JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—At the time of admission of this Second Appeal on 4.10.1980 following order was passed : “After hearing Counsel for the appellant, I am satisfied that grounds No. 1, 2, 4 and 7 raise substantial question of law. Accordingly, I admit the appeal.” 2. The substantial question of law number 1, 2, 3 and 7 mentioned in the memo of appeal after the grounds of appeal on which appeal was admitted are quoted below : (1) Whether the pith and substance of the plaint involves declaration of Bhumidhari right, hence the plaintiff’s suit is barred by Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act and the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit? (2) Whether the plaintiff’s suit is barred by Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953? (4) Whether the necessary ingredients of Benami transaction were neither pleaded nor proved by the plaintiff? 7. Whether the plaintiff’s suit is barred by Sections 38 and 41 of Specific Relief Act? Bar of Section 49 of U.P.C.H Act (Second question of law) 3. I propose to consider the aforesaid substantial question of law first. 4. This is defendant’s second appeal. Plaintiff original respondent No. 1 Sita Ram since deceased and survived by legal representatives instituted OS No. 395 of 1968 against appellant Satya Narain who was defendant No. 1 and respondent No. 2 Ram Sevak who was defendant No. 2 in the suit. According to the plaint allegations, sale deed dated 16.8.1960 executed by Ram Sevak defendant respondent No. 2 in favour of Satya Narain defendant No. 1-appellant was benami and in fact plaintiff original respondent No. 1 was the real owner of the property in dispute which was in the form of agricultural land. The suit was dismissed by Munsif Shahganj, Jaunpur. Against the said judgment and decree plaintiff Sita Ram filed civil appeal No. 48 of 1976. Ist Additional District Judge, Jaunpur through judgment and decree dated 16.7.1980, allowed the appeal, set-aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and decreed the suit and restrained the respondent No. 1 in the said appeal i.e. Satya Narain from interfering in the possession of plaintiff over the land in dispute. 5. In the plaint the relief claimed was for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the possession of the plaintiff over the dispute plot. 5. In the plaint the relief claimed was for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the possession of the plaintiff over the dispute plot. An alternative relief was also prayed for a direction to the defendant to execute sale deed of the disputed agricultural plots in favour of the plaintiff for Rs.1/-. 6. Further case of the plaintiff was that in an earlier suit being suit No. 19 of 1958 filed by plaintiff Sita Ram against the same defendants one Dubri Pandey started doing pairvi hence the defendants of the said suit (who were also the defendants in the instant suit) promised to help the plaintiff and on the advice of plaintiff’s advocate it was decided that defendants of the said suit should execute a sham transfer deed in favour of a person of plaintiff’s confidence and the said suit was got dismissed. In order to defeat the alleged evil intention of Dubri Pandey and in pursuance of the said arrangement sale deed was executed by Ram Sevak in favour of Satya Narain. The least said about the morality and legality of such arrangement the better. The parliament realising the quantum of dishonesty involved in benami transaction prohibited the same in the year 1988. However, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 is not retrospective hence this case will have to be decided on the basis of principles pertaining to benami transactions prevailing at the relevant time. 7. It was admitted to the parties that before filing of the suit giving rise to the instant second appeal and after execution of the sale deed of 1960 consolidation proceeding started in the village in question and Dubri Pandey filed objections before the Consolidation Courts/authorities and ultimately matter was decided in favour of the appellant Satya Narain and consolidation Courts held the sale deed to be valid. It was further admitted by the plaintiff that he also filed objections however the said statement was qualified and it was stated that objection was filed on the asking of Satya Narain. It was further pleaded by the plaintiff that thereafter he and Satya Narain consulted his advocate who advised that plaintiff should withdraw from the contest. On the said advise, plaintiff did not presses his objection and the matter was decided in favour of Satya Narain. 8. Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act is quoted below : "49. It was further pleaded by the plaintiff that thereafter he and Satya Narain consulted his advocate who advised that plaintiff should withdraw from the contest. On the said advise, plaintiff did not presses his objection and the matter was decided in favour of Satya Narain. 8. Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act is quoted below : "49. Bar to Civil Jurisdiction.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of land lying in an area for which a [Notification] has been issued [under sub-section (2) of Section 4, or adjudication of any other rights arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act.” 9. The Supreme Court has held that plea of benami nature of transaction is a question relating to title and if it is not raised during consolidation proceedings then subsequently it cannot be raised and the said plea will be barred by Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act vide AIR 2005 SC 582 , Narendra Singh v. Jai Bhagwan. The facts of the said case were that the recorded tenure holders executed an agreement to sell. The prospective vendee filed suit for specific performance of contract. Sons of the persons who had executed the agreement for sale filed impleadment applications stating therein that the property was joint family property and they also had share therein. The Supreme Court held that after consolidation such plea was not permissible to be raised and was barred by Section 49 U.P.C.H. Act. 10. In this regard learned Counsel for the appellant has also cited an authority of this Court reported in Nirankar v. Mahendra Singh, 2006 (101) RD 487. 11. In my opinion lower appellate Court committed an error of law in holding that the suit was not barred by Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. This substantial question of law was wrongly decided by the lower appellate Court. Appeal deserves to be allowed on this ground alone. 12. 11. In my opinion lower appellate Court committed an error of law in holding that the suit was not barred by Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. This substantial question of law was wrongly decided by the lower appellate Court. Appeal deserves to be allowed on this ground alone. 12. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff respondent has argued that plaintiff had also prayed for alternative relief of direction to the defendants to execute sale deed of the property in dispute in favour of plaintiff for Rs. 1 sale consideration and in case suit for injunction is held to be barred by Section 49 of U.P.C.H Act or on any other ground then the said relief should be granted to the plaintiff. In respect of the said relief which was relief No. 4 issue No. 8 was framed by the trial Court. Under the said issue the entire finding of the trial Court is quoted below : “Plaintiff has not produced any evidence before me for this relief so plaintiff is not entitled to get relief No. 4. Issue decided accordingly.” 13. In view of this, argument of learned Counsel for the plaintiff cannot be considered. Even otherwise learned Counsel for the plaintiff/respondent has not been able to substantiate as to how the said relief could be granted. 14. In view of the finding that the suit was barred by Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act there is no need to discuss other substantial questions of law. The lower appellate Court discussed only the aspect of benami transaction and held that the transaction was benami. There was no need to decide the said question. The plea of benami was barred by Section 49 of U.P.C.H Act. 15. Accordingly, Second Appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff is set-aside. Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dismissing the suit is restored. ————