JUDGMENT S.D. Anand, J.:- The parties are estranged spouses who are fighting over the custody of their minor daughter. To obtain guardianship of the female child the respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the’ father’), filed a petition under the relevant Legislation. The appellant (hereinafter referred to as the ‘mother’) entered appearance. On 19.06.2007, the learned District Judge, Rohtak, recorded the following proceedings: “Both the parties present in the Court have consented that the will accept the desire of their daughter and, therefore, her desire be ascertained separately in Camera. The parties and their counsel are, thereafter, directed to leave the Court room. Now, to come up after lunch break. Sd/- District Judge, Rohtak 19.6.2007. Present: S/Shri V.S. Rathi and R.P. Budhwar, counsel for the petitioner Shri R.S. Kadian, counsel for the respondent. I have ascertained the desire of the minor daughter of the parties. She consented in unequivocal terms that her custody be given to her father namely Amit Hooda initially for one year. She also consented that she has accepted her father to be her legal and natural guardian out of free will and without any duress. In view of the above, I allow the application and declare Shri Amit Hooda as the legal and natural guardian of his daughter Aish Hooda. The respondent Smt. Manju wife of the petitioner shall, however, be at liberty to move an application afresh after the expiry of one year from today to obtain further consent of her minor daughter. The application, shall stand disposed of in the manner indicated above. 2. In the last but not in the least, it is made clear that the respondent shall be at liberty to visit her daughter in the school premises once in three months after her school hours till 5.00 p.m. Announced in open court. Sd/- District Judge June 19,2007 Rohtak. “ 2. At the very outset, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the mother argued that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to try the petition in view of the Notification dated 11.06.1996 vide which this Court had empowered the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at the District Headquarters (and the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) at the Sub Divisional Headquarters) to try the cases under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). That notification is reproduced hereunder for facility of reference:­ “Powers:- In modification of this Court’s Notifications No. 106-Gaz/XV.A.13, dated 1.4.1975 and No. 336-Gaz.II/XV.A.13, dated 1.4.1975 and in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Section (1) of Section 4-A of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, as amended by Act IV of 1926, Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh hereby empower the Civil Judge (Senior Division) in each of the districts in Punjab, Haryana and U.T., Chandigarh, to dispose of any proceedings under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, transferred to him by the District Judge of the same district. Their Lordships further empower the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Sub Divisional Headquarters for the trial of cases under Guardianship Act.” 3. Relying upon the above quoted notification, it was argued on behalf of the mother that the District Judge was not empowered to retain the petition under the Act on his own file and all that he could do, on receipt/entertainment of any such petition, was to transfer it to the Civil Judge (Senior Division). 4. The plea was contested by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the father. He argued that the provisions of Section 4-A of the Act, do not take away the plenary jurisdiction of the District Judge to try the petition under the Guardians and Wards Act and that the notification above quoted would come into play only if the District Judge is inclined to refrain from trying the matter and to transfer it. In that eventuality, the argument proceeded, the matter could be tried only by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) at the Headquarters and the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) at the Sub Divisional Headquarters. 5. On a careful consideration of the matter in entirety, I am inclined to agree with the plea on behalf of the father. As would be evident from a perusal of Section 9(1) of the Act, an application with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, has to be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. As would be evident from a perusal of Section 9(1) of the Act, an application with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, has to be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. The issuance of notification by this Court, in terms of Section 4-A of the Act, does not take away the inherent jurisdiction of the District Judge to try the matters pertaining to the’ guardianship of a person of a minor. The provisions. of Section 4-A, and the notification issued thereunder, only provide an option to the District Judge to transfer a petition under the Act, if the officer is so inclined. If the District Judge is inclined to transfer a petition of the indicated category, the provisions of the notification aforementioned would come into play inasmuch as that petition would be transferrable only to the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) at the Headquarters and the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) at the Sub Divisional Headquarters. 6. Apart therefrom, it may be noticed that the mother entered appearance before the District Judge and also consented to the disposal of the matter on ascertainment of the wishes of the child by the District Judge. It was only on the indication of a consensual affair in the context by the mother and the father that the District Judge proceeded to ascertain the wishes of the child and pass the impugned order. 7. I have, thus, no hesitation in holding that the learned District Judge, Rohtak, did have jurisdiction to try the petition filed by the father under the Act. 8. It was, then, argued by the learned counsel for the mother that the District Judge hurried through the proceedings without complying with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. That provision is reproduced as under for facility of reference:­ “17. Matters to be considered by the Court in appointing guardian.- (1) In appointing or declaring the guardian of a minor, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be guided by what, consistently with the law to which the minor is subject, appears in the circumstances to be for the welfare of the minor. Matters to be considered by the Court in appointing guardian.- (1) In appointing or declaring the guardian of a minor, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be guided by what, consistently with the law to which the minor is subject, appears in the circumstances to be for the welfare of the minor. (2) In considering what will be for the welfare of the minor, the Court shall have regard to the age, sex and religion of the minor, the character and capacity of the proposed guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes, if any, of a deceased parent, and any existing or previous relations of the proposed guardian with the minor or his property. (3) If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference, the Court may consider that preference. (4) The Court shall not appoint or declare any person to be a guardian against his will.” 9. It was argued on behalf of the mother that the impugned order does not conform to the provisions of the Act and also the normal emotional needs of the female child and the mother. The plea was raised in the context that the impugned order would authorise the mother to meet only four times in a year which cannot be said to be reasonable. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the father argued that the mother cannot be heard to resist the impugned order because she had herself consented to be bound by the wishes of the child and she and also the father had authorised the District Judge to ascertain the wishes of the child. 11. In the given case, the petition was filed on 04.06.2007. The matter, thereafter, came up before the learned District Judge on 19.06.2007 which must presumably the first date of hearing before that Court. Though the parties did agree to abide by the desire of their daughter which was to be ascertained in Camera, it cannot be denied that things appear to have been hurried through. The adoption of such a hurried procedure is foreign to law. It would appear unnatural that the female child aged about 11 years agreed to her custody being given to her father “initially for one year”. The adoption of such a hurried procedure is foreign to law. It would appear unnatural that the female child aged about 11 years agreed to her custody being given to her father “initially for one year”. It would equally appear abnormal that the child “consented that she has accepted her father to be her legal and natural guardian out of free will and without any duress.” A child of that tender-age is not expected to be conversant with connotation of a legal and natural guardian nor is a child of that age expected to tell the District Judge that she was doing so out of free will and without any duress. Assuming that the child was old enough to form an intelligent preference, it would have been in the fitness of things if the learned District Judge were to record her statement in writing. 12. It may be noticed here that the preference given by a child is surely entitled to be given priority consideration but only if the child is old enough to form an intelligent preference. It is for the Court to take into enough to form an intelligent preference consideration a host of other factors as well. In the present case, the presentation made on behalf of the mother is to the effect that she holds a Doctorate decree and has adequate earning capacity, as against the father who is not even a graduate and is not earning anything. In the present case, no reply ever came to be filed (before the District Judge). Thus, the learned Trial Court had no occasion to take into consideration the other legally allowable factors into consideration. It would have been apt for the Court to allow the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims about entitlement to be appointed guardian of the female child. It is thereafter only that the Court would have been competent to ascertain the validity or otherwise of the pleas raised by the parties in the context of their entitlement to the guardianship of the child. 13. The learned counsel for the mother initially argued that the learned Trial Court appears to have been swayed by the fact that the paternal grandfather of the female child is a leading Advocate of Rohtak Town. 13. The learned counsel for the mother initially argued that the learned Trial Court appears to have been swayed by the fact that the paternal grandfather of the female child is a leading Advocate of Rohtak Town. When I pointed out to the learned counsel that the inference is uncharitable and there is no indication that the Judicial Officer had been governed by such consideration, the learned counsel indicated that he does not press that point. It is clarified, on point of fact, that there is nothing in the impugned order to indicate that the learned District Judge, Rohtak, was influenced by the fact that the paternal grandfather of the female child is a leading Advocate of Rohtak Town. 14. It would be pertinent to notice certain other facts as well. While issuing notice of motion, Hon’ble R.S. Madan, J. ordered that “the appellant is allowed to meet the child in the school for one hour after the school hours once in a week on every Sunday.” That order was not complied with by the father. Learned counsel for the mother informed this Court that father had taken away the child from the school itself in order to frustrate that order. That averment was fortified by a certification issued by the school authorities to the effect that the child had been taken away by the father for medical check up. The father has not placed on record any medical certification to the above effect or the result of the medical check up. The child rejoined school only on 13.10.2007. 15. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the petition shall stand allowed. The impugned order shall stand set aside. The matter shall be listed before the learned District Judge for proceeding further in accordance with the law. It will be in the discretion of the learned District Judge to himself try the petition or to transfer it to any Court in terms of notification dated 11.06.1996 issued by this Court. ———————————