ORDER V.K. Shrivastava,J. :- 1. Since both the appeals involve in a common question they are taken together, and are being disposed of by this common order. Both these appeals under Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short, “the Act, 1940”) are against the order dated 25-09-1996 passed by IVth Additional District Judge, Raipur, in Civil Suit No.37-B/1990 whereby appellant's objection for setting aside the award has been rejected and award has been made rule of the Court and accordingly judgment and decree has been passed. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that M/s Lucky Bharat Garage (for short "insured") is a Private Ltd. Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act with its main office of business at M.G. Road, Raipur having branches and godowns at several places in the country. Insured carries on the business of transportation of goods to various places, who got his godowns insured for fire risk of certain godowns and for riots and strike risk with respect to other godowns. Policy issued by the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Limited (for short "insurer") in its favour was expiring on 13-4-1994. In order to renew of the policies, insured submitted a letter enclosing a list of branches and godowns for renewal or insurance against fire, riot and strike risk for the year 1984-85 and also sent premium vide cheque dated 15/04/1984. Insurer accepted the premium and thereby the contract of insurance was completed. Godowns at Jeevan Colony, West Niwarganj, Jabalpur, Godowns and offices at M.G. Road, Raipur, Godown No.1 and 2 at Bhanpuri, Raipur, Godown at 19, New Lohar Mandi, indore, Godown at Mantri Chowk, Bhawani Patnam were insured for fire, riot and strike stick for the year 1984-85. In the year 1984 after unfortunate assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi, Ex Prime Minister of India, the incidents of riots throughout the country took place. Resultantly insured's branches were completely looted and burnt. Insured filed its claim along with necessary details to the insurer and also demanded the policy. Insurer along with covering letter dated 26-12-1984 supplied photo-copy of the policies. Insured going through those documents found that insurer has manipulated the policies. 3. Insurer contested the claim and stated that the insured obtained insurance policy in respect of certain godowns for fire risk and for certain godowns riots and strike risk. Insurer along with covering letter dated 26-12-1984 supplied photo-copy of the policies. Insured going through those documents found that insurer has manipulated the policies. 3. Insurer contested the claim and stated that the insured obtained insurance policy in respect of certain godowns for fire risk and for certain godowns riots and strike risk. Godowns located at Jabalpur and Raipur, were not insured for riot and strike risk whereas godowns situated at indore and Bhavani Patnam were insured against fire due to riot risk. The amount of loss in respect of godowns situated at indore was settled between the parties at Rs.2,97,700=22 subject to usual requirement of insurance Company which insured did not fulfill. The godowns at Bhawani Patnam was insured for Rs.2,00,000/-. In respect of godowns at Jabalour and Raipur, insurer has no responsibility to reimburse the loss sustained by the insured having policy not covered under the riot and strike risk. 4. Insurance Policy contains Arbitration Clause, therefore, insured to settle the dispute filed an application under Section 20 of the Act, 1940 for appointment of Arbitrator before the lower Court. Lower Court for resolving the dispute appointed two Arbitrators and one umpire with consent of both the parties. Shri L.D. Deoras and Shri S.P. Sharma were appointed as Arbitrators and Shri B.P. Gorha was appointed as Umpire. Arbitrator Shri L.D. Deoras in his award decided that only godowns at Indore and Bhawani Patnam were insured for riot and strike risk and the loss sustained by the insured in both these places comes to Rs.3,46,306=37. He further decided that the godowns situated at Jabalpur, M.G. Road Raipur and Bhanpuri Raipur were not insured for riot and strike. On the contrary, Arbitrator Shri S.P. Sharrna decided that the godowns situated at Jabalpur, M.G. Road, Raipur, Bhanpuri, Raipur, Indore and Bhawani Patnam were insured for fire, riot and strike risk and accordingly awarded Rs.15,00,000/-. Umpire Shri B.P. Gorha agreed with the award passed by Shri L.D. Deoras and accordingly submitted his award. On 15-6-1996 both the parties filed their objections against the award submitted by Umpire. 5. Insured had stated in its objection that learned Umpire without assigning any reason has brushed aside the award passed by arbitrator Shri S.P. Sharma. Umpire has not based award on documents filed by him. Umpire wrongly stated that the claimant did not dispute Schedule 1 of the opposite party. 5. Insured had stated in its objection that learned Umpire without assigning any reason has brushed aside the award passed by arbitrator Shri S.P. Sharma. Umpire has not based award on documents filed by him. Umpire wrongly stated that the claimant did not dispute Schedule 1 of the opposite party. Umpire is misconceived and his award is based on wrong assumption, conjectures and surmises. Accordingly, insured prayed to set aside the award passed by the umpire and to make the rule of the Court the award passed by Shri Satyapal Sharma. 6. Insurer raised objections to the award submitted by Umpire stating that the Umpire has not considered the evidence of survey report of surveyor, terms and conditions of the policy and passed his award on inadmissible evidence. The decision of the Umpire is perverse. The Umpire ignored to consider that insurer agreed to pay claim for Indore godowns for Rs.2,91,000/- on furnishing necessary documents by the insured, which failed to submit those, as also in respect of Bhawani Patnam godowns, insured failed to provide documents to insurer to settle the claim. Therefore, insurer prayed to set aside the award passed by the Arbitrator and Umpire. 7. Lower Court after hearing both the parties vide impugned order, assigning detailed reasons did not accept the objection raised by both the parties, on the other hand, accepted the award passed by the Umpire Shri B.P. Gorha and made it rule of the Court and passed the decree in terms of the award. 8. Learned counsel appearing for both the parties contended that Court refused to set aside the award and in tenns of the award passed the judgment and decree. The order being composite in nature, without assailing the judgment' and decree they had right to challenge the order under Section 39(1) of the Act, 1940 and in order to support their contention, they relied upon the following judgments rendered by various High Courts. (1) Amarchand Sharma Vs. Moosabhai E. Peer Mohamed. (2) Sheoramprasad Ram Narayanlal Bania Vs. Gopal Prasad Parmeshwaniayal Shukla and others. (3) Raja Brijendra Singh Vs. Buti Sahua and others. (4) Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika Vs. Narain Das Haribansh. (5) Union of India Vs. B.C. Basu and another. 9. (1) Amarchand Sharma Vs. Moosabhai E. Peer Mohamed. (2) Sheoramprasad Ram Narayanlal Bania Vs. Gopal Prasad Parmeshwaniayal Shukla and others. (3) Raja Brijendra Singh Vs. Buti Sahua and others. (4) Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika Vs. Narain Das Haribansh. (5) Union of India Vs. B.C. Basu and another. 9. In the above judgments it has been held that if the composite order is passed whereby the Court refused to set aside the award and made the award rule of the Court, without assailing judgment and decree, appeal under Section 39(1) of the Act, 1940 can be preferred. 10. Whether after coming into force of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1976 and the provisions contained in Sections, 104, 105, Order 43, Rule 1-A of the C.P.C., the law down by Hon'ble the Apex Court while rendering judgment in the' matters of Smt, Ujjam Bai Vs. State of UP and others & Ittyavira Mathai Vs. Varkey Varkey mid another and other various provisions enshrined in the Act, 1940, yet parties have right to file appeal under Section 39 by passing the judgment and decree, is a vital question, which requires to be examined in the present scenario. 11. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the matter of Smt. Ujjam Bai (supra), held thus; “The characteristic attribute of a judicial act or decision is that it binds, whether it be a right or wrong. An error of law or fact committed by a judicial or quasi-judicial body cannot, in general be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends. These principles govern not only the findings of inferior courts stricto sensu but also the findings of administrative bodies which are held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Such bodies are deemed to have been invested with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction, and provided that they keep within those limits, their decisions must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal.” 12. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the matter of Ittyavira Mathia (supra), held thus; “It is true that S.3 of the Limitation Act is peremptory and that it is the duty of the Court to take notice of this provision and give effect to it even though the point of limitation is not referred to in the pleadings. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the matter of Ittyavira Mathia (supra), held thus; “It is true that S.3 of the Limitation Act is peremptory and that it is the duty of the Court to take notice of this provision and give effect to it even though the point of limitation is not referred to in the pleadings. Even so it cannot be said that where the court fails to perform its duty, it acts without jurisdiction. If it fails to do its duty, it merely makes an error of law and an error of law can be corrected only in the manner laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. If the party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have that error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity.” 13. Sections 30, 33, 41 and 17 of the Act, 1940 and Sections 104, 105 and Order 43, Rule 1-A of the Code of Civil Procedure are reproduced below : “30. An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely : (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35 ; (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. 33. Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits : Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit. 41. 41. Subject to the provisions of this Act and of rules made thereunder : (a) the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all proceedings before the Court, and to all appeals, under this Act, and (b) the Court shall have, for the purpose of, and in relation to, arbitration proceedings, the same power of making orders in respect of any of the matters set out in the Second Schedule as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before the Court : Provided that nothing in clause (b) shall be taken to prejudice any power which may be vested in an arbitrator or umpire for making orders with respect to any of such matters. 17. Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for consideration or set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow; and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award. S.104. Orders from which appeal lies. - (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders : [* * *] (ff) an order under section 35A;) (ffa) and order under section 91 or section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in section 92, as the. case may be;) (g) an order under section 95; (h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree; (i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules: (provided that no appeal shall lie against any order specified in clause (ff) save on the ground that no order, of an order for the payment of a less amount, ought to have been made,) (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section. 105. Other orders. - Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction; but, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any party aggrieved by an order of remand [* * *] from which an appeal lie does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from depositing its correctness. Order XLIII, Rule 1-A. Right to challenge non-appealable orders in appeal against decrees. - (1) Where any order is made under this Code against a party and thereupon any judgment is pronounced against such party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appeal against the decree, contend that such order should not have been made and the judgment should not have been pronounced. (2) in an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not, have been recorded.” 14. For setting aside the award, an application in writing requires to be filed on the grounds mentioned in Section 30 of the Act, 1940 and when such an application is dismissed, in that case alone, party preferring the application has right to challenge the order under Section 39 of the Act, 1940 before the appellate forum, subject to procedural law applicable to him. Although statutory right has been allowed, but procedure for preferring the appeal is to be followed in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "the Code"). When the Code prescribes the mode, according to which after passing of the decree, only decree is required to be challenged and orders on such an interlocutory application can be raised in that appeal, no appeal without assailing the judgment and decree under Section 39 of the Act, 1940 can be preferred. 15. In Gadiraju Bangarayya and another Vs. Gottemukkula Ramabhadriraju8, the Court held thus; “Where after the filing of an award in Court one of the parties to the arbitration, being misled by the order of the Court posting the suit for objections, files objections instead of an application to set aside the award, and the objections not only are in substance an application to set aside the award, but almost so in form, the mistake made by the party is nothing more than an irregularity which is not such as to entitle the Court to overlook his objections and to pass a decree in terms of the award: 8 A.I.R. 1921 Bom. 419 and 28 A.I.R. 1941 Cal. 527 Ref.” 16. In Kasiraju Lakshmikanta Rao Vs. Dendukuri Venkateswarlu and another, the Court held thus : “Rules 1 and 2 framed under the Arbitration Act require that an application for setting aside an award should be in Writing. Article 11 (m) of the Court fees Act prescribes the payment of Court-fee. On a combined reading of these provisions it is clear that the mere filing of objections or an oral application will not satisfy the requirement of law. This conclusion receives further support from the language of the Proviso to S.33, which provides for setting down of the application for hearing on other evidence also. There is no question of an oral application being set down for hearing. Therefore to hold that neither a written application nor the payment of Court fee on such an application is a pre-requisite for setting aside the award, would have the result of rendering all the aforesaid provisions otiose. AIR 1947 Mad 315 and AIR 1954 Mad 560 and AIR 1959 Andh Pra 632 (FB)Distinguished.” 17. Section 6 of the Court Fee Act, 1870 reads as below : “6. Fees on documents filed, etc., in Mufassal Courts or in public offices. AIR 1947 Mad 315 and AIR 1954 Mad 560 and AIR 1959 Andh Pra 632 (FB)Distinguished.” 17. Section 6 of the Court Fee Act, 1870 reads as below : “6. Fees on documents filed, etc., in Mufassal Courts or in public offices. - Except in the Courts hereinbefore mentioned, no document of any of the kinds specified as chargeable in the first or second schedule to this Act annexed shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in any Court of Justice, or shall be received or furnished by any public officer, unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said schedules as the proper fee for such document.” 18. Section 33 of the Act, 1940, in proviso Clause speaks about the application. It does not say any objection. Therefore, if any party desirous of setting aside the award has only filed objection against any award without exposing the grounds as envisaged under Section 30 of the Act, without paying proper Court fees and other parameter necessary for it, such an objection cannot fall within the ambit of dismissal of application filed following the provisions contained in Sections 30/33 of the Act, 1940. Therefore, if the Court in a composite order disagreed with the objections that does not give rise the right of statutory appeal to the concerned party under Section 39 of the Act, 1940. 19. Here in the instant case, both the parties filed objection against the award passed by the Umpire. In both the objections although they have stated and disputed the facts and evidence adduced before the Umpire, but how Umpire himself misconducted the proceedings, they did not say or described those facts. Therefore, the objection raised by both the parties does not fall within the ambit Section 30/33 of the Act, 1940. For the sake of argument if it may be accepted that the challenge made by the party indirectly impeach the conduct of Umpire, in that case also lack of application in accordance with Section 33 of the Act, 1940 does not allow any right of appeal against refusal of their objection under Section 39 of the Act. Even otherwise, the Court after refusal of objections has made the award rule of the Court by passing judgment and decree in terms of Section 17 of the Act. Even otherwise, the Court after refusal of objections has made the award rule of the Court by passing judgment and decree in terms of Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, only option left with parties was to assail the judgment and decree and to raise objection in accordance with Section 105 and Order 43, Rule 1-A of the C.P.C. Therefore, the appeals filed by both the parties are not maintainable. 20. Learned counsel for the insured contended that Jabalpur and Raipur Godowns were also covered under the riot and strike risk, but the Umpire did not correctly appreciate it and held that Godowns at Jabalpur and Raipur, were not covered under the riots risk. On the other hand, Insurer supports the finding of the Umpire and Arbitrator that Jabalpur and Raipur godowns were not covered under riots and strike risk. Insurer contends that Umpire exceeded its jurisdiction by passing award for loss sustained by the insured towards his Indore and Bhawani Patnarn godowns. 21. To ascertain whether the Umpire misconducted himself or misconducted the proceedings or exceeded his jurisdiction, it is necessary to go through the award passed by him. The relevant portions at para 10 to 24 of the award are extracted as below : “10. According to the opposite party, i.e., the Oriental Respondent/Insurance Company, the claimant started insurance business with it from 1981. The claimant went on renewing the insurance till 1984-85. It is mentioned in the reply of the opposite party that the last reminder letter was sent by the claimant on 7.4.1984. On 13.4.84 the claimant sent a letter for renewal along with a list of godowns to be covered under fire risk and riot risk. This list is schedule-I filed with the reply of the opposite party. Accordingly, policy schedule IV was issued covering the fire risk and riot risk. Schedule II shows the godowns covered under fire risk and schedule III shows those covered under riot risk. Schedule II and Schedule III were drawn up by the opposite party on the basis of the Schedule I. Schedule II and Schedule III do not bear the signature of the insurant-claimant. A copy of the Schedule I is annexed to the insurance policy Schedule IV. The policy mentions certain serial No. in its annexure as those which were covered under riot also. Deciphering these serial Nos. A copy of the Schedule I is annexed to the insurance policy Schedule IV. The policy mentions certain serial No. in its annexure as those which were covered under riot also. Deciphering these serial Nos. in the light of the annexure, the conclusion is inescapable that Raipur and Jabalpur godowns were not covered by riot risk. And, therefore, all depends on the authenticity of Sh.I filed within the reply. The covering letter Dt.13.4.84 is also marked as Sh. I at page 31 in file No.1. This covering letter filed by the Opposite Party with the list Sh. I shows that the claimant had also remitted Rs. 41,606/- as premium for riot and fire policy by cheque No. 052005 Dt. 15.4.84. 11. The case of the claimant is that he had submitted a separate list of godowns to be covered against fire risk and another list of godowns to be covered against riot risk also. These lists are annexure A and B attached to the statement of claim, vide pages 20 to 24 in file No.1. Annexure B shows that Jabalpur and Raipur godowns were also insured against riot risk. Puransingh, the Managing Director of the claimant company, has sworn an affidavit to that effect. The deponents on behalf of the opposite party, namely Shri Puspendra Bharadwaj, A.A.O. Shri R.K. Kumar, Deputy Manager, and Shri R.K. Marwah, Sr. Divisional Manager have asseverated in their respective affidavits that the claimant never submitted any separate lists like annexure A and B. 12. The learned arbitrator, Shri Satya Pal Sharma, dwelt on the normal practice of general insurance, and came to the conclusion that the godowns at Jabalpur and Raipur were not only insured against fire, but they were insured against riot as well. In my opinion the signed proposal of the insurant, if not disputed, would provide the positive, conclusive and exclusive proof whether the godowns in question were insured against riot or not. 13. In the course of arguments before me the learned counsels for the claimant did not seriously dispute Sh.I of the opposite party, because it bears the signature of Puransingh, the managing director of the claimant. However, they vehemently argued that the insurer selected the godowns to be insured against riot risk as the insurer filed in the columns of premium for fire and riot insurance as they liked. However, they vehemently argued that the insurer selected the godowns to be insured against riot risk as the insurer filed in the columns of premium for fire and riot insurance as they liked. The proposal in the form of Sh.I was not referred back to the claimant for approval. The insurer company itself chose the godowns to be insured against riot and strike. The argument is not sound, in the light of the pleadings of the claimant. There is no pleading to support the argument. 14. When the claimant paid the premia for fire and riot insurance on 15.4.84 by cheque No.052005, he must have satisfied himself as to the godowns covered under fire risk and as to the godowns covered under riot risk also. It is unnatural that premia were paid without even knowing the godowns covered under relevant risks. 15. In the statement of claim, it has been asserted by the claimant that he had sent two separate lists, Annexure A and a, along with the renewal letter Dt.13.4.84 Annexure A mentions godowns to be covered under fire risk only and Annexure B mentions godowns to be covered under riot risk also. However, the letter Dt. 13.4.84 of the claimant, vide page 31 in file I, which is part of Sh.I, belies him. In this letter it is mentioned as follows: “The list of branches and address along with the sum insured of each branch is enclosed herewith”. The above letter mentions only a singular list, and, not two lists like Annexure A and B filed with the statement of claim. Both the Annexure A and B have been denied by the opposite party in its reply and in the affidavits filed on its behalf. 16. In view of the claimants letter Dt. 13.4.84 I am unable to hold that a separate list of godowns for fire insurance, Annexure A and a separate list of godowns for riot insurance, Annexure B, were sent by the claimant. Only one list Sh.I filed with the reply of the opposite party was sent to the opposite party for renewal of the previous policy. The premium quoted against insurance or for both fire and riot insurance. This list Sh.I bears the signature of the managing Director of the claimant Shri Puransingh. So the authenticity of Sh.I is not open to doubt. The renewal letter Dt. The premium quoted against insurance or for both fire and riot insurance. This list Sh.I bears the signature of the managing Director of the claimant Shri Puransingh. So the authenticity of Sh.I is not open to doubt. The renewal letter Dt. 13 .4.84 is silent about inclusion of Jabalpur and Raipur godowns for riot insurance which were not insured against riot in the previous year. 17. On the strength of the reasoning of the learned arbitrator Shri Satyapal Sharma, it was contended before me that all the godowns were insured against riot. According to the learned arbitrator, since there is no exclusion clause in the endorsement for riot and strike risk, it should be inferred that all the 84 godowns in Sh. I were insured against riot. Conversely, there is no inclusion clause in the said endorsement, but the inference does not follow that none of the godowns was insured against riot. Moreover, no court or forum can make out any case for any party bigger than that presented by the party itself. It is not the case of the claimant that all the eighty four godowns were insured against not also. In the statement of claim, no such assertion has been made. It is not even alleged that riot premium was paid for all the godowns. Without payment of premium no risk could be assumed at all. 18. The so called endorsement in form No.1 vide page 44, file No.1 is merely attached to the main policy, Sh.IV. It prescribes conditions applicable to property insured against riot risk. So, one has to look to the main policy in order to determine what were the godowns or other property insured against riot. 19. As indicated earlier, the main policy, Schedule-IV; refers to Serial Nos. of godowns mentioned in Schedule I as those insured against riot risk also,. Deciphering these serial Nos. in the light of Sh.I, one finds that the godowns at Jabalpur and Raipur were not insured against riot and strike. In Sh.I, the serial Nos. of godowns at Jabalpur are 36 and 37: and the serial, Nos. of the godowns at Raipur are 72 to 76. These serial Nos. are expressly excluded in the body of the policy, Sh.IV which mentions specific serial Nos. insured against riot, and strike. In Sh.I, the serial Nos. of godowns at Jabalpur are 36 and 37: and the serial, Nos. of the godowns at Raipur are 72 to 76. These serial Nos. are expressly excluded in the body of the policy, Sh.IV which mentions specific serial Nos. insured against riot, and strike. In the previous years also, godowns at Jabalpur and Raipur were not insured against riot, I hold that the godowns at Jabalpur and Raipur were not insured against riot during the relevant period. 20. It follows that the claimant plaintiff is entitled to claim insured amount in relation to godowns at Bhavani Patnam and Indore, which were admitted by insured against riot. Nothing can be claimed in relation to godowns at Jabalpur and Raipur because they were not insured against riot, although these godowns were also looted and burnt in the riots that ensured after the assassination of late Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi. 21. The godown at Bhavani Patnam was insured for Rs.2,00,000/- and the godown at Indore was insured for Rs.3,00,000/-. The extent of loss resulting due to riots, as given by the claimant in relation to these godowns vide flag G in Document file No.3 is as follows: Name of godown : Statement of loss caused : Indore Rs. 2,97,700.22 Bhavani Patnam Rs. 48,606.15 Rs. 3,46,306,37 22. The learned counsel for the opposite party contended that the claimant has not produced any bills, vouchers etc. evidencing the liability discharged by him. The claimant has filed a long list showing the name of consigners. Consignees, kind of consignment, destination, and the amount paid by him, by cheques to his customers, vide pages 1 to 82 in document file No.3. All the details given therein cannot be false or fictitious. 23. Believing the claimant on the question of extent of loss and quantum of compensation, in relation to the godowns at Bhavani Patnam and Indore, I hold that the claimant is entitled to recover Rs.3,46,306.37 only from the opposite party. 24. Accordingly, I award a sum of Rs.3,46,306.37 (Rupees three lacs forty-six thousand and three hundred six and paise thirty seven) payable by the opposite party to the claimant. The oriental fire and general Respondent/Insurance Company is accordingly directed to pay the said amount to the claimant M/s. Lucky Bharat Garage Pvt. Ltd., with interest at 12% P.A. from the date of the suit till payment. The oriental fire and general Respondent/Insurance Company is accordingly directed to pay the said amount to the claimant M/s. Lucky Bharat Garage Pvt. Ltd., with interest at 12% P.A. from the date of the suit till payment. This direction is subject to the decree of the court.” From bare reading of the award, it is evident that fair opportunity of hearing has been given by the Umpire who also considered the award passed by Shri Satyapal Sharma and L.D. Deoras and thereafter assessing evidence properly with reasonings passed the award. 22. In Insurance Policy, clause 18 contains Arbitration clause which reads as below : “18. If any difference shall arise as to the quantum to be paid w1der this policy, (liability being otherwise admitted) such difference shall independently of all other questions be referred to the decision of an arbitrator, to be appointed in writing by the parties in difference, or if they cannot agree upon a single arbitrator to the decision of two disinterested persons as arbitrators of whom one shall be appointed in writing by each of the parties within two calendar months after having been required so to do in writing by the other party in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as amended from time to time and for the time being in force. In case either party shall refuse or fail to appoint arbitrator within two calendar months after receipt of notice in writing requiring an appointment the other party shall be at Liberty to appoint sole arbitrator, and in case of disagreement between the arbitrators, the difference shall be referred to the decision of an umpire who shall have been appointed by them in writing before entering on the reference and who shall sit with the arbitrators and preside at their meetings. It is clearly agreed and understood that no difference or dispute shall be referable to arbitration as hereinbefore provided, if the Company has disputed or not accepted liability under or in respect of this Policy. It is hereby expressly stipulated and declared that it shall be a condition precedent to any right of action or suit upon this policy that the award by such arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire of the amount of the loss or damage shall be first obtained.” 23. It is hereby expressly stipulated and declared that it shall be a condition precedent to any right of action or suit upon this policy that the award by such arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire of the amount of the loss or damage shall be first obtained.” 23. Insurer did not dispute that they have settled claim for loss of godown at Indore for Rs.2,91,000/- and also agreed to settle the loss of godown at Bhawani Patnam. The umpire after due consideration of the documentary evidence has passed an award for a sum of Rs.3,46,306=37 towards loss caused to Godowns at Indore and Bhawani Patnam. The amount awarded by the umpire in view of the admissions of the insurer does not appear to be without evidence or jurisdiction. So far as godowns at Jabalpur and Raipur are concerned, the insured who claims that he got renewed earlier insurance policies, did not file earlier policies to support that earlier insurance policies were covered for riot and strike risk also. On the other hand, it is undisputed that earlier insurance policies issued for its godowns at Jabalpur and Raipur were not covered under riot and strike risk. When those godowns were not covered under riot and strike risk, it is a matter of common sense that without further agreement or specific understanding between the parties those policies after renewal or earlier to renewal cannot be treated covering riot & strike risk. Therefore, earlier policies which were not covered under riot and strike risk, in absence of any specific contract, could not have been renewed for riot and strike risk. 24. Letter Ex.P/4 reads as below : “LBG/HO/3578/84 Dt. 13-4-84. To, The Divisional Manager, The Oriental Fire, Raipur, (MP). Sub.: Renewal of Fire Policy No.10/10504/83/riot and Strike Policy. Dear Sir, Please find enclosed Ch.No.052005 dated 15-4-84 for Rs.41,606/- State Bank of India, Ranchi for the renewal of above policies. The list of branches and address along within the sum insured of each branch enclosed herewith. Further we have added five more godowns in this current year which are our agencies. The agents of the five stations i.e., Pali Marwar, Balotra, Sholapur, Jetpur and Chhindwara do business of other Transporters too but we want to insure only our goods, kept in these godowns given above. For, Lucky Bharat Garage (P) Ltd. Adm. Officer. Enclosed: Cheque No.052005 Rs.41,606=00 dated 15-4-1984, SBI, Ranchi 0167. The agents of the five stations i.e., Pali Marwar, Balotra, Sholapur, Jetpur and Chhindwara do business of other Transporters too but we want to insure only our goods, kept in these godowns given above. For, Lucky Bharat Garage (P) Ltd. Adm. Officer. Enclosed: Cheque No.052005 Rs.41,606=00 dated 15-4-1984, SBI, Ranchi 0167. One list of all godowns.” This is a letter relying upon which it is contended that for renewal of policies two separate lists were sent; one for renewal of insurance for fire risk and another for insurance of fire, riot and strike risk. From bare reading of the documents, it appears that in the body of the letter the word “the list” has been used and in the bottom one list of all godowns has been mentioned. Therefore, the contentions of the insured does not appear to be correct. From this letter it can very well be said that the policies which were earlier insured for fire risk and the policies which were insured for riot and strike risk were as earlier sent for renewal of the insurance. Admittedly, when earlier godowns at Raipur and Jabalpur were not covered under riot and strike risk policy, they were not desired by the insured for insurance against riot & strike risk and arbitrator Shti L.D. Deoras and the Umpire after making elaborate discussion did not commit any illegality in arriving at their findings. Clause 18 that is arbitral clause covers the dispute resolved by the Umpire and he in no way exceeds his jurisdiction. 25. Both these appeals are neither maintainable nor call for any interference. In the result, both the appeals are liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. 26. Having considered the cases of both the parties, they are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal Dismissed.