Judgment : 1. The Applications in O.A. No.710 of 2006 and A. No.3788 of 2006 have been filed by the plaintiff seeking inter alia (i) an interim order of injunction restraining the defendants from altering the superstructure or putting up any further construction in the suit property, and (ii) an interim direction, directing the defendants to pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- towards damages for use and occupation of the suit property, pending disposal of the Suit for recovery of possession and damages for use and occupation. The Application A. No.476 of 2007 has been filed by the first defendant in the Suit under Section 9 of the Madra s City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921, for a direction to the plaintiff to sell the suit land to them at a price to be fixed by this Court by appointing an Advocate Commissioner. 2. Heard Mr. Satish Parasaran, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, who is the applicant in O.A. No.710 of 2006 and A. No.3788 of 2006 and Mr. O.R. Santhanakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the first defendant, who is the applicant in A. No.476 of 2007. 3. The facts which are not in dispute are as follows: .(a) The plaintiff’s mother was the absolute owner of a larger extent of land of which the suit schedule property was a part. After dividing into two portions, the mother of the plaintiff leased out the suit schedule property to Burmah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited, under a Deed of Lease dated 3. 1962. The said Lease Deed has been filed as document No.3 along with the plaint. Clause (1) of the Lease Deed fixed the term of lease as 20 years and the yearly rent as Rs.6,000/-. (b) Clause 3(iii) of the Lease Deed dated 3. 1962 provided for the renewal of the lease for a further period of 20 years, at the option of the Lessee subject to the conditions stipulated therein. .(c) The aforesaid Lessee was nationalised by Central Act 2 of 1976, and all the assets of the Lessee vested with the Central Government. Subsequently, the Lessee underwent a transformation twice, before eventually becoming Bharath Petroleum Corporation Limited, the first defendant in the Suit. .(c) The aforesaid Lessee was nationalised by Central Act 2 of 1976, and all the assets of the Lessee vested with the Central Government. Subsequently, the Lessee underwent a transformation twice, before eventually becoming Bharath Petroleum Corporation Limited, the first defendant in the Suit. .(d) In exercise of the power conferred under Sections 5(2) and 7(3) of the Central Act 2 of 1976, the first defendant sought statutory renewal of the lease, by their letter dated 13. 1981 for a further term of 20 years with effect from 3. 1982. The renewal was on the same yearly rent of Rs.6,000/-. .(e) The lease got renewed statutorily and the renewed period of lease was to come to an end on 22. 2002. .(f) Even before the renewed term of lease came to an end, the plaintiff’s mother attempted to terminate the lease and demanded possession by 22. 2000, but it was not agreed to by the first defendant. Again by a letter dated 1. 2002, followed by another letter dated 11. 2002, the plaintiff’s mother appears to have demanded vacant possession of the land by 22. 2002. However, the first defendant sought further renewal of the lease. .(g) The plaintiff’s mother then executed a Deed of Settlement dated 12. 2003 registered as document No.367 of 2003 in the Office of the Sub-Registrar of Mylapore, settling the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff. After settlement, the plaintiff issued a legal notice dated 16. 2006 to both the defendants, calling upon them to surrender possession of the suit property within three months. The first defendant sent a reply, refusing to concede the demand, forcing the plaintiff to come up wit h the present Suit for recovery of possession and also for damages for use and occupation. 4. Along with the Suit, the plaintiff filed two Applications viz ., A. No.710 of 2006, for restraining the defendants from altering the superstructure or putting up any further construction in the suit property and A. No.3788 of 2006 for an interim direction to the respondents to pay Rs.1,50,000/- per month for their use and occupation of the suit property. 5. After entering appearance in the Suit, the first defendant, which is the Lessee, has come up with the Application A. No.476 of 2007 under Section 9 of The Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act , 1921. O.A. No.710 of 2006 : 6. 5. After entering appearance in the Suit, the first defendant, which is the Lessee, has come up with the Application A. No.476 of 2007 under Section 9 of The Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act , 1921. O.A. No.710 of 2006 : 6. In so far as this Application for an interim order of injunction restraining the respondents from putting up any further construction in the suit property is concerned, it is seen that the plaintiff has sought for such an injunction only for the purpose of avoiding the first respondent/first defendant from pleading any equity at the end of the day, if the Suit is decreed in his favour. Moreover, the contention of the plaintiff is that after the termination of the lease, the defendants are not entitled to put up any further construction. 7. Mr. O.R. Santhanakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the first defendant submitted that at present, there is no proposal to put up any further construction. In any event, even if the defendants put up any construction, after the termination of the tenancy and during the pendency of the Suit, they would only be doing so at their own risks and costs. Therefore, recording the statement made by the learned counsel for the first defendant that there is no proposal to put up any construction, this Application is closed, leaving it open to both parties to approach this Court whenever any contingency arises. Application No.3788 of 2006 : 8. Admittedly, the rent for the suit schedule property was fixed at Rs.6,000/- per year way back on 3. 1962. After 20 years, the lease got renewed compulsorily on the same terms and conditions, on account of a statutory provision. Consequently, the rent for the suit schedule property has remained at Rs.6,000/- per year (Rs.500/- per month) for the past 45 years (from 1962 to 2007). The suit schedule property is a land of the extent of 3 grounds and 597 sq. ft., in T.T.K. Road, Alwarpet, Chennai-18. Therefore, even if the rent is fixed at Rs.1 per sq. ft., per month, it would work out to Rs.7,797/- per month. Hence, I am of the considered view that the first defendant should be directed at least to make a deposit at the rate of Rs.8,000/- per month to the credit of the Suit with effect from July 2007 onwards. ft., per month, it would work out to Rs.7,797/- per month. Hence, I am of the considered view that the first defendant should be directed at least to make a deposit at the rate of Rs.8,000/- per month to the credit of the Suit with effect from July 2007 onwards. Accordingly, without prejudice to the rights of both parties, to lead evidence and invite a finding on the quantum of rent or damages for use and occupation (by whatever name it is called), at the time of trial of the Suit, an interim direction is issued, directing the defendants to deposit to the credit of the Suit a sum of Rs.8,000/- per month with effect from July, 2007, onwards. Application No.476 of 2007 : 9. This Application under Section 9 of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921, is resisted by the plaintiff on the short ground that the first defendant is not in actual physical possession of the property and that therefore, he is not a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921. In order to be entitled to protection under the Act, the Lessee should be in actual physical possession of the property, apart from satisfying the other criteria. 10. Mr. Satish Parasaran, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff contended that Section 2(4) of the Tamil Nadu Act No.III of 1922 which defines a Tenant, makes it clear that only a person who continues in possession of the land would be entitled to invoke the provisions of the Act. Section 2(4) reads as follows: “(4) “Tenant” in relation to any land — .(i) means a person liable to pay rent in respect of such land, under a tenancy agreement express or implied, and .(ii) includes — .(a) any such person as is referred to in sub-clause (i) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement. .(b) any person who was a tenant in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement to which this Act is applicable under sub-section (3) of Section 1 and who or any of his predecessors in interest had erected any building on such land and who continues in actual physical possession of such land and building, notwithstanding that — .(1) such person was not entitled to the rights under this Act by reason of the Proviso to Section 12 of this Act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1972), or .(2) a decree for declaration or a decree or an order for possession or for similar relief has been passed against such person on the ground that the proviso to Section 12 of this Act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972) disentitled such person from claiming the rights under this Act, and (c) the heirs of any such person as is referred to in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii)(a) or (ii)(b); but does not include a sub-tenant or his heirs.” 11. In support of his contention that actual physical possession is a sine quo non for claiming the benefits under the Act, Mr. Satish Parasaran, learned counsel for the plaintiff relied upon the following decisions: 1. P. Ananthakrishnan and Another v. Dr. G. Ramakrishnan and Another, 1987 (2) SCC 429 . 2. S.R. Radhakrishnan and Others v. Neelamegam , 2003 (3) CTC 488 : 2003 (10) SCC 705 . 3. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Spencer and Company Limited, AIR 2004 Mad. 110 . 4. Hamsa Patel and Two Others v. S. Balakrishnan and Another, 1997 (1) CTC 367 . 5. Malini Parthasarathy v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, 2007 (1) CTC 67 . 6. R. Chandramouleeswaran and 11 Others v. P. Vasudevan and Others, 2007 (2) LW 265 . 7. P.R. Aithala alias P. Ramakrishna Aithala v. Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited , A.S. No.113 of 1991, C.M.P. No.14303 of 2005 and C.M.A. No.336 of 1987 dated 10. 2006 - MANU/TN/2672/2006 Page-1. 8. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. M/s. Keyaram Hotels (P) Limited , 2002 (2) CTC 21 . 12. Per contra , Mr. 7. P.R. Aithala alias P. Ramakrishna Aithala v. Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited , A.S. No.113 of 1991, C.M.P. No.14303 of 2005 and C.M.A. No.336 of 1987 dated 10. 2006 - MANU/TN/2672/2006 Page-1. 8. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. M/s. Keyaram Hotels (P) Limited , 2002 (2) CTC 21 . 12. Per contra , Mr. O.R. Santhanakrishnan, learned counsel for the first defendant contended that the first defendant alone is in actual physical possession of the suit schedule property and that the second defendant is only on a ‘leave and license arrangement’ and that therefore, the first defendant cannot be taken to be divested of possession. The learned counsel invited my attention to the definition of the word “License” contained in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 and pointed out that no interest in immovable property has been created in favour of the second defendant and that therefore the actual physical possession is only with the first defendant. 13. Mr. O.R. Santhanakrishnan, learned counsel for the first defendant, relied upon the following decisions in support of his contention: 1. Bhubaneswar Prasad Narain Singh v. Sidheswar Mukherjee, 1971 (1) SCC 556 . 2. Babu Singh Chauhan v. Smt. Rajkumari Jain , 1982 (1) SCC 520 . 3. State of U.P. v. District Judge , 1997 (1) SCC 496 . 4. Estate of T.P. Ramaswami Pillai v. A. Mohd. Yousuf, 1983 (2) MLJ 319 . 5. T.R.P. Raja Sekara Bhoopathy v. Navaneethammal, 1979 (2) MLJ 144 . .14. Mr. O.R. Santhanakrishnan, learned counsel for the first defendant also brought to my notice that against some of the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, Special Leave Petitions have already been admitted by the Supreme Court and pending. Therefore, the learned counsel for the first defendant contended that the issue has not so far been clinched by the Supreme Court. 15. As seen from the rival contentions, the entitlement of the first defendant to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922 is questioned on account of the fact that the first defendant is not running an outlet for the sale of Petrol and Diesel in the suit schedule property, by themselves. Though the suit schedule property was taken on lease by the first defendant, the first defendant has granted a License to the second defendant to run the outlet in the suit schedule property. Though the suit schedule property was taken on lease by the first defendant, the first defendant has granted a License to the second defendant to run the outlet in the suit schedule property. Admittedly, some of the Petrol Bunks in the City and elsewhere are run and operated by the first defendant as a company outlet and some outlets are run by the first defendant through persons to whom Licenses are granted for the purpose. As admitted by both parties, if the outlet run in the suit schedule property is operated by the first defendant-Company itself, this question would not have cropped up at all. Since the outlet is now operated by the second defendant as Licensee, the question as to who is in actual physical possession of the property has arisen. 16. It is not in dispute that only a tenant in actual physical possession is entitled to the benefits of Section 9 of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921. Therefore, the core issue to be decided is as to whether the first defendant is in possession or the second defendant is in possession of the suit schedule property. To be more precise, the question that is to be decided is as to whether the possession of a Licensee can be taken to be the possession of the Licensor, in so far as the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, are concerned. It must be remembered that this question as to whether the Licensee’s possession can be taken to be the Licensor’s possession, is to be decided only with reference to the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921 and not with reference to any other enactment. .17. Before considering the decisions cited on either side, it would be useful to consider the submission made by the learned counsel for the first defendant with reference to Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, reads as follows: “52. “License” defined .—Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license.” 18. Thus the definition of the word “License” make it clear that no interest in immovable property is created by the grant of License. But Section 52 does not throw any light upon the question as to whether the possession of the Licensee is in fact as well as in law, the possession of the Licensor also. In so far as the right of possession is concerned, Sections 63 and 64 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, provide a clue. Section 63 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, reads as follows: “63. Licensee’s rights on revocation.— Where a license is revoked, the licensee is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property affected thereby and to remove any goods which he has been allowed to place on such property.” Section 64 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, reads as follows: “64. Licensee’s rights on eviction.— Where a license has been granted for a consideration, and the licensee, without any fault of his own, is evicted by the grantor before he has fully enjoyed, under the license, the right for which he contacted, he is entitled to recover compensation from the grantor.” 19. Thus, Sections 63 and 64 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, make it clear that the Licensee is granted a right of possession, to a limited extent even after a License is revoked and he is also conferred with a right to seek compensation if he is evicted before he has fully enjoyed the rights guaranteed under the License. Therefore, the Indian Easements Act, 1882, appears to have recognised a right of actual physical possession in a Licensee, to a limited extent. If the Licensee is entitled to such a protection in respect of his actual physical possession, as against the Licensor, then it is futile to contend that the possession of the Licensee is actually the possession of the Licensor, at least in so far as the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, are concerned. 20. The first defendant has filed a typed set of papers containing a “Dispensing Pump and Selling License” entered into between the first defendant and the second defendant, as Document No.1, to show that the first defendant is in actual possession of the property. Mr. 20. The first defendant has filed a typed set of papers containing a “Dispensing Pump and Selling License” entered into between the first defendant and the second defendant, as Document No.1, to show that the first defendant is in actual possession of the property. Mr. O.R. Santhanakrishnan, learned counsel for the first defendant took me through the various clauses contained in the said License Agreement to show that the first defendant is in possession of the property. Some of these clauses are of signif icance and hence they are either extracted or dealt with as follows: “(a) In Clause 1 of the License Agreement, the first defendant-Company has stated that what was granted to the Licensee was only a License to enter upon the premises and to use the Motor Spirit, Pumps, Storage Tanks, Pipes and Fittings and all other facilities for the purpose of sale of Motor Spirit, Motor Oil, etc. But the later portion of Clause 1 of the License Agreement also says that the first defendant would have the right to take back the whole or any portion of the premises or the facilities. .(b) Clause 2(b) of the License Agreement imposes an obligation upon the second defendant to pay and discharge all rates, taxes, cesses, duties and other impositions and outgoings levied or imposed by the Municipality, Government etc., in respect of the premises. .(c) Clause 4 declares that the premises and the facilities shall remain the absolute property and in sole possession of the first defendant. .(d) Clause 5 of the License Agreement imposes an obligation upon the Licensee to use the premises only for the purposes stated therein. .(e) Clause 8 of the License Agreement requires the Licensee to keep the underground storage tanks properly locked with padlocks provided by the Licensees and to delivery possession of the keys to the Licensor whenever required. .(f) Clause 10(j) of the License Agreement imposes an obligation upon the Licensee not to do or permit to be done anything on the premises that would endanger the grant or continuance of Government License. .(g) Clause 10(q) of the License Agreement imposes an obligation upon the Licensee “not to sell, mortgage, let or otherwise deal with or dispose of the said premises”. .(g) Clause 10(q) of the License Agreement imposes an obligation upon the Licensee “not to sell, mortgage, let or otherwise deal with or dispose of the said premises”. .(h) Clause 15 of the License Agreement makes it clear that upon the revocation or termination of the License, the Licensee shall cease to have any rights to enter or remain in the premises and that if the Licensee continues to remain on the premises, the Company would be at liberty to evict them. .(i) Clause 18 of the License Agreement makes it clear that nothing contained in the License Agreement shall be deemed to create any right right other than the revocable permission granted in respect of the Licensed premises and that nothing contained in the agreement shall be deemed to create any tenancy or other right of occupation in favour of the Licensee. 21. From the aforesaid Clauses, it is clear that the first defendant has taken pains to drive home a strong message that the agreement should not be construed as a lease. But however disguised as it may be, the agreement has created a limited possessory right in favour of the second defendant, both in terms of the Clauses contained in the License Agreement itself and also by virtue of the provisions contained in the Indian Easements Act, 1882 discussed above. Therefore, the conclusion that it is the second defendant, who is in actual physical possession of the property, appears to be inevitable. 22. Coming to the decisions relied upon by Mr. Satish Parasaran, learned counsel for the plaintiff, it is seen that in P. Ananthakrishnan and Another v. Dr. G. Ramakrishnan and Another, 1987 (2) SCC 429 , the Supreme Court held as follows: “Section 9 confers an additional statutory right on a tenant against whom Suit for ejectment is filed to exercise an option to purchase the demised land through the medium of Court on fulfillment of conditions specified therein. It is not an absolute right, as the Court has discretion to grant or refuse the relief for the purchase of the land. It is not an absolute right, as the Court has discretion to grant or refuse the relief for the purchase of the land. The tenant has no vested right in the property, instead it is a privilege granted to him by the statute which is equitable in nature.” Therefore, the Supreme Court held further that an enquiry under Section 9 pre-supposes that the tenant making the Application has been in the occupation of the land and the superstructure wherein he may be either residing or carrying on business. 23. In S.R. Radhakrishnan and Others v. Neelamegam, 2003 (3) CTC 488 : 2003 (10) SCC 705 , the Supreme Court laid down the conditions for the grant of relief under Section 9, in paragraph-5 as follows: “5. From the above provision, it will be seen that the following conditions are to be satisfied before a tenant is entitled to relief: .(i) He should be a tenant in possession of the land. .(ii) He should have erected a superstructure on the land in respect of which he would be entitled to claim compensation under Section 3. (iii) A Suit or proceeding for eviction should have been taken by the landlord against him. (iv) He should have applied to the Court for direction in that regard within one month from the date of service of summons in such Suit.” The question as to whether the actual physical possession is necessary for the grant of relief under Section 9, was answered by the Supreme Court in paragraph-13 of the same judgment as follows: “13. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the actual physical possession of the premises is not essential for exercising the privilege conferred on a tenant by Section 9 of the Act. In support of his contention he relied on Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva, AIR 1959 SC 577 : 1959 Supp (1) SCR 968. This was a case under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In support of his contention he relied on Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva, AIR 1959 SC 577 : 1959 Supp (1) SCR 968. This was a case under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 14(1) of the Act provides: “14(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.” In the context of this provision it was held that the word “possession” occurring in Section 14(1) is used with the widest connotation and it may be either actual or constructive or in any form recognized by law. We are afraid that the wide meaning given to the word possession in Section 14 in the Act cannot have any relevance for purposes of provision of Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Act under consideration. As already noted, Section 9 read with Section 3 of the Act makes it imperative that the tenants s hould be in possession of the premises with respect to which the right to purchase is sought to be exercised. If a tenant is not to hand over possession of the suit premises to the landlord at the time of ejectment, there is no question of payment of any compensation to him under Section 3 of the Act. If he is not entitled to compensation under Section 3 of the Act he cannot invoke Section 9 of the Act. Actual physical possession is essential in the context of relevant provisions of the Act. In fact in P. Ananthakrishnan Nair v. Dr. G. Ramakrishnan, 1987 (2) SCC 429 ( though cited by the learned counsel for the appellant), it was held by this Court that the premises must be in personal occupation of the tenant before he could exercise the right under Section 9 of the Act.” 24. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Hamsa Patel and Two Others v. S. Balakrishnan and Another, 1997 (1) CTC 367 , followed the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Ananthakrishnan Nair’s case. The decision of a learned Judge of this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Spencer and Company Limited , AIR 2004 Mad. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Hamsa Patel and Two Others v. S. Balakrishnan and Another, 1997 (1) CTC 367 , followed the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Ananthakrishnan Nair’s case. The decision of a learned Judge of this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Spencer and Company Limited , AIR 2004 Mad. 110 , followed the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in S.R. Radhakrishnan’s case, under identical circumstances, in respect of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.’s case . 25. In Malini Parthasarathy v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, 2007 (1) CTC 67 , both the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court were followed and a Licensee of a Petroleum Corporation was the person held to be in actual physical possession. In paragraph-18 of the said judgment, Mr. Justice K. Mohan Ram, went into the issue of several types of possession and held as follows: “There is lot of difference between the ‘legal possession’ and ‘physical possession’ and also there is lot of difference between the ‘legal possession’ and ‘actual physical possession’. It may be true that the respondent is in ‘legal/constructive possession’ of the suit property through its dealer M/s. Bhandari Agencies but by no stretch of imagination it could be said that the respondent is in actual physical possession of the suit property. For being in actual physical possession the respondent should be running the outlet at the suit property through its own employees having full control over the entire operation and administration.” 26. In R. Chandramouleeswaran and 11 Others v. P. Vasudevan and Others, 2007 (2) LW 265 , Mr. Justice M. Chockalingam, considered the same question, in respect of the very same first defendant herein and held in paragraph-16 as follows: “Admittedly, the second defendant, who is the retail dealer, has been in actual possession all along. There is distinction between the actual physical possession and legal possession. In the instant case, it is true, the first defendant is in legal possession, but he is not in actual physical possession of the land, but it is only the second defendant.” 27. In P.R. Aithala alias P. Ramakrishna Aithala v. Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited , A.S. No.113 of 1991, C.M.P. No.14303 of 2005 and C.M.A. No.336 of 1987 dated 10. In P.R. Aithala alias P. Ramakrishna Aithala v. Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited , A.S. No.113 of 1991, C.M.P. No.14303 of 2005 and C.M.A. No.336 of 1987 dated 10. 2006 - MANU/TN/2672/2006 Page-1), the Division Bench of this Court considered the definition of the word “Tenant” appearing in Section 2(4) of The Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921 and held in paragraph-11 as follows: “Therefore, the long line of decisions referred to above clearly point out one thing and that is, if a tenant wants to get the benefit under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Tenants’ Protection Act, he must be in actual physical possession of the land and building and the tenant or his predecessors in interest ought to have erected that building.” 28. The decision of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. M/s. Keyaram Hotels (P) Limited, 2002 (2) CTC 21 , is also to the same effect. .29. Mr. O.R. Santhanakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the first defendant produced copies of stay orders issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various Special Leave Petitions, arisen out of the some of the decisions of this Court referred to above. Those order copies disclose that the Hon’ble Supreme Court is seized of the matter. But the interim orders granted in those cases are only with respect to dispossession or the continuance of further proceedings in the Suit. Those orders do not amount to a pronouncement of the law on the point. 30. Coming to the decisions relied upon by Mr. O.R. Santhanakrishnan, learned counsel for the first defendant, it is seen that the Supreme Court held in Bhubaneswar Prasad Narain Singh v. Sidheswar Mukherjee, 1971 (1) SCC 556 , that the possession of one co-sharer is the possession of all the co-sharers. The said decision is of no assistance to the first defendant since the case before the Supreme Court arose out of a suit for partition, between co-sharers. In this case, the first defendant and the second defendant are not co-sharers, but Licensor and Licensee, even according to the first defendant. 31. In Babu Singh Chauhan v. Smt. Rajkumari Jain, 1982 (1) SCC 520 , the Supreme Court held that possession by a landlord of his property may assume various forms. In paragraph-10, the Supreme Court held as follows: “10. 31. In Babu Singh Chauhan v. Smt. Rajkumari Jain, 1982 (1) SCC 520 , the Supreme Court held that possession by a landlord of his property may assume various forms. In paragraph-10, the Supreme Court held as follows: “10. We have gone through the judgment of the High Court in the light of the arguments of the parties and we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the High Court that the mere fact that the landlady did not actually reside in the premises which were locked and contained her household effects, it cannot be said that she was not in possession of the premises so as to make Section 17(2) inapplicable. Possession by a landlord of his property may assume various forms. A landlord may be serving outside whi le retaining his possession over a property or a part of the property by either leaving it in charge of a servant or by putting his household effects or things locked up in the premises. Such an occupation also would be full and completes possession in the eye of law.” But the ratio laid down in the said decision, cannot be imported to the case on hand. That was a case which arose out of rent control proceedings and when a portion occupied by the tenant was surrendered to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the landlady claimed the benefits of Section 17(2) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. While construing Section 17(2) of the said Act, the Supreme Court held as above in the said case. But in so far as the Madras City Te nants’ Protection Act, 1921 is concerned, the definition of the word “Tenant” has been held by the Supreme Court to be peculiar to the said Act. Therefore, the said decision cited by the learned counsel for the first defendant is not applicable to the case on hand. .32. In State of U.P. v. District Judge , 1997 (1) SCC 496 , the Supreme Court held that a person can be in constructive possession or legal possession. But the said decision also arose out of the provisions of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 and hence it is of no use to the first defendant. 33. In Estate of T.P. Ramaswami Pillai v. A. Mohd. But the said decision also arose out of the provisions of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 and hence it is of no use to the first defendant. 33. In Estate of T.P. Ramaswami Pillai v. A. Mohd. Yousuf, 1983 (2) MLJ 319 , the definition of the word “Tenant” appearing in Section 2(4) was considered and it was held that even the heirs of a tenant, who are not in possession, are not entitled to the benefits of Section 9. In T.R.P. Raja Sekara Bhoopathy v. Navaneethammal, 1979 (2) MLJ 144 , Chief Justice T. Ramaprasada Rao (as he then was), held that “the primordial requirement for a tenant to claim the benefits under the Act is that he should be in actual physical possession of such land and building.” 34. Thus, all the aforesaid decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court make it clear that the actual physical possession is a sine quo non for claiming the benefits of Section 9. It is admitted even by the first defendant that he has granted a license to the second defendant to sell petrol and petroleum products in the suit schedule property. The various clauses contained in “Dispensing Pump and Selling License”, granted by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant as well as the provisions of The Indian Easements Act, 1882, make it clear that the second defendant is in physical possession of the suit schedule property and his possession is even protected by Section 63 of the Easements Act, 1882. Therefore, the first defendant is not entitled to the benefits of Section 9 of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921. 35. Consequently, Application A. No.476 of 2007 filed by the first defendant is dismissed.