JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been filed by the husband, against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Bikaner dated 19.10.2002, whereby the appellant's petition for dissolution of marriage under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act has been dismissed. 2. The facts of the case, according to the appellant are, that the parties were married on 4.7.91, and were living together. Then the wife had conceived, she was got treated on 13.1.94 in Veena Nursing Home, Bikaner, where-from her father took her away, against the wishes of the appellant on 18.1.94, on the pretext, that the delivery 2 would be got done at the parental house. Thereafter, numerous efforts were made to bring her to the matrimonial home, but she did not return. Thereafter, the respectable persons of the community, being Purushottam Bihani, Champalal Periwal, Jugalkishore Modi, etc. were called, and the Panchayat was convened, still she did not come to the matrimonial home. Seeing all efforts having failed, on 16.2.95 the petition for restitution of conjugal rights was filed by the husband, wherein the wife appeared in the Court, but she and her father flatly declined to live in the matrimonial home, therefore, on 14.5.96 that petition was withdrawn. Thus, it was pleaded that the wife has deserted the matrimonial home without any justifiable cause, and despite efforts she is not rehabilitating the matrimonial home. Then it is alleged, that the wife lodged a First Information Report on 15.6.96 against the husband and his family members, for the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC, she has already received the entire Stridhan, and got the husband and others arrested. Thus, she has behaved with cruelty, and therefore, it is not possible for the appellant to keep her with him. With these averments, the petition for divorce has been filed. 3. It may be observed here, that the petition was initially filed on 22.5.96, only on the ground of desertion, however, subsequently, it was got amended, of course with permission of the Court, and the amended 3 petition was filed on 12.8.97, wherein the aforesaid ground of cruelty was incorporated in para-8. 4. Reply has been filed on behalf of the respondent before the learned trial Court on 5.3.97, and after amendment, fresh reply has been filed on 3.12.97. The wife contested the petition. 4. Reply has been filed on behalf of the respondent before the learned trial Court on 5.3.97, and after amendment, fresh reply has been filed on 3.12.97. The wife contested the petition. It was admitted that she conceived from the lions (NUTFA) of the appellant, and delivered male child on 12.8.94. Other pleadings were denied. It was admitted, that the petition for conjugal rights was filed. Then in additional pleas, it was pleaded, that at the time of marriage, the appellant, his father and brother alleged that the respondent is having dark complexion, is the only female issue, therefore, they require good dowry. However, the respondent's father gave dowry beyond his capacity, which comprised of gold ornaments of 30 Tola, and 2 kilograms of silver ornaments and utensils and the included ornaments imbedded with precious stones. Likewise, furniture, goods, cloths, alongwith Rs.21,000/- in cash were also given. Then it is alleged, that the in-law family persons started harassing the wife for bringing other articles like, colour T.V., Frieze, Cooler, Scooter, etc., and also to bring cash money, the presents sent on the occasion of Makar Sankranti were also returned, being much inferior. Thereupon, her father, being compelled, had to give better things. Then in July 1992, the husband and his brother Shyam Sunder gave beating to her, and left her to 4 parental home, with instructions, to come with Rs.30,000/- only. However, the respondent's father gave some assurance and sent her back to matrimonial home. Then it is pleaded, that on two earlier occasions, her pregnancy was got terminated and she was being harassed, and kept hungry, and made to work all the times. Thereafter, when she conceived third time, she was given out to be being taken for treatment, and was taken to doctor, whereupon she entertained apprehension about pregnancy being again got terminated by her husband, but she was assured, that this time pregnancy would not be got terminated, she was taken to Subham Nursing Home, Bikaner, where she learnt, that the appellant means to have the pregnancy terminated; somehow the information reached to her father, who retorted for it, and thereupon, the husband left her in the Nursing Home itself. In such circumstances, being compelled, she had to go to her parental home, with the garments on her body only. In such circumstances, being compelled, she had to go to her parental home, with the garments on her body only. It is then alleged, that the family members of the respondent and other respectable persons of his community extended their good offices, but to no good. Then when the male child was delivered, information was sent, but nobody turned up from the in laws side, even to see the child, rather declined to keep, and it was given out, that they will marry again, so that they will get fresh bride, and fresh dowry. Regarding petition for restitution of conjugal rights, it is pleaded, that when the wife offered, that she is ready to live in the matrimonial home if the respectable 5 persons of the community give guarantee, that she will not be harassed again, thereupon the husband assured that he would manage for guarantee, but then, he withdrew the petition. It is alleged, that thereafter on 8.6.96, when the wife's brother met the appellant, he was directed to see at the appellant's house alongwith the father and sisters of the respondent. Thereupon, he went on 9.6.96 at Gangashahar, and the wife's father told that they have brought the wife and the newly born child, and therefore, they should give the requisite guarantee of the respectable persons of the community. Thereupon, it was given out, that the litigation was initiated under legal advice to avoid police proceedings, and therefore, they will not keep her. Various other pleadings have been taken regarding criminal prosecution for the offence under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC. It was pleaded, that when the Stridhan was not returned, and was being squandered away, the FIR was lodged, whereupon the case is pending, and that, separate proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is also pending. It was maintained, that the FIR was lodged on correct facts, and lodging of correct FIR does not amount to cruelty. With these pleadings, it was prayed, that the petition for dissolution of marriage be dismissed. 5. The learned trial Court framed four issues. Issue No.1 was, as to whether the wife has deserted the matrimonial home since 18.1.94, without any reasonable 6 cause. Then issue No.2 was about cruelty. Issue No.3 was about the husband's entitlement to get a decree for dissolution of marriage. Issue No.4 is about relief. 6. 5. The learned trial Court framed four issues. Issue No.1 was, as to whether the wife has deserted the matrimonial home since 18.1.94, without any reasonable 6 cause. Then issue No.2 was about cruelty. Issue No.3 was about the husband's entitlement to get a decree for dissolution of marriage. Issue No.4 is about relief. 6. During trial, the appellant examined 4 witnesses, including himself, while the wife examined herself, and produced her father and brother Aaskaran and Moolchand, D.W.2 and D.W.3. The wife also produced the discharge certificate of Shubham Nursing Home as Ex.A/1 and subsequent prescription slip of the doctor as Ex.A/2. It may be observed here, that apart from these two documents, three more documents have come to be marked as Ex.A/1 and A/2, being statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of the witnesses Purushottam and Champalal, so also the letter of the Rajasthan Pradeshik Maheshwari Sabha, written to P.W.2 and P.W.4 on 4.12.1998, which has been proved by P.W.2. as Ex. A/2 Be that as it may. 7. Learned trial Court found both the issues against the appellant, and dismissed the petition for dissolution of marriage, as above. 8. Arguing the appeal it was contended, that the learned trial court has erred in deciding both the issues against the appellant, rather from the evidence on record both the grounds of divorce, being desertion and cruelty, are very well established. Learned counsel submitted, that 7 it is not in dispute, that in January, 2004 the respondent had left the matrimonial home, and may be, that according to the appellant she left on 18.1.1994, while according to the respondent she left on 16.1.1994, but then, from the totality of circumstances it is clear, that she left the matrimonial home with intention never to return. Thus, the requisite animus was also there. It was submitted, that the appellant made all possible efforts to rehabilitate the matrimonial home, so much so, that he filed petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, invoked good counselling of the community people, as is clear from the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.4, but the respondent has adopted attitude of adamancy, and straightway declined to come back to matrimonial home. Even during the statement, she has clearly given out, that she is not prepared to go back to the matrimonial home. Even during the statement, she has clearly given out, that she is not prepared to go back to the matrimonial home. In such circumstances, finding on the question of desertion, is liable to be set aside. Then, regarding the cruelty, it was submitted, that there is bulk of evidence on record, to show, that ever since the time of marriage, she has been treating the appellant, and his family members, cruelly, by picking up quarrels day in and day out, and have been misbehaving the family members, rather she filed a criminal complaint against the appellant and his family members for the offence under Section 406 and 498A I.P.C., wherein she had received all her Stridhan property, and also got them arrested, which even by itself is a clear act of cruelty, entitling the appellant to be 8 granted decree of divorce, on the basis of material on record, oral as well as documentary. It was then submitted, that in any case, admittedly the spouses are living separately for the last more than 13 years, all efforts of reconciliation have failed, thus there are no chances of any reconciliation, the marriage has been irretrievably broken down, and is a mere dead wood. Consequently there is no purpose of keeping such a dead matrimony alive, and even on that ground, the decree of divorce could not be granted. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent, supported the judgment, and submitted, that it is clearly established on record, that the respondent was practically turned out of the matrimonial home, and it cannot be said that she deserted the matrimonial home. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent, supported the judgment, and submitted, that it is clearly established on record, that the respondent was practically turned out of the matrimonial home, and it cannot be said that she deserted the matrimonial home. She was taken to the hospital under the pretext of getting treated, but later on she learnt, that the appellant wants to have the pregnancy terminated, sensing this when the respondent's parents came, the respondent was left in the nursing home unattended, and a false story has been cooked up, and that the appellant's sister in law was left there to take care, and the circumstances show, that the respondent was clearly left unattended, and in order to properly take care of the health, the respondent's parents took her away, even thereafter nobody came forward to take care, so much so, that even when she delivered the male child, and information thereof was sent to the in-laws, 9 they not only did not turn up, but flatly refused to keep the child and the respondent. Thus, it cannot be said that the respondent has deserted the matrimonial home. It was in the alternative submitted, that apart from above, there is ample material on record to show, that the respondent was being treated cruelly, on the pretext of dowry, and that the Stridhan articles had been misappropriated by the in-laws, and thus, the respondent, in any case, had justifiable cause to decline to go back to matrimonial home. It was submitted that in the petition for restitution of conjugal rights, the respondent clearly offered, that adequate guarantee should be given, to the effect, that in future she will not be ill-treated, but instead of giving such guarantee, and rehabilitating the matrimonial home, the petition was withdrawn, which clearly shows, that the appellant did not want the restitution of conjugal rights. Then, so far as the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.4 is concerned, they have rightly been found by the learned trial court to be not reliable, in this regard, rather about Ex.A-2, it has been admitted by the appellant's witness to have received it, which does clearly show, that on the other hand all reasonable efforts were being made on the side of the respondent, to see that good sense prevails, and the matrimonial home is restored, but then it was due to adamancy and obduracy of the appellant, that the things could not materialise, and in such circumstances it cannot be said, that the respondent was at all guilty of 10 matrimonial offence of desertion. Then, regarding cruelty, it was submitted, that there is no pleading, or evidence on record, to show the cruel behaviour of the respondent in the matrimonial home, and in absence of any such pleading, no such contention can be entertained, rather the allegation of cruelty was not made in the initial application for dissolution of marriage, and subsequently it was introduced by amending the petition. Obviously if the behaviour of the respondent was cruel since beginning, there was no occasion for not taking this plea in the original divorce petition. In that view of the matter, this aspect need not be taken into consideration, apart from the fact, that the appellant has not raised this contention before the learned trial court. It was submitted that the allegation of the cruelty, levelled on the side of the appellant, is contained in para-8 of the application, being, that she lodged a first information report on 15.6.1996, for the offence under Section 498A and 406 I.P.C. against the appellant and his family members, she received Stridhan property, and got the appellant and his family members arrested, and thereby has manifested cruelty. It was submitted, that so far as these allegations are concerned, the F.I.R. lodged by the respondent was not false one, the Stridhan property was recovered, and was restored to the respondent, and after due investigation the accused persons are being prosecuted, apart from this, it is not the averment of the appellant, that the first report 11 was falsely lodged, or that they were arrested in a false case, which might have made out a ground of cruelty, but in absence of allegations about the prosecution being false, the mere launching of the prosecution, by itself, cannot be said to be amounting to an act of cruelty on the part of the respondent, and therefore, the averment, as made, even by itself, does not constitute the offence of cruelty, and the learned trial court has rightly negatived the ground of cruelty, as well. Then, replying the contention about irretrievable break down, it was submitted, that in the first place, there is no irretrievable break down, rather it is the appellant, who has created the circumstances, for braking matrimonial home, and as is clear from the impugned judgment, that repeated efforts were made for reconciliation, and every-time the attitude of the appellant was non-cooperative, while on the side of the respondent, all that was submitted was, that there should be reasonable guarantee, to the effect, that she would not be ill-treated in future, and even that is not acceptable to the appellant. In the alternative it was submitted, that totality of circumstances does show, that the situation has been brought about only by the appellant, and the appellant cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong, to have a walk over the respondent, and get rid of the matrimonial tie. Thus, it was submitted, that the appeal has no merit, and is required to be dismissed. 10. I have considered the submissions, and have gone through the record closely and carefully. 11. Taking up the ground of cruelty first, a look at the divorce petition shows, that the only averment about cruelty is contained in para-8, beyond that para, in the entire petition, either as originally filed, or even as amended, there is no whisper about any act, or conduct of cruelty, on the part of the respondent. 11. Taking up the ground of cruelty first, a look at the divorce petition shows, that the only averment about cruelty is contained in para-8, beyond that para, in the entire petition, either as originally filed, or even as amended, there is no whisper about any act, or conduct of cruelty, on the part of the respondent. So far para-8 is concerned, the facts are not in dispute, that the respondent lodged a report against the appellant and his family members for the offence under Section 498A and 406 I.P.C., wherein recovery was made, accused were arrested, and after completing the investigation, challan has been filed. Of course, lodging of the first report resulted into inconvenience to the appellant, and his family members, on account of being arrested, and being made to deliver the property, but then, that was result of the own conduct of the appellant, or his family members. Then in para-8, it is not the averment, that the F.I.R. was falsely lodged, or that the case was lodged only with a view to harass or humiliate the appellant or his family members, without any basis. In such circumstances, if the offence appear to have been committed, the respondent was legally entitled to lodge the first report, and obviously further, investigating agency was also entitled to file challan, or was required to act in accordance with law, and the 13 results, as alleged, are legal and natural consequence of the conduct of the case, in accordance with law. But then, on that count it cannot be said, that such an act amounts to cruelty on the part of the respondent. Admittedly the accused are facing trial. It may be clarified that any observations in this judgment, made in this regard, shall not be taken into consideration by the learned trial court, in deciding the criminal prosecution, and the same shall be decided on the basis of the material on record of that case, without in any manner effected by any of the observations made, or findings recorded about it. The learned trial court has also found, relying on the Division Bench judgment of this Court, in Parvati Soni v. Vinay Kumar, reported in 2001(3) RLR-499 , that where the prosecution is pending for the offence under Section 498A I.P.C., it cannot be said that the report was lodged falsely, and even otherwise, it is not established, that the report was falsely lodged. In such circumstances, no matrimonial offence of cruelty is made out. In my view, the finding recorded by the learned trial court, on issue no.2, in view of above discussion, does not require any interference. The finding is, therefore, affirmed. 12. Then, I take up the ground of desertion. Desertion as the settled law is, comprises of two parts, being the factum of desertion, and the animus deserendi; deserting the house, with the animus, not to return to the 14 matrimonial home. Unless both the elements are co-existing, or proved, no matrimonial offence of desertion can be said to have been made out. In the present case, a look at the divorce petition shows, that the factual averments are, that the appellant got the respondent admitted in Veena Nursing Home (it has come on record that Veena Nusing Home, as pleaded by the appellant, and Subham Nursing Home, as pleaded by the respondent, is one and the same) where-from the respondent's father took her away on 18.1.1994, against the wish of the appellant, on the pretext, that they want to have the delivery at their house, and she delivered the male child on 13.8.1994. Then, it is pleaded that after 18.1.94, many efforts were made, to bring the respondent back to matrimonial home, but then, she did not return. Then, respected persons of community were collected, and a Panchayat was convened, still she did not come. Then, petition for restitution of conjugal rights was filed on 16.2.95, wherein she appeared along with her father, and flatly refused to return to matrimonial home, thereupon that application was withdrawn. Thus, she has deserted the matrimonial home without any reasonable cause. These are the only averments made in the divorce petition. Then, petition for restitution of conjugal rights was filed on 16.2.95, wherein she appeared along with her father, and flatly refused to return to matrimonial home, thereupon that application was withdrawn. Thus, she has deserted the matrimonial home without any reasonable cause. These are the only averments made in the divorce petition. As against this, the stand of the respondent, in the reply is, that in the past the pregnancy was got terminated twice, and this time also the appellant did not want to see the pregnancy materialised, and in that sequence, on 13.1.94, she was told, that she is being taken to be shown to the doctor, 15 whereupon she expressed apprehensions of getting the pregnancy terminated, but she was assured, that this time this would not happen so, and she was got admitted in Shubham Nursing Home, where she learnt, that the appellant again wants to have pregnancy terminated, but as the luck would have it, the information reached the respondent's father, whereupon they retaliated, and thereupon the appellant left the respondent in the nursing home, unattended, and in such circumstances she was compelled to go to her parental house. Then, she has also alleged in the reply, that the dowry was given beyond the capacity of her father, still time and again she was being harassed for further dowry, in cash and kind, and that, giving physical beating to her, on that count, had become a routine affair. It is also pleaded, that the respondent's father and family members, so also the respectable persons of the community, being Tola Ram, and Chand Ratan Mohta etc. advanced good counselling to the appellant, and his family members, to properly take care of the respondent, lest it results in mental cruelty, but they clearly declined, even to get her treated. It is then alleged, that after she delivered male child, information was sent to the in-laws, but nobody came to see, or take care, and on good counselling being advanced, they clearly refused to take her and the child. Regarding petition for restitution of conjugal rights, it was pleaded, that when she learnt about initiation of the proceedings, she gave out to be ready to return to 16 matrimonial home, if the appellant submits guarantee before the respectable persons of the community that she will not be ill-treated in future, and she would be kept as a wife. Regarding petition for restitution of conjugal rights, it was pleaded, that when she learnt about initiation of the proceedings, she gave out to be ready to return to 16 matrimonial home, if the appellant submits guarantee before the respectable persons of the community that she will not be ill-treated in future, and she would be kept as a wife. Thereupon the appellant agreed to furnish guarantee, but then, he withdrew the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. It has also been pleaded, that further efforts were made in this regard on her side, but to no good. 13. Thus, both the parties have their own versions to plead. The precise question before me is to find out, as to version of which of the side is correct. If I proceed to examine the material on record, a look at the statement of P.W.1, the husband, shows, that according to him she was got admitted in the nursing home on 14.1.1994, where-from she went away on 18.1.94, with her father. It is deposed that she was taken in his absence, and he was not asked. It may be observed here, that the pleading taken in the divorce petition, in this regard is, that she was taken against the appellant's wish, by telling, that they want to have the delivery in the parental house, which has not been deposed in the statement. Then, regarding the efforts for rehabilitation of the matrimonial home, he has deposed, that he got made efforts to bring her back, through respectable persons of the community being Purshotam Bihani, Champalal Periwal, etc. but despite the efforts she did not come. Coming to the pleading again, the pleading taken in para-5 is, that when the wife did not come, the 17 respectable persons of the community, including these four persons were got collected, and Panchayat was got convened, still she did not come. There is not even a whisper in the entire statement, about any Panchayat having been got convened, so much so that even Champalal Periwal, and Purshotam, who appeared as P.W.2 and P.W.4, have also not deposed about any such Panchayat having been convened, and simply deposed to have gone to the parental house of the respondent in May 2004 and October, 2004, and advanced good counselling, but the father declined, and did not disclose any reason for his declining. P.W.4 has not even deposed about his having gone twice, much less in May or October, 1994, but has simply deposed to have gone some 4-5 years back. Thus, there is no evidence to show, that any Panchayat was ever got convened. In that background, may be that these persons may have gone to the parental house of the respondent, but then what transpired there, as given out by these two witnesses, does not inspire any confidence. These two witnesses have deposed, that no reason whatever was given out by the father, to decline to send the respondent to matrimonial home, while a look at the cross-examination of D.W.2, the father of the respondent shows, that it was not even suggested to him, that these four persons had gone, had any dialogue with him, and he declined to send her back to the matrimonial home, rather all that was asked was, that when he did not send her to the matrimonial home the petition under Section 18 9 was filed. Nothing in this regard has been suggested to the respondent, except about her knowing Purshotam Bihani and Champalal Periwal, and she has deposed that there is no enmity between them and her. So far as D.W.3 is concerned, who is the brother of the respondent, even he was not suggested about these four persons having gone to the house, and as to what transpired. In this background a look at the statement of P.W.2 Champalal Periwal, which was recorded on 2.8.1999, shows, that he has admitted to have received a letter from Rampal Soni, the president of Rajasthan Pradeshik Maheshwari Sabha, dated 4.12.98, wherein he was requested to attempt reconciliation, and a look thereat shows, that thereby a photocopy of the letter of Askaran Mohata (respondent's father) was forwarded, wherein a demand was raised to have justice done with his daughter. This obviously shows, that rather there was demand on the side of the respondent, for restoring the matrimonial home, and theory, as propounded by the appellant, are not correct. In this sequence it is further significant to note, that the respondent, as D.W.1, has deposed, that it was on 15.1.1994 itself, that her in-laws had left her in the nursing home, and she was discharged on 16.1.94, and she had to go to the parental house. In this sequence it is further significant to note, that the respondent, as D.W.1, has deposed, that it was on 15.1.1994 itself, that her in-laws had left her in the nursing home, and she was discharged on 16.1.94, and she had to go to the parental house. She has also deposed, that after she delivered the male child, her father personally told her in-laws, and communications were also addressed, and telegrams were also sent, but nobody turned up. Even in cross examination she was not suggested, that she was taken away by her father against the wish of the appellant, on the pretext, that delivery would be done at her parental house. Likewise a look at the statement of D.W.2, father, shows, that when he learnt about the respondent being admitted in Shubham Nursing Home, he went to Bikaner on 14.1.94, and requested them, not to have the pregnancy terminated, whereupon they got annoyed, and on 15.1.1994 they left her alone, and even on 16.1.1994, when she was discharged, nobody was there on the in-laws' side, and on information being given about her discharge, when nobody came, she was taken to her parental house. He has deposed, that good counselling was advanced by him, his family members, and people of community, who requested them to get the respondent treated, but they flatly refused. He has deposed, that the respondent was got treated, and she delivered a male child, information of which was sent to her in-laws, but nobody turned up. Then even in cross examination he also was not suggested anything about her having been discharged on 18th, or his having taken her away on the pretext, that delivery would be got done at the parental house. In this sequence, again reverting to cross examination of P.W.1, which shows, that he has deposed in cross examination at page 3, that his sister in law was left there to take care of the respondent, but when he returned, he was informed by the doctor, that she was taken away. Even this has not been suggested to any of the witnesses, or to the respondent; apart from the fact, that it has not been pleaded, and the said sister in law has not been produced before the Court either. Even this has not been suggested to any of the witnesses, or to the respondent; apart from the fact, that it has not been pleaded, and the said sister in law has not been produced before the Court either. In view of this evidence, in my view, the learned trial court rightly concluded, that the story of the manner, and way, of leaving matrimonial home, as pleaded is not correct, rather she was left unattended in the hospital on her resisting the termination of pregnancy, and thereupon he was left to go to her parental house. In my view, these circumstances, rather show, that it cannot be said, that wife left matrimonial home, much less with the requisite animus. Then, it is also significant to note, that admittedly she had delivered the male child in August, 1994, and it is not pleaded, nor has been deposed, even by a word of mouth, that the appellant or his family members did not receive information of her delivering male child, and they have also not even deposed, that they did go to take her, or the child, to the matrimonial home. Thus, the totality of circumstances show, to say the least, that they have rightly been considered by the learned trial court, the evidence has rightly been appreciated by the learned trial court, while deciding issue no.1 against the appellant, and I do not find any ground to interfere with the findings. 14. So far as the contention about irretrievable break down is concerned, of course, earlier Hon'ble the Supreme Court had been taking the view, and been passing decree for dissolution of marriage, on the ground of irretrievable break down, but then, the view has subsequently been changed, in view of the fact, that irretrievable break down is not one of the grounds for seeking decree for dissolution of marriage. In the present case, firstly it cannot be said that there is irretrievable broken down, and secondly, even if it were to be so, it is for the appellant's own cause, for which he cannot claim any advantage, and have a march over the respondent, apart from the fact, that it is not one of the grounds, on which decree for divorce can be granted. Obviously the Court cannot assume, or enact, any other ground of dissolution of marriage, which is not contained in the law. 15. Obviously the Court cannot assume, or enact, any other ground of dissolution of marriage, which is not contained in the law. 15. Thus, considering the case from any stand point, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeal thus has no force, and the same is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.Appeal dismissed. *******