Judgment :- 1. The applicant was a tenant of a portion of the premises in Door No.103, Broadway, Chennai-600 108 measuring 765 sq.ft. It is not disputed that the premises belongs to the respondent. The tenancy is non-residential. The respondent wanted to demolish the building and reconstruct the same and requested him to vacate the premises temporarily so as to enable him to reconstruct the same. The applicant paid a sum of Rs. 1,41,000/- There was a registered agreement of lease under which the respondent confirm a receipt of refundable receipt of Rs.2,25,000/-. He agreed to lease 800 sq.ft. in the ground floor and another separate built up area in the ground floor measuring 457 sq.ft. Another agreement of lease dated 27.01.2005 was entered into and according to the applicant, the respondent was entitled to retain 180 sq.ft. super-built up area including staircase. There seems to have been an agreement that if he did not retain the same, it would also be let out to the applicant. There is an agreement that the applicant can adjust future rents in the advance that has already been paid. The applicant has been in possession of 570 sq.ft. as per the undertaking. According to the applicant the remaining portion has not been handed over. According to the applicant, there was a supplemental rental agreement by which it was agreed that in addition to the 570 sq.ft., he would be given possession of some more extent aggregating to a total extent of 900 sq.ft. The possession was not handed over. Clause No.15 of the lease agreement provides for arbitration and therefore, the applicant after having issued a letter that the dispute could be referred to the Arbitration Centre prays for an injunction restraining the respondent from leasing or handing over possession in Schedule A and B property in favour of the third persons. 2. According to the respondent, after the demolition the applicant has been put in possession of 570 sq.ft., as per the understanding and the applicant has occupied the same. According to the respondent, the applicant has occupied the entire ground floor without leaving any place for constructing any steps to the first floor which is even as per the applicant he is entitled to. 3. According to the applicant, the agreement is void and there are proceedings before the Civil Court as well as the Rent Control Court. According to the respondent, the applicant has occupied the entire ground floor without leaving any place for constructing any steps to the first floor which is even as per the applicant he is entitled to. 3. According to the applicant, the agreement is void and there are proceedings before the Civil Court as well as the Rent Control Court. Several agreements have been produced in the typed set of papers. It is also seen that on 07.07.2006, a letter has been issued for nomination of the Arbitrator. The applicant was a tenant and would be entitled to the protection of the Rent Control Act normally and it is admitted by the counsel for the applicant and the respondent that the applicant has been given possession of the same extent that he was in possession before he vacated the premises. This enabled the respondent to demolish and reconstruct the premises. It appears that he has given some amount as advance. According to the applicant, he is entitled to occupy the rest of the portions. 4. The counsel for the respondent was asked to enquire whether the respondent was willing to let out the vacant portions to the applicant on a mutually acceptable rate of rent. The respondent is not willing. Even assuming that the applicant has the right to be given possession of any extent in the first floor apart from what he is now occupying in the ground floor which is of the same extent he was occupying prior to the demolition and reconstruction and even assuming that he has paid a huge amount of advance, for this purpose, the injury that may be suffered by him is easily quantifiable in money and the rents payable by him can be adjusted towards the advance until whatever the respondent allegedly owes to the applicant is totally wiped out. 5. On the other hand, to restrain the owner by granting an interim mandatory injunction directing possession being handed over would cause extreme hardship and such a relief cannot be granted because that is not in the nature of the interim relief but almost a final relief. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the Court can grant Interim Mandantory Injunction only in very exception cases. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the Court can grant Interim Mandantory Injunction only in very exception cases. “In Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and others, 1990 (2) SCC 117 , while considering the scope of issuing Ad-interim Mandatory Injunction, after referring to several authorities, it was observed by the Supreme Court: “16. The Relief of Interlocutory Mandatory Injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when foil relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, Courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are: 1. The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. 2. It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. 3. The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief.” This was referred to in Sakthi Durga Builders and Developers v. P.S. Raman, 2007 (3) CTC l63, and the Division Bench held,— “From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that before taking the extraordinary step of issuing Interim Mandatory Injunction, the Court is required to find out about the existence of a very strong prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff, apart from other aspects regarding irreparable loss and balance of convenience. As observed by the Supreme Court, the tests to be satisfied are to be much stringent while dealing with the Application for Interim Mandatory Injunction.” 6. Applying the above guidelines, I find that the applicant is not entitled to the relief prayed for. The Original Application is dismissed.