MUSTAFA AHMAD KHAN v. CHANCELLOR, LUCKNOW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW
2007-01-02
RAKESH SHARMA
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Sharma, J.—This matter relates to the year 1987. Case called out thrice but none appeared on behalf of the opposite parties. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has put in appearance. Even after the arguments of Sri Abdul Moin, learned Counsel for the petitioner, the names of learned Counsel for the opposite parties were again called to enable them to put in appearance on behalf of the opposite parties but no one has put in appearance. Since this is an old matter relating to the year 1987, the Court has no option left except to proceed with the case. 2. The petitioner who was working as Accountant in the college of Arts and Crafts, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as the ‘college’) was put under suspension on 3.7.1965 in connection with certain irregularities allegedly committed by him in the College. On 5.5.1965 an FIR was lodged against the petitioner and three other employees, S. Sri D.R. Kaushik, S.R. Khastgir and H.L. Merh and criminal case No. 237 of 1965 under Section 409 I.P.C. P.S. Hasanganj, Lucknow was initiated against the petitioner. The petitioner was enlarged on bail on 3.7.1965. The charge-sheet and criminal proceedings against the petitioner were quashed by the Court on 9.12.1985. However, the departmental inquiry against the petitioner continued and ultimately he was dismissed from the service on 27.11.1986. 3. The Principal of the College after suspending the petitioner did not take any action nor proceeded with the departmental inquiry. After the criminal proceedings were quashed by the Court, the petitioner approached the Principal of the College and requested to allow him to resume duties as Accountant. The petitioner was not allowed to join in the college and immediately he was issued a charge-sheet on 18.10.1986 i.e. after more than 21 years of putting the petitioner under suspension. The petitioner submitted a reply to the charge-sheet on 3.11.1986. The petitioner was not supplied with the documents, extract and other materials, which were cited in the charge-sheet. 4. As per learned Counsel for the petitioner, without holding any formal regular departmental inquiry and fixing date, time and place of the departmental inquiry the petitioner was dismissed from the service on 27.11.1986.The opposite parties had acted in utter haste in completing the enquiry instantly and immediately to avoid for reinstatement of the petitioner in service after quashing of the criminal proceedings by the Court.
The action had been taken with predetermined mind and prejudging the issues to somehow punish the petitioner. 5. The petitioner has assailed the departmental inquiry on several grounds as indicated in the writ petition as well as in the grounds clause of the same. He has challenged the competence of the principal of the College in dismissing the petitioner from the services. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Principal of the college was not the appointing authority rather the Vice Chancellor of the Lucknow University was the appointing authority of the petitioner. However, no relevant rules were placed by the petitioner to substantiate this submission. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that Sri A.K. Ghosh, Administrative Officer was biased with the petitioner and, therefore, he could not have hold the enquiry against the petitioner as he was junior than the petitioner and if the petitioner had been allowed to join in the service Sri A.K. Ghosh would have been reverted from the post of Administrative Officer. Thus, Sri A.K. Ghosh was an interested person and did not want that the petitioner come back in the service. In view of this the; petitioner had submitted an application for change of the Inquiry Officer but this application was not dealt with by the Principal of the College and no order was passed on the said application. A biased officer cannot proceed with the enquiry as per law laid down by Hon. the Supreme Court of India in the judgments reported in 2001 (1) ATJ 527 (SC), State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna; 1999 (1) UPLBEC 433 , S.N. Pandey v. State; 1993 (4) SCC 10 , Ratan Lal Sharma v. Management Committee and 1984 (4) SCC 103 , J. Mahapatra v. State of Orissa. 7. Sri Abdul Moin, learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the departmental inquiry was held in utter haste by issuing the charge-sheet on 18.10.1986. The Inquiry Officer had submitted his report on 15.11.1986, without waiting for affording adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to meet the case, report etc. The petitioner has contended that immediately after issuing of the charge-sheet and submission of the reply on 3.11.1986, the Inquiry Officer had submitted his report on 15.11.1986. 8.
The Inquiry Officer had submitted his report on 15.11.1986, without waiting for affording adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to meet the case, report etc. The petitioner has contended that immediately after issuing of the charge-sheet and submission of the reply on 3.11.1986, the Inquiry Officer had submitted his report on 15.11.1986. 8. In the present case, neither the Inquiry Officers report was supplied to the petitioner nor any show cause notice was issued to him. After receiving the Inquiry Officer’s report dated 15.11.1986, the petitioner was dismissed from the services on 27.11.1986. The Inquiry Officer ought to have supplied the documents cited in the charge-sheet to the petitioner to enable him to submit a proper reply to the charge-sheet. The charges levelled against the petitioner were based on the report and other documentary evidences, which were not made available to the petitioner. Thus, the principles of natural justice have been violated in the present case. 9. As per learned Counsel for the petitioner, the enquiry was conducted in utter haste where in such matter, dismissal from the service, a proper enquiry was required. No date, time and place was fixed by the Inquiry Officer. The petitioner was not associated with the departmental trial whereas a detailed departmental inquiry was needed in the facts and circumstances of the case and proper procedure ought to have been followed. 10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner highlighted various documents, replies, charge-sheet, findings of the Inquiry Officer and the dismissal order that the principles of natural justice were not followed. The enquiry was completed within one month and three days after issuing the charge-sheet dated 18.10.1986. The chronology of events itself shows that the principles of natural justice were flagrantly violated. The petitioner was not given proper opportunity of hearing and he was not dealt with fairly and properly. The whole enquiry was farce and sham. 11.
The enquiry was completed within one month and three days after issuing the charge-sheet dated 18.10.1986. The chronology of events itself shows that the principles of natural justice were flagrantly violated. The petitioner was not given proper opportunity of hearing and he was not dealt with fairly and properly. The whole enquiry was farce and sham. 11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgments as reported in 2004 (2) SCC 65 , Bhadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia, AIR 1981 SC 2181 , S.P. Kapoor v. State of H.P.; 2002 (20) LCD 733, All Shafatullah v. Commissioner; 2001(2) UPLBEC 1475 (DB), Subhash Chandra Sharma v. U.P. Cooperative Spinning Mills; 2000(18) LCD 768 (All)(DB), Hari Nath Singh Yadav v. Administrator and AIR 1998 SC 3038 , State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal, in support of his submissions. 12. Since the learned Counsel for the respondents are absent, no arguments were advanced and the Court has to formulate its conclusions on the basis of arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 13. Here is a case where after suspending the petitioner on 3.7.1965, the appointing authority did not proceed with the departmental inquiry. The charge-sheet and the criminal proceedings were quashed, by the competent Court of law on 9.12.1985, meaning thereby that no element of crime was found against the petitioner after quashing of the charge-sheet and the criminal proceedings. It was open for the appointing authority to proceed with the departmental inquiry as both the proceedings could be taken simultaneously and not one after another. In the circumstances of the case, due caution and care should have been taken by the Principal of the College in holding the departmental inquiry. In this case the Inquiry Officer completed the departmental inquiry within one month three days immediately after issuing the charge-sheet. The petitioner demanded supply of relevant pages of audit objections and other relevant materials on the basis of which, the whole charges were founded, but it emerges that these documents were not supplied to the petitioner to enable him to meet the case effectively and in proper manner. The chronology of events shows that enquiry was conducted in utter haste without following the principles of natural justice. The petitioner has submitted the reply of the charge-sheet on 3.11.1986 in absence of the demanded documents.
The chronology of events shows that enquiry was conducted in utter haste without following the principles of natural justice. The petitioner has submitted the reply of the charge-sheet on 3.11.1986 in absence of the demanded documents. The appropriate authority could have fixed the date, time and place of the enquiry and informed the same to the petitioner. The petitioner was not kept associated with the departmental trial. He was not even informed as to when the Inquiry Officer was going to hold the enquiry. The versions of the petitioner were not appreciated by the Inquiry Officer as well as the punishing authority. 14. In the present case, neither the findings of the enquiry nor show cause notice were issued to the petitioner to inform him as to what decision is going to be taken against him. However, it is relevant to mention that in the enquiry report it was indicated that the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner but the petitioner had denied to receive the same. Taking that a show cause notice was issued against the petitioner, the punishing authority could have fixed a date for personal hearing of the petitioner to arrive at a conclusion of dismissal or removing him from the service. The petitioner was not informed as to what findings were recorded against him and why he is going to be dismissed or removed from the service and what was the material and in what manner it was weighed and appreciated by the Inquiry Officer and the same was against him. This is certainly violative of the principles of natural justice and the petitioner was not dealt with fairly. 15. As far as question of bias is concerned, the application of the petitioner was not dealt with by the punishing authority for change of the Inquiry Officer. There appears to be substance in the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The application for change of the Inquiry Officer ought to have been dealt with by the punishing authority at the appropriate time. This has not been done. Thus, it can be said that the enquiry is vitiated by element of bias. Various case laws as mentioned above cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner cover the controversy. 16. In view of above discussion, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.11.1986, is quashed.
This has not been done. Thus, it can be said that the enquiry is vitiated by element of bias. Various case laws as mentioned above cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner cover the controversy. 16. In view of above discussion, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.11.1986, is quashed. Since the petitioner must have been retired in the year 1989 this Court is of the opinion that a compensation may be awarded to the petitioner which this Court finds appropriate as Rs. 25,000 towards compensation and Rs. 15,000 -towards the costs of litigation, expenses incurred by the petitioner for pursuing the litigation in this Court. A total sum of Rs. 40,000 shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. Other consequences shall follow. ————