JUDGMENT Sham Sunder, J.:- The instant revision petition has been filed by the petitioner, against the order dated 2.11.2001 rendered by the Court of the then Additional District Judge, Bathinda vide which the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay of 345 days for filing the appeal, was dismissed. 2. The facts, in brief, are that vide judgment and decree dated 20.10.1995, the suit filed by Hari Dev-plaintiff-respondent, for recovery of Rs.1,36,000/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, with proportionate costs, was decreed by the Court of the then Additional Senior Sub Judge, Bathinda. 3. Feeling aggrieved, against the judgment and decree, an appeal was preferred, in the Court of District Judge, which was entrusted to the Court of an Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bathinda. Along with the appeal, an application for condonation of delay of 345 days, was filed by the petitioner-appellant, on the ground, that he came to know, of the passing of the decree dated 20.10.1995 only on 30.8.1996, when an application was moved by Hari Dev-plaintiff in a suit, pending in the Court of Sudesh Kumar, Civil Judge, Delhi. Thereafter, he came to Bathinda and on enquiry, came to know that his Counsel Sh. J.C. Malhotra, had left the practice, and shifted to Delhi, by handing over all the briefs to Sh. Satya Murti Nayyar. He also came to know that Sh. S.M. Nayyar, Advocate, had been appearing on his behalf, without any authority, and without informing him of the developments in the case, and the dates of hearing. He filed an application through Counsel Sh. S.M. Nayyar on 12.9.1996, and, copies were prepared on 26.9.1996. Thereafter on 28.9.1996, he filed an appeal within the period of limitation, from the date of knowledge. It was further stated, in the application, that the delay in filing the appeal, was neither intentional nor wilful. 4. On notice of the application, the plaintiff-respondent, put in appearance, and contested the application. It was stated that the petitioner very well knew that Sh. J.C. Malhotra, Advocate, earlier engaged by him had shifted to Delhi and thereafter Sh. S.M. Nayyar, Advocate, was appearing, on his behalf. It was denied that Sh. S.M. Nayyar was appearing on behalf of the petitioner in the suit without any authority. It was stated that the petitioner very well knew that Sh. J.C. Malhotra, Advocate, earlier engaged by him had shifted to Delhi and thereafter Sh. S.M. Nayyar, Advocate, was appearing, on his behalf. It was denied that Sh. S.M. Nayyar was appearing on behalf of the petitioner in the suit without any authority. It was further stated that delay of 345 days in filing the appeal, was wilful and intentional and as such, could not be condoned. 5. On the application and reply the following issues were struck by the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bathinda:­ “1. Whether there are sufficient reasons for condonation of delay ?OPA 2. Relief.” 6. The parties led evidence. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, and, on going through the record of the case, the Appellate Court came to the conclusion, that there was no sufficient cause, for condoning the delay and, as such, dismissed the application. 7. Feeling aggrieved, against the order dated 2.11.2001, passed by the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bathinda, the instant revision petition was filed. 8. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitione and have gone through the record of the case, carefully. 9. In Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu Vs. Gobardhan Sao, 2002 (2) RCR (Civil) 337 (SC) the principle of law laid down, was that the term sufficient cause, in Section 5 of Limitation Act, and Rule 9 of Order 22 CPC, must receive a liberal construction, so as to advance substantial justice. When no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party, condonation of delay is a rule, and refusal an exception-No doubt, a valuable right accrued to the other party, should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay, in a routine manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper-technical view, explanation furnished, should not be rejected when stakes are high and arguable points are involved. The Courts have to strike a balance. When the appeals are pending for a long time, the parties are not expected to keep constant watch of the events. The Rule of limitation is not meant to destroy the rights but is to keep the cause alive, for such prescribed time and is meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics. In State of Nagaland Vs. The Rule of limitation is not meant to destroy the rights but is to keep the cause alive, for such prescribed time and is meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics. In State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO, [ 2005(2) Law Herald (P&H) 400 (SC)] : 2005 (3) SCC 752, the principle of law, laid down, was to the effect that the Courts should be liberal in condoning the delay. Expression ”every day’s delay” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be adopted. It was further held in the said authority that unless want of bona fides or inaction or negligence is proved to deprive a party of the protection of Section 5, the application must not be thrown out. It was further held that mistake of the Counsel, by itself, is always sufficient cause, for condonation of delay. It is always a question, whether the mistake was bona fide, or was merely a device, to cover an ulterior purpose. If the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Expression “sufficient cause” is adequately elastic. The Court is to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. Court should not adopt an injustice oriented approach, in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1998 Supreme Court 3222, the delay of 883 days, in filing the appeal was condoned, on the ground, that the same had been caused due to the failure of an Advocate, to inform the appellant, as well as failure to take action. 10. It must be remembered that, in every case of delay, there can be some lapse, on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea, and to shut the door, against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala-fides, or it is not put forth, as a part of dilatory the Court must show utmost consideration, to the suitor. But when are there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned, by the party, deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. But when are there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned, by the party, deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne, in mind, that he is a loser, and he too would have incurred quite a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline, that when the Court condones the delay, due to laches, on the part of the applicant, it shall compensate the opposite party, for its loss. 11. Keeping in view the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid authorities, now let us see, as to whether in the instant case, the petitioner was able to show sufficient cause, for condonation of delay of 345 days, in filing the appeal. The petitioner, when appeared, as AW-1, in the application for condonation of delay in clear-cut terms, stated that earlier Sh. J.C. Malhotra, Advocate, was engaged by him, in the suit, but he did not know that he had shifted to Delhi. He only came to know about this fact on 30.8.1996, when the plaintiff-respondent moved an application in a Delhi Court. It was, at that time that he came to know that the briefs had also been handed over by Sh. J.C. Malhotra, Advocate, to Sh. S.M. Nayyar, Advocate. The petitioner, in clear-cut terms, stated, in his statement, that he never engaged Sh. S.M. Nayyar nor Sh. S.M.Nayyar, informed him, with regard to the developments in the suit, from time to time. No doubt, Hari Dev, when appeared as, RW-2, stated that the petitioner was well aware of the position that Sh. J.C. Malhotra had shifted to Delhi, and handed over his briefs to Sh. S.M. Nayyar, and thus, there was intentional delay, in filing the appeal. There was no reason, on the part of the petitioner, to depose falsely. Had he been informed by his Counsel, with regard to the developments, in the suit, he would have certainly taken steps, to file an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Lower Court, immediately, after such a decision. It appears that on account of shifting of Sh. J.C. Malhotra, Advocate earlier engaged, as a counsel, by the petitioner, in the suit to Delhi, there was a communication gap, between him, and his Counsel. It appears that on account of shifting of Sh. J.C. Malhotra, Advocate earlier engaged, as a counsel, by the petitioner, in the suit to Delhi, there was a communication gap, between him, and his Counsel. It was, on account of this reason that he did not come to know of the exact and correct position in the suit, as also the date, on which the decree was passed. Fault was therefore, of Sh. J.C. Malhotra, Advocate, who did not inform the petitioner that he had shifted to Delhi, and handed over his brief to Sh. S.M. Nayyar. No doubt, at the same time, there was some negligence, on the part of the petitioner, in not contacting Sh. J.C. Malhotra, or getting information with regard to the progress in the suit. The petitioner was not to gain anything, by filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation. Decree of recovery of money had been passed, against him, and he really wanted, to file an appeal, against the same, so as to show that the same was wrongly passed. The petitioner had, thus, proved that there was sufficient cause, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The Courts are required to decide the cases, on the merits, and not by adopting short cut methods. Procedure is, in the ultimate the hand-maid of justice, meant to subserve the ends thereof, than to thwart the same. If procedural wrangles and the substantial justice are pitted against each other, then the latter will prevail over the former. The first appellate Court was thus, wrong in dismissing the application for condonation of delay, holding that no sufficient cause had been proved, by the petitioner. The order dated 2.11.2001, suffers from illegality and infirmity, and is liable to set aside. The findings of the Lower Court on issue No.1, being, erroneous are reversed. 12. For the reasons recorded hereinbefore, the revision petition is accepted subject to payment of costs as Rs.5,000/-,payable by the petitioner to the respondent on or before 31.1.2008. The parties are directed to appear in the Successor Court of the court of Sh. Karnail Singh, the then Additional District Judge, Bathinda on 31.1.2008. The said Court shall restore the appeal, and thereafter, decide the same, in accordance with the provisions of law. —————————