JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pankaj Mithal, J.—This second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff Gulab Singh against the District Inspector of Schools, Basti and Committee of Management, B.R. Inter College, Harraiya Basti through its Manager as respondents No. 1 and 2 being defendants No. 2 and 3 in the suit. 2. B.R. Inter College, Harraiya in District Basti is a recognised Intermediate college which is receiving grant-in-aid. In the said college there is only one sanctioned post of lecturer in English. The plaintiff had previously filed Writ Petition No. 27461 of 1997 before the High Court for the payment of his salary as lecturer in English on the allegations that the vacancy of post of lecturer in English had fallen vacant in 1988 and after it was notified to the U.P. Secondary Education Service Commission and was not filled up, the plaintiff was appointed on ad hoc basis after due selection and his appointment was also approved by the DIOS but even then he was not being paid salary. The writ petition was disposed of in limine permitting the plaintiff to present to the DIOS. In pursuance thereof, the representation of the petitioner was rejected by the DIOS vide order dated 6.10.1994 holding that there was no vacant post of lecturer in English at the Institution and the petitioner was not validly appointed, therefore, he is not entitled for any salary. 3. In the aforesaid background, the plaintiff instituted Original Suit No. 212 of 1997 for a decree of declaration that he may be declared a validly appointed lecturer in English at the institution and entitled for salary under the U.P. High Schools; and Intermediate (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as an Act). He further prayed that the defendants to the suit i.e. the State of U.P., through Collector, Basti, DIOS, Basti and Committee of Management, B.R. Inter College, through its Manager be restrained from interfering in his functioning as lecturer in English. 4. The plaint was amended and a challenge was also made to the order of the DIOS dated 6.12.1994 rejecting his representation and disapproving his appointment and for declaring it to be null and void. 5. 4. The plaint was amended and a challenge was also made to the order of the DIOS dated 6.12.1994 rejecting his representation and disapproving his appointment and for declaring it to be null and void. 5. The Trial Court vide judgment and order dated 1.11.2000 decreed the suit and it was held that the plaintiff was appointed and is working as lecturer in English and as such is entitled to salary. The order of the DIOS dated 6.12.1994 was declared to be illegal, null and void. A permanent injunction was issued restraining the defendants from interfering in his working. Against the judgment, order and decree of the Trial Court the State of U.P. filed Civil Appeal No. 76 of 2000, another appeal No. 18 of 2002 was preferred by the Committee of Management. The two appeals were clubbed together and were decided by a common judgment and order dated 3.10.2002. Both the appeals were allowed and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment, order and decree of the Lower Appellate Court, the plaintiff has preferred this Second Appeal. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law: whether the plaintiffs appointment was not approved by the DIOS, Basti? If so its effect. 7. I have heard Sri P. N. Saxena, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri D. B. Mishra, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant, Sri G.K. Pandey for the respondent No. 1 and Sri B.S. Pandey for respondent No. 2 Committee of Management, B.R. Inter College. 8. At the outset an objection has been raised that no substantial question of law is involved in the Second Appeal. Therefore, the question arises as to whether a substantial question of law as framed by the Court at the time of the admission in fact arises or not and is a substantial question of law under the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. A careful perusal of the judgment and order of the Appellate Court reveals that the Appellate Court after considering the entire evidence on record has set aside the findings of the Trial Court for cogent reasons with regard to the validity of the plaintiffs appointment. 9. A careful perusal of the judgment and order of the Appellate Court reveals that the Appellate Court after considering the entire evidence on record has set aside the findings of the Trial Court for cogent reasons with regard to the validity of the plaintiffs appointment. The appellate Court on the basis of the documentary evidence recorded that there was only one sanctioned post of lecturer in English at the institution which was being occupied by one Sheetala Prasad and as such there was no vacancy at all. No further post was created or sanctioned under Section 9 of the Act. In the absence of the post the plaintiff could not have been appointed. Moreover, the vacancy was not notified to the Commission and the documents to that effect are false and fictitious. The post was not even advertised for ad hoc appointment nor the Committee of Management had passed any resolution for appointment, of the plaintiff on ad hoc basis. The alleged approval of the DIOS to the plaintiffs appointment was also held to be illegal inasmuch as the letter of approval was held to be forged and fictitious. The judgment and order further records that even the DIOS vide order dated 6.10.1994 had held that no approval to the plaintiffs appointment was given and the letter of approval No. 45-C-1 is forged and fictitious. On the basis of the aforesaid findings the Appellate Court reversed the findings of the Trial Court. All the aforesaid findings are pure findings of fact. 10. Sri P.N. Saxena, learned Counsel for the appellant is unable to demonstrate that the aforesaid findings are in any way perverse or are based on misreading of evidence. 11. In view of the aforesaid findings of fact, the question as to whether the appointment of the plaintiff was approved by the DIOS stand duly answered to the effect that it was never approved and in fact stood disapproved for valid reasons by the order of the DIOS dated 6.10.1994. This order dated 6.10.1994 is not under challenge. It is final and conclusive. Therefore, in view of the disapproval to the plaintiffs appointment the public exchequer cannot be burdened to pay salary to the plaintiff who has not been appointed lawfully. The findings with regard to disapproval of the plaintiffs appointment are pure findings of fact and are not liable to be disturbed in Second Appeal. It is final and conclusive. Therefore, in view of the disapproval to the plaintiffs appointment the public exchequer cannot be burdened to pay salary to the plaintiff who has not been appointed lawfully. The findings with regard to disapproval of the plaintiffs appointment are pure findings of fact and are not liable to be disturbed in Second Appeal. Therefore, under the above facts and circumstances no substantial question of law as framed earlier arise in this appeal. It stands decided by findings of facts. 12. Sri P.N. Saxena, learned Counsel for the appellant fairly conceded that though the findings recorded by the Appellate Court are findings of fact but stressed for framing a fresh substantial question of law. He argued that the plaintiff is entitled to salary at least from the Committee of Management of the institution as he had been working at the institution. He accordingly submitted that a substantial question of law arises as to whether in view of the findings of the Trial Court which have not been reversed by the Trial Court to the effect that the plaintiff is actually functioning as lecturer in English, the Appellate Court was justified in refusing to allow payment of salary to the plaintiff from the funds of the Committee of Management. 13. The above argument in the first instance appeared to be attractive but on slightly deeper consideration is found to be totally misconceived. Undoubtedly the Trial Court while deciding issue No. 1 about the validity of the plaintiffs appointment has recorded a finding that the plaintiff is actually working as lecturer in English at the institution and has also invigilated the High Schools and Intermediate examination conducted by the Board of High Schools and Intermediate, U.P. However, it is not correct that the said finding has not been set aside by the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court while deeming with the above point and after considering the various documentary evidence on record held that there is nothing on record to prove that the Committee of Management of the institution ever resolved to appoint the plaintiff as teacher in English at the institution. The certificates of working issued by the Principal and produced by the plaintiff were held to be inadmissible in evidence as they were not legally proved. The certificates of working issued by the Principal and produced by the plaintiff were held to be inadmissible in evidence as they were not legally proved. The Appellate Court recorded that in the absence of any document or the resolution of the Committee of Management of the institution appointing the plaintiff or allowing him to work the Committee of Management is not responsible for payment of his salary. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled for any salary either from the State of U.P., through DIOS or the Committee of Management. The working of the plaintiff if any is due to the collusion of the manager or the principal in their personal capacity for which the Committee of Management cannot be held liable. Thus, the Appellate Court has rightly concluded that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any salary either from the State of U.P. or from the Committee of Management of the institution. The cause of action if any in this regard lies against, the principal or the Manager of the Committee of Management in their personal capacity. The plaintiff has not arrayed either the principal or the manager in his personal capacity nor has claimed salary from them. 14. I find no error of law in the recording of the said finding. 15. The aforesaid finding is also a finding of fact. 16. In view of the above, even the substantial question of law which has now been suggested by Sri Saxena does not arise. 17. No other point was raised. 18. The appeal therefore, fails and is dismissed. ————