JUDGMENT R.R. Prasad, J. 1. This writ application has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein on amongst others prayer has been made to quash the order dated 15.9.2003 passed by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro in I.D. Case No. 2 of 2002, whereby the cognizance purported to be under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act for contravention of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act has been taken and consequently processes have been issued against the petitioners. 2. The facts giving rise to this application are that as per the case of the petitioners, one Anil Kumar, respondent No. 3, was appointed by the Bokaro Steel Sports and Recreation Council, Bokaro on 1.3.1985, which is an autonomous body, and his service was fully under the control of that Council and has no concerned with the Bokaro Steel Plant. However, on the other hand, it is the case of the respondent No. 3 that he was appointed as Junior Sports Organizer by the management of the Bokaro Steel Plant and was asked by the management to report for duty before the Officers of the Sports and Civic Amenities Department, which was under the control of Bokaro Steel Plant and as such his service is controlled and regulated by the management of the Bokaro Steel Plant and not the Council. Subsequently, the respondent No. 3 represented before the management of Bokaro Steel Plant for regularization of his services. That dispute led the Government to make reference for adjudication and the term of the reference was as follows: Whether the relationship of employer and employee is established between the management of Bokaro Steel Plant and Shri Anil Kumar, Junior Sports Organizer, a workman of Bokaro Steel Sports and Recreation Council, Bokaro Steel City established by the management of Bokaro Steel Plant? If so, whether not to make regular the services of Shri Anil Kumar by the management of Bokaro Steel Plant is justified? If not, what relief he is entitled to? 3. If so, whether not to make regular the services of Shri Anil Kumar by the management of Bokaro Steel Plant is justified? If not, what relief he is entitled to? 3. The Labour Court after taking evidences answered the reference in favour of the workman vide its award dated 15.3.2001, wherein it was held that the workman is entitled to regularization of his services and all other benefits and, therefore, the management of the Bokaro Steel Plant was directed to implement the award within two months from the date of its pronouncement and the said award was pronounced on 10.7.2001. 4. Being aggrieved with that award, the management filed W.P. (L) 45 of 2002 before this Court, which was dismissed and then L.P.A. No. 341 of 2002 preferred against the order dismissing the writ application was also dismissed on 1.7.2002. Thereafter, the management preferred S.L.P. (Civil) before Honble Supreme Court, which also got dismissed on 1.11.2002. 5. It is stated that in the meantime, the respondent No. 3 informed the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Bokaro regarding non-implementation of the award, and a notice was issued to management to show-cause as to why not the award has been implemented. Upon it, it was informed simply that the matter is pending before Honble Supreme Court and, therefore, Labour Superintendent, Bokaro filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro alleging therein that the management by not implementing the award has violated the provisions of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the said Act), which is punishable under Section 29 of the said Act. Upon which, cognizance of the offence was taken vide order dated 15.9.2003 and the petitioners were summoned to face trial. Being aggrieved with that, this writ application has been filed. 6. Upon which, cognizance of the offence was taken vide order dated 15.9.2003 and the petitioners were summoned to face trial. Being aggrieved with that, this writ application has been filed. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the award, which was passed on 15.3.2001, was pronounced only on 10.7.2001 and as per the award, the service of the petitioners was to be regularized within two months i.e. by 10.9.2001 but before that, the management had preferred writ application before this Court which was dismissed and then L.P.A. was preferred before this Court which also got dismissed and then S.L.P. was preferred before Honble Supreme Court which was also dismissed on 1.11.2002 and before expiry of two months the management appointed the respondent No. 3 on the post of Khalasi on 1.1.2003 and regularized his service w.e.f. 1.12.1986 and, therefore, the petitioners cannot be said to have not implemented the award, rather within two months from the date of dismissal of S.L.P. the concerned workman was appointed. Though against that order, the petitioner (respondent No. 3) has preferred a writ application before this Court vide W.P. (L) No. 187 of 2003 taking the plea that his service has never been regularized in terms of the award but that matter is still sub judice and, therefore, at this stage it can never be said that the management has not implemented the award. Second limb of the argument of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that as the award was pronounced on 10.7.2001, which was to be implemented within two months. Therefore, the limitation starts running from 10.7.2001 but the complaint was filed on 4.12.2002 much after expiry of one year though punishment prescribed under Section 29 of the said Act is six months only, therefore, the order taking cognizance of the offence is certainly barred by limitation under the provisions as contained in Section 468 of Cr.P.C. 7. Therefore, the limitation starts running from 10.7.2001 but the complaint was filed on 4.12.2002 much after expiry of one year though punishment prescribed under Section 29 of the said Act is six months only, therefore, the order taking cognizance of the offence is certainly barred by limitation under the provisions as contained in Section 468 of Cr.P.C. 7. As against this, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 submits that the respondent No. 3 was working as Junior Sports Organizer and when the reference was made, Labour Court vide its award dated 15.3.2001, which was pronounced on 10.7.2001, directed the management to regularize the services but instead of regularizing the services the management claimed to have appointed the respondent No. 3 on the post of Khalasi and as such it can never be said that the award has been implemented. Learned Counsel further submits that non implementation of the award does fall within the category of continuing of offence in terms of Section 472 of Cr.P.C. and, therefore, question of order taking cognizance being barred by limitation under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. never arises and as such this application filed on behalf of the petitioners is fit to be rejected. 8. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I may say that so far as the first submission is concerned, there is no scope in this application to decide whether the award has been implemented or not. Therefore, I need not to adjudicate upon that matter. However, so far as the second submission is concerned, it is to be considered as to whether the non implementation of an award is a continuing offence or not? 9. I do not get any elaborate definition of a continuing offence in the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, Section 472, of Chapter XXXVI of Code of Criminal Procedure, which deals with limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences, speaks about continuing offence which reads as follows: Section 472 - Continuing offence - In the case of a continuing offence, a first period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. 10. This sufficiently gives an idea that if any act, committed by an accused, constitutes an offence and that act continues from day to day, then from day to day a fresh offence is committed by the accused so long as the act continues. 10. This sufficiently gives an idea that if any act, committed by an accused, constitutes an offence and that act continues from day to day, then from day to day a fresh offence is committed by the accused so long as the act continues. 11. The matter as to when an offence can be said to be a continuing offence fell for consideration before Honble Supreme Court in a case of State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi , wherein it was observed as follows: A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and in act or omission which continues and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all. 12. Somewhat similar matter fell for consideration before Honble Supreme Court to consider whether non payment of the employers contribution to the Provident Fund is a continuing offence or not in a case of Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of M.P. AIR 1984 SC 1688 , wherein Their Lordships have categorically held that non-payment of the employers contribution to the Provident Fund before the due date, is a continuing offence and was pleased to observe that the question whether a particular offence is a continuing offence must necessarily depend upon the language of the statue which creates that offence, the nature of the offence and, above all, the purpose which is intended to be achieved by constituting the particular act as an offence. 13. 13. Therefore, in order to consider as to whether any offence under the Act is continuing offence or not one has to look into the nature of the offence and also the language used in the statute and the object with which the same was employed. 14. Here one needs to take notice of Section 29 of the said Act which lays down that any person who commits breach to any term of an award which is binding upon him under the Act shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. 15. In this background, if one takes into consideration the principle of Industrial Law, one can easily say that the award or settlement regulates the relation between the parties and after expiry of the specific period contractually or statutorily fixed as the period of operation of an award or settlement, the same does not become nonest but continues to be binding until a new contract or award replaced the previous one. Therefore, even after expiry of the statutory period liability does exist and that exist till the award is implemented and, therefore, there remains no doubt whatsoever to hold that offence under Section 29 of the said Act is a continuing offence, the same view has been taken by the Karnataka High Court in a case of N.K. Shah v. Engineering General Workers Union, Bangalore 1997 CRI. L.J. 3537. 16. Having come to the conclusion that non implementation of the settlement or award by the employer is a continuing offence, there would be no application of Section 468 of Cr.P.C. in this case. Hence I do not find any merit in this application and this application is, accordingly, rejected.