Judgment :- The subject matter of these writ petitions is a proposed petroleum outlet and the issues raised, are intricately connected. Hence these matters are consolidated and heard. Therefore, this common judgment. 2. The 2nd petitioner in WP(C).No.8090 of 2006 and in WP.(C).No.5956 of 2006 is the managing partner of the 1st petitioner in WP (C) No.8090 of 2006, a firm, which is a franchisee of the 1st petitioner in WP (C) No.5956 of 2006, an authorised petroleum marketer, hereinafter referred to as “Reliance”. He is one among the co-owners of the land on which the petroleum outlet is proposed. 3. By Ext.P4 in WP (C) No.5956 of 2006, the District Collector granted permission, hereinafter, “KLU Permission”, for short, to the franchisee’s managing partner and his co-owners, under the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1987, hereinafter, the “KLU Order”, for short, to convert the wet lands to provide the site for the proposed petroleum outlet. The Land Revenue Commissioner, hereinafter, the “Commissioner”, for short, entertained an appeal filed by respondents 4 & 5 and others, who are stated to be neighbours, against that order and passed Ext.P6 order staying the operation of the KLU Permission. WP (C) No.5956 of 2006 is filed by Reliance and the franchisee’s managing partner (one of the co-owners of the land) challenging Ext.P6 order of the Commissioner. 4. WP (C) No.7064 of 2006 is filed by a neighbour challenging Exts.P5 & P6 therein, the decision of the Chief Town Planner approving the layout of the petroleum outlet and that of the Government granting zonal exemption from the Town Planning Scheme. 5. WP (C) No.7148 of 2006 is filed by respondents 4 & 5 in WP (C) No.5956 of 2006 seeking to quash the aforesaid Government Order granting zonal exemption. 6. After this court admitted WP (C) No.5956 of 2006 on 28.02.2006, the 5th respondent therein moved an appeal dated 06.03.2006 before the Commissioner against the decision of the Additional District Magistrate – hereinafter, the “ADM” – granting No Objection Certificate (hereinafter, “NOC”, for short) under the Petroleum Rules. The Commissioner stayed that decision of the ADM and ordered status quo to be maintained. WP (C) No.8090 of 2006 is filed by the franchisee and its managing partner challenging that order of the Commissioner, which is Ext.P8 in that case. An order prohibiting the Commissioner from proceeding with that appeal is also sought for. 7. The Commissioner stayed that decision of the ADM and ordered status quo to be maintained. WP (C) No.8090 of 2006 is filed by the franchisee and its managing partner challenging that order of the Commissioner, which is Ext.P8 in that case. An order prohibiting the Commissioner from proceeding with that appeal is also sought for. 7. WP (C) No.9811 of 2006 is filed by another neighbour challenging Ext.P3 NOC granted by the ADM and against which the Commissioner entertained an appeal, as stated above. He also seeks a direction to the Controller of Explosives not to grant licence to Reliance and the franchisee under the Petroleum Rules, for the proposed outlet. 8. When these matters, except the last among them, where being heard, it was noticed that the power of the Commissioner to sit in appeal over the decision of the ADM under the Petroleum Rules is an issue arising for decision and therefore, to facilitate expediency, it was agreed that the rights of parties to prosecute the appeals, against the NOC and the KLU Permission, before the Commissioner could be given up without prejudice to comprehensive contentions on facts on the merits of the NOC and the KOU Permission in these writ petitions. This was recorded in my order dated 21.03.2006 and the files, including those relating to the appeals before the Commissioner and those relating to grant of the NOC and the KLU Permission have been called for and obtained. It is in this context that WP (C) No.9811 of 2006 challenging Ext.P3 NOC granted by the ADM is filed thereafter and entertained. 9. On the basis of the pleadings and the arguments advanced, the following issues arise for decision: A. Is the Land Revenue Commissioner an appellate authority over the decision of the ADM, to issue NOC under the Petroleum Rules? B. Is the decision of the ADM issuing NOC under the Petroleum Rules liable to be set aside? C. Are the decision of the Chief town Planner approving the layout of the petroleum outlet and that of the Government granting zonal exemption from the Town Planning Scheme, liable to be set aside? D. Is the decision of the District Collector granting KLU Permission to the franchisee’s managing partner and his co-owners, under the KLU Order, liable to be interfered with? D. Is the decision of the District Collector granting KLU Permission to the franchisee’s managing partner and his co-owners, under the KLU Order, liable to be interfered with? E. Is the Controller of Explosives to be directed to desist from granting licence, for the outlet in question, to Reliance and the franchisee, under the Petroleum Rules? Issue A: Is the Land Revenue Commissioner an appellate authority over the decision of the ADM, to issue NOC under the Petroleum Rules? 10. Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 reads as follows: “144. No-objection certificate. – (1) Where the licensing authority is the Chief Controller or the Controller, as the case may be, an applicant for a new licence other than a licence in forms III, XI, XVII, XVIII or XIX shall apply to the District Authority with two copies of the site-plan showing the location of the premises proposed to be licensed for a certificate to the effect that there is no objection, to the applicant receiving a licence for the site proposed and the District Authority shall, if he sees no objection, grant such certificate to the applicant who shall forward it to the licensing authority with his application Form IX.” Per this Rule, the authority to issue certificate is the District Authority and the Chief Controller or the Controller may refer to the District Authority, any application for licence, received without NOC. Rule 144 (5) shows the legislative intent that the NOC be issued expeditiously. Even if the District Authority is of the opinion that the licence applied for should not be granted, there is no absolute embargo, in the sense that licence could then be granted only with the sanction of the Central Government. 11. By virtue of Rule 2(1) (x), “District Authority” means – (a) in towns having a Commissioner of Police, the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner of Police; (b) in any other place, the District Magistrate. Rule 2(1)(xi) provides that “District Magistrate” means and includes an Additional Magistrate and in the States of Punjab and Haryana and in the Karaikal, Mahe and Yenam areas of the Union Territory of Pondicherry, also includes a Sub-divisional Magistrate. 12. Chapter VII dealing with licences, to which Rule 144 belongs, provides Rule 154 affording right to appeal in situations enumerated therein. 12. Chapter VII dealing with licences, to which Rule 144 belongs, provides Rule 154 affording right to appeal in situations enumerated therein. It does not provide a right of appeal against the grant of NOC, which could have been provided, were it intended. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 154 provides for an appeal against any order of the District Authority refusing to grant or canceling an NOC. Therefore, there is an implied but clear exclusion of an appeal against the grant of NOC. The Rules, by themselves, therefore, provide the conclusion that no appeal is provided against the grant of NOC. 13. Petroleum Rules are statutory rules. When the appropriate District Authority, identifiable by virtue of Rules 2(1)(x) and 2 (1)(xi) thereof, acts under Rule 144, he is discharging statutory functions under those Rules. A decision granting NOC, cannot be interfered with by the Commissioner for the simple but strong reason that no right of appeal is conferred under the Petroleum Rules or the Petroleum Act against the grant of NOC. Those who have filed the appeal before Commissioner have not shown before me any statutory provision, by way of primary legislation or subordinate, providing any such appellate power with the Commissioner or any other authority. Nor have I been able to see any. In the absence of any such provision, the decision of the ADM granting NOC under the Petroleum Rules is not appealable and no such appeal lies before the Commissioner. 14. There is one more aspect. Rules 144, 2(1)(x) and 2 (1)(xi), read together would show that the Authority to decide on a request for NOC is legislatively chosen. Rule 161 provides that every authority, other than the Central Government, acting under Chapter VII, shall perform its duties subject to the control of the Central Government. Even in the matter of exercise of their powers as Executive Magistrates, the District Magistrate, ADM or SDM, are not authorities subordinate to the Commissioner. Therefore any assumption of authority to sit in appeal, on the ground that those officers, having regard to their other duties and responsibilities, may be revenue officials under the control of the Commissioner, would be wholly misconceived. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, it is held that the Land Revenue Commissioner has no power to entertain any appeal against the grant of NOC by the District Authority under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, it is held that the Land Revenue Commissioner has no power to entertain any appeal against the grant of NOC by the District Authority under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002. As a consequence, Ext.P8 in WP (C) No.8090 of 2006 is liable to be quashed and the Land Revenue Commissioner cannot proceed with the appeal in which that order has been issued. Issue B: Is the decision of the ADM issuing NOC under the Petroleum Rules liable to be set aside? 16. The Petroleum Act, 1934 is an enactment to consolidate and amend the law relating to the import, transport, storage, production, refining and blending of petroleum. Among other things, it classifies petroleum into different classes on the basis of “flash point”, as defined in section 2(c) of that Act. Section 4 enjoins on the Central Government to make rules for the import, transport and storage of petroleum. Section 3 provides prohibition against import, transport and storage of petroleum, save in accordance with the rules made under Section 4. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 5 make similar provision regarding production, refining and blending. Sections 14, 21 and 22 in Chapter II authorise making of rules to govern inspection, sampling and tests. Section 29(1) provides the Central Government with authority to make ancillary rules. The Petroleum Rules, 2002 are made by the Central Government in exercise of the aforesaid authority. Classified into twelve chapters, with five schedules, including statutory forms, the Petroleum Rules are extensive. The scientific knowledge required for managing the arena of petroleum industry, including storage and supply, have gone into the making of those Rules. The Petroleum Act clearly prohibits activities relating to petroleum, except in accordance with the Rules made under that Act. The Petroleum Rules are therefore exhaustive. Hence, while it has to be ensured that those Rules are scrupulously followed, subject to the limited and regulated power in Rule 201, to exempt, it is also totally impermissible to take into consideration anything not provided for by those Rules, while deciding the issue of grant or renewal of licence under those Rules. This includes the arrival at a decision as to whether there is any objection to the grant of NOC. 17. This includes the arrival at a decision as to whether there is any objection to the grant of NOC. 17. When an applicant for a new licence applies to the District Authority, with two copies of the site plan, as enjoined by Rule 144, showing the location of the premises proposed to be licensed, for NOC, the District Authority shall grant such certificate, “if he sees no objection”. The nature of authority so exercised by the District Authority is to ensure that the application conforms and satisfies the requisites for the grant of licence under the Petroleum Rules. Even if NOC is not refused, the power vests with the Central Government to allow issuance of licence. Therefore, for the District Authority to see, or not, any objection to grant NOC, that authority has to confine his evaluation of the facts to be with reference to the Petroleum Rules only. Nothing more, nothing less. 18. The aforesaid conclusion is also inescapable from the point of view of the rights of the parties, as may be referable to Part III of the Constitution. Right to life of the immediate neighbour and those in the neighbourhood of a site proposed for a petroleum outlet is sacrosanct and would fall within Article 21. That rights also includes the right to potable water and the right against pollution. The rights of such persons to property fall away from the pale of Part III and would be within the gaze of Article 300A and governed by statues and other laws. Article 19 (1)(g) guarantees the right to, among other things, carry on any occupation, trade or business. That right is available to a citizen aspiring to deal with petroleum. Being that material, it is put under statutory control of the State by virtue of the Petroleum Act and the Petroleum Rules, which also provide comprehensive provisions as to licensing. While they would amount only to reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(g), of the applicant for licence, they provide the necessary checks and balances between the fundamental right to life of those in the neighbourhood and the fundamental right of an intending licensee, to occupation, trade or business, in the societal existence of the Nation, under the canopy of constitutional governance and Rule of Law. 19. 19. So much so, comprehensive statute laws, including rules, being available to regulate petroleum licensing, the Authority to grant licence in terms of Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules shall grant NOC, unless he sees an objection referable to the Petroleum Act and/or Petroleum Rules. A person who has been refused NOC has a right of appeal under Rule 154(2) of the Petroleum Rules. If the District Authority intimates the Chief Controller or the Controller, as the case may be, that licence sought for, should not, in his opinion, be granted, such licence shall not be issued without the sanction of the Central Government. 20. Reverting to the facts, no ground is pointed out by the objecting neighbours, with reference either to the Petroleum Act or the Petroleum Rules to sustain the challenge to the NOC. So much so, the decision of the ADM, issuing NOC under the Petroleum Rules, stands. The challenge against it is repelled. Issue C: Are the decision of the Chief Town Planner approving the layout of the petroleum outlet and that of the Government granting zonal exemption from the Town Planning Scheme, liable to be set aside? 21. As per G.O.(Rt.) 2268/05/LSGD dated 9-6-2005 (Ext.P6 in WP(C).No.7064/2006), the Government granted zonal exemption for the petroleum outlet from the Town Planning Scheme, subject to the conditions laid down therein. By Order dated 14-7-2005, Ext.P5 in the said writ petition, the Chief Town Planner approved the layout plan of the petroleum outlet. These decisions are challenged principally on the ground that there is no power with the Government to grant individual exemptions from the zoning made by the Town Planning Scheme. 22. On 22-4-2005, Thrissur Corporation issued Ext.P3 in WP(C).No.7064/2006 by which Reliance was informed that petrol filling station can be permitted in residential area as a restricted user but the site in question is included in area to be acquired for residential use, as per the master plan under the Detailed Town Planning Scheme for Kannankulangara, hereinafter, “KDTPS”, for short. Therefore, the cause for Reliance/franchisee moving the Government leading to the issuance of the impugned decisions of the Government and the Chief Town Planner regarding the KDTPS was the stand of the Corporation that the KDTPS enjoins that the area in question has to be acquired for residential use. Therefore, the cause for Reliance/franchisee moving the Government leading to the issuance of the impugned decisions of the Government and the Chief Town Planner regarding the KDTPS was the stand of the Corporation that the KDTPS enjoins that the area in question has to be acquired for residential use. In O.P.No.5139/1994, a learned Judge of this Court had opportunity to consider the effect of the Town Planning Scheme in question, namely, KDTPS. It was noticed that in spite of KDTPS being available, Thrissur Urban Development Authority had no idea or funds for acquisition of the lands covered by KDTPS at any point of time and the fact remains that no acquisition steps were taken within the three years period as provided by Section 33 of the Town Planning Act, 1108 (hereinafter referred to as the “Town Planning Act”) under which the Scheme is framed. It is accordingly held that it was not, therefore, open to the Development Authority to invoke the restrictions in that Act and reject the request to grant licence for constructions. After referring to the earlier decision of this Court in the case of G.C.D.A. v. Dr. M. Chandrasekhar [1994 (1) KLJ 512] and in Kunniyil Hassan and another v. Secretary, Corporation of Calicut and another [ILR 1997 (1) Kerala 619], this Court directed that the application for permission to construct building shall be considered and permit issued without reference to any such objection. The decision in O.P.No.5139/1994 was followed by this Court in WP(C).No.30253/2004. I am in complete agreement with the views expressed in those judgments. Therefore, the mere assertion of the Thrissur Corporation in Ext.P3 in WP(C).No.7064/2006 that the building permit cannot be issued because it is included in an area to be acquired for residential use, as per the KDTPS, does not have any legal sanction and the same will not stand. 23. Now, the question is whether, if the application for building permit could not have been refused on the ground that the area in question was to be acquired for residential use as per KDTPS, would Reliance or the franchisee require any zonal exemption for the petroleum outlet. 23. Now, the question is whether, if the application for building permit could not have been refused on the ground that the area in question was to be acquired for residential use as per KDTPS, would Reliance or the franchisee require any zonal exemption for the petroleum outlet. This question arises because the issuance of the impugned decisions by the Government and the Chief Town Planner were only on account of Reliance or franchisee applying for such orders in the light of the stand of the Corporation that building permit cannot be granted because the site is part of the area to be acquired for residential use, as per the KDTPS. As noticed above, even the decision of the Corporation in Ext.P3 in WP(C).No.7064/2006 is that a petrol filling station can be permitted in a residential area as a restricted use. 24. This leads to certain arguments addressed on the basis of the terms of the KDTPS. It was contended on behalf of the persons challenging the impugned decisions that in “Residential Use Zone”, only petrol filling stations engaging not more than five workers would be permitted as a restricted use. This contention is met by the learned counsel appearing for the Reliance and franchisee that a proper interpretation of the relevant provision in the KDTPS would show that such restriction on the number of workers is only regarding auto-garages and not for petrol filling stations. Advertence to the KDTPS is necessary to resolve the said controversy. 25. Ext.P2 in WP(C).No.7064/2004 is a copy of KDTPS. Clause 10.c.(1) of KDTPS deals with Residential Use Zone. It reads as follows: “(1) RESIDENTIAL USE ZONE i. Uses permitted: All residential buildings, including one or two multi-family dwellings, apartment house and flats, parks and playgrounds incidental to the residential uses, public utility buildings such as Water Supply, Drainage and electric installations of a minor nature and small service industries of non-nuisance character engaging not more than 3 workers with power limited to 3 H.P. or 6 workers without power. Convenient shops such as vegetable shops, groceries, pan-shops etc. will be normally permitted. ii. Convenient shops such as vegetable shops, groceries, pan-shops etc. will be normally permitted. ii. Uses restricted: The following shall be permitted by the responsible authority with the approval of the Chief Town Planner: Minor educational buildings, small neighbourhood libraries and reading rooms, community halls, police and fire stations, small post offices, telegraph offices, small banks, hostels, dormitories, small eating houses not exceeding 150 sq.M floor, small professional or commercial offices and clinics of floor area not exceeding 100 sq.M., petrol filling stations, small auto garages, engaging not more than 5 workers and other non-nuisance type service industries engaging not more than 10 workers with power limited to 10 H.P. 20 workers without power and new areas or buildings for religious uses. Uses Prohibited: All other uses not mentioned above.” 26. The restricted uses permitted in Residential Use Zone can be permitted by the responsible authority with the approval of the Chief Town Planner. Restricted uses which can be permitted are enlisted in Clause 10.c.(1)(ii). A reading of that clause, quoted above, would show that every item of such restricted use gets an independent treatment in the mode of presentation of that clause. The words “engaging not more than 5 workers” occurring after the notation “,” after the words “small auto garages” characterize only the small auto garages and cannot be extended to take within its sweep, petrol filling stations occurring before the notation “,” that precedes the words “small auto garages”. The term “petrol filling station” is also not prefixed by any adjective like “small”. If the argument that the condition as to engagement of not more than 5 workers is applicable to petrol filling stations also is accepted, there is no reason why it should not apply to all categories of uses enlisted as restricted uses before the words “small auto garages”. If that were so, educational buildings, police and fire stations, small post offices, telegraph offices, small banks etc. could be run in a residential area only with 5 workers. Therefore, the reasonable and rational way to read the words “engaging not more than 5 workers”, in the context of the notation “,” occurring after the words “small auto garages” in Clause 10.3.(1)(ii) is that small auto garages, for being permitted as a restricted use in a Residential Use Zone, would be only those which engage not more than 5 workers. Such restriction cannot be imported to the petrol filling stations. I may also at once notice that in KDTPS, petrol filling stations are permitted also in commercial zones, as restricted use, where again I do not find it being prefixed with the adjective “small”. Under such circumstances, I have no hesitation to conclude that petrol filling station is a restricted use that can be permitted in a residential use zone in terms of KDTPS provided it is permitted by the responsible authority with the approval of the Chief Town Planner. Therefore, the impugned decisions of the Government and the Chief Town Planner could have not the legal effect of granting any zonal exemption, but amounts the only to the decision of the Chief Town Planner in terms of Clause 10.c.(1)(ii) approving the grant of permission by the responsible authority, which approval has to precede the permission by the responsible authority. Hence, on the basis of the impugned decisions of the Chief Town Planner, the Municipal Corporation and the Thrissur Development Authority are empowered and enjoined in law to issue building permit to Reliance or the franchisee, as the case may be. The question of the Government or the Chief Town Planner exceeding jurisdiction and granting zonal exemption to an individual does not arise in these cases and therefore, the impugned decisions do not fall within the law laid in the decisions of this Court in Shasthri Nagar Colony Welfare Committee v. Calicut Development Authority [2006 (1) KLT 294] or of the Division Bench of this Court in Suresh Kumar v. Raveendran (ILR 2005 (4) Kerala 769]. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the impugned decisions of the Government and the Chief Town Planner do not amount to granting the Reliance or the franchisee any exemption from the KDTPS and the net result of those decisions is only that the Chief Town Planner has granted approval to the responsible authority to permit Reliance/franchisee to put the land in question to use as a petrol filling station. By the force of this judgment, the said impugned decisions of the Government and the Chief Town Planner (Exts.P6 and P5 in WP(C).No.7064/2006) will stand trimmed and read down to the said effect and would not be worth anything more. By the force of this judgment, the said impugned decisions of the Government and the Chief Town Planner (Exts.P6 and P5 in WP(C).No.7064/2006) will stand trimmed and read down to the said effect and would not be worth anything more. Issue D: Is the decision of the District Collector granting permission to the franchisee’s managing partner and his co-owners, under the KLU Order, liable to be interfered with? 27. Before proceeding to consider the merits of the contentions on the basis of facts and the files which have been called for in view of what is stated in paragraph 8 above, I deem it appropriate to notice an issue of law that cropped up during arguments. 28. Admittedly, the area in question is covered by the KDTPS, a Scheme issued under the Town Planning Act. The provisions of the Town Planning Act and a Scheme thereunder provide a complete control over the lands to which the Scheme relates, in so far as the nature of use of which those lands can be put to, is concerned. The variation or revocation of the Scheme can be only in terms of the Town Planning Act and as already noticed, going by the decisions of this Court, with which I am in complete agreement, the variation or revocation can be only of the Scheme and there cannot be any tinkering with the Scheme by the Government or any other authority, on a case to case basis. The mere fact that the acquisitions have not been made in accordance with the Scheme does not take away the effect of the Scheme as far as zoning on the basis of the use is concerned, though in the absence of acquisition, it may not be open to the Municipal authorities to refuse permit to build, but such constrictions have to be only in accordance with the zoning regulations in the Scheme. If this is the effect of a Scheme, in the context of the Town Planning Act, it can be immediately noticed that the KDTP, except to the extent it provides for a Green Strip Area, does not visualize or authorise the use of any other area exclusively for planting trees and cultivation of cash crops. If this is the effect of a Scheme, in the context of the Town Planning Act, it can be immediately noticed that the KDTP, except to the extent it provides for a Green Strip Area, does not visualize or authorise the use of any other area exclusively for planting trees and cultivation of cash crops. It may be laudable that every available space should be utilised for planting trees and making such similar cultivation which would empower the environment and improve the quality of the living environs. But any compulsion to put to exclusive use for any agricultural operation, any part of the Residential Use Zone or any other zone classified under a Town Planning Scheme, apparently creates a contradiction. Going by the terms of the KLU Order, which is issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1967, the paramount object sought to be achieved by that piece of subordinate legislation is to ensure that agricultural operations and cultivations, as are made compulsory by the KLU Order, are carried out to ensure availability of essential commodities. The KLU Order deals with utilization of land for the purpose of cultivation of food crops which includes the various items listed in Clause 2(b) of that Order. If a particular area is exclusively under the residential or commercial zone under the Town Planning Act and Scheme, it does not reconcile to say, in the same breath, that there can be no such user because the land is an agricultural land to which KLU Order also applies. 29. The Town Planning Act is referable to Entry 20 of List III in the Seventh Schedule in the Constitution, relating to economic and social aims. Profitable reference can be made in this regard to the decision of the Apex Court in Maneklal Chhotalal v. M.G. Makwana (AIR 1967 SC 1373). Essential Commodities Act has, for its object, the control of the production, supply and distribution in trade, of essential commodities and is covered by Entry 33 of List III. [See Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Shiv Shanker [1971 (1) SCC 442]. So much so, the Essential Commodities Act and the Town Planning Act are referable to different entries in the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule. [See Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Shiv Shanker [1971 (1) SCC 442]. So much so, the Essential Commodities Act and the Town Planning Act are referable to different entries in the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule. Reconciling the said two legislations in the backdrop of the objects sought to be achieved by such legislations, it can be easily noticed that it is not the intention of the Legislature to enforce the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act or any order issued thereunder in derogation of the legal effect of the legislations relatable to Town Planning. If the Town Planning Scheme lawfully notified in terms of Town Planning Act enjoins on a citizen who owns or holds an item of land to put that land only to a particular use in terms of that Act and Scheme thereunder, he cannot also be compelled under the Essential Commodities Act or any order issued thereunder, including the KLU Order to put the said piece of land to a particular use which would contradict his entitlement to use the said land in terms of the Town Planning Act and the Scheme. In this view of the matter, the KLU Order issued under the Essential Commodities Act can have an impact in an area covered by a Town Planning Scheme under the Town Planning Act, if at all, only to the extent of those lands which are identified as green strip areas or such other areas which are exclusively earmarked in the Town Planning Scheme for being put to use for cultivation. So much so, an area which is a Residential Use Zone or for that matter, any area other than the Green Strip Area under the KDTPS cannot be subjected to the KLU Order. Hence, no permission under the KLU Order is necessary for any activity of construction or use of any land in the Residential Use Zone or any other zone in the KDTPS, other than the Green Strip Area and the grant of permission under the KDTPS, for such land, cannot be made dependent upon any sanction under the KLU Order. 30. Be that as it may, adverting to File D.Dis-30380/05/B1 of the Revenue Department in the District Collector’s Office, it can be seen that pages 14 and 15 of that file contain the report of the Village Officer, countersigned by the Additional Tahsildar. 30. Be that as it may, adverting to File D.Dis-30380/05/B1 of the Revenue Department in the District Collector’s Office, it can be seen that pages 14 and 15 of that file contain the report of the Village Officer, countersigned by the Additional Tahsildar. That report as well as the report of the RDO at page 9 in that file would show that though the land in question is shown in the revenue documents as wet land “(nilam)”, the same is barren without any cultivation and cannot be put for cultivation. It is recorded that the land adjacent to its west is filled up and there are residential houses built in the immediate vicinity of the plot in question. The RDO, on inspection, also found that the land on the east is also barren and the land on the south is a coconut garden and the land on the north is the public road. It is also a matter of record that the objectors include persons who had given written consent to the conversion of the land in question. The files also contain the consent letters. However, in the counter-affidavit filed by respondents 4 and 5 in WP(C).No.5956/2006 they attempt to resile from their consent by stating that consent for the conversion was given on the basis that the conversion is only for residential use. 31. Clause 6 of the KLU Order enjoins that no holder of any land, which has been under cultivation with any food crop for a continuous period of three years immediately before the commencement of the KLU Order, shall convert or attempt to convert or utilise or attempt to utilise such land for the cultivation of any other food crop or for any other purpose except under and in accordance with the terms of a written permission given by the Collector. This is the provision under which the impugned order under the KLU Order was issued by the Collector granting written permission imposing certain terms on the owner of the land for conversion of the land. On the basis of the materials on record, as already noticed, the District Collector came to the conclusion that the land in question can be permitted to put to use as sought for by the owner. Jurisdictionally, such order need not depend upon the consent of the neighbour. It also does not depend upon the objection of the local authority. On the basis of the materials on record, as already noticed, the District Collector came to the conclusion that the land in question can be permitted to put to use as sought for by the owner. Jurisdictionally, such order need not depend upon the consent of the neighbour. It also does not depend upon the objection of the local authority. This is because the paramount object sought to be achieved by the KLU Order issued under the Essential Commodities Act is to ensure that those lands which are put to use for the agricultural purpose of cultivation of food crops which are enumerated in Clause 2(b) of that Order are put to such use. The facts of the case in hand disclose that the lands in question and the neighbouring lands are not being cultivated and the neighbouring lands are either left barren or converted to residential plots or coconut gardens etc. It would not be out of context to refer to the photographs produced along with the reply affidavit in WP(C).No.5956/2006 which will disclose the existing buildings and construction activities, as also the conversion of the utility of the lands in the locality. Going by the materials on record, it is abundantly clear that the Collector was fully justified in issuing the impugned order under KLU Order and there would not have been any reason for the appellate authority to interfere with the said decision. I have considered the materials with particular reference to the files and have come to the aforesaid conclusion because of the consensus on the basis of which these matters have been heard as stated in paragraph 8 above. Issue E: Is the Controller of Explosives to be directed to desist from granting licence, for the outlet in question, to Reliance and the franchisee, under the Petroleum Rules? 32. Having regard to the findings under Issues A to D, I do not find any ground to issue any direction to the Controller of Explosives to desist from granting the licence for the petroleum outlet in question. Issue E is, therefore, answered against the objectors. 33. 32. Having regard to the findings under Issues A to D, I do not find any ground to issue any direction to the Controller of Explosives to desist from granting the licence for the petroleum outlet in question. Issue E is, therefore, answered against the objectors. 33. In the result, (i) Ext.P6 in WP(C).No.5956/2006 is vacated and the appeal in which that order was issued by the Land Revenue Commissioner would stand disposed of by this judgment rejecting the same and confirming the order issued by the District Collector under the KLU Order, (ii) WP(C).No.7064/2006 challenging the decisions of the Government and the Chief Town Planner (Exts.P6 and P5 therein) and WP(C).No.7148/2006 are dismissed, subject to what is stated in paragraph 26 above. (iii) WP(C).No.8090/2006 is allowed quashing Ext.P8 decision of the Land Revenue Commissioner staying the decision of the ADM granting NOC under the Petroleum Rules. (iv) WP(C).No.9811/2006 is dismissed affirming Ext.P3 NOC granted by the ADM under the Petroleum Rules. No costs.