PRATAP KUMAR RAY, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned Advocates appearing for the parties in connection with the appeal registered as M. A. T. No. 842 of 2007 whereby judgment and order dated 28th February, 2007 passed in Writ Petition no. 24098 (W) of 2006 was challenged. An application praying for stay of the impugned judgment under appeal being C. A. N. No. 2021 of 2007 was filed. This application for stay was heard on 15th March and 20th March, 2007. In course of hearing of this application for stay which has come up today for further hearing, this Court is of the view that in deciding the stay application as this Court is required to consider the legal question involved in the judgment under appeal, the appeal should be heard along with this stay application. Accordingly, both the appeal and application are taken up for final hearing. All parties have been served and submission of informal paper book is dispensed with and all other formalities are dispensed with. ( 2 ) IN this appeal the appellants are Industrial Investment Bank of india Limited Officers' Association as appellant No. 1 and one Sri Milan kumar Das, Vice-President of appellant No. 1, as appellant No. 2. Though the appeal has been preferred assailing the judgment and order dated 20th February, 2007 aforesaid and the subsequent order dated 12th March, 2007, but in course of hearing appellant restricted his argument so far as challenge of Clause (c) of the order dated 20th February, 2007 passed in this writ application and other writ applications as were disposed of. For effective adjudication of the matter the impugned judgment under appeal is required to be re-produced. By the order dated 28th February, 2007 the writ Petition No. 24098 (W) of 2006 was disposed of against which this appeal has been preferred, by passing orders on consent of the parties which reads thus : - "in the back ground of such suggestions being made and in the interest of justice, this matter is, therefore, disposed of by-consent of parties. As a result, the following directions are made: - (a) Notwithstanding the date for exercising the option having come to an end and notwithstanding the Bank having taken a decision not to give any further effect to the Letter of Option, they will now extend the period for exercising the option not only to these petitioners but also to all such similarly situated persons who could not exercise their options within time including those who had come to this Court and whose writ petitions were disposed off on the basis of the statement of the Bank to the effect that the Letter of Option would not be given to; (b) The Bank shall extend the period for exercising the option in terms of the Letter of Option and the said period shall be available to all such employees till 15th of March, 2007; (c) It is made clear that the act of exercising such option should not be construed to mean that the optees have given up their right to pray for consideration of their claims for pension and wage revision strictly in accordance with law before their employers under which they would be serving after exercising such option. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this writ petition is disposed of by consent of parties. " ( 3 ) AN oral prayer was made by giving notice to the parties by the present appellants before the learned Trial Judge for clarification of the order dated 28th February, 2007. On 12th March, 2007 a further order was passed in the said writ application which reads thus: - "this case has been listed at the instance of the petitioners for clarification of Clause 'c' of the order dated 28. 2. 2007. The learned Counsel for the petitioners states that Clause 'c' of the order should not be restricted only to make their claims before the employers under which they would be serving but they should be given liberty to make such claim before the Government of India also. 2. 2007. The learned Counsel for the petitioners states that Clause 'c' of the order should not be restricted only to make their claims before the employers under which they would be serving but they should be given liberty to make such claim before the Government of India also. In the opinion of this Court, such a clarification is totally misconceived because this Court has already observed that the act of exercising such option should not be construed to mean that the optees have given up their right to pray for consideration of their claims for pension and wage revision strictly in accordance with law before their employers under which they would be serving after exercising such option. Since, they are not Government of India employees, no further clarification is required to be given. If urgent xeroxed certified copy of this order is applied for by the parties, the same should be given expeditiously". ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellants submits before us on different angle as if it is an appeal against the order which was passed without any consent. It is the submission of the appellants that when by the Act, namely, Industrial Reconstruction Bank (Transfer of Undertakings and Repeal) Act, 1997 the members of the appellant No. 1 got their services transferred in Industrial Investment Bank of India Limited, their services were protected in terms of Clause 5 which along with other conditions provided protection of retirement, voluntary retirement, gratuity and other benefits as enjoyed by the employees under the reconstruction bank by holding that such undertaking never was vested to the company. The clause 5 (1) as relied upon from the said Act reads thus: - "cl. The clause 5 (1) as relied upon from the said Act reads thus: - "cl. 5 (1)-Every officer or other employee of the reconstruction Bank (except a Director of the Board or the Chairman and Managing Director) serving, in the employment immediately before the appointed day shall, in so far as such officer or other employee is employed in connection with the undertakings which have vested in the Company by virtue of this Act, become, as from the appointed day, an officer or, as the case may be, other employee of the Company and shall hold his office or service therein by the same tenure, at the same remuneration upon the same terms and conditions, with the same obligations and with the same rights and privileges as to leave, leave late concession, welfare scheme, medical benefit scheme, insurance, provident fund, other funds, retirement, voluntary retirement, gratuity and other benefits as he would have held under the Reconstruction Bank if its undertakings had not vested in the Company and shall continue to do so as an officer or, as the case may be, other employee of the Company or until the expiry of a period of six months from the appointed day if such officer or other employee opts not to continue to be the officer or other employee of the Company within such period. " ( 5 ) IT is the submission made by the appellants that being the employees of Industrial Investment Bank of India Limited (hereinafter for brevity referred to as I. I. B. I. Ltd.) they raised their grievance on issue of revision of pay and for introducing a pension scheme. It is the submission of the learned Advocate that on issue of such the Central Government agreed to the demand of employees by several communications annexed at pages 77 to 85 of stay application. From those documents it appears that in the year 1994 by the letter dated 22nd July, 1994 the under Secretary to the Government of India informed the Deputy General Manager (Admn. and P)Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India to this effect that pension scheme introduced in IDBI/rbi may be formulated and submitted to the government for approval. From those documents it appears that in the year 1994 by the letter dated 22nd July, 1994 the under Secretary to the Government of India informed the Deputy General Manager (Admn. and P)Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India to this effect that pension scheme introduced in IDBI/rbi may be formulated and submitted to the government for approval. By communication dated 28th August, 1996 the executive Director of I. I. B. I. had informed that a pension scheme was prepared on the lines of the pension scheme of I. I. B. I. and same was sent for approval of the Government and it requires amendment of I. I. B. I. Employees Provident Fund Rules, 1993 to enable transfer of the part of the employer's contribution to pension fund. The Chief General Manager (Admn. Para) by his communication under letter dated 22nd July, 1997 informed the under Secretary to the Government of India to this effect that as soon as they would receive approval of the Government of India, necessary action for implementation of the pension scheme in I. I. B. I. pursuant to the I. I. B. I. Pension Regulation, 1997 should be introduced by taking necessary steps of notification as per law. ( 6 ) ON 8th January, 1998 Deputy Secretary to the Government of india wrote a letter to the General Manager-in-Charge I. I. B. I. Ltd. , had informed that some suggested modification should be made in the draft regulation. By the letter dated 16th July, 1998 the Executive Director of i. I. B. I. informed the Deputy Secretary Banking Division of Ministry of finance, Government of India to this effect that issue relating to the pension matter was awaiting approval of the Government and request made for approving draft pension scheme as was sent on 22nd July, 1997. ( 7 ) SO far as the pay revision is concerned the learned Advocate for the appellants has invited our attention to the document annexed at page 46 of the stay application being some proposal and suggestion of Special secretary (Financial Sector ). ( 7 ) SO far as the pay revision is concerned the learned Advocate for the appellants has invited our attention to the document annexed at page 46 of the stay application being some proposal and suggestion of Special secretary (Financial Sector ). ( 8 ) HOWEVER, from the factual matrix it appears that during pendency of consideration of the matter in the aforesaid manner, namely, consideration of pay revision as well as introducing of the pension scheme, the present bank of I. I. B. I. Ltd. , in view of huge loss as suffered reached to a stage whereby it was not possible for continuing this organization. The matter was accordingly discussed and an in-house arrangement made in consultation with the Vice-President of the Indian Bank's Association to protect the interest of the employees of I. I. B. I. Limited. It was considered accordingly that as there was no scope to revive the organization and as such the employees who would desire to be transferred in other Public sector Banks, on existing pay and other service benefits as is being enjoyed by them, their services could be placed at the disposal of the said banks on transfer, otherwise any employee on his option would be entitled to accept the Voluntary Retirement Scheme of I. I. B. I. Considering all the aspects an option letter was published on 10th October, 2006 which became the subject-matter of the writ application which is quoted in extenso : - "1. You are aware'as to the fact that huge accumulated loss has eroded the capital and resources of I. I. B. I. and in spite of earnest endeavours on the part of the management, the situation could not be retrieved. The present situation has become such that it is leading towards the stoppage of works and closure of I. I. B. I. 2. In such a situation, to mitigate hardships and consequent unemployment of existing employees/officers of I. I. B. I. , the management of I. I. B. I. has seriously explored possibilities for gainful employment of its existing employees/officers with other nationalized banks. 3. In such a situation, to mitigate hardships and consequent unemployment of existing employees/officers of I. I. B. I. , the management of I. I. B. I. has seriously explored possibilities for gainful employment of its existing employees/officers with other nationalized banks. 3. In such view of the matter, the management of I. I. B. I. would like to offer the following options to all of its employees/officers excluding those who have already opted for existing Voluntary retirement Scheme of I. I. B. I. Wherefore, you are given the following options: -Option- I employment/absorption in different nationalized banks (as per list enclosed) subject to the rules and regulations of the respective banks. Your last pay drawn in I. I. B. I. will be protected and your fitment will be at a Basic Pay of Rs. 21,6607- as a Scale-IV. Offer of the bank in the Pay Scale as follows: -Rs. 20,480-560-21, 040-620-24,140/- (7 years) (Your total gross emoluments as on 31. 8. 2000 (sic) will be rs. 30,494. 66 ). " ( 9 ) IN the writ application the prayer made for not giving any effect of the said decision inviting the options from the employees concerned on the ground that no provision was made in such option about protection of the revised pay for which the matter was in undecided condition as well as the opening of the pension scheme. The prayers of the writ application being relevant for adjudication of this appeal reads thus: - " (a) A writ of or in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent authority and each of them, their agents, employees, servants or subordinates to act in accordance with law and to withdraw the purported option letters dated October 10, 2006; (b) A writ of or in the nature of certiorari calling upon the respondent authority and each of them, their agents, employees, servants or subordinates to certify and transmit the records of this case and to produce the same before this Hon'ble Court at the time of hearing, so that conscionable justice may be imparted in favour of the petitioners, inter alia, in respect of protection of their pay and scale/grade; (c) A writ of or in the nature of prohibition prohibiting respondent authority and each of them, their agents, employees, servants or subordinates from taking any action in respect of the purported option letters without first protecting the petitioners' pay and scale/grade and pension facility; (d) Rule NISI in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c) above; (e) An interim order of injunction restraining the respondent authorities and each of them from taking any action on the basis of the purported option letters without first protecting the petitioners' pay and scale/grade adequately; (f) Ad interim order in terms of prayer (e) above; (g) Costs of an incidental to this application be borne by the respondents; (h) Such further order or orders or directions be given as this hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper; and for this act of kindness your petitioners, as in duty bound shall ever pray. " ( 10 ) IT is the submission of the learned Advocate for the appellants that in the option form the bank ought to have provided a provision for protection of the revised pay scale as to be introduced as well as the pension facilities. However, it appears that in the writ application the issue was not ultimately canvassed in that length as now being canvassed at appeal stage. But, the present appellant allowed the disposal of the writ application on consent in terms of the Clauses 'a', 'b' and 'c' of the order as already quoted. However, it appears that in the writ application the issue was not ultimately canvassed in that length as now being canvassed at appeal stage. But, the present appellant allowed the disposal of the writ application on consent in terms of the Clauses 'a', 'b' and 'c' of the order as already quoted. ( 11 ) THE appellants before us prayed for clarification of the clause 'c' of the ordering portion for the purpose of putting a liability to the Government of India on issue of approval of the revised pay scale as well as approval of the pension scheme which, however, was rejected by the learned Trial Judge by the order dated 12th March, 2007 by holding that since the writ petitioners therein were not the employees of government of India, accordingly, no further clarification would be allowed. ( 12 ) THIS appeal and the application could be disposed of by us even on considering the nature and character of the impugned judgment under appeal, namely, a consent order passed by the learned Trial Court. It is a settled law that a consent order is not appellable. The provision of the civil Procedure Code also has its applicability in view of incorporation of the provisions thereof in the Appellate Side Rules, being Rule 53 of the appellate Side Rules framed by the High Court which reads thus: - "r. 53 - Save and except as provided by these Rules and subject thereto, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings under Article 226 and nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of this Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. " ( 13 ) IN view of the incorporation of the provision of Civil Procedure code we can go straight way to test the maintainability of the appeal herein as raised by the learned Advocate for the respondents in view the nature of the order being a consent order. Under Section 96 (3) of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908, no appeal is maintainable from any consent decree applying the principle of estoppel. Under Section 96 (3) of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908, no appeal is maintainable from any consent decree applying the principle of estoppel. Reliance may be placed to the judgment passed in the case Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guntreddi Annmanaidu, reported in 1974 (1) SCC 567 , a judgment of three Judges Bench. ( 14 ) AT the pre-amendment stage of the Civil Procedure Code under order 43 Rule 1a of the Code an appeal was maintainable against an order under Rule 3 of Order 23 i. e. a compromise order on the ground as set forth thereof but such provision has been repealled by the Amendment act of 1999 providing a new scope of appeal under Order 43 Rule 1a by introducing a new provision subject to fulfilment of the conditions as laid down thereof. Order 43 Rule 1a reads thus: - "o. 43 R. IA. Right to challenge non-appealable orders in appeal against decree.-(1) Where any order is made under this Code against a party and thereupon any judgment is pronounced against such party and a decree is drawn up, such party may, in an appeal against the decree, contend that such order should not have been made and the judgment should not have been pronounced. (2) In an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not, have been recorded. " ( 15 ) FROM the provision of the law as quoted above it appears that bar of Section 96 (3) of Civil Procedure Code for preferring an appeal in respect of a consent decree or consent order could be avoided if any case is made out under Order 43 Rule 1a. ( 16 ) FROM the order dated 28th February, 2007 it appears that the order starts with the word "on consent of the parties". Hence, the ingredients and/or the material as are required to be fulfilled for the purpose of identifying an order as an order on consent in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 is present. ( 16 ) FROM the order dated 28th February, 2007 it appears that the order starts with the word "on consent of the parties". Hence, the ingredients and/or the material as are required to be fulfilled for the purpose of identifying an order as an order on consent in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 is present. From the notice as was served to the other side when the matter was placed for clarification, it appears that there was no such whisper that the appellants never consented the order as was passed on 28th february, 2007. From the tenure of the order it appears that only point advanced before the learned Trial Court when the prayer for clarification was made that the Government also should be added in the Clause 'c' of the order so that the writ petitioners/appellants may file a representation to the Government praying for opening of the pension scheme as well as approval of the revised pay scale. Learned Trial Court held that as the writ petitioners were not at all employees of the Government, accordingly there was no ground made for clarification of the order. Hence, it appears that the materials as are required to be considered to by-pass and/or overcome and/or to cross the statutory bar under Section 96 (3) of the code of Civil Procedure in preferring the appeal in terms of Order 43 Rule 1a that the compromise order was not recorded properly by the learned trial Court and/or the materials of the dispute on the compromise issue, not at all present in the instant case. Having regard to such, we very well at the very threshold on deciding the maintainability of the appeal may say that the appeal is not maintainable in view of the statutory embargo in terms of Section 96 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. We are holding the said view accordingly. ( 17 ) BUT, since the parties had advanced their arguments at length on issue, on assuming for argumendo that it was not at all a consent order, and though in fact it was a dispute is being raised for our decision accepting the maintainability of the appeal in terms of Order 43 Rule 1a of the Civil Procedure Code only to test its validity, we now want to proceed about the merits of the matter. ( 18 ) FOR adjudicating that issue whether the Government should be added in Clause 'c' of the order for the purpose of opening a benefit to the appellants to file a representation seeking the Government's approval for revised pay scale and/or Government's consent for opening a pension scheme, this Court has to decide whether the writ petitioners/appellants are legally entitled to claim such. ( 19 ) FROM the pleadings as made out in the writ application it appears that it is an admitted position that the employees of I. I. B. I. are the employees of a Government Company. The employee of a Government company whether can be considered as employee of the Government by advancing the argument that the Government is an agent now to be looked into. This point in fact res integra in view of the several judgments of the apex Court in that field. The status of the employees of a Government company is not identical with the status of the Government employee. The Government employees are not the Government servants. This view has been expressed in the case of A. K. Bindal and Anr. v. Union of India, reported in 2003 (5) SCC 163 as relied in the case of Heavy Engineering corporation Voluntary Retired Employees Welfare Society and Anr. v. Heavy engineering Corporation Limited, reported in 2006 (3) SCC 708 where in paragraph-32 the Apex Court held: - "our attention has not been drawn to the provision of any statute that even in its day-to-day functioning, the Company would be bound by any direction issued by the Central Government. It may be that the respondent is a Government Company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act. It may be that the entire shareholding of the Company is held by the President of India or his nominee but in law it is a separate juristic entity and thus, in the absence of any statutory provision, the Company was not bound by any such clarification issued by the Central Government. Even where a statute confers such a jurisdiction on the Central] government, the same must be held to be confined only to the provisions contained therein. Even where a statute confers such a jurisdiction on the Central] government, the same must be held to be confined only to the provisions contained therein. " ( 20 ) THE aforesaid view was passed relying upon the earlier judgment passed in the case of State of U. P v. Neeraj Awasthi, reported in 2006 (1)SCC 667 , The legal status of the employees of a Government Company as to whether they should be treated as employees of the Government was examined in details in the case Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar and Ors. , reported in 1969 (1) SCC 765 wherein in Paragraph-4 by referring and relying on the judgment passed in the case of Salomon v. Salomon and Company, reported in 1897 Appeal Cases, page 22, the court held to this effect: - "before considering the authorities cited by counsel before, we proceed first to examine the meaning of the words used by parliament in the definition clause of 'appropriate Government'. It is an undisputed fact that the company was incorporated under the companies Act and it is the company so incorporated which carried on the undertaking. The undertaking, therefore, is not one carried on directly by the Central Government or by any one of its departments as in the case of posts and telegraphs or the railways. It was, therefore, rightly conceded both in the High Court as also before us that it is not an industry carried on by the Central government. That being the position, the question then is, is the undertaking carried on under the authority of the Central government? There being nothing in Section 2 (a) to the contrary, the word 'authority' must be construed according to its ordinary meaning and therefore must mean a legal power given by one person to another to do an act. A person is said to be authorized or to have an authority when he is in such a position that he can act in a certain manner without incurring liability, to which he would be exposed but for the authority, or, so as to produce the same effect as if the person granting the authority had for himself done the act. For instance, if a authorizes B to sell certain goods for and on his behalf and B does so, B incurs no liability for so doing in respect of such goods and confers a good title on the purchaser. There clearly arises in such a case the relationship of a principal and an agent. The words "under the authority of mean pursuant to the authority, such as where an agent or a servant acts under or pursuant to the authority of his principal or master. Can the respondent-company, therefore, be said to be carrying on its business pursuant to the authority of the Central government? That obviously cannot be said of a company incorporated under the Companies Act whose Constitution, powers and functions are provided for and regulated by its memorandum of association and the articles of association. An incorporated company, as is well known, has a separate existence and the law recognizes it as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. This new personality emerges from the moment of its incorporation and from that date the persons subscribing to its memorandum of association and others joining it as members are regarded as a body incorporate or a Corporation aggregate and the new person begins to function as an entity. (Cf. Salomon v. Salomon and Co. ). Its rights and obligations are different from those of its shareholders. Action taken against it does not directly affect its shareholders. The company in holding its property and carrying on its business is not the agent of its shareholders. Consequently, it has been said that if a man trusts a Corporation he trusts that legal persona and must look to its assets for payment; he can call upon the individual shareholders to contribute only if the Act or charter creating the corporation so provides. The liability of an individual member is not increased by the fact that he is the sole person beneficially interested in the property of the Corporation and that the other members have become members merely for the purpose of enabling the Corporation to become incorporated and possess only a nominal interest in its property or hold it in trust for him. (Cf. Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed. , Vol. 9, p. 9 ). (Cf. Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed. , Vol. 9, p. 9 ). Such a company even possesses the nationality of the country under the laws of which it is incorporated, irrespective of the nationality of its members and does not cease to have that nationality even if in times of war it falls under enemy control. (Cf. Janson v. Driefentain Consolidated Mines and Kuenigi v. Donnersmarck ). The company so incorporated derives its powers and functions from the by virtue of its memorandum of association and its articles of association. Therefore, the mere fact that the entire share capital of the respondent-company was contributed by the central Government and the fact that all its shares are held by the president and certain officers of the Central Government does not make any difference. The company and the shareholders being, as aforesaid, distinct entities the fact that the President of India and certain officers hold all its shares does not make the company an agent either of the President or the Central Government. A notice to the President of India and the said officers of the Centrals government, who hold between them all the shares of the company, would not be a notice to the company; nor can a suit maintainable by and in the name of the company be sustained by or in the name of the President and the said officers. " ( 21 ) IN the case passed in Pyare Lal Sharma, Managing Director jammu and Kashmir Industries Ltd. Srinagar v. Managing Director, reported in 1989 (3) SCC 448 , the Apex Court held that the employees of a government Company is neither the Government employee nor the civil servant to enjoy the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. ( 22 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid clear views expressed by the apex Court in the said judgment, this Court is of the view that the I. I. B. I. Limited has a separate juristic entity than the Central Government irrespective of the fact that it is a Government Company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act and irrespective of the fact that the entire share-holding of the company is held by the President of India or his nominees. Further, the learned Advocate for the appellants had failed to satisfy us about the presence of any other statutory provision except the fact simplicitor that the I. I1. B. I. Limited is a Government Company and that there was a relationship particularly the jural relationship with the government of India and this Government Company. Had it been so, surely the Central Government would have been liable to decide the issue. ( 23 ) NOW on the points about their claim as made and/or the grievance as lodged, viz. the pay revision and the opening of the pension scheme, the court has to consider whether legally they are entitled to raise that issue even to the I. I. B. I, and/or the Government. This point is also not res integra in view of the appeal Court's judgment in the field that the demand for pay revision is not within the right of the employees concerned and demand for opening of the pension'scheme also was not within their right to claim such. Exactly identical question was decided in the case Officers and supervisors of I. D. P. L v. Chairman and Managing Director of I. D. P. L, reported in 2003 (6) SCC 490 wherein the Apex Court relied on the earlier judgment in A. K. Bindal (supra), Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1958 SC 578 , Hindustan Times Limited New Delhi v. Their Workmen, reported in AIR. . . . . . SC 1332 to reach a finding that public Sector Undertakings or Public Sector Organization and its financial capacity is the important factor in the matter of consideration of the revised pay scale and the employees of such Public Sector Undertakings are not the Government servants and they cannot claim that their pay scale be revised and additional expenditure involved therein due to such revision should be made by the Government. ( 24 ) THE pay revision or wage revision whether could be considered as a constitutional right to claim in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India by giving a wider meaning of word 'life' and injecting the material ingredients of the word 'life' in terms of the judicial pronouncement made by the Apex Court which could be considered as law of the land in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, now to be answered. Article 21 of the Constitution of India has no applicability and effective force to claim the pay revision, this issue had been decided in the case of A. K. Bindal (supra) by holding inter alia that Article 21 could be applied and the word 'life' could be interpreted with its extended meaning and greater amplitude in a case where a minimum wage is not being paid by any employer who are coming under the purview of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, but so far as the pay revision is concerned or higher pay scale is concerned, article 21 has no applicability. By this way in the case of A. K. Bindal (supra)the Supreme Court distinguished the judgment passed on interpretation of the word life' in terms of Article 21 so far as the applicability in the pay fixation issue as earlier passed in the case Delhi Transport Corpn. v. DTC mazdoor Congress and Ors. , reported in 1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 600. ( 25 ) IN the case of DTC (supra) the issue involved therein was payment of the minimum pay/wages for subsistence and accordingly the court applied Article 21 of the Constitution of India to provide the relief to the concerned workmen but in the instant case the fact situation is completely different. Here the writ petitioners who are the officers of the organization are getting the fat salary packet per month and now are praying further pay revision which cannot be justified as a right in terms of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India. For that reason, this Court-is of the view that the grievance on pay revision cannot be within the domain of any right which could be claimed. Even such claim could not be raised to the Government of India irrespective of the communication made by the different officials of the Central Government in view of the fact that the writ petitioners/employees of the concerned banks, are not the Government employees but employees of a Government Company which has a separate juristic entity and Central Government cannot be saddled with the liability of payment of additional amount on account of the revision of the pay as claimed. ( 26 ) ON the same logic, the opening of a pension scheme also cannot be within the domain of any right to pray for as it depends upon the employer's financial capacity and condition to formulate a scheme thereof. Furthermore, on opening of the pension scheme the Central Government i. e. the Government of India also cannot be placed in a liability in view of the logic as we have advanced so far as the pay revision is concerned, namely, that the writ petitioners/appellants who are the employees of the i. I. B. I. Ltd. are not the Government servants and they are not the employees of the Central Government but the employees of a Government Company, viz. I. I. B. I. Ltd. And it is the Government Company who on the basis of its financial capacity has discretion to open a pension scheme or not for which no party can file writ petition praying for any order to that effect. ( 27 ) EVEN in identical situation when some teachers of the private school recognized by the Board but an unaided school approached the high Court for implementation of the recommendation of the Third Pay commission and a necessary order/writ of mandamus directing the school authority to release the amount, the Apex Court in the case Sushmita basu v. Ballygunge Siksha Samity, reported in 2006 (7) SCC 680 by distinguishing its earlier views passed in the case Frank Anthony Public school Employers Association v. Union of India, reported in 1986 (4) SCC 707 and the views expressed in the case of Reserve Bank of India v. C. N. Saharvanam, reported in 1986 Suppl. (1) SCC 143 held "the High court was wrong to grant relief as there is no statutory provision directing the payments to the privately managed school for implementation of the pay Commission Recommendation. " ( 28 ) EVEN on the pay fixation issue the Apex Court held in the case k. T. Veerappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka Ors. , reported in 2006 (9) SCC 406 that the scope of judicial review in the administrative decision on pay fixation is very limited by holding that writ Court should not. " ( 28 ) EVEN on the pay fixation issue the Apex Court held in the case k. T. Veerappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka Ors. , reported in 2006 (9) SCC 406 that the scope of judicial review in the administrative decision on pay fixation is very limited by holding that writ Court should not. interfere with the administrative decision pertaining to the pay fixation and pay parity unless and until decision is unreasonable, unjust or prejudicial to a section of the employees and such revision of pay fixation is in ignorance of the material and relevant factors. ( 29 ) LEARNED Advocate for the appellants has advanced point of legitimate expectation by contending that when the Government exchanged the views and I. I. B. I. referred the matter for approval, the employees legitimately expected that the matter should be decided by the Government. We are afraid to apply the said doctrine of legitimate expectation' on the factual matrix of this case when we have already held that the writ petitioners/appellants are neither employees of the government of India nor they are protected in terms of Article 311 of the constitution and that Government has no responsibility with reference to their service matters are concerned. Furthermore, the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' is maintainable only in respect of any privilege and/or accommodation provided by the appropriate body even in absence of any right and thereby withdrawal of the same. The applicability of the doctrine which is a weak right has been considered by the Constitution Bench in the case Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors. , reported in 2006 (4) SCC 1 as well as in another Constitution Bench in Ram Pravesh singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. , reported in 2006 (8) SCC 381 . ( 30 ) HAVING regard to the settled law thereof we are of the view that the principle of legitimate expectation has no applicability in the instant case on the factual matrix as canvassed. ( 31 ) SIMILARLY, promissory estoppel point as urged has no applicability in the instant case in view of the factual findings that the writ petitioners/appellants are not employees of the Central government and as such though the communication made by the Central Government, the same cannot be construed as a promise made by the Central Government. ( 31 ) SIMILARLY, promissory estoppel point as urged has no applicability in the instant case in view of the factual findings that the writ petitioners/appellants are not employees of the Central government and as such though the communication made by the Central Government, the same cannot be construed as a promise made by the Central Government. Further, the elements of promise of change of position due to such promise are absent here. So said direction has no applicability. ( 32 ) LEARNED Advocate appearing for the respondents opposed this appeal and this application both. It has been contended by the learned advocate for the Bank that out of total 146 employees of I. I. B. I. Ltd. , except 33 employees other employees exercised their option and some of the employees have also joined in the respective banks in terms of the option, as exercised by them. ( 33 ) IN the instant case it appears that the I. I. B. I. Ltd. Practically is on the verge of the closer in view of the huge loss as it has sustained. The company could close the organization by paying the necessary compensatory amount to his employees for such closer in terms of statute. But, it appears that the company considered the matter in welfare angle and wanted transfer of service by mutual arrangement with the Vice-President of the Indian Banks Association and the employees concerned are protected with reference to their pay and other service conditions by way of transfer to the other Public Sector Banks. Besides such, there was a further option open to opt a Voluntary Retirement Scheme. ( 34 ) HAVING regard to such State of affairs this Court is of the view that in fact the writ application itself was not maintainable as filed by the appellants/writ petitioners praying for the revision of pay and opening of the pension scheme. Besides such, there was a further option open to opt a Voluntary Retirement Scheme. ( 34 ) HAVING regard to such State of affairs this Court is of the view that in fact the writ application itself was not maintainable as filed by the appellants/writ petitioners praying for the revision of pay and opening of the pension scheme. However, with reference to the Central issue in this appeal as already observed that assuming that the order under Clause 'c' as referred to was not rightly recorded in terms of the compromise and consent and appeal is maintainable still then we are of the view that since the Central Government has no liability as appellants/employees are not employees of the Central Government but they are employees of the government Company of I. I. B. I. Ltd. , the Central Government cannot be allowed to be a party in a decision making issue of considering the representation praying for the pay revision and/or opening of the pension scheme as sought for in this appeal praying for addition of the word in the clause 'c' of the order that the writ petitioners/appellants would be allowed to file a representation to the Central Government on that issue. ( 35 ) SINCE, the writ petitioners are not employees of the Central government and Government also cannot be burdened in terms of the aforesaid judgments as already referred to and relied upon by us, the appeal is not entertainable on merit even if we assume that the appeal is maintainable under Order 43 Rule 1a of the Civil Procedure Code. ( 36 ) AS already discussed earlier at the very beginning that the appeal is hot maintainable in view of the bar that the judgment under appeal was a consent order, we are holding the same that the appeal is not maintainable accordingly in terms of embargo of Section 96 (3) of the Civil procedure Code. ( 37 ) BEFORE parting with the matter, as by the interim order the last date of option was fixed today, it is extended till 4. 00 p. m. of 26. 3. 2007. ( 38 ) HENCE, having regard to the findings aforesaid, the appeal and the application both stand dismissed. However, no cost on the facts and circumstances of the case.