JUDGMENT S.S. Saron, J.:- This order will dispose of the above mentioned petitions filed by the writ petitioners as they involve similar and common questions of law and facts. The facts are taken from the case of Amar Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others (Review Application No.344 of 2004 in CWP No.13152 of 2001). 2. All the above review applications have been filed for reviewing/recalling the order dated 18.8.2003 passed by this Court, the operative part of which reads as under:- “At the hearing, Shri Ashish Aggarwal, learned counsel for the petitioners gave out that similar writ petition bearing No.183 of 2001 was disposed of by a Full Bench on 13.3.2003 and submits that this writ petition may also be disposed of in terms of the judgment of the Full Bench. In view of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of the judgment of the Full Bench in Jai Singh Versus State of Haryana and others, (2003-2) PLR 658.” 3. A perusal of the above shows that it is on the statement of the counsel for the petitioners that the cases were disposed of in terms of the Full Bench judgment passed in the case of Jai Singh v. State of Haryana, (2003-2) PLR 658. 4. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that when the present petitions came up for motion hearing, the Division Bench had ordered the hearing of the present petitions after the Full Bench decision in Jai Singh’s case (supra). The vires of the Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) (Haryana Amendment) Act, 1992 (‘the Amendment Act, 1992’ - for short) was under challenge which was likely to affect the decision in the present petitions also. It is submitted that when the writ petitions came up for hearing before this Court after the Full Bench decision in Jai Singh’s case (supra) due to inadvertence and oversight and under the bona fide belief that since the Full Bench had given judgment and these cases were to be heard after the decision of the Full Bench, a prayer was made for disposing of the cases in terms of the Full Bench judgment. It is submitted that, however, while passing the judgment in Jai Singh’s case (supra), the Full Bench held that the cases in which the orders passed by the authorities under the Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1961 (as applicable in Haryana) (‘1961 Act’ – for short) were challenged with a prayer to set aside the order of ejectment, such cases shall be examined on merit in the light of law laid down by the Full Bench in Jai Singh’s case (supra). Therefore, it was ordered that the cases in which orders of ejectment are also under challenge may be separated from the other bunch in which only the vires of the Amendment Act, 1992 were under challenge. A reference is made to para 66 of the Full Bench judgment and on the basis of the same it is submitted that the present set of writ petitions filed by the petitioners were to be segregated from the bunch and heard independently as per the decision rendered by the Full Bench. In the present case, it is submitted that the land in question was reserved during consolidation after taking the same from the owners for the income of the Gram Panchayat. This, it is submitted, is apparent from the scheme of consolidation (Annexure-P.2) and the relevant Jamabandi (Annexure-P.3). Moreover, possession of the land in question was never taken from the owners by the Gram Panchayat and they remained in cultivating possession of the same. Therefore, the orders of ejectment passed against the petitioners (Annexure- P.10 and P.12) inter alia on the ground that land having been reserved during consolidation would vest in the Grant Panchayat are not liable to be sustained. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 927 held that the land which was reserved for imposing pro-rata cut upon the owners in the village during consolidation of holdings for the income of the Gram Panchayat is unconstitutional being violative of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. Reliance is also placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Kala Singh v. Commissioner, Hissar Division, 1984 PLJ 169. Reliance is also placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Kala Singh v. Commissioner, Hissar Division, 1984 PLJ 169. It is submitted that in the present cases the land was admittedly reserved for income of the Gram Panchayat and the same having been held to be unconstitutional, the land in question would not vest in the Gram Panchayat and the orders of ejectment are liable to be quashed on this ground alone. It is further submitted that even though against the order dated 18.8.2003 passed by this Court, SLPs were filed in the Supreme Court these were dismissed in limine before leave to appeal was granted. Thereafter, review applications were also dismissed on 22.4.2005. However, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kunahayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359, the present review applications are maintainable before this Court. 5. In response, Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court for respondent No.4-Gram Panchayat has submitted that the application for review after dismissal of the SLPs are not maintainable. In any case, it is submitted by Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Amicus Curiae that even on merits the petitioners have no claim as their land in question in the present cases is recorded as ‘Shamilat Deh’ and, therefore, would vest in the Gram Panchayat by virtue of Section 4(1)(a) of 1961 Act and the land has never been in the cultivating possession of the individual owners so as to be excluded from the definition from the ‘Shamilat Deh’ as contained in Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act. It is submitted that the ratio of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram’s case (supra) and of this Court in Kala Singh’s case (supra) would not apply as no land of the proprietors is being taken for the income of the Gram Panchayat in which case applicability of the second proviso of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India may be there. It is only when the land of the proprietors is taken which is within the ceiling limit that the provisions of the second proviso of Article 31-A of the Constitution would apply. 6. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the matter and also perused the record. It is only when the land of the proprietors is taken which is within the ceiling limit that the provisions of the second proviso of Article 31-A of the Constitution would apply. 6. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the matter and also perused the record. As regards the maintainability of the review applications, it may be noticed that in Kunahayammed’s case (supra) it was inter alia held that the doctrine of merger is a common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety in the hierarchy of justice delivery system. It was held that the the doctrine of merger and the right of review are concepts which are closely inter-linked. If the judgment of the High Court has come up to the Supreme Court by way of a special leave, and special leave is granted and the appeal is disposed of with or without reasons, by affirmance or otherwise, the judgment of the High Court merges with that of the Supreme Court. In that event, it is not permissible to move the High Court by review because the judgment of the High Court has merged with the judgment of the Supreme Court. But where the special leave petition is dismissed – there being no merger, the aggrieved party is not deprived of any statutory right of review, if it was available and he can pursue it. It may be that the review court may interfere, or it may not interfere depending upon the law and principles applicable to interference in the review. The case of the petitioners is that the Special Leave to Appeal filed by them before the Supreme Court against the order dated 18.8.2003 passed by this Court has been declined without recording any reasons. In this situation, in terms of the ratio of the judgment in Kunahayammed’s case (supra) there would be no merger of the order dated 18.8.2003 passed by this Court with that of the order declining Special Leave to Appeal or the order passed by the Supreme Court in review. In this situation, in terms of the ratio of the judgment in Kunahayammed’s case (supra) there would be no merger of the order dated 18.8.2003 passed by this Court with that of the order declining Special Leave to Appeal or the order passed by the Supreme Court in review. In any case, in order to obviate the contention of the petitioners that their matter has not been considered on merits as regards challenge to orders of their eviction and the Full Bench has only been considered to the extent of the validity of Clause (6) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act, we proceed to consider the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners as regards to the challenge to the validity of the orders of their eviction. 7. The writ petitions were filed for declaring Section 2 of the Punjab Village Common Land (Regulation) (Haryana Amendment) Act, 1991 as ultra vires to the Constitution of India by which the existing definition of ‘Shamilat Deh’ under Section 2(g) of the principal Act has been amended. In view of the amendment, it is submitted that the land in question which belongs to the proprietors and right holders of the village and was reserved during consolidation proceedings in Village Dhakwala, Tehsil and District Karnal under Sections 18 and 23-A of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (‘1948 Act’ – for short), only the management and control was given to the Gram Panchayat. However, the same has been made to vest in the Gram Panchayat as ‘Shamilat Deh’ by including the said land within the ambit of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act without any payment of compensation etc. which is violative of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. A further submission has seen made for quashing the impugned orders dated 27.6.2001 and 25.7.2001 passed by the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Karnal and Collector, District Karnal respectively by which the petitioners have been ordered to be evicted from the land in question. It is also submitted that the order dated 8.5.2001 passed by the Assistant Collector Ist Grade wherein it has been held that no question of title was involved is liable to be quashed. 8. In respect of Villages Dhakwala Roran and Dhakwala Gujran there is one Gram Panchayat Dhakwala. The petitioners are proprietors and right holders in Village Dhakwala Roran. It is also submitted that the order dated 8.5.2001 passed by the Assistant Collector Ist Grade wherein it has been held that no question of title was involved is liable to be quashed. 8. In respect of Villages Dhakwala Roran and Dhakwala Gujran there is one Gram Panchayat Dhakwala. The petitioners are proprietors and right holders in Village Dhakwala Roran. Their names figure in the Fahrist Malkan/Missal Haquiat of the village prepared by the revenue officials. Gram Panchayat Dhakwala on 8.3.2001 filed 16 petitions under Section 7 of the 1961 Act for ejectment of various proprietors of the village from the total land measuring 208 Kanals 9 Marlas. The said petitions were consolidated by the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Karnal. The land in question, it is submitted, is ownership and in possession of the proprietors and right holders of the village which was initially joint. Thereafter, in the year 1972-73, the land was partitioned amongst the proprietors and right holders of the village and it fell to the share of the respective petitioners who have been in possession of the same as proprietors and right holders of the village for the last many years and much prior even to the consolidation of holdings that took place in the village. In the Jamabandi (Record of Rights) for the year 1952-53 with respect to the entire land measuring 208 Kanals 9 Marlas in the column of ownership it is recorded as ‘Shamilat Deh’. In the column of cultivation, it is recorded as ‘Khud Kashat Wa Makbuza Malkan’ i.e. in possession of the owners. The consolidation of holdings in the village took place in the year 1964. A scheme of consolidation of holdings was prepared. Certain lands belonging to the proprietors and right holders of the village were reserved for common purpose of the village under the provisions of the 1948 Act. The reservation was made further imposing a pro-rata cut on the holdings of the respective shares of the proprietors and right holders of the village. From the land holdings of the petitioners and other proprietors and right holders of the village total land measuring 208 Kanals 9 Marlas was reserved for the purpose of income of the Gram Panchayat. It was reserved after imposing a pro-rata cut as per the consolidation scheme (Annexure-P.2). From the land holdings of the petitioners and other proprietors and right holders of the village total land measuring 208 Kanals 9 Marlas was reserved for the purpose of income of the Gram Panchayat. It was reserved after imposing a pro-rata cut as per the consolidation scheme (Annexure-P.2). The case of the petitioners further is that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram’s case (supra) and of this Court in Kala Singh’s case (supra), land reserved for income of the Gram Panchayat is ultra vires Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. 9. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties, it may be noticed that it is the admitted case of the parties that in the Jamabandi for the year 1952-53 in respect of land in question it has been recorded as ‘Shamilat Deh’ which means common land of the village. Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act defines ‘Shamilat Deh’ in the following terms:- “2(g) “Shamilat Deh” includes. (1)Lands described in the revenue records as Shamilat Deh or Charand excluding abadi Deh; (2) Shamilat Tikkas; (3) Lands described in the revenue records as shamilat Tarafs, Patties, Pannas and Tholas and used according to revenue records for the benefit of the village community or a part thereof or for common purposes of village; (4) Lands used for the benefit of village community including streets, lanes, playgrounds, schools, drinking wells, or ponds situated within the Sabha area as defined in clause (mmm) of Section 3 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 excluding lands reserved for the common purposes of a village under section 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948), the management and control whereof vests in the State Government under section 23-A of the aforesaid Act; (4a) vacant land situated in abadi deh or gora deh not owned by any person; (5) Lands in any village described as Banjar quadim and used for common purposes of the village according to revenue records. (6) Lands reserved for the common purposes of a village under Section 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act, 50 of 1948), the management and control whereof vests in the Gram Panchayat under Section 23-A of the aforesaid Act. (6) Lands reserved for the common purposes of a village under Section 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act, 50 of 1948), the management and control whereof vests in the Gram Panchayat under Section 23-A of the aforesaid Act. Explanation:- Lands entered in the column of ownership of record of rights as ‘Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hasab Rasad’, shall be shamlat deh within the meaning of this section.” but does not include land which: (i) becomes or has become shamilat deh due to river action or has been reserved as shamilat in villages subject to river action except shamilat deh entered as a pasture, pond or playground in the revenue records; (ii) has been allotted on quasi permanent basis to a displaced person; (ii-a) was shamilat Deh, but has been allotted to any person by the Rehabilitation Department of the State Government, after the commencement of this Act, but on or before the 9th day of July, 1985; (iii) has been partitioned and brought under cultivation by individual landholders before the 26 th January, 1950; (iv) having been acquired before 26th January, 1950, by a person by purchase or in exchange for proprietary land from a co-sharer in the Shamilat Deh and is so recorded in the Jamabandi or is supported by a valid deed; (v) is described in the revenue records as Shamilat Taraf, Patti, Panna or Thola and not used according to revenue records for the benefit of the village community or a part thereof or for common purposes of the village; (vi) lies outside the abadi Deh and was being used as gitwar, bara, manure pit, a house or for cottage industry immediately before the commencement of this Act. (vii) xx xx xx xx (viii) was shamilat deh, was assessed to land revenue and has been in the individual cultivating possession of co- sharers not being in excess of their respective shares in such shamilat Deh on or before the 26 th January 1950; or (ix) is used as a place of worship or for purposes subservient thereto.” ....(Emphasis added) A reading of section 2(g)(1) of the 1961 Act shows that the land which is described in the revenue record as ‘Shamilat Deh’ excluding Abadi Deh is ‘Shamilat Deh’. In terms of Section 4(1)(a) of the 1961 Act, it is provided that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any agreement, instrument, custom or usage or any decree or order of any Court or other authority, all rights, title and interest whatsoever in the land which is included in ‘Shamilat Deh’ of any village and which is not vested in a Panchayat under the ‘Shamilat Law’ shall at the commencement of the 1961 Act vest in a Panchayat constituted for the said village and where no such panchayat has been constituted for such village vest in the panchayat on such date as panchayat having jurisdiction over that village is constituted. Sub-clause (6) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act and the explanation appended thereto were inserted by way of the Haryana Government Gazette notification dated 11.2.1992. In terms of the same the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) (Haryana Amendment) Act, 1992 (Haryana Act No.9 of 1992) received the assent of the President on 14.1.1992 and published in the Haryana Government Gazette (Extra-ordinary) on 11.2.1992. In terms of the amendment the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act was omitted and after sub-clause (5), Clause (6) to Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act has been inserted. The vires of the said provision was challenged in this bunch of petitions which was adjourned to await the decision of the Full Bench. The Full Bench in Jai Singh’s case (supra) vide its judgment dated 13.3.2003, held as follows:- “62. The vires of the said provision was challenged in this bunch of petitions which was adjourned to await the decision of the Full Bench. The Full Bench in Jai Singh’s case (supra) vide its judgment dated 13.3.2003, held as follows:- “62. In view of the discussion made above, we hold that:- i) sub-section (6) of Section 2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and the explanation appended thereto, is only an elucidation of the existing provisions of the said Act read with provisions contained in the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948; ii) the un-amended provisions of the Act of 1961 and, in particular, Section 2(g)(1) read with Sections 18 and 23-A of the Act of 1948 and Rule 16(ii) of the Rules of 1949 cover all such lands which have been specifically earmarked in a consolidation scheme prepared under Section 14 read with Rules 5 and 7 and confirmed under Section 20, which has been implemented under the provisions of Section 24 and no other lands; iii) the lands which have been contributed by the proprietors on the basis of pro-rata cut on their holdings imposed during the consolidation proceedings and which have not been earmarked for any common purpose in the consolidation scheme prepared under Section 14 read with Rules 5 and 7 and entered in the column of ownership as Jumla Mustarka Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab Rasad Arazi Khewat and in the column of possession with the proprietors, shall not vest with the Gram Panchayat or the State Government, as the case may be, on the dint of sub-section (6) of Section 2 (g) and the explanation appended thereto or any other provisions of the Act of 1961 or the Act of 1948; iv) all such lands, which have been, as per the consolidation scheme, reserved for common purposes, whether utilised or not, shall vest with the State Government or the Gram Panchayat, as the case may be, even though in the column of ownership the entries may be Jumla Mustarka Malkans Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab Rasad Arazi Khewat etc.” 10. Therefore, in view of the above, the challenge in the writ petitions to declare Section 2(g)(6) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) (Haryana Amendment) Act, 1961 as ultra vires does not survive. 11. Therefore, in view of the above, the challenge in the writ petitions to declare Section 2(g)(6) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) (Haryana Amendment) Act, 1961 as ultra vires does not survive. 11. In the present case admittedly, the land is recorded in the column of ownership as ‘Shamilat Deh’. Therefore, it is to vest in the Gram Panchayat in terms of Section 4(1)(a) of the 1961 Act. Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act is in two parts. The first part relates to the land which is included in the ‘Shamilat Deh’ and the second part relates to the lands which are excluded. In terms of clause (iii) which is in the second part of section 2(g) and relates to the lands which are not included as ‘Shamilat Deh’ it has to be shown that for the land to be the ownership of the individual land owners, it has been partitioned and brought under cultivation by the individual land holders before 26.1.1950. It is only then that such land would be excluded from ‘Shamilat Deh’. In terms of the exclusion clause (iii) of the second part of Section 2(g) it was open to the proprietors and share holders before the appointed date i.e. 26.1.1950 to partition or bring into cultivation the land of the ‘Shamilat Deh’. The land in question admittedly has not been partitioned or brought under cultivation by an individual land holder before 26.1.1950. In fact, as has already been noticed, the case of the petitioners is that the ‘Shamilat Deh’ land was partitioned some time in the year 1972-73 and thereafter, the individual proprietors of the land have been in possession. However, in terms of clause (a) of the second part of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act for the land to be excluded, it is to be shown that the land was ‘Shamilat Deh’, was assessed to land revenue and has been in individual possession of cosharers not being in excess of their respective shares in such ‘Shamilat Deh’ on or before 26.1.1950. Therefore, it is required not only to be shown that the land was ‘Shamilat Deh’ and was assessed to land revenue but has been in individual possession of co-sharers not being in excess of their respective shares in such ‘Shamilat Deh’ on or before 26.1.1950. Therefore, it is required not only to be shown that the land was ‘Shamilat Deh’ and was assessed to land revenue but has been in individual possession of co-sharers not being in excess of their respective shares in such ‘Shamilat Deh’ on or before 26.1.1950. A perusal of the Jamabandi for the year 1952-53 even though it is recorded as in ‘Khud Kashat Mukbuza Malkan’, however, the nature of the land has been described as ‘Gair Mumkin Ret’ (sand). Therefore, the land being described in the Jamabandi for the year 1952-53 as ‘Gair Mumkin Ret’ (sand), it cannot be said that any crop was being sown so as to make it cultivable and neither can it be said to be in self-cultivation of the Makbuza Malkan. The Jamabandi for the year 1952-53 is evidently after the cut off date of 26.1.1950. As such, it cannot be said to be in individual possession of cosharers so as to come within the second part of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act and thus excluded from ‘Shamilat Deh’. In the circumstances, the land being recorded as ‘Gair Mumkin Ret’ (sand) dislodges the stand of the petitioners that it has been in the individual cultivating possession of the cosharers before 26.1.1950. A reference to the extract of the consolidation scheme would show that the land has been reserved for common purposes. It is mentioned that at the spot land for passage and other common purposes has been carved out after imposing a cut which has been indicated in the consolidation scheme. The land measuring 208 Kanals 6 Marlas has been reserved for income of the Gram Panchayat. On the strength of Supreme Court judgment in Bhagat Ram’s case (supra), the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the same is in violation of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. The land measuring 208 Kanals 6 Marlas has been reserved for income of the Gram Panchayat. On the strength of Supreme Court judgment in Bhagat Ram’s case (supra), the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the same is in violation of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. In the said case the question that was considered was in respect of the consolidation scheme insofar as it made reservations of land for income of the Panchayat and whether the same was hit by the second proviso to Article 31-A. Section 2(bb) of the 1948 Act defines “common purpose” as follows:- “2(bb) “common purpose” means any purpose in relation to any common need, convenience or benefit of the Village and includes the following purposes:- (i) xx xx xx xx xx (ii) providing income for the Panchayat of the village concerned for the benefit of the village community. (iii) xx xx xx xx xx (iv) xx xx xx xx xx” 12. Section 23 A of the 1948 Act provides for management and control of lands for common purposes to vest in Panchayats or State Government. As soon as a scheme comes into force for the management and control of all lands assigned or reserved for common purposes of the village under Section 18 shall vest in the Panchayat of that village which shall be entitled to draw the income accruing therefrom for the benefit of village community and the rights and interests of owners of such land shall stand modified and extinguished accordingly. In Bhagat Ram’s case (supra) it was held that a Consolidation Officer preparing a scheme could easily defeat the object of the second proviso to Article 31-A by reserving for the income of the Panchayat a major portion of land belonging to a person holding within the ceiling limit. Article 31-A of the Constitution provides for saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates etc. Article 31-A of the Constitution provides for saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates etc. The second proviso to Article 31-A reads as under:- “Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.” 13. Therefore, what is provided is payment of compensation to the owner of land in case the State is to acquire land of an owner which is within his permissible ceiling limit in a revenue estate. Such a situation would not arise in the present cases as the land in question is the ‘Shamilat land’ of the Gram Panchayat itself, which has been reserved under the consolidation scheme for common purposes namely, for income of the Gram Panchayat. Therefore, it is not a case where land is being taken from any owner of the land which would require the payment of compensation to him. It is a case where the own land of the Gram Panchayat which is ‘Shamilat Deh’ and vests with it is being utilized for the common purpose for the income of the Panchayat. The proprietors and right-holders of the village have no right to the ‘Shamilat Deh’ land which is to vest in the Gram Panchayat in accordance with the provisions of Section 4(1)(a) of the 1961 Act. The management and control of the land reserved for common purposes under Section 18 of the 1948 Act vests with the Gram Panchayat in terms of Clause (6) to Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act. Therefore, for all intents and purposes the land which has been reserved for the income of the Panchayat of the village for the benefit of village community is the own land of the Panchayat and such reservation is permissible by the provisions of Section 2(bb)(ii) of the 1948 Act. Therefore, for all intents and purposes the land which has been reserved for the income of the Panchayat of the village for the benefit of village community is the own land of the Panchayat and such reservation is permissible by the provisions of Section 2(bb)(ii) of the 1948 Act. Therefore, the ratio of the judgment in Bhagat Ram’s case (supra) would not apply to the facts of the present case. These aspects as considered herein were not subject matter of decision in Kala Singh’s case (supra) which only followed Bhagat Ram’s case (supra). Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, the ratio of the judgment in Kala Singh’s case would also be inapplicable. 14. Another argument raised by Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, learned counsel for the petitioners is that his case would fall within the exclusion clause (1) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act, inasmuch as the land is not to be part of ‘Shamilat Deh’ because it has become ‘Shamilat Deh’ due to river action. However, no material has been placed on record to show that the land has become ‘Shamilat Deh’ due to river action. In the impugned orders passed evicting the petitioners, the learned Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Karnal in his order dated 8.5.2001 has inter alia held as follows:- “The record of consolidation was summoned and was perused. As per record, at the time of Consolidation this land was kept for the benefit of the village and the management and control of the same was for the Gram Panchayat. The khasra numbers mentioned in the application, the same are different from the shamilat khewat as per revenue record. In the column of cultivation the entry is for income of Nagar Panchayat.” 15. The appeal against the said order was dismissed by the Collector on 25.7.2001. It was held that in the present case the land in question belongs to the ‘Shamilat Khewat’ from the very beginning and vests in the Gram Panchayat as the entire village including non-proprietors are the original owners. Besides, there was no proof on record that the land in dispute was subject to river action. Mere entry in column No.8 as ‘Sailab’, it was held, was not enough to prove the kind of land or that it was alluvian and dilluvian land. Mention to this effect, it was held, should have existed in the scheme ‘Ishtemal’. Besides, there was no proof on record that the land in dispute was subject to river action. Mere entry in column No.8 as ‘Sailab’, it was held, was not enough to prove the kind of land or that it was alluvian and dilluvian land. Mention to this effect, it was held, should have existed in the scheme ‘Ishtemal’. The land in dispute was held to be cultivable since the time of consolidation and it had been leased by the Gram Panchayat upto the year 1972-73. Thereafter, it has been partitioned by the occupants unauthorisedly and they were claiming title over it. Therefore, there is nothing on record to dislodge the said findings of facts reached at by the authorities below. As such the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the land in question is ‘Sailab’ land is misconceived and without basis. 16. During the course of hearing, it was also submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents and not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Gram Panchayat had taken possession of the land in consequence of the impugned orders. The present petitions have been pending in review as it is the case of the petitioners that the question independent of the challenge to the vires of sub-clause (6) to Section 2(g), it was to be seen whether the land reserved for income of the Gram Panchayat is not illegal in view of the judgments in Bhagat Ram’s case (supra) and Kala Singh’s case (supra). The ratio of the judgment in the said cases having been held to be inapplicable would not confer any rights as regards the ownership of the land on those who were occupying the same. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in these petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed. We had appointed Mr. Ashok Aggarwal as Amicus Curiae in the case for assistance of the Court. For the assistance rendered, we feel that he should be paid a sum of Rs.5,000/- in each of the cases which would be payable by the Gram Panchayat Dhakwala. ----------------