicants 5 and 6 and the question of treating the leave as granted in favour of six persons would not arise at all. 36. In such an event, the question of amending the decretal order in A. No. 33 of 1994 so as to include the impleaded parties as co-applicants 5 and 6 and the question of treating the leave as granted in favour of six persons would not arise at all. 36. Therefore, inasmuch as the proceeding under Section 92 was held by the Division Bench to be only administrative in nature, all the trappings of order 1 Rule 10, C.P.C. and the consequential procedural entanglements of amendments, carrying out amendments etc., do not arise. Consequently, the impleadment ordered by the Division Bench in A.No.215 and 1901 of 1994, cannot be taken to have enlarged the number of persons who sought leave to sue, from 4 to 6. In fine, the only effect of the order of the Division Bench allowing the application for impleading is that they had the permission to join as co-plaintiffs in the suit. The effect of the said order is not to dilute the leave granted to the respondents 1 to 4 herein in A. No. 33 of 1994 nor to make the order in A. No. 33 of 1994 wholly dependent on the orders passed in A. Nos. 215 and 1901 of 1994. 37. Looking at the issue from a different perspective, the order of the Division Bench has to be understood simply as a permission granted to two advocates to joint the respondents 1 to 4 herein as co-plaintiffs in the suit. The order of the Division Bench cannot be misunderstood to mean that the leave granted to respondents 1 to 4 was subject to the condition that the two impleaded parties should also join them as co-plaintiffs. From a reading of the order of the Division Bench, I am unable to find any condition imposed upon the respondents 1 to 4. The leave granted to respondents 1 to 4 was not coupled with an obligation on their part to take along with them, two persons who jumped into the bandwagon halfway through. It was not the intention of the Division Bench of this Court to place the respondents 1 to 4 at the mercy of two third parties, to exercise the right to sue conferred upon them by the Division Bench by granting leave under Section 92 C.P.C. 38. It was not the intention of the Division Bench of this Court to place the respondents 1 to 4 at the mercy of two third parties, to exercise the right to sue conferred upon them by the Division Bench by granting leave under Section 92 C.P.C. 38. All the decisions cited on the side of the applicants do not contemplate a situation of the kind that we are now dealing with, if the law laid clown in those decisions (relied upon by the applicants), are applied blindly to the case on hand, without reference to its peculiar circumstances, it would result not only in an unintended benefit to the applicants herein but also in undesirable consequences. Every application for leave to sue, filed by a group of persons, against a public charitable trust, can be easily sabotaged by some third parties filing applications for impleading and getting impleaded under the guise of being interested persons and then refusing to join as parties to the institution of the suit. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the leave granted by the Division Bench in O.S.A.No.54 of 1996 batch of cases is for respondents 1 to 4 and the same was not made contingent or conditional upon the two impleading parties joining them. 39. Once it is found that the leave granted by the Division Bench in A.No.33 of 1994 is in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 herein, it follows as a corollary that the suit C.S.No.498 of 2004 instituted by the respondents 1 to 4 herein was perfectly in conformity with the leave granted. Therefore, the only ground on which the applicants seek rejection of plaint is bound to fail. Accordingly, it fails and therefore A.No.3640 of 2006 and A.No.2065 of 2007 are dismissed. Applications dismissed.