Per Virender Singh, J. 1. The instant Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the Union of India (appellant in CIMA No.32/97) for setting aside the judgment dated 26.9.2005 passed by the learned Single Judge vide which the award dated 30.5.1995 of learned District Judge, Jammu (Arbitrator) allowing the compensation on the basis of two different classes of land and also the interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of passing of the award has been confirmed. 2. Pursuant to notice all the respondents have put in their appearance. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge and award. 4. Mr. Gagan Basotra, submits that the learned Arbitrator had assumed that the appellant had agreed for the payment of compensation to the land owners (respondents-herein) on the basis of class II and class III land, whereas the rate of compensation was never proposed by the appellant at all. It was in fact, proposed by the Collector which was not agreed by the appellant. Mr. Basotra then submits that even, otherwise, the learned District Judge (Arbitrator) had fixed the compensation of the acquired land on the higher side and the same was upheld by the learned single Judge without considering the evidence on record and simply observing that the value of the immovable property every where is increasing day by day. This approach was not applicable in the present case on the present set of circumstances and exorbitant rates have been given to the respondents and call for satisfaction of the amount. 5. The other argument advanced by Mr. Basotra is that the interest granted to the respondents is contrary to the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act of 1968") as no interest can be awarded under the Act. He then submits that the judgment relied by the learned single Judge (The Managing Director, J&K Handicrafts, Jammu v. M/s Good Luck Carpets, AIR 1990 SC 864) was under the Arbitration Act which cannot be made applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the land of the respondents was requisitioned and acquired by the State under section 7 of the Act. In the said Act, there is no provision of interest at all and, therefore, the impugned award dated 30-05-1995 passed by the learned District Judge, Jammu (Arbitrator) and subsequently upheld by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set-aside to that extent atleast. 6. In support of his contentions, Mr. Basotra relies upon a judgment of Honble Apex Court rendered in Union of India vs. Hari Krishan Kholsa (1993 Supp (2) SCC 149 (dead) by LRs and subsequently relied upon by Division Bench of this Court in case titled Gurdwara Guru Nanak Dev Ji vs. Union of India and another, LPA(C)32/97 decided on 25-05-2004. 7. Learned counsel for respondents (land owners) repudiated the submissions advanced by Mr. Basotra and submit that both the Courts below have divulged deeply into the matter so far as amount of compensation is concerned, and, therefore, the said observations do not call for any indulgence of this Court. With regard to the interest part, the learned counsel relied upon a latest judgment of Honble Apex Court rendered in Spl. Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), General Hyderabad vs. B. Chandra Reddy (AIR 2007 SC 15779) and drawn our attention to paras-21 and 22 of the judgment. 8. After giving our thoughtful consideration to all the aspects of the matter, we do not find any substance in the arguments of Mr. Basotra so far as fixing of amount of compensation is concerned. The learned District Judge, Jammu (Arbitrator) had entered into a detailed discussion while fixing the amount of compensation for class-II land @ 24,000/- and class three land @ Rs. 20,000/- per Kanal. The learned single Judge has also re-scanned the entire case once again and returned a categoric finding that the compensation awarded to the respondents is assessed on the basis of documentary evidence placed before the Arbitrator and, therefore, cannot be said to be excessive one. We, while sitting in intra-Court appeal do not intend to disturb the concurrent finding on facts as we do not find any basic infirmity in it. Consequently, we repel the argument of Mr. Basotra on this aspect. 9. We, however, find force in the other submission advanced by Mr. Basotra vis-a-vis, interest granted to the respondents @ 12% P.A. from the date of passing of the award by the Arbitrator and subsequently upheld by the learned single Judge. Consequently, we repel the argument of Mr. Basotra on this aspect. 9. We, however, find force in the other submission advanced by Mr. Basotra vis-a-vis, interest granted to the respondents @ 12% P.A. from the date of passing of the award by the Arbitrator and subsequently upheld by the learned single Judge. In our considered view, granting of interest is contrary to the provisions of the Act. 10. The Apex Court, while dealing with constitutionality of section 8(3) (a) of the Act in Hari Krishan Khoslas case (supra) observed that the aforesaid section is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was observed in the aforesaid judgment that amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement under Section 8(1) (b) and in the absence of such an agreement it is left to the discretion of the Arbitrator, who under Section 8 (1) (e) is to hear the dispute. The Arbitrator must determine the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just but he must have regard to sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 8. It was then observed that the significant omission of solatium is indicative of the legislative intent necessitating stress on the expressions "just and "circumstances of which case" occurring in sub section (1) (e) of Section 8. Further it was observed that another distinguishing feature is the expression with `open market in Section 8(3) (a) and the reasons why solatium has not been provided is that "open market" contemplates a bargain between `free buyer and a `free seller unfettered by the consideration of requisition and consequent acquisition. 11. In Gurdawara Sh.Nanak Dev Jis case (supra) relied upon by Mr. Basotra, the Division Bench of this Court, while relying upon Hari Krishan Khoslas case (supra) declined the solatium and interest to the appellant. In the said case the land owner was granted the compensation under the Act, whereas no solatium and interest was awarded. Union of India had shown its grievance with regard to the amount of compensation, whereas the land owners were unhappy in disallowing the interest and solatium to them. Ultimately, both the sides had filed letters patent appeals before this Court. The Division Bench of this Court while agreeing that the amount of compensation as already enhanced by the learned single Judge also agreed with the view of the learned Single Judge in not awarding the solatium and interest. Ultimately, both the sides had filed letters patent appeals before this Court. The Division Bench of this Court while agreeing that the amount of compensation as already enhanced by the learned single Judge also agreed with the view of the learned Single Judge in not awarding the solatium and interest. Therefore, in our view, the aforesaid two judgments cited by Mr. Basotra, resolve the controversy with regard to the interest part. 12. With due respect, the judgment in case M/s Good Luck Carpets (Supra) relied upon by the learned Single Judge so as to award interest would not be applicable in the present case. It was with regard to the proceedings under the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration Act (2 of 2002 Svt.). However, in the present case the arbitrator was appointed under section 8 (1) (b) of Act of 1968. 13. To be fair to learned counsel for the respondents, we may observe here that the judgment in case Spl. Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), General Hyderabad (Supra) cited by them would have no bearing on the facts of the present case. In the aforesaid case, the Honble Supreme Court did not disturb the finding with regard to grant of benefit of solatium and interest to the land owners primarily on the pretext that the award was passed by the Arbitrator sixteen years back and it had attained finality being not challenged. That is not the position in the case in hand. In the aforesaid case, Hari Krishan Kholsas case (supra) was also referred to by the appellant(s) but no finding is returned thereto. 14. From the perusal of the provisions of the Act it is manifest that no provision for payment of interest on the compensation payable on the acquisition of immovable property has been made. The reason for not providing for interest is obvious. Section 7 of the Act vests the Government with Power to acquire only such property which is subject to requisition. Unless the property sought to be acquired has already been requisitioned in terms of Section 3 of the Act the same cannot be acquired in terms of section 7. The reason for not providing for interest is obvious. Section 7 of the Act vests the Government with Power to acquire only such property which is subject to requisition. Unless the property sought to be acquired has already been requisitioned in terms of Section 3 of the Act the same cannot be acquired in terms of section 7. When a property is requisitioned in terms of section 3, the person to whom such property belongs becomes entitled to the payment of periodic compensation during the period of requisition fixed in terms of Rule 9 of the rules framed under section 22 of the Act which can be in the shape of monthly rental. Thus until the property is acquired and just compensation is paid, the person to whom such property belongs continues to remain entitled to be paid the requisition compensation/rental. Therefore, at no point of time the right of such person to receive compensation for acquisition remains in jeopardy. 15. Testing the case in hand on that rationale, we are of the confirmed view that the respondents are not entitled to any interest and the view taken by the learned Arbitrator awarding them the interest on the acquired property and subsequently upheld by the learned Single Judge deserves to be disturbed. Ordered accordingly. 16. The net result is that the instant appeal is partly allowed confirming the amount of compensation already awarded to the respondents (land owners) and disentitling them to the interest as already awarded. LPA (C) No. 60/2005 alongwith connected CMPs is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.