Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 2031 (ALL)

Lal Behari Under Guardianship of his Natural Father Ram Raj v. Gyanchand and Rakesh Under Guardianship of their Natural Father

2007-08-02

TARUN AGARWALA

body2007
JUDGMENT : TARUN AGARWALA, J. 1. Heard Sri V.C. Misra, the learned senior counsel for the defendant-appellant. List of hearing cases has been revised, no one appears for the plaintiff- respondents. 2. It transpires that the plaintiffs filed a suit for the cancellation of the adoption deed dated 13.10.1978 executed and registered in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that Ram Abhilash had executed a will dated 24.12.1976 bequeathing the entire property in his favour. On the other hand, the defendant was claiming to be the adopted son on the basis of a registered adoption deed. The plaintiffs contended that the adoption deed was obtained by fraud, inasmuch as, the adoption deed was executed on 13.10.1978 and that, Ram Abhilash died, soon thereafter, on 11.11.1978 and consequently suspicious circumstances surrounded the execution of the adoption deed. The plaintiffs alleged that Ram Abhilash was blind since birth and that he was seriously ill for about 5 to 6 months prior to his death. The defendants' father had taken Ram Abhilash to his residence and it was alleged the adoption deed was executed without there being an actual giving and taking ceremony. 3. The defendant resisted the suit and contended that no will was ever executed in favour of the plaintiffs and that a registered adoption deed was executed in accordance with the provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The defendant contended that there was no suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the adoption deed. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial court framed various issues and concluded that a will was duly executed by the testator Ram Abhilash in favour of the plaintiffs and that the adoption deed was executed without there being a giving and taking ceremony. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the property of the testator was bequeathed in favour of the plaintiffs. Aggrieved, the defendant filed an appeal which was also dismissed and the findings of the trial court was affirmed. The defendant consequently, filed the present Second Appeal which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law, namely. Whether the decision arrived at by the lower appellate court is vitiated on account of burden to prove that the ceremony of giving and taking of adoption had taken place being laid upon the defendant-appellant, contrary to the provisions contained in Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption end Maintenance Act, 1956? Whether the decision arrived at by the lower appellate court is vitiated on account of burden to prove that the ceremony of giving and taking of adoption had taken place being laid upon the defendant-appellant, contrary to the provisions contained in Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption end Maintenance Act, 1956? 4. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, he registration of the adoption deed was executed in accordance with law and that there was a valid ceremony of giving and taking. Consequently, the burden to disapprove the adoption deed fell squarely on the plaintiffs whereas, the court below, had unnecessarily placed the burden, upon the defendant, which was totally against the provisions of Section 16 of the Act. 5. In order to appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant it would be appropriate to consider the provisions of Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 which is quoted hereunder: 16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoptions - Where any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. 6. From the aforesaid, it is clear that a document, duly registered under any law for the time being inforce is, produced before the Court purporting to record an adoption made and signed by the person giving and taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption had been made in compliance with the provisions of the Act. The presumption, that the/document was executed in accordance with the provisions of law would operate so long as there is no rebuttal. The learned Counsel placed reliance upon a decision in Sushil Chandra vs. Smt. Bhoop Kunwar and Others, AIR 1977 All 441 , wherein it had been held that if the adoption deed is challenged on the ground of fraud or undue influence, the burden of proof would lie upon the party alleging fraud and undue influence. The learned Counsel placed reliance upon a decision in Sushil Chandra vs. Smt. Bhoop Kunwar and Others, AIR 1977 All 441 , wherein it had been held that if the adoption deed is challenged on the ground of fraud or undue influence, the burden of proof would lie upon the party alleging fraud and undue influence. In Karam Chand and Another vs. Baljit and Others, AIR 1990 P&H 220 , it was held that a registered adoption deed raised a presumption of a valid adoption though the presumption of a valid adoption could be rebutted by evidence but could not be discharged by mere conjectures and discrepancies in the evidence and that the totality of the circumstances of the evidence brought on record was required to taken into account and weighed in deciding whether such presumption stood rebutted or not. In Pathivada Ramaswami and Another vs. Korda Surya Prakasa Rao, AIR 1993 AP 336 , it was held that whenever a registered document of adoption was produced, the Court would presume that the adoption had been made in compliance with the provisions of the Act. In Ramji vs. Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and Others, 1981 AWC 2004, it was held that the presumption of a valid adoption according to Section 16 of the Adoption Act is raised where document had been signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption and only in such cases that the Court would presume that the adoption had been made in compliance with the provisions of Adoption Act. Where the document had not been signed by the person, the presumption u/s 16 of the Act would not attracted. 7. There is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition of law propounded in the aforesaid judgments. This Court is in entire agreement with the said proposition of law propounded in the aforesaid judgments. Section 16 of the Act is clear and explicit, namely, that the court would presume that the adoption had been made in compliance with the provisions of the Act where the adoption deed was registered and that the presumption would continue till it was disapproved. 8. In the present case, the plaintiffs had come out with a specific plea, namely, that the executors of the document, Ram Abhilash, was blind since birth and that he was seriously ill six months prior to his death. 8. In the present case, the plaintiffs had come out with a specific plea, namely, that the executors of the document, Ram Abhilash, was blind since birth and that he was seriously ill six months prior to his death. Another suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the adoption deed was that a month before the death of Ram Abhilash the defendant's father had taken Ram Abhilash to his residence and the document was thereafter executed in favour of the defendant. This specific allegation were made by the plaintiff, in addition with the allegation, that no ceremony of giving and taking was performed These allegations, namely, that Ram Abhilash was blind and that the defendant's father had taken Ram Abhilash to his residence a month before his death had not been denied by the defendant in his written statement. The defendant, however, submitted that a ceremony of giving and taking was duly performed. 9. In the light of the aforesaid, the burden placed upon the plaintiffs was duly discharged and the onus fell back upon the defendant. The defendant in support of his pleading that the ceremony of giving and taking was duly performed alleged that the barber of the village had performed the Shaving ceremony of the adopted child. The onus was therefore discharged by the defendant and the burden fell back again on the plaintiff. In order to dislodge this allegation, the plaintiffs produced the certificate issued by the authorities in Form-A under the Panchayat Raj Act which is called the family Register. In column No. 11 of the certificate, it was indicated that the barber had died on 25.4.1975. whereas, the adoption deed is alleged to have been executed and registered on 13.10.1978. This document, issued under the Panchayat Raj Act has not been denied by the defendant. This document proves that the barber had died in 1975 and therefore he could not perform the ceremony on 13.10.1978. Consequently, one of the essential ingredients of giving and taking ceremony was not performed while executing the adoption deed. In the light of this document, the onus fell back on the defendant. No document has been filed nor any witness had been produced to show that a ceremony was performed. No relatives of Ram Abhilash were produced or were present at the time of the execution of the adoption deed. In the light of this document, the onus fell back on the defendant. No document has been filed nor any witness had been produced to show that a ceremony was performed. No relatives of Ram Abhilash were produced or were present at the time of the execution of the adoption deed. Consequently in the opinion of the Court, the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant does not have any force. The question of law framed by the Court is answered in the negative. This Court finds that the burden to prove the ceremony of giving and taking of the adoption was initially placed before the plaintiff which was duly discharged by the plaintiffs, and thereafter, the onus to prove that a valid ceremony of giving and taking had taken place was not discharged by the defendant. 10. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that under the Panchayat Raj Act there is a specific Form-D issued by the authorities to indicate the date and cause of death of a person. This Form-D had not been produced and consequently, Form-A which is only a family register could not be relied upon. In my opinion, the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is bereft of merit. Column No. 11 of the Form-A also indicates the date of death of a person. This certificate is issued by an authority under the Panchayat Raj Act. Consequently if Form-A was produced, there was no difficulty in adducing the date of death of the barber. The date of the death shown in the Form-A has not been denied by the defendant. Consequently, it is immaterial as to whether Form-D was produced or not. The date of death indicated in Form-A was sufficient for the Court to presume that the barber had died prior to the execution of the alleged adoption deed. 11. The learned Counsel for the appellant also made a submission that the will executed in favour of the plaintiffs was not duly proved inasmuch as, the signature of the testator was not placed in the margin of the documents and that the statement of the marginal witness did not indicate that they had signed the document in the presence of the testator or that testator had signed the document in their presence and consequently, the document could not be proved by the plaintiff. 12. 12. In my view, the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is not correct. The marginal witness had categorically stated that the will in question was read over and explained and thereafter the testator had placed his thumb impression and thereafter the witness had also placed their thumb impressions. There was sufficient compliance. The contents of the will was read out and thereafter me testator had mated his signatures and the witness has also placed their thumb impressions. In my opinion, the will was duly proved. 13. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds no ground to interfere in the judgments passed by the Court below. The second appeal fails and dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to cost.