JUDGMENT Hon’ble D.P. Singh, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondent No. 1, Shri Yashwant Verma for respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and Shri Vijay Singh for respondent No. 5. 2. Pleadings are complete and the Counsel for the parties agree that the petition may be finally disposed off under the Rules of the Court. 3. In pursuance of an advertisement dated 22.11.2004 inviting applications for recruitment to Class III post in the Judgeship at Banda, the petitioner along with several other applied, the petitioner having cleared his written and other examination was selected and an appointment letter dated 17.1.2005 was issued and started to draw his salary. After about two years he was intimated by the Civil Judge vide his order dated 23.12.2006 that on the basis of a complaint raised by one of his Uncles, an enquiry has been ordered and he should participate in the enquiry. The petitioner submitted his reply and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the District Judge who vide a show cause notice dated 29.1.2007 asked the petitioner to show cause why his services not be terminated because he was overage by one day and thus, was not eligible for appointment. The petitioner submitted his detailed reply, but by the impugned order dated 31.1.2007 his services were dispensed with and thus, this petition. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that he was overage only by a day and since he did not conceal anything and submitted his testimonials etc., it was a fit case where the District Judge ought to have approached the High Court under Clause II of Rule 6 of the Subordinate Civil Court Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947 (here-in-after referred to as the Rules.) 5. No doubt the petitioner was overage by one day which is in consonance with the method adopted by the Apex Court in Prabhu Dayal Seswa v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1986 SC 1948 , which has also been relied upon by the respondents. But in the penultimate paragraph of the report it dealt with hardship which may be caused in such cases in the following words : "Before parting with the case, we shall be failing in our duty if we do not advert to the undue hardship caused to the appellant. But in the penultimate paragraph of the report it dealt with hardship which may be caused in such cases in the following words : "Before parting with the case, we shall be failing in our duty if we do not advert to the undue hardship caused to the appellant. The appellant had not only qualified at the written examination held by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission but was also called for an interview under the directions of the High Court. In case he cleared the interview, it would imply that the appellant would fail to secure entry into the Rajasthan Administrative Service just by one day because of the interpretation placed on R. 11-B of the Rajasthan State and Subordinate Services (Direct Recruitment by Competitive Examination) Rules, 1962. We wish the Government would consider the question of relaxing the upper age limit in the case of appellant in order to mitigate the hardship, if otherwise permissible. There is need for a provision like the proviso to Rule 4 of the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1955, conferring the power of relaxation on the State Government under certain conditions without which a candidate though deserved would be ineligible for appointment.” 6. Rule 6 (II) of the Rules is in the same terms as the Apex Court opined in afore-quoted paragraph. It reads as under : "6. Age—A candidate for recruitment to a post in the ministerial establishment shall not be less than 18 or more than 27 years of age on the date of the competitive test held for the purposes, provided that : (I) any continuous period spent in Civil Service of that Government and any period spent after the third day of September, 1939 in the service of His Majesty’s Naval, Military or Air Force shall be deducted from the age of the applicant for the purpose of deciding his eligibility; (II) the District Judge may with the sanction of the High Court of the Chief Court, as the case may be, extend the age limit in favour of a candidate on the grounds of public interest or fair dealing; (lll) the maximum age limit applicable to a candidate of the Scheduled Castes for service under these Rules shall be greater by one year than the maximum age limit prescribed for other candidates”. 7. 7. The words ‘fair dealing’ in the context in which it is used would imply to give a fair deal to the incumbent with regard to relaxation in age. This has opened a window to the application of principles of equity and fair play, it is not denied that the petitioner had correctly disclosed his date of birth, was allowed to take the tests and was selected and appointed and continued to work for about two years without any challenge by any of the rejected candidates and without any apparent adverse report with regard to his work. He has also became overage for other jobs. But there is nothing on record why the power under Rule 6(II) was not brought into play and, in this background, why the matter was not forwarded to the High Court before terminating his services immediately. The haste in passing the order by not extending the time for meeting the allegations more effectively raises a doubt in the mind of the Court about the real object which was sought to be achieved by creating a vacancy in this manner. Be it so, in the opinion of the Court, the District Judge, before passing the impugned termination order, ought to have forwarded the matter to the High Court for its sanction under the Rules. The omission to do so, renders the termination illegal. 8. However, learned Counsels for the respondents contend, in unison, that in fact the petitioner was involved in a Criminal Case under Sections 323, 325, 504 and 506 I.P.C. and thus in view of Rule 10 read with Form A with regard to certification of his character, the petitioner had suppressed this material fact and, therefore, was not eligible for appointment. 9. A perusal of the show cause notice dated 29.1.2007 shows that the only ground on which the petitioner was asked to submit his reply was with regard to his being overage and not for suppression of any fact with respect to the criminal case. The District Judge, rightly, did not mention it because neither the case involved any imputation with regard to moral turpitude nor it discloses involvement in any crimes and violence. Therefore, for both the reasons, this argument cannot be accepted. 10. The District Judge, rightly, did not mention it because neither the case involved any imputation with regard to moral turpitude nor it discloses involvement in any crimes and violence. Therefore, for both the reasons, this argument cannot be accepted. 10. For the foregoing reasons given above, this petition succeeds and is allowed, the impugned order of termination dated 31.1.2007 is hereby set aside and the petitioner is re-instated forthwith with all consequential benefits. The District Judge may send the particulars of the case together with his noting and opinion and also a copy of this judgment to the High Court. The Hon’ble High Court may examine it and if necessary, hear the petitioner, and take a reasoned decision thereafter. In the facts of the case, no order as to costs. ————