JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 2. The petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari for quashing the impugned judgment dated 5.10.2004 passed by the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar. By the impugned judgment the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar has dismissed the application filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act along with revision and stay application. 3. The dispute in the instant writ petition pertains to the ground floor portion of Bungalow No. 126. The Mall, Cantt.. Kanpur which is under the tenancy of the petitioner since 1911. The rent was paid to Mr. S.de Noronha. Km. C.de Noronha and Mr. S.de Noronha. The Post Master Noronha Exchange Post Office by the letter dated 27.7.1981 was informed that the landlords had transferred the aforesaid Bungalow No. 126 to Gopi Kishan Omar Vaish Dharmada Trust, Birhana Road, Kanpur and advised the petitioner to pay rent to Sri Gopi Kishan Gupta w.e.f. 1.8.1981 to whom the rent is said to be paid since then. 4. The subsequent purchaser of the property/landlords Sri Gopi Kishan Gupta and others filed S.C.C. Suit No. 883 of 1982 before the Judge, Small Cause Court, Kanpur Nagar for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment which was decreed ex-parte in their favour vide judgment dated 6.2.1984 appended as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. Thereafter the decree holders filed Execution Case No. 222 of 1984 for execution of the decree. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 6.2.1984 Writ Petition No. 11550 of 1984 was filed by the petitioner instead of civil revision. In the said Writ Petition No. 1550 of 1984 following interim order was passed : “Issue noice. The Post Office Noronha Exchange, The Mall, Kanpur and the petitioner shall not be evicted from the building in its occupation known as 126 Cantonment, Kanpur until further orders of this Court. Sd/- K.P.S., J. 14.3.1984" 6. Subsequently on 29.9.1988 following further directions were given by the Court as under : “The Standing Counsel for the petitioner prays for and is granted one month’s time to deposit the arrears of rent and damages subject to the following conditions : 1. that the petitioner shall deposit the arrears of rent and damages due up to June, 1988 within a month from today. 2. that the petitioner shall deposit the arrears of rent and damages due up to June, 1988 within a month from today. 2. that in addition to arrears of rent and damages the petitioner shall also deposit interest thereon at the rate of 10% within one month from today. 3. that the petitioner shall deposit rent/damages of the period commencing from 1st July 1988 to 31st December, 1988 in advance within a month from today; and 4. that further rent/damages shall be deposited by the petitioner in half yearly instalments, the first half yearly instalment becoming due up to 7th January, and second up to 7th July every year. Sd/- O.P., J. 29.7.88" 7. The Writ Petition No. 11550 of 1984 was dismissed by this Court with costs at Rs. 5000/- vide judgment dated 30.4.2004 holding that the petitioner had an alternate remedy by filing a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act and the writ petition was not maintainable on the ground of alternate remedy. 8. The petitioner thereafter preferred S.C.C. Revision No. 484/7 of 2004 under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act along with stay application and Section 5 application supported by an affidavit. However, the revisional court vide impugned order dated 5.10.2004 dismissed the delay condonation application on the ground that the reasons given for condonation of delay in filing the revision were not sufficient. 9. After filing the revision the petitioner also filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 C.P.C. and also under Order IX Rule 7 read with Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act to set aside the ex-parte decree and to recall the ex-parte order along with stay application as well as an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 10. It appears that the petitioner brought on record certain documents showing that the properly in dispute belongs to Government of India, i.e., Annexures R.A.-1. R.A.-2 and R.A.-3 to the Rejoinder Affidavit as well as Annexure S.R.A.-1 filed by the petitioner with Supplementary Rejoinder Affidavit in order to substantiate that the Bungalow No. 126 consists of 3 survey Nos. 425, 427 and 428 of Cantonment Area, Kanpur as has also been averred in paragraph 4 of the Rejoinder-Affidavit and further that the Bungalow in question viz. Post Office is situated over Survey No. 428. 425, 427 and 428 of Cantonment Area, Kanpur as has also been averred in paragraph 4 of the Rejoinder-Affidavit and further that the Bungalow in question viz. Post Office is situated over Survey No. 428. It has also been brought on record that the lease of Survey No. 425 and 428 was for a period of 66 years from 1.1.1917 which has already expired on 31.6.1983 and has not been extended thereafter. 11. The High Court vide order dated 29.10.2004 issued notices to respondents 3 to 8 returnable within six weeks and stayed the eviction of the petitioner from the accommodation in question for a period of three months or till the order was modified or vacated. Thereafter vide order dated 6.10.2005 the Court enhanced the rent of the accommodation in dispute to Rs. 1200/- per month. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was supported with an affidavit contained the reasons for the delay in filing the revision after 20 years. The delay in fact according to him was caused as the writ petition was filed directly against the judgment passed by the Judge, Small Cause Court bypassing the remedy of revision and was made ground for dismissing the writ petition by penalizing the petitioner by imposing the costs of Rs. 5000/-. Thus, while availing the remedy of revision the delay having been sufficiently explained the revisional court was duty bound to give benefit to the petitioner of the fact that the High Court has dismissed the writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy by imposing the cost and ought to have exercised the discretion in a reasonable manner. It is stated that the revisional court appears to have been swayed by the fact that the revision has been filed after delay of 20 years and the reason/explanation given for condoning the delay and the delay have not been seen by the revisional court in right perspective. It is submitted that the revisional court condoned the delay and decided the revision on merits particularly when the judgment of the trial court was ex-parte. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner is also entitled for the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act as remedy was bona fide pursued by it in writ petition instead of revision. 14. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner is also entitled for the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act as remedy was bona fide pursued by it in writ petition instead of revision. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that merely procedural or technical objections should not frustrate the course of justice. In fact the justice demands that cases should have been heard on merits, as such the delay condonation application ought to have been allowed. It is submitted that in view of the fact that the valuable rights of the petitioner ought not be fortified on mere technicalities particularly when the petitioner is defending an action of such a person who has no legal right to hold the property as the lease of area viz. Survey No. 425 and 428 over which the property is situated has already expired and had not been renewed. 15. Relying upon the Hon’ble Supreme Court decision rendered in Lajpat Rai and others v. State of Punjab and others, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1400, the learned counsel for the petitioner lastly contends that the petitioner cannot be allowed to suffer for the fault of the counsel. In the present case the fact that the costs have been imposed by the High Court while dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy it was a clear case of result of pursuing remedy before wrong forum imposing costs by the High Court in the writ petition also proves that it was a case of conscious consideration by the High Court that the writ petition was wrongly filed and the proper remedy was to file revision. 16. In support of his contentions the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions rendered in Lajpat Rai and others v. State of Punjab and others, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1400; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, JT 1996 (3) SC 371; and State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another, JT 2000 (5) SC 389. 17. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlords firstly submits that it was within the discretion of the revisional court to condone the delay or refuse to condone the delay. 17. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlords firstly submits that it was within the discretion of the revisional court to condone the delay or refuse to condone the delay. A superior court of law does not normally interfere with a discretionary order passed by the court below unless it is perverse and not in accordance with the settled principles of law. 18. In the instant case, the revisional court being of the view that there is no explanation for not filing the revision and for wasting 20 years’ time in pursuing the writ petition filed by it before the High Court and the revisional court having refused to condone the delay, the view taken by the revisional court in refusing to condone the delay cannot be said to be illegal. 19. The learned counsel further submits that under Section 14 of the Limitation Act the period which has been spent in prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence and in good faith can be excluded. He states that in the instant case, the writ petition was filed before the High Court directly against the judgment of the trial court as the Union of India and its counsel was of the view that the entire proceedings before the Judge Small Cause Court are without jurisdiction in view of promulgation of Ordinance No. 43 of 1983. The Union of India preferred to give up other points which it could have raised in the revision filed under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and invoked the jurisdiction of this Court on the ground of inherent lack of jurisdiction. In such circumstances, after the plea of inherent lack of jurisdiction of Judge, Small Cause Court having been repelled by this Court, it was no more open to the petitioner to file a revision before the District Judge after a long period of 20 years. It is evident on the face of the record that it was a conscious decision taken after due deliberations to file writ petition on legal grounds instead of invoking the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It is not a case of bona fide mistake. In such circumstances, benefit of Section 14 cannot be given to the petitioner. 20. It is not a case of bona fide mistake. In such circumstances, benefit of Section 14 cannot be given to the petitioner. 20. It is thirdly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlords that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has in Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., (1993) 2 S.C.C. 185 ; M/s. Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Nirmala Devi and others, (1979) 4 S.C.C. 365 ; and Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, 1969 (2) S.C.C. 770 , held that an advocate is an agent of the party and his act cannot be ordinarily disowned by the client. 21. In the circumstances of the case, the Union of India who was represented in the earlier writ petition by a very seasoned and senior advocate cannot disown his acts and seek condonation of delay on the ground of having filed writ petition before the High Court on misconceived legal advice. 22. The fourth submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlords is that it would be evident from the perusal of the application for condonation of delay that no ground of giving wrong legal advice was taken in the application for condonatioin of delay except the assertions that after the judgment in the writ petition was given it took some time in obtaining a certified copy and seeking permission from the Government for filing the revision. The necessary pleadings required for exclusion of the period contemplated by Section 14 of the Limitation Act are conspicuous by their absence. This ground is also not sustainable in law. 23. The learned counsel lastly submitted that the Union of India occupied a spacious accommodation on the ground floor of the building situated on The Mall, Cantt. Kanpur on a meagre sum of Rs. 108.38. It succeeded in perpetuating its possession by virtue of stay order granted in earlier Writ Petition No. 11550 of 1984 and thereafter in the instant writ petition. The suit was filed in the year 1982 and was decreed on 6.2.1984. In such circumstances, the respondent-landlords are entitled for being compensated by directing the Union of India to pay rent and damages for the entire period since 1.5.1982 till date at least at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per month as the present rental value of the building is about Rs. 10,000/- per month. 24. In such circumstances, the respondent-landlords are entitled for being compensated by directing the Union of India to pay rent and damages for the entire period since 1.5.1982 till date at least at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per month as the present rental value of the building is about Rs. 10,000/- per month. 24. In State of Haryana (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held : “It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court be it by private party or the State - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay." 25. In State of Bihar (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court giving reference of its decision rendered in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, JT 1987 (1) SC 537, has held : “Power to condone the delay in approaching the court has been conferred upon the courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. This Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, JT 1987 (1) SC 537, held that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the court in differe nt situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The time limit fixed for approaching the court in differe nt situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack malafides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor.” 26. Similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lajpat Rai (supra). The writ petition was filed by the Union of India through the then Senior Standing Counsel. The petitioner has complied with the interim order dated 14.3.1984 as well as order dated 29.7.1988 and continued in possession over the property in question which is under its tenancy since 1911. The fact that this Court has been pleased to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of having alternate remedy by imposing costs of Rs. 5,000/-, it was clearly a case of pursuing the remedy with due diligence and in good faith and as such the revisional court ought to have condoned the delay and allowed the delay condonation application to hear the revision on merit. It being a clear case of bona fide pursuing the remedy in wrong forum the petitioner is entitled for benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 27. As has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana (supra) the expression ‘’sufficient cause” should be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than technical detection. Similarly in State of Bihar (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court giving reference of its decision rendered in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, JT 1987 (1) SC 537, has held that technicalities of law cannot prevent the courts to do substantial justice and undo illegalities. 28. Superior courts normally do not interfere with the discretionary orders passed by the subordinate courts. However, considering the law and the principles settled in the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to above this Court thinks it proper to interfere in the matter as the Post Office is established for the convenience of the public in the building in dispute. However, considering the law and the principles settled in the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to above this Court thinks it proper to interfere in the matter as the Post Office is established for the convenience of the public in the building in dispute. The revisional court has wrongly come to the conclusion that there is no explanation for filing the revision and wasting 20 years’ time in pursuing the writ petition filed by the petitioner before the High Court. The hearing of the writ petition is beyond the control of a party and if the High Court has taken time to decide the writ petition this cannot be placed in the court of the petitioner as a reason which is sufficient for the delay in the matter. Since the petitioner had pursued a wrong remedy by means of a writ petition instead of filing revision under Section 14 of the Limitation Act comes into play. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lajpat Rai (supra) has unequivocally held that the delay may be compensated by costs, hence while allowing the writ petition it is observed that since the petitioner has been enjoying the property on a meagre rent of Rs. 109.38 and the delay has been caused due to the fault of his counsel and further that the suit was filed in 1982 and was decreed in 1984, as such the landlords can be compensated suitably. Since the lease has not been got renewed by the landlords the land would belong to the State Government, hence they are not entitled to the damages at the market rate. The respondents shall therefore pay damages at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per month from 1984 till date apart from the rent which has already been paid for use and occupation of the tenement/debris standing on the Government land. The arrears of rent, if any. shall also be paid by the petitioner to the respondents with interest at the rate of 9% per annum. All the aforesaid payments shall be made by the petitioner within a period of four months from today. This payment is a precondition for hearing of the dispute in the revision filed by the petitioner. In case the petitioner makes the aforesaid payments to the landlords within two months from today the court below shall hear and decide the revision on merits. This payment is a precondition for hearing of the dispute in the revision filed by the petitioner. In case the petitioner makes the aforesaid payments to the landlords within two months from today the court below shall hear and decide the revision on merits. With the aforesaid directions this petition is disposed of. No order as to costs. —————