Judgment H.R. Panwar, J.-By the instant writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the award dated 17.04.2001 passed by the Judge, Industrial Disputes Tribunal, Bikaner (for short, “the Industrial Tribunal” hereinafter), whereby on a reference made by the State Government, the claim filed by Non-petitioner No. 1 under Section 10(1)(Gha) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, “the ID Act” hereinafter), was allowed and it was held, that the workman/non-petitioner No. 1 possesses the requisite qualification to be appointed as a Meter Reader and held, that the act of the petitioners denying promotion by direct recruitment to the Non-petitioner No. 1 on the post of Meter Reader was illegal and invalid. It was further held, that the workman/non-petitioner No. 1 is entitled to be promoted/appointed on the post of Meter Reader w.e.f. 18.07.1994. However, it was held, that since, the workman/non-petitioner No. 1 did not work on the post of Meter Reader, therefore, by granting notional benefit, the petitioners were directed to promote the workman/non-petitioner No. 1 on the post of Meter Reader with all consequential benefits like seniority, wage revision etc. The petitioners, who are employer, by the instant writ petition, seeks quashing of the Award Annexure 5 dated 17.04.2001. 2. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Carefully perused the impugned award. 3. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the workman non-petitioner No. 1 was initially appointed as a Class IV employee w.e.f. 26.04.1980. While in service, he passed Prathma Examination held, by the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Allahabad (Prayag) in the year 1979.
2. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Carefully perused the impugned award. 3. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the workman non-petitioner No. 1 was initially appointed as a Class IV employee w.e.f. 26.04.1980. While in service, he passed Prathma Examination held, by the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Allahabad (Prayag) in the year 1979. On the relevant date of his passing the said Prathma Examination, it was declared by the State Government, vide Notification Shi.P/a4/7/Sa.Pra/Kha/60 dated 13.05.1974 as the qualification equivalent to Secondary School Examination, but subsequently, the State Government de-recognized the said qualification of Prathma Examination held by the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Allahabad (Prayag) as equivalent to Secondary School Examination by the Notification No. F3 (45)/Karmik/Ka-2/85 dated 07.05.1988 issued by the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms of the State of Rajasthan and as the vacancies for the post of Meter Reader for which the workman Non-petitioner No. 1 claims promotion, occurred on 18.07.1994 and, therefore, on the date of occurrence o the vacancy for promotion to the post of Meter Reader, the qualification which was recognized as equivalent to Secondary School Examination by the Notification dated 13.05.1974, stood de-recognized and, therefore, the workman/non-petitioner No. 1 was not entitled to be promoted on the post of Meter Reader. 4. Learned Counsel for the workman/non-petitioner No. 1 supported the Award of the Industrial Tribunal and relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Shiv Karan & Ors., 1993 (2) WLN 286 and submitted that the facts of the instant case are identical to the facts in State of Rajasthan vs. Shiv Karan & Ors., (Supra) and, therefore, the controversy involved in the instant case is squarely covered by the decision of the Division Bench in the aforesaid case. 5. In State of Rajasthan vs. Shiv Karan & Ors., (Supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that as soon as the respondents therein passed the Prathma Examination prior to 1985, they would be deemed to have passed High Schools in view of the said notification dated 13.05.1974. The said notification dated 28.06.1985 was not retrospective in effect. It did not effect the equivalence which was earlier granted by the notification dated 13.05.1974. The said notification dated 28.06.1985 was not retrospective in effect. In that case, the respondents therein, viz.
The said notification dated 28.06.1985 was not retrospective in effect. It did not effect the equivalence which was earlier granted by the notification dated 13.05.1974. The said notification dated 28.06.1985 was not retrospective in effect. In that case, the respondents therein, viz. Shiv Karan and Others, had passed the Prathma Examination in 1984 from Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Prayag and, therefore, the Division Bench of this Court held, that it is thus clear that all the respondents therein had passed the Prathma Examination prior to issuance of the said notification dated 26.08.1985 de-recognizing the Prathma Examination as equivalent to High School/Matriculation Examination. All the respondents therein had acquired the said qualification before it was de-recognized and, therefore, they will not be denied that they had possessed the qualification equivalent to High School/Matriculation Examination. The equivalence given to Prathma Examination with that of High School/Matriculation is not available to those who had passed it after 28.06.1985. It would be unjust for the petitioner-respondents if their qualification of prathama obtained prior to 1985 is not taken into consideration for the purpose of their promotion. 6. In Suresh Pal vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 2027 , the Honble Supreme Court observed as under: “The certificate course in Physical Education in Shri Hanuman Vyayam Prasarak Mandal, Amravati, Maharashtra was recognised by the Government of Haryana in 1975 for appointment to the post of Physical Training Instructor in Government Schools in Haryana. On the basis of this recognition granted by the State of Haryana to the certificate course of physical education in this Institute in Amravati, the petitioners joined the certificate course and were receiving instruction in this Institution until 09.01.1985 when the State of Haryana derecognised the certificate course with the result that the certificates obtained by the petitioners at the end of the certificate course became useless for obtaining service as Physical Training Instructor in Haryana. The petitioners, therefore, filed writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for a writ directing the State of Haryana to recognise the certificates obtained by them, because they had joined the course on the basis of the recognition given by the State of Haryana and the recognition was in force at the time when they joined the course. Writ petition was however rejected summarily by the High Court and hence, the present appeal by the special leave.
Writ petition was however rejected summarily by the High Court and hence, the present appeal by the special leave. We are of the view that since, at the time when the petitioners joined the course, it was recognised by the Government of Haryana and it was on the basis of this recognition that the petitioners joined the course, it would be unjust to tell the petitioners now that though at the time of their joining the course it was recognised, yet they cannot be given the benefit of such recognition and the certificates obtained by them would be futile, because during the pendency of the course it was derecognised by the State Government on 09.01.1985. We would, therefore, allow the appeal and direct the State Government the recognise the certificates obtained by the petitioners and others similarly situate as a result of completing the certificate Court in Shri Hanuman Vyayam Prasarak Mandal, Amravati for the purpose of appointment as Physical Training Instructor in Government Schools in Haryana. Of course, if any person has joined the certificate course after 09.01.1985, he would not be entitled to the benefit of this order and any certificate obtained by him from the said institute would be of no avail. There will be no order as to costs of the appeal.” 7. Keeping in view the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Shiv Karan & Ors. (Supra), in my view, the Industrial Tribunal was justified in making the award impugned. In the circumstances, therefore, I do not find any error, illegality or perversity in the impugned award warranting interference in the extraordinary jurisdiction. 8. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. The stay petition also stands dismissed. No order as to costs.