JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for both the parties. 2. Plaintiff-respondents filed a suit for ejectment in respect of rented premise, which was decreed by the trial court on the ground that a suitable alternative accommodation has been made available to the defendant-appellant. Being aggrieved with the same, the appeal was preferred by the defendant-appellant. The first appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the finding of the trial court, hence this second appeal has been preferred by the defendant-appellant. 3. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the respondents brought to my notice the earlier order dated 6.2.2007 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court and contended that the appeal was heard on merits and the said Bench was going to dismiss the appeal on that date itself, but, on the request of the learned counsel for the appellant to seek instructions from the appellant whether he wants to vacate the premise, the matter was adjourned. It was again listed on 14.2.2007 and 19.2.2007, but, on the request of the learned counsel for the appellant, it was adjourned. The matter was again listed on 12.4.2007 but no one was present on behalf of the appellant and the Court adjourned the case for two weeks. 4. The order dated 6.2.2007 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court is reproduced as under : "Both the Courts below have recorded the finding that the appellant (tenant) has acquired vacant possession of a house, which is suitable for his residence. The consideration of the matter by the Trial Court as well as Appeal Court in this regard is based on evidence on record. As a matter of fact, the Appeal Court has considered the evidence at quite some length. The concurrent finding cannot be said to suffer from any legal infirmity. When I was going to dismiss the appeal having recorded my observations above, counsel for the appellant prayed for some time to seek instructions whether the appellant is desirous of some reasonable time for vacating the subject premises, if he does not intend to press the appeal on merits. As prayed by the counsel for the appeal, stand over to 13.2.2007." 5. The matter has again come-up today on the Board. As prayed by the counsel for the appeal, stand over to 13.2.2007." 5. The matter has again come-up today on the Board. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that he has already sent letters to the appellant but he has not come and contacted him so far, therefore, the appeal may be heard on merits. In this background, the matter has again been argued by the learned counsel for both the parties and, after considering their submissions in the light of findings of both the courts below, I find that both the courts below have decreed the suit for eviction against the defendant on the ground that alternative accommodation has already been made available to the defendant. The question of availability of alternative accommodation to defendant, is purely a question of fact and thereon there is concurrent finding by both the courts below, which cannot be interfered with by this Court in second appeal. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurdev Kaur & Others v. Kaki & Others, 2007(1) WLC (SC) Civil 326 : (2007) 1 SCC 546 , considered the true import, scope and ambit of Section 100 CPC by referring the Section 100 CPC, before and after amendment of 1976, various declarations of law by Privy Council and Supreme Court, Legislative background in the 54th Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in 1973, Historical perspective, Rational behind permitting second appeal on substantial question of law, and held as under "81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the amendment of Section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 82. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 82. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallized by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs." 7. No substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed in limine.Appeal Dismissed. *******