Hrushikesha Sen v. Governor, Reserve Bank of India
2007-01-03
A.K.PARICHHA, B.P.DAS
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT B. P. DAS, J. : This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing the order dated 23.9.1992 passed by opposite party No.2 imposing certain penalties which, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, are shockingly disproportion¬ate to the charges and that too the multiple punishments are contrary to the service Rules. The charges framed against peti¬tioner, as it appears from Annexure-2, are as follows :- “3. You are therefore, charged with- (a) having colluded with others in the substitution of 7992 punched notes in the 114 packets of non-issuable notes, with the intention of causing pecuniary loss to the Bank. Or in the alternative (aa) having performed our duties as Asst. Treasurer grossly negligently, in failing to notice the substitution of 7992 punched notes of Rs.100/- denomination in the said 114 packets, inter alia, by not following the instructions contained in paras 39 and 53 of the Chapter-III of the issue department manual (1972 edition). (b) having caused pecuniary loss to the bank in the sum of Rs.7,99,200/- being the value of the substituted 7992 pieces of non issuable notes of Rs.100 denomination. Accordingly, this charge sheet is issued to you in pursuance of Regulation 47 of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regula¬tions, 1948, xxx xxx” The Disciplinary Authority ultimately found the petitioner guilty of the aforesaid charges and imposed the following puni¬shment : 1. Reversion to the post of Teller for a period of seven years. 2. Pay in the reversed scale be reduced by 7 stages from the date of passing of the order. 3. Reduction shall have the effect of postponing future increments. 4. Period of suspension be regularized by grant of leave. The petitioner went in appeal against the order of disci¬plinary authority and the appellate authority confirmed the same. Now the petitioner before this Court challenges the orders of disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority on various grounds. One of such is that there was nothing before the disciplinary authority to implicate the petitioner with the alleged charges and draws our attention to the report of the Inquiry Officer under Annexure-15 wherein it was observed as follows : “...... As such the CSO did not have either direct or any indirect hand in the alleged substitutions and consequential loss to the Bank.
As such the CSO did not have either direct or any indirect hand in the alleged substitutions and consequential loss to the Bank. Though he could have prevented the continuation of losses day after day caused by the substitutions perpetrated by Sri S.C. Mohanty, Teller, through performance of his duties as laid down in para-53 ibid (ext-M-19) and thereby detect the mal¬practice, he was prima facie grossly negligent. Even then as the loss to the Bank had already occurred in the hands of Sri S.C. Mohanty much before the packets were brought to CSO for consid¬eration while he was working as A.T. (C) CSO cannot be held directly responsible for the pecuniary losses sustained by the Bank. Hence, charge (b) does not stand.” 2. Relying upon the aforesaid observation, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is not liable to be punished for an act of omission or commission of another person. But the ultimate finding of the Inquiry Officer is that the petitioner is grossly negligent and failed in his duty, which led to infliction of the punishment, which is under challenge in this proceeding. 3. In such nature of the case, at the out set, we make it clear that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the reliability of evidence is not to be considered by the High Court and also it cannot over look the fact that the departmental authority is the sole judge of the fact, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. (See-The High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil and another, reported in AIR 2000 SC 22 ). In our considered opinion, we cannot now assess the evidence in a proceeding under Article 226 and substitute the finding recorded by the departmental authority. 4. Next comes the question of imposition of multiple penalties. Rule 47(1) of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regu¬lations 1948 provides for penalty in the following manner.
In our considered opinion, we cannot now assess the evidence in a proceeding under Article 226 and substitute the finding recorded by the departmental authority. 4. Next comes the question of imposition of multiple penalties. Rule 47(1) of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regu¬lations 1948 provides for penalty in the following manner. “(a) reprimand; (b) delay or stoppage of increment or promotion; (c) degradation to a lower post or grade or to a lower stage in his incremental scale; (d) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by the employees; (e) dismissal.” In the case of Commissioner of Rural Development v. A.J. Jagannathan, (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 313, it has been held by the apex Court that the multiple penalties can be imposed. So, the plea of the petitioner that multiple penalties cannot be imposed is bound to fail. Thereafter, the petitioner says that punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the charges framed. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a decision in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra and others, AIR 2000 Supreme Court 1151, where the apex Court held that the High Court can interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employees in a disciplinary proceeding, if that penalty shocks the con¬science of the Court. The petitioner further relies upon a deci¬sion of the Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, AIR 1996 Supreme Court, 484 and submits that the High Court can direct the authorities to reconsider the penalty im¬posed or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, imposes appropriate punishment with cogent rea¬sons in support thereof. He further relies upon a decision of the apex Court in Union of India and another v. S.C. Parashar, (2006) Supreme Court Cases 167 to draw our attention that the apex Court deprecated the imposition of penalty both minor and major by the same order. 5. Here is a case where penalties have been imposed as per Rule 47 of the Regulations and have been distinctly awarded, as indicated above. The aforesaid decisions will not, in any way, help the petitioner as in the present case, the petitioner is an officer of the Bank.
5. Here is a case where penalties have been imposed as per Rule 47 of the Regulations and have been distinctly awarded, as indicated above. The aforesaid decisions will not, in any way, help the petitioner as in the present case, the petitioner is an officer of the Bank. The apex Court in the case of Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Behari Patnaik, (1996)9 SCC-69 held as follows : “The very discipline of the organization/bank is dependent upon each of its officers and employees acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is misconduct.” In the case of V. Ramana v. A.P.S.R.T.C. and others AIR 2005 Supreme Court, 3417 the apex Court further, taking into consid¬eration the various earlier decisions of the said Court, held : “The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury’s case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. To put differently, unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interfer¬ence. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.” 6. Considering the above noted legal position and the fact that the petitioner is an employee of the Bank where high stan¬dard of moral discipline is necessary, we do not find that the punishments imposed on the petitioner by the disciplinary author¬ity and confirmed in appeal, are at all disproportionate to be interfered with. 7. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. A. K. PARICHHA, J. I agree. Petition dismissed.