JUDGMENT Sham Sunder. J.:-This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 21.10.1999, rendered by the Court of District Judge, Chandigarh, vide which the petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, filed by the appellant-petitioner, for dissolution of marriage was dismissed. 2. The facts, in brief, are that on 5.8.1984, the marriage between the parties was solemnized at Chandigarh, according to Anand Karaz ceremony. The parties cohabited, as husband and wife. From this wedlock one child namely Prabh Kiran Singh was born on 5.11.1986. At the time of marriage, the respondent was in service. After her transfer from Panchmari (M.P.) where the respondent was earlier posted, to Chandigarh she started residing at Mohali with her parents because both her brothers namely Amarjit Singh and Jaspal Singh were employed and residing outside Chandgiarh/Mohali. The mother of the respondent was a handicapped lady. Under these circumstances, the respondent insisted upon the petitioner, to live with her, at Mohali, in the house of her mother, so that they may be able to look after her. The appellant-petitioner however, did not accede to this demand of the respondent. The petitioner, at that time, was residing at Faridkot. He asked the respondent to leave her job and live with him at Faridkot. He was in a position to maintain her, as well as the child. He also told her that, in case, both of them lived together they could look after the child in a proper manner. The respondent, however, did not give heed to the request of the petitioner. On the other hand, she insisted upon him, to live with her, in the house of her parents, at Mohali. It was further stated that the respondent most of the time, used to reside at Mohali, with her parents. She rarely visited Faridkot. In vacations, she pressed the petitioner that he should join her in the house of her parents, but he again did not care. When the petitioner flatly refused the demand of the respondent, to live with her parents, at Mohali, he left the society of the petitioner, with a threat, that she would never come back to join him at Faridkot. As she was residing with her parents, at that time, she also took away with her the minor child. When the petitioner flatly refused the demand of the respondent, to live with her parents, at Mohali, he left the society of the petitioner, with a threat, that she would never come back to join him at Faridkot. As she was residing with her parents, at that time, she also took away with her the minor child. The petitioner waited for some time that the respondent would come and join him at Faridkot, but she did not come. After about a month, the petitioner went to Mohali to bring back the respondent-wife, but she flatly refused to join his society. Again after two months, the Panchayat consisting of the petitioner, his father, Gurdeep Singh and Pala -Singh s/o Kundan Singh and Manjit Singh s/o Jawala Singh went to the house of her parents. The Panchayat asked the respondent to accompany the petitioner, but she refused to accompany him. It was further stated that the respondent deserted the petitioner continuously since December, 1989, with an intention to put an end to the matrimonial ties, permanently. Ultimately, the petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (amended up to date) was filed by the petitioner, in the Court of District Judge, Faridkot. It was, later on, transferred by this Court, to the Court of District Judge, Chandigarh. 3. The respondent, put in appearance, and filed written statement. It was pleaded that the petition had been filed after an undue delay, which remained un-explained, and, as such, was liable to be dismissed. The marriage between the parties was also admitted. It was also admitted that the parties cohabited as husband and wife. The birth of a child namely Prabh Kiran Singh, from this wedlock, was also admitted. It was stated that the respondent was working as Post Graduate Teacher, in Central School and was posted at Panchmari (M.P.) at the time of her marriage. She was transferred to Chandigarh on 5.9.1988. It was further stated that before the marriage, the father of the petitioner, namely Gurdeep Singh, represented to the father of the respondent, that the petitioner had through-out studied at Dehradun, and his academic career was very bright. He also represented that he was a very bright and pushing Advocate, in District Courts, at Faridkot. It was further stated that before the marriage, the father of the petitioner, namely Gurdeep Singh, represented to the father of the respondent, that the petitioner had through-out studied at Dehradun, and his academic career was very bright. He also represented that he was a very bright and pushing Advocate, in District Courts, at Faridkot. In another letter, the father of the petitioner, represented to the father of the respondent, that they had no demand, except the marriage of the respondent. The matrimonial ties, between the parties, were finalized through correspondence. It was further stated that Amarjeet Singh, brother of the respondent was/is at Chandigarh. The other brother of the respondent namely Jaswant Singh, an Officer in the Air Force, no doubt, was posted outside Chandigarh. It was further stated that the mother of the respondent, was not a handicapped lady. She, however, got her leg fractured, but, otherwise, she was an able-bodied lady. The father of the respondent retired from Defence Forces, and was a healthy person. It was denied that the respondent insisted upon the appellant-petitioner, to settle at Chandigarh, to look after her parents. It was further stated that after the marriage which was finalized, through correspondence, the respondent, on her first visit, to Faridkot, came to know, that the petitioner was not a practising lawyer, and was dependant on his parents, who were owing 15 acres of land, and not 50 acres, as represented. The respondent further came to know that the petitioner had not through-out studied at Dehradun as represented by his father, before the marriage. On coming to know of all this, the respondent felt very much depressed. The petitioner and his parents instead of realizing their fault, regarding the misrepresentations, gave a very severe blow to the respondent, by openly expressing, that her parents had not given cash or dowry, in the marriage, and had thrown her out of their home, as a dirt. On 7.8.1984, the petitioner, his father Gurdeep Singh, his brother Dr. Harcharan Singh, his wife, Surjit Kaur and petitioner’s maternal aunt, Mohinder Kaur, along with the respondent, came to the house of her parents, at Mohali. On 7.8.1984, the petitioner, his father Gurdeep Singh, his brother Dr. Harcharan Singh, his wife, Surjit Kaur and petitioner’s maternal aunt, Mohinder Kaur, along with the respondent, came to the house of her parents, at Mohali. It was further stated that before the respondent could complain to her parents, with regard to the misrepresentations of the father of the petitioner, which she came to know, on her first visit to Faridkot, the father of the petitioner, told the father of the respondent, that they were discarding their daughter, as she had challenged his property. They further stated that, at the time of marriage, the father of the respondent had not given anything in the dowry. These persons showed open dissatisfaction with the dowry, given to the respondent, in the marriage. After some discussion, the matter was compromised, and they took the respondent to Faridkot on 8.8.1984. It was further stated that even thereafter she was always harassed and taunted for not bringing dowry. Threat of divorce was hurled by the petitioner, in the month of August, 1984, itself. The respondent was visiting Faridkot till October, 1985. Thereafter, she did not go to Faridkot, on account of the aforesaid reasons. It was further stated that the respondent was always keen to join the petitioner, at Faridkot, but he was never willing to take her along with him, even in the vacations, in her School, and had been avoiding to take her, on different excuses. Sometimes, he used to tell that he had no place of abode and he could not take her. On other occasions, he was telling her, that they were in the process of shifting to Chandigarh, and buying a house. It was denied that the respondent visited Faridkot, in the month of December, 1989. It was denied that the respondent insisted upon the petitioner that he should live with her (respondent) at Mohali, in the house of her parents. It was further stated that in the month of April 1987, the petitioner along with his father, his brother and his brother in-law came to Chandigarh, and demanded cash from the father of the respondent, and threatened him, that if they did not give sufficient cash, then bad consequences would follow, and she would be divorced. It was further stated that in the month of April 1987, the petitioner along with his father, his brother and his brother in-law came to Chandigarh, and demanded cash from the father of the respondent, and threatened him, that if they did not give sufficient cash, then bad consequences would follow, and she would be divorced. In April, 1989, the petitioner and his brother came to the School of the respondent, at Chandigarh, and asked her, to give him divorce. She told that she was not interested in divorce. It was further stated that ever since 1992, the respondent had not seen the petitioner, except in the Court on 28.3.1995. It was further stated that the respondent was always ready and willing to join the petitioner, at Faridkot, after getting herself transferred, but he was not interested to take her along with him. It was denied that the respondent deserted the petitioner, for a continuous period of two years, immediately preceding the filing of the petition, with an intention, to put an end to the matrimonial ties. On the other hand, it was stated that it was the petitioner who deserted the respondent, without any sufficient cause. 4. In the replication, filed by the petitioner, she reasserted all the averments, contained in the petition, and controverted those, contained in the written statement:- 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues, were struck:­ 1. “Whether the respondent has deserted to the petitioner without any reasonable cause?OPP 2. Relief.” 6. The petitioner examined Puran Chand, Registry Clerk, PW-1, Madhurjit, Sr. Assistant, O/o Estate Officer, Punjab, Jalandhar, PW-3, Gurdeep Singh, his father, PW-5 and himself appeared in the witness box as PW-4. The documents P-4 to P-13 were also tendered into evidence. 7. In rebuttal, the respondent examined Amarjit Singh, RW-2, her younger brother, Pritam Kaur, RW-3, and herself appeared in the witness box as RW-1. She could not examine her father, as his memory had gone blank, and he was incapable of making rational statement. This fact is evident from the statement of Mr. R.S. Walia, Counsel for the respondent, made in the Lower Court on 22.9.1999. 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the record of the case, carefully. 9. This fact is evident from the statement of Mr. R.S. Walia, Counsel for the respondent, made in the Lower Court on 22.9.1999. 8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the record of the case, carefully. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the trial Court, was wrong, in coming to the conclusion, that the respondent did not desert the petitioner for a continuous period of two years, immediately preceding the filing of the petition, without any sufficient cause. He further contended that the petitioner-appellant was always ready and willing to rehabilitate the respondent, in his house, at Faridkot, but she was insisting upon him that he should live with her, at Mohali, in the house of her parents, as she was posted at Chandigarh, so that they may be able to look after her handicapped mother properly. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. Before touching the submission of the counsel for the appellant, in context of the evidence, on record, the legal position on the question of desertion, deserves to be highlighted. In Surjit Kaur Vs. Tirath Singh, 1979 Current Law Journal (Civil) P&H 534, it was held that the burden of proof, is on the petitioner-husband, to establish the animus deserendi, and also the fact that the wife has no animus revertendi, to come back, and resume cohabitation. The principle of law, laid down in Bipin Chandra Vs. Prabhvati, AIR 1957 SC 176 and Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani Vs. Meena AIR 1964 (SC) 40 was to the effect, that it is for the petitioner, to prove the factum of separation, and the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similar principle of law, was laid down in Savitri Pandey Vs. Prem Chandra Pandey, 2002 (1) R.C.R. (Civil) (S.C) 719. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. Babu Singh, 1988(1) The Punjab Law Reporter 131, it was held that the mere fact that the parties were living separately for 7/8 years, in itself, was not sufficient to prove the ground of desertion. The petitioner should further prove that the respondent had no intention to live with him, when she parted company. In Amarjit Singh Vs. Darshan Kaur, 1994 (2) RRR 151, it was held that desertion has not been defined, in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, or any other Statute. The petitioner should further prove that the respondent had no intention to live with him, when she parted company. In Amarjit Singh Vs. Darshan Kaur, 1994 (2) RRR 151, it was held that desertion has not been defined, in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, or any other Statute. It has to be spelt out, from the conduct of the parties, and the pronouncements of the Courts. Desertion means the separation of one spouse, from the other, with an intention of bringing cohabitation permanently, to an end, without reasonable cause, and consent of the other spouse, and with an intention not to return or resume cohabitation. Mere severance of relations or separation without desertion, is not sufficient. Desertion is not walking out of a house, but is withdrawal, from a home. Desertion consists in withdrawal, not from a place, but from the state of things. Desertion for the purpose of being a ground, for dissolution of marriage is to be ascertained, from the facts and circumstances of each case, keeping in view the status of the parties, their social surroundings, and larger interests of the family. The concept of Hindu marriage, in our country, is a historical development, which has passed through various stages, like human society. The institution of marriage, in our social system, has been considered to be a sacred sanskar, and the insistence is always required to be made, for its continuance, and not its dissolution, unless no other option is left. In Smt. Satwant Kaur Vs. Gurnam Singh, 2002(1) RCR (Civil) 447, the same principle of law was laid down. 10. Keeping in view the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid authorities, now let us see, as to whether, the appellant-husband was able to prove that the respondent-wife deserted him, for a continuous period of two years, immediately preceding the filing of the petition, without any sufficient cause, with an intention to put an end to the matrimonial ties permanently. Admittedly, at the time of marriage, the respondent was serving, as Post Graduate teacher, in Central School, at Panchmari (M.P.) whereas, the father of the appellant before marriage represented to the father of the respondent, that the petitioner was having a very good practice as an Advocate at Faridkot. It is proved from the evidence, on record, that the respondent was transferred to Central School at Chandigarh, in the year 1988. It is proved from the evidence, on record, that the respondent was transferred to Central School at Chandigarh, in the year 1988. It means that it was very well known to the petitioner, and also his family members, right from the very beginning, that the respondent was a working lady, and posted at a place far away from Faridkot. At that time, they must also be knowing it very well, that there may be remote possibility of her transfer to Faridkot, even after the marriage. However, whatever, the respondent could do to come near the house of her in-laws, she did, and ultimately, in the year 1988, she got, herself transferred to Chandigarh, in a Central School. It is to be seen, as to whether, the motive set up by the appellant, in the petition, as also in the evidence, for desertion is proved or not. Bhupinder Kaur-respondent, when appeared, in the witness box, as, R W -1, as also her brother Amarjit Singh, when appeared as RW-2 in clear-cut terms, stated that their mother is an able bodied person. They further stated that she got fractured her leg. Amarjit Singh (R W2) further stated that he has been living at Chandigarh since long. He further stated that he was there to look after his parents. In these circumstances, the respondent did not require the services of the appellant, at Chandigarh, or Mohali, for the purpose of looking after her mother, or father. Since, one of the brothers of the respondent, had been very much posted, at Chandigarh, at the relevant time, in my opinion, he could certainly take care of his parents, even if they were old. Therefore, there was no necessity, on the part of the respondent, to insist upon the appellant-petitioner, to live with her, in the house of her parents, at Mohali, so as to enable her, to look after her parents. The motive, which was set up by the appellant-petitioner, for the alleged insistence of the respondent that he should live with her, at Mohali, in the house of her parents, therefore, was not at all proved. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct, and stands rejected. 11. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that upto December, 1989, the respondent lived with the petitioner and thereafter she deserted him. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct, and stands rejected. 11. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that upto December, 1989, the respondent lived with the petitioner and thereafter she deserted him. He further contended that the findings of the Lower Court, that the respondent started living separately, from the appellant-petitioner, since October, 1985, were incorrect, on account of the reason, that the marriage between the parties, took place on 5.8.1984, and the son was born from this wedlock on 5.11.1986. He further contended that this clearly proved that she started living separately from December, 1989. It is an admitted case of the parties, that a son was born on 5.11.1986 from the wedlock. However, the respondent when appeared as, RW-1, in clear-cut terms, stated that she started residing separately since October, 1985. She further stated that even after October, 1985, her husband had been visiting her, both at Chandigarh and Panchmari (M.P.) for a number of days and stayed with her. It means that even before October, 1985 and after October, 1985, the petitioner used to visit the respondent, at the place of her posting, at Panchmari and Chandigarh and resided with her, for a number of days. During that period, they were living as husband and wife, and could be expected to have physical relations, resulting into conception of the respondent, and delivery of a child by her on 5.11.1986. The statement of Bhupinder Kaur, respondent, in this context, thus, clearly falsifies the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, that since the son was born on 5.11.1986 to the respondent, she could not be said to have been living separately since October, 1985. The findings of the Lower Court, in this regard, therefore, are based on evidence, and not on conjectures and surmises. This finding will be relevant for the purpose of determining the effect of delay and laches, in filing the petition. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, thus, being without merit is rejected. 12. The marriage, between the parties, as stated above, was arranged through correspondence. Before the marriage, letters Ex. R-l to R-4 were written by the father of the appellant. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, thus, being without merit is rejected. 12. The marriage, between the parties, as stated above, was arranged through correspondence. Before the marriage, letters Ex. R-l to R-4 were written by the father of the appellant. In letter Ex.R-1 dated 7.9.1983, written by Gurdeep Singh, SDO (retd.) father of the appellant, to Box No. 5392-F Tribune, Chandigarh, in pursuance of the matrimonial advertisement, he represented that his son aged 27 years was LL.B and an Advocate, in District Courts, Faridkot. It was further indicated, in this letter, that he studied through-out at Dehradun, and his academic career was very bright. He further represented that he owned 50 acres of very fertile agricultural land, and his yearly income from the said land was Rs.50,000/-. In letter Ex. R-2, dated 15.12.1983, Gurdeep Singh, aforestated indicated that they had absolutely no demand, except the marriage of the girl, and the family background. In letter Ex.R-3 dated 28.9.1983, written by Gurdeep Singh, aforesaid, he depicted the background of his family. It was further indicated, in this letter, that his son had studied at Dehradun through-out, and his academic career was very bright. It was further indicated that his son was a pushing Advocate, doing legal practice, in District Courts, Faridkot. In letter dated 19.3.1984, written by Gurdeep Singh, aforesaid, he again indicated that their family was a distinguished one and after marriage, respondent, Bhupinder Kaur shall be treated with respect and affection. It was further indicated that she would be more regarded as their loveliest daughter, rather than daughter-in-law. Gurinder Singh, petitioner, when appeared as, PW-4, during the course of his cross­ examination, stated that he graduated in third division, and did matriculation in second division. He further stated, during the course of cross­examination, that he did his graduation from Govt. Barjindera College, Faridkot. He further stated that he did his law, from Dehradun in 1979. It was further stated by him, that he joined Bar in the year 1979, and started, appearing in the Courts. He further stated that he stopped practice in the Courts in 1990. It was further stated by him, during the course of crossexamination that he was earning 7,000/- to 8,000/- per month. He further stated that in the year 1984, he was earning 3,000/- to 4,000/- per month, and was never an income tax payee. He further stated that he stopped practice in the Courts in 1990. It was further stated by him, during the course of crossexamination that he was earning 7,000/- to 8,000/- per month. He further stated that in the year 1984, he was earning 3,000/- to 4,000/- per month, and was never an income tax payee. He further stated that he never maintained any accounts of his professional income. It was further stated by him that he did not have any diaries, maintained by him from the year 1984 to 1990, for appearing in law Courts, in various cases. No doubt, he stated that he was issuing notices, on behalf of the banks, in relation to money suits, etc. He, however, could not produce even a single document, showing that he was actually practising as an Advocate, in the Courts, and appearing as an Advocate, in various cases. Had he appeared in the Courts from 1979 to 1990, he would have remembered as to in which, important cases he appeared in the Courts and the approximate fees, charged by him, in the cases, in which he was appearing. During the cross-examination Gurdeep Singh, PW -5, father of the appellant-petitioner, stated that in letter Ex.R-1 he meant to say that his son studied law at Dehradun. He further stated that his son was earning maximum to the extent of 7,000/- to 8,000/­ from legal profession, when he was practising at Faridkot. Even the President and Secretary of the Bar Association, Faridkot, were not examined by the petitioner to prove that he was actually practising as a lawyer, in District Courts, Faridkot from 1979 to 1990. He could summon his membership record from Bar Association, Faridkot, to prove his bona fides that he was actually practising from 1979 to 1990. He could not tell the name of the District and Sessions Judges or any other Judicial Officers, who remained posted at Faridkot during the period, he was allegedly practising, as an Advocate. The aforesaid representation made by the father of the appellant-petitioner, in the letters referred to above, was, thus, proved to be false, from the evidence discussed hereinabove. He could not tell the name of the District and Sessions Judges or any other Judicial Officers, who remained posted at Faridkot during the period, he was allegedly practising, as an Advocate. The aforesaid representation made by the father of the appellant-petitioner, in the letters referred to above, was, thus, proved to be false, from the evidence discussed hereinabove. Not only this, Bhupinder Kaur respondent, when appeared as RW-1, during the course of her statement, stated that after the marriage when she went to Faridkot for the first time, she came to know that the petitioner was not a practising lawyer, nor he obtained education throughout at Dehradun, as represented by his father. When she carne to know of these unpleasant facts, she became depressed, and felt cheated, because before the marriage, correct information about the income of the petitioner, his bright academic career, that he was practising as an Advocate and was pushing had not been given to her and her parents. One can imagine the plight of a newly married lady, when she comes across the falsity of the information, provided by the parents of her husband, on the aforesaid matters. In these circumstances, she was bound to feel depressed, that fraud had been played upon her, and her parents, by the parents of the petitioner. What was the reason for making such false representation, in the letters, referred to above, by the father of the appellant-petitioner, was best know to him. The only motive, could be that the father of the appellant-petitioner, knew that he (petitioner) was doing nothing, but was dependant upon him, and some-how or the other, he should be married to a lady who was an earning hand. It was with this motive, in view, that he made false representations, with regard to the aforesaid facts, in the letters Ex.R1 to R-4. But such false representations certainly caused mental harassment, to the respondent. In these circumstances, she could be said to be the last lady, to repose confidence, in her father-in-law, and the petitioner. In these circumstances, the appellant-petitioner, was unable to leave her job and come to Faridkot, to live with the appellant-petitioner, who was dependant upon his parents, until and unless, she was transferred to that place. This circumstance, also clearly proved that it was the appellant-petitioner who was at fault. 13. In these circumstances, the appellant-petitioner, was unable to leave her job and come to Faridkot, to live with the appellant-petitioner, who was dependant upon his parents, until and unless, she was transferred to that place. This circumstance, also clearly proved that it was the appellant-petitioner who was at fault. 13. It was, however, submitted by the Counsel for the appellant-petitioner, that in Ex. DX/3 transfer application, filed by the respondent, in the High Court, in para 2 B, she stated that her husband was an Advocate at Faridkot. He further contended that since the respondent, herself, made an admission, in the transfer application, that the appellant­ petitioner was practising as an Advocate, at Faridkot, she could not be f allowed to wriggle out of the same. It may be stated here, that she made such an averment, in the transfer application, as the appellant-petitioner was through-out proclaiming that he was practising as an Advocate, in District Court, Faridkot. It is settled principle of law, that the maker of an admission can prove the same to be erroneous. In the instant case, from the evidence, on record, the aforesaid admission made by the respondent in the transfer application, was proved to be erroneous/false. This admission, therefore, was of no consequence, and did not bind the respondent. The contention of the Counsel for the appellant, is, thus, rejected. 14. It is evident, from the evidence, on record, that right from the very beginning, the intention of the appellant-petitioner, was to get rid of the respondent, one way or the other. This is abundantly proved, from the following facts. Gurinder Singh-appellant petitioner executed Will Ex.P-3 dated 7.2.1986. The execution of this document, was proved by Puran Chand, PW-1, and by the petitioner himself. Vide this Will, he bequeathed his property, in favour of his brother and, if he died during his (testators) life time, the property was to go to his nephew. He, thus, disinherited his young wife, who had not yet even completed two years of married life. No doubt, vide the Will it was directed that a sum of Rs.500/- per month, shall be paid to Bhupinder Kaur, his wife. This clearly indicated the bad intention of the petitioner. The petitioner got an insurance policy, Ex.P-1 on 28.9.1986. In this insurance policy, he had nominated his mother, as a nominee, and not his young wife. No doubt, vide the Will it was directed that a sum of Rs.500/- per month, shall be paid to Bhupinder Kaur, his wife. This clearly indicated the bad intention of the petitioner. The petitioner got an insurance policy, Ex.P-1 on 28.9.1986. In this insurance policy, he had nominated his mother, as a nominee, and not his young wife. What was the necessity of executing the Will Ex.P-3, bequeathing the property, in favour of his brother, and in the event of his death, in favour of his nephew, by the petitioner, and nominating his mother, as nominee, in the insurance policy, referred to the above, especially, when his young wife, was still alive, is not known. Since he disinherited the respondent, from his property, by executing the Will, it clearly showed the intention of the petitioner, of discarding his wife immediately, after the marriage. This also goes to make the version of the respondent probable, when she stated that for the last time, she lived with her husband, in the month of October, 1985, and after that he always felt reluctant and even avoiding to take her with him, to Faridkot, even during her summer vacations. Gurinder Singh, in his cross- examination, admitted that she did not attend the marriage of his younger sister, which was performed in the year 1986. However, he denied that she was not invited. The statement of Gurinder Singh, to the effect, that Bhupinder Kaur, was invited to the marriage of his sister, in the year 1986, was rightly presumed to be wrong, as no newly married daughter-in-law, would unnecessarily try to create fuss, by not attending the marriage of her sister-in-law, i.e. the sister of her husband, in case, she was invited to attend the same. She would always try to attend such a marriage, so as to show a mark of respect to her-in-laws. These facts clearly proved the conduct of the appellant­petitioner, that he was always, on the look out, to desert the respondent. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner, however, submitted that the Will Ex.P-3, no doubt, was executed by the petitioner, bequeathing his property, in favour of his brother and, in the event of his death, in favour of his nephew in the year 1986, yet the same could be revoked, at any time, by him, before his death, as the same was to become operative only after his death. He further contended that even, nomination in the insurance policy could be changed, at any time by the petitioner. He further contended that these factors, therefore, did not go to prove that the appellant-petitioner, was out and out, to desert the respondent. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not appear to be correct. Since, the petitioner, had executed the Will bequeathing his entire property, in favour of his brother, and in the event of his death, in favour of his nephew, it could not be definitely said that he would revoke the same, in future. Had it been the intention of the petitioner, not to deprive his wife, of his property, and not to discard her, he would not have executed the Will Ex.P-3. It also could not be said definitely that he would change his nominee, in the insurance policy. By executing both these documents, the appellant-petitioner, in no uncertain terms, expressed his intention, that he did not like the respondent, in any manner, and would go to any extent, to discard her. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant-petitioner, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 16. As stated above, the respondent was employed as a teacher in Madhya Pradesh, before her marriage. In the year 1988, she was transferred to Central School, Chandigarh. Since she was employed at Chandigarh, it could not be expected of her to go to Faridkot daily, and live with the appellant-petitioner. The appellant-petitioner knew this very well, before marriage, that the respondent was employed at a far off station, and it would not be possible for her, to come to Faridkot frequently. If a wife is working at a place, which is far away, from the place of residence of her husband, and she is unable to come to the place of her husband daily, it cannot be said that she deserted the husband, as would be discussed hereinafter. The respondent always remained willing and ready to live with the petitioner, but it was, he, who did not bother to take her to Faridkot with him, even in summer vacations after October, 1985, last time, when she lived with him. The petitioner did not examine even a single independent witness or even his relative (except his father) to prove that efforts were made to bring about reconciliation. The petitioner did not examine even a single independent witness or even his relative (except his father) to prove that efforts were made to bring about reconciliation. No independent witness was examined by the petitioner that Panchayats were taken to the house of the parents of the respondent, to bring her back to her matrimonial home. The petitioner and his father tried to prove that, in the month of December, 1989, they took one or two Panchayats, to the house of the parents of the respondent, to bring her back. This fact was denied by the respondent and her brother. This fact also did not stand proved from any cogent and convincing evidence. 17. A perusal of the file shows that on 28.3.1995 re­conciliation proceedings, between the parties, were conducted, by the then District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh. The following order was recorded by the then District and Sessions Judge, in pursuance of the re-conciliation proceedings, which were conducted by him:­ “The petitioner has been a practicing lawyer at Faridkot; whereas the respondent is employed as a Post Graduate Teacher (PGT) in the Central School, Chandigarh. Both are mature and well educated and their marriage took place on 5.8.1984 at Chandigarh and only one child was born from the wed lock on 5.11.1986 who is in the care and custody of the mother. The problem of the couple was discussed with them, first individually to understand and appreciate the view point of each and then with both of them together in the Chamber. It was impressed upon them to cast aside their ego problem, if any, keeping in view the interest of the only child upper most in their mind. The wife is willing to apply for her transfer to Faridkot and with the liberty to her husband to make endeavours for its being got effected so that they can live together with their child. However, the husband is not willing to accept the offer and states that the wife should resign from the job and that he would be providing her amount equal to the salary being drawn by her from his own resources and income. However, the husband is not willing to accept the offer and states that the wife should resign from the job and that he would be providing her amount equal to the salary being drawn by her from his own resources and income. The petitioner also express the apprehension that if his wife comes to live with him he may invite some problems for himself claiming earlier also he had been into depression because of her attitude which allegation was denied by the wife at his face. At the moment there is no prospect of their reconciliation. They have, however, been advised to give further serious consideration to find their way for reconciliation so that the child may get the affection of both the parents. The petition has been received from the Court of District Judge, Faridkot before the respondent appearing in that Court. The respondent to file the written statement/reply on 17.4.1995.” 18. From the aforesaid order, recorded by the then District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, it was proved that the respondent through out remained ready and willing to join the company of her husband, but, on the other hand, the petitioner was not willing to accept this offer. He being a dominating male, wanted that his wife should resign her job, and he would provide her an amount equal to her salary, being drawn by her, from his own resources, and income. This offer made by the petitioner, to the respondent, as is evident, from the order aforesaid, was not in consonance with the facts, brought on record. As stated above, the petitioner was having no income, and was for all intents and purposes dependant upon his parents. In these circumstances, he put forth such a condition, which could not be accepted, by the respondent, at any cost. Had the respondent accepted the offer of the petitioner of resigning the job, she would have been put to a great inconvenience and hardship. In those circumstances, it would have been very difficult for her, to even maintain her, and her minor child. The mere fact that the respondent has been living separately at Mohali, in the house of her parents, on account of the reason, that she is posted as a teacher, at Chandigarh, did not mean that she had deserted the petitioner. In those circumstances, it would have been very difficult for her, to even maintain her, and her minor child. The mere fact that the respondent has been living separately at Mohali, in the house of her parents, on account of the reason, that she is posted as a teacher, at Chandigarh, did not mean that she had deserted the petitioner. Her intention was always to live with the appellant-husband, but he never made an attempt to take her along with him, to Faridkot, even during vacations, in her school, or on other occasions, whenever, she was free from the school for a few days. Therefore, there never was nor there is animus deserendi, on the part of the respondent, to live separately from the petitioner. It, was, thus, proved that it was the appellant-husband, who deserted the respondent-wife. The ground of desertion, therefore, did not stand proved. The Trial Court was, thus, right in holding so. 19. The learned Counsel for the appellant-petitioner, however, submitted that the marriage, between the parties, was irretrievably broken down, as they have been living separately, from each other, for a long period. He further contended that there were no chances of re-conciliation, between the parties, and it would be in the fitness of things, if such an irretrievably broken down marriage, should be put to an end, by granting the decree of divorce. He placed reliance on Sanghamitra Ghosh Vs. Kajal Kumar Ghosh, 2007(4) Punjab Law Reporter, 76 and Naveen Kohli Vs. Neelu Kohli, 2006 S.C. 1675 to support his contention. It is, no doubt, proved from the evidence, that the parties have been living separately, from each other, since October, 1985, yet the ground of desertion set up by the petitioner, did not stand proved. Irretrievably breaking down of the marriage, is not a ground, for divorce, under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The petitioner could claim decree of divorce, only on the statutory grounds, provided under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Apex Court, in exercise of the powers, under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, dissolved the marriage, between the parties, in the aforesaid cases, by decree of divorce on the ground, that the same had irretrievably broken down. No such powers are vested in this Court, under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court, in exercise of the powers, under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, dissolved the marriage, between the parties, in the aforesaid cases, by decree of divorce on the ground, that the same had irretrievably broken down. No such powers are vested in this Court, under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Not only this, in Naveen Kohli’s case (supra) the wife initiated numerous civil and criminal proceedings, against the husband. Numerous proceedings initiated by the wife, indicated her resolve, to make life of her husband a miserable hell. Husband also initiated some proceedings against the wife. These facts were also taken into consideration by the Apex Court, while granting decree of divorce. Similarly in Sanghamitra Ghoshs’s case (supra), the wife had got registered a case under Section 498-A read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, against the husband. She had also filed a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the husband. The husband had also filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, for restitution of Conjugal Rights, against the wife. He had also filed a petition under Section 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act, for the custody of the child. Both the parties, in that case, made statements that their marriage had broken down irretrievably, and there was no possibility of their living together. It was, thus, clearly evident from Sanghamitra Ghoshs’s case (supra) that numerous proceedings had been filed by the parties, against each other. In the instant case, there is nothing, on the record, that other proceedings were pending between the parties. The facts of the cases, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant-petitioner, are distinguishable, from the facts of the present case. Therefore, no help can be drawn, by him, therefrom. The findings of the Trial Court, on issue No.1, being correct are affirmed. 20. For the reasons, recorded hereinbefore, the appeal being without merit, must fail, and the same is dismissed with no orders as to costs. ————————