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2007 DIGILAW 1960 (ALL)

ANIRUDHA SINGH v. RADHEY SHYAM

2007-07-24

PANKAJ MITHAL

body2007
JUDGMENT Honble Pankaj Mithal, J.—This is an appeal filed by the two plaintiffs Anirudha Singh and Luxman Singh of village Kandhi, Fatehpur who are father and son against the judgment, order and decree of the Courts below arising from a suit for ejectment of the defendants No. 1 to 3 Lalit Kumar & others from the house in dispute and for damages which has been dismissed by both the Courts below. 2. A house belonging to one Harpal Singh stood on part of Abadi plot No. 290 and part of Shahrai plot No. 476 (new No. 815) which was shown in the plaint map in pink colour. Harpal Singh was grand father of the Anirudha Singh and great grand father of Laxman Singh. Anirudha Singh constructed a room on the south of the aforesaid house shown by blue colour in the plaint map. 3. Lalit Kumar defendant No. 2 is son of Jagmohan and was resident of village Mahraha, Fatehpur. Lalit Kumar accompanied by his mother left his village Mahraha as his father was involved in a murder case and was ultimately prosecuted. He along with his mother shifted to village Kandhi where his Mausa defendant No. 3 Ram Bharose used to live. On the request of Ram Bharose, Anirudha Singh permitted them to reside in the disputed house only as a licensee. The room was kept locked. Lalit Kumar on 19th June, 1969 without any authority of law transferred the house and the room in favour of defendant No. 1 Radheshyam. He was delivered possession of the house and later he illegally took possession of the room as well. In the above background the plaintiffs revoked the licence of Lalit Kumar and instituted the original suit No. 477 of 1969 for the eviction of the defendants and for possession of the house and the room with mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month. 4. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 alone contested the suit and denied the theory of licence set-up by the plaintiffs. They alleged that both the house and the room were constructed by the mother of the defendant No. 2 Lalit Kumar when they had shifted to the village and started residing therein. 5. The suit as well as the appeal were both dismissed by the Courts below. Hence the second appeal. 6. They alleged that both the house and the room were constructed by the mother of the defendant No. 2 Lalit Kumar when they had shifted to the village and started residing therein. 5. The suit as well as the appeal were both dismissed by the Courts below. Hence the second appeal. 6. I have heard Sri V.K.S. Chaudhari, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Jitendra Ojha, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs-appellant. 7. He submitted that both the Courts below manifestly erred in law in dismissing plaintiffs’ suit on the ground that they were unable to establish their ownership over the house and the room, even though the defendants have not set-up any title on the suit land nor adduced any evidence to establish that the house and the room were actually constructed by the mother of defendant No. 2. In the absence of dispute of ownership of the plaintiffs over the land, the house and the room standing over it also belonged to them and as such the Courts below erred in law in drawing adverse inference against the plaintiffs and in dismissing their suit. 8. Before dealing with the above submissions, it may not be out of context to mention that this is a Second Appeal of the year 1975 and was admitted. According to the law in force at the time of institution of the suit and the filing of the Second Appeal there was no provisions for formulating the substantial question of law. The subsequent requirement of framing the substantial question of law would not affect the rights of the parties to their detriment as they have contested the suit and have filed the appeal on the basis of law which was in force. Therefore, it can be decided on the basis of question of law and the formulation on substantial question of law would not be necessary as the amendment to this effect had come into force in the C.P.C. vide C.P.C. (Amendment) Act i.e. Act No. 104 of 1976 w.e.f. 1.2.1977. Section 97 of the said Amendment Act provides that the provision for formulating substantial question of law for deciding a second appeal would not affect the fate of the second appeals which have been admitted prior to the aforesaid amendment coming into force. 9. Section 97 of the said Amendment Act provides that the provision for formulating substantial question of law for deciding a second appeal would not affect the fate of the second appeals which have been admitted prior to the aforesaid amendment coming into force. 9. Now therefore, in view of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the only question of law which is involved in the appeal is as to whether the house and the room standing over the land, in which undisputedly no right or title has been claimed by the defendants, belong to the plaintiffs specially in the absence of any evidence that they were constructed by the defendants. A perusal of the pleadings and the two judgments of the Courts below indicate that the house in dispute exists on part of Abadi plot No. 290 and partly at Shahrai plot No. 476 and some part of it on Shahrai plot No. 477. Admittedly Abadi plot No. 290 and Shahrai plot No. 476 is the land of Harpal Singh, the ancestor of the plaintiffs, therefore, most of the construction of the house and the room is on the said land. The defendants have not pleaded and set up any title in the said land, they have not even adduced any evidence to establish that the said house or the room was constructed by them or by the mother of defendant No. 2. Therefore, in the absence of the pleadings that the aforesaid Abadi plot No. 290 and Shahrai Plot No. 476 are owned by any of the defendants and further in the absence of evidence that same were constructed by the defendants, it cannot be held by any stretch of imagination that the defendants specially defendant No. 2 or his mother are the owners of the said house and the room. The minor discrepancy in the dimensions of the house which is Kachha in nature and which may have encroached upon a small portion of Shahrai plot No. 477 is not sufficient for drawing any inference against the plaintiffs to the effect that they have failed to prove their title over the said house and the room. 10. The minor discrepancy in the dimensions of the house which is Kachha in nature and which may have encroached upon a small portion of Shahrai plot No. 477 is not sufficient for drawing any inference against the plaintiffs to the effect that they have failed to prove their title over the said house and the room. 10. According to the meaning of the word ‘land’ as per Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition, the “land” in the most general sense, comprehends any ground, soil, or earth whatsoever, including fields, meadows, pastures, woods, moors, waters, marshes, and rock. Technically, ‘land’ signifies everything which may be holden; and the term is defined as comprehending all things of a permanent and substantial nature. In other words, ‘land’ is material of the earth, whatever may be the ingredients of which it is composed, whether soil, rock, or other substance, and includes free or occupied space for an indefinite distance upwards as well as downward subject to limitations upon the use of airspace granted by law. 11. The land in common legal parlance as such would include the earth and anything which is permanently fastened to the earth or is attached to it. According to AIR 1988 SC 1626 , P. Rami Reddy and others, etc. v. State of A.P. and another, the expression ‘land’ in its legal sense is a comprehensive expression which is wide enough to include structures, if any, raised thereon. Therefore, the structure (Malva) of the house or the room which is a permanent fixture to the earth shall be included within the land and shall go with the ownership of the land in the absence of evidence of construction by any one else. Curiously, there is no finding by any of the Courts below that the construction of the house and the room was made by the defendants or the mother of the defendant No. 2. 12. In view of the above legal position, I am of the opinion that the Court below manifestly erred in law in holding that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the disputed house and the room belongs to them. The Appellate Court has returned the specific finding that most part of the house is on Abadi plot No. 290 and Shahrai plot No. 476 which undisputedly was the land of the plaintiffs fore fathers. The Appellate Court has returned the specific finding that most part of the house is on Abadi plot No. 290 and Shahrai plot No. 476 which undisputedly was the land of the plaintiffs fore fathers. There is nothing on record which could prove that the defendant No. 2 had acquired right in the said land after he migrated from village Mahraha to village Kandhi. Therefore, he had not right whatsoever to transfer the house and the room which stood on the aforesaid plots in favour of defendant No. 1 by a sale-deed. Accordingly, the possession of the defendant No. 2 on the house and the room in dispute was only permissive in nature as a licensee of the plaintiffs. 13. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the judgment and order of the Court below dated 27.11.1974 passed in Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1974 and of the lower Court dated 29.1.1974 passed in Original Suit No. 477 of 1969 Anirudhdha Singh and others v. Radhey Shyam and others are set aside and the suit of the plaintiffs for the ejectment of the defendants from the house in dispute is decreed. 14. However, in the absence of the evidence about the loss suffered by the plaintiffs due to the possession of the defendants, the damages are unworthy of being quantified. 15. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed to the above effect with no order as to costs. ———