Judgment : P. R. SH1VAKUMAR, J. 1. The defendant in the original suit is the appellant in the second appeal. 2. The respondent herein instituted original suit No. 317/1991 on the file of the learned District Munsif, Palani for recovery of possession of the suit property based on alleged termination of tenancy, by issuing a statutory notice dated 9.10.1990, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 450/- as arrears of rent for three months from 1.8.1990 to 31.10.1990 at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month and for the recovery of damages for use and occupation, thereafter, at the rate of Rs. 600/- per month. The suit was resisted by the appellant herein/defendant contending that the suit was not maintainable because the same was filed by S. Badrinarayanan in his individual capacity and not as a Trustee of the plaintiff Trust; that the tenancy was not terminated in accordance with law; that since the Trust had become defunct, the exemption provided in G.O. Ms. No. 2000, dated 16.8.1976 to the properties belonging to the Public Religious and Charitable Trusts from the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 will not be applicable to the plaintiff. 3. The parties went on with the trial, in which one witness was examined and 12 documents were marked as Exhibits A-l to A-12 on the side of the plaintiff and no witness was examined and no document was marked on the side of the defendant. At the conclusion of trial, the trial Court took the view that the property belonged to the plaintiff Trust, a public Trust and hence the suit property was exempted from the purview of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as per G.O. Ms. No. 2000, dated 16.8.1976; that the Trust was not a defunct one as contended by the defendant and that even assuming that the Trust had become defunct, the benefit conferred upon the Trust by the G.O. was not nullified. Based on the above said findings, the suit was decreed for recovery possession of the suit property. So far as the other prayers are concerned, namely recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation, the same were negatived on the basis of an endorsement made by the counsel for the plaintiff to the effect that the said prayers were not pressed. 4. So far as the other prayers are concerned, namely recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation, the same were negatived on the basis of an endorsement made by the counsel for the plaintiff to the effect that the said prayers were not pressed. 4. As against the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, the appellant herein preferred an appeal on the file of the District Court, Dindigul in A.S. No. 212 of 1994. The learned District Judge by judgment dated 12.2.1996 dismissed the above said appeal with cost and confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Hence, the appellant/defendant is before this Court challenging the decree passed by the trial Court which stands confirmed by the lower appellate Court. 5. This Court heard the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and also perused the materials available on record, including the judgments of the lower Courts. 6. Admittedly, the appellant herein/defendant is a tenant in respect of the suit property a building bearing Door No. 34, Big Bazaar Street, Palani Town, Dindigul District. Contending that the suit property and other properties originally belonged to one Baluswamy Chettiar and by virtue of a Trust deed of the above said Baluswamy Chettiar dated 11.6.1902, the plaintiff Trust was created and the suit property and other properties became the properties of the Trust; that the above said Trust is a Public Charitable Trust and hence the suit property is exempted from the provisions of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960; that the tenancy of the appellant/defendant was brought to an end by issuing a statutory notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and that hence the appellant/defendant is bound to vacate the premises and hand over the vacant possession of the same to the respondent/plaintiff, the respondent filed the original suit for recovery of possession and other reliefs. The appellant/defendant resisted the suit contending that the property did not belong to the plaintiff Trust; that only a Kattalai for the use of the income from the property in a particular manner alone was provided in the Trust deed and that hence the property is not one exempted from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The further contention of the appellant/defendant before the lower Court was that even assuming that the property was that of the plaintiff Trust, the suit could not be maintained because the plaintiff Trust, according to the appellant/defendant, had become defunct and that the notice terminating tenancy was not issued on behalf of the plaintiff Trust, but was issued by Badrinarayanan in his individual capacity. 7. “Whether it is a public trust and whether it is in existencee” is the question framed by this Court at the time of admission as the substantial question of law involved in this appeal. It is nobodys case that the plaintiff trust is a private trust and not a public trust. The contents of Exhibit A-5 Trust deed make it clear that the beneficiaries of the trust is a section of public. The beneficiaries are not confined to a close circle to say that the trust is a private trust. Moreover, it is not the contention of the appellant/defendant that the plaintiff trust is a private trust to make G.O. Ms. No. 2000 dated 16.8.1976 exempting the properties of the Public Religious and Charitable Trusts from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 inapplicable to the property of the plaintiff trust. On the other hand, it is the contention of the appellant/defendant that the plaintiff trust had become defunct and hence the G.O. exempting the properties of Public Religious and Charitable Trusts will not be applicable to the suit property. The further contention of the appellant/defendant is that even assuming that the suit property is exempted from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the lease in favour of the appellant/defendant was not legally terminated since the termination notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was issued by the individual and not on behalf of the plaintiff trust. The following are the questions which can be cited as the substantial questions of law involved in this second appeal. (i) Whether the property of a trust which claimed to be defunct is not exempted from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 by virtue of G.O. Ms. The following are the questions which can be cited as the substantial questions of law involved in this second appeal. (i) Whether the property of a trust which claimed to be defunct is not exempted from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 by virtue of G.O. Ms. No. 2000 dated 16.8.1976; (ii) Whether the notice dated 9.10.1990 issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 did not validly terminate the tenancy in respect of the suit property. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant, after drawing the attention of the Court to the suit notice marked as Exhibit A-2 dated 9.10.1990, argued reiterating the above said contentions that the suit notice was not issued on behalf of the Trust and hence the tenancy was not validly terminated in accordance with law and that the Trust having become defunct, Badrinarayanan could not have represented the Trust as its Trustee in the legal proceeding. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that originally the suit, was filed in the name of Badrinarayanan in his individual capacity and that only a subsequent amendment made to the plaint, had made the suit one filed on behalf of the Trust and hence the suit on behalf of the Trust should be construed as-not instituted properly. None of the above said contentions raised on behalf of the appellant is sustainable. The reasons are as follows: Originally Badrinarayanan, under the impression that the suit property was his separate property and only an obligation was cast upon him to perform a Kattalai of the Trust out of the income of the suit property and that hence the same was not exempted from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as per G.O. Ms. No. 2000, dated 16.8.1976, moved a petition R.C.O.P. No. 16 of 1988 before the Rent Controller (District Munsif) for the eviction of the tenant, namely the appellant herein/defendant in the suit. In the said R.C.O.P., it was contended by the appellant herein that the suit property, being a property of a Public Charitable Trust, stood exempted from the purview of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 by the above said G.O. and hence the R.C.O.P. was not maintainable. In the said R.C.O.P., it was contended by the appellant herein that the suit property, being a property of a Public Charitable Trust, stood exempted from the purview of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 by the above said G.O. and hence the R.C.O.P. was not maintainable. Accepting the above said contention and holding that the suit property was the property of the plaintiff Trust and hence the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rant Control) Act, 1960 were not applicable, the learned Rent Controller passed an order, dismissing the said R.C.O.P. Only pursuant to the above said order passed by the learned Rent Controller, the present suit happened to be filed after issuing notice under Exhibit A-2, dated 9.10.1990 terminating tenancy by the end of the calendar month i. e. by 31.10.1990 and demanding possession of the suit property on 1.11.1990. Having contested the R.C.O.P. and obtained an order of dismissal of R.C.O.P. on the ground that the suit property is a Trust property and hence exempted from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the appellant/defendant is estopped from contending that the suit property is not that of the Trust and hence the suit is not maintainable. The appellant cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold. A clear finding has been given by the Rent Controller in the R.C.O.P. by the learned trial Judge in the suit and by the appellate Judge in the appeal that the suit property is a Trust property belonging to the plaintiff Trust. The beneficiaries, being a Section of public, the Trust has been held to be a Public Charitable Trust, by virtue of Trust deed Exhibit A-5 dated 11.6.1902. Reference can be made to the recitals of Exhibit A-5 -Trust deed. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the appellant/defendant cannot now contend that the suit property is not a Trust property and hence the suit is not maintainable. The above said contention has got to be discountenanced. 9. The second contention of the appellant/defendant is that the Trust having become defunct, the suit on behalf of the defunct Trust is not maintainable. Factually, the said contention of the appellant/defendant that the Trust had become defunct has not been substantiated by reliable evidence. The above said contention has got to be discountenanced. 9. The second contention of the appellant/defendant is that the Trust having become defunct, the suit on behalf of the defunct Trust is not maintainable. Factually, the said contention of the appellant/defendant that the Trust had become defunct has not been substantiated by reliable evidence. Even assuming that the plaintiff Trust has become defunct, the interest of the Public Charitable Trust shall have to be protected by the Court, as the Court is custodian of the Trust properties. The appellant/defendant who is the tenant in respect of the suit property belonging to the plaintiff Trust cannot try to squat on the property, stating that the Trust has become defunct. If at all he believes that the Trust has become defunct, he should have recognised some other person as Trustee or landlord. Here, in this case, the contention raised by Badrinarayanan (P.W.1) in the R.C.O.P. that he was the owner of the suit property and hence was the land lord, was successfully disputed by the appellant/defendant. Having done it and succeeded in such an attempt, the appellant/defendant cannot now deny the fact that the plaintiff Trust is the owner of the suit property. Therefore, the above said contention raised on behalf of the. appellant also has got to be discountenanced. 10. The next contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the suit was originally filed by Badrinarayanan in his individual capacity, that in fact, in his evidence he admitted hat he filed the suit as Badrinarayanan, S/o. A.Sundaresan Chettiar and that the same should be construed as a suit by the individual Badrinarayanan and not by the plaintiff Trust, even though by a subsequent amendment, the plaint might have been amended by substituting the name of the plaintiff Trust for the individual Badrinarayanan. The said contention is also untenable. Somehow or other by mistake the Trustee of the plaintiff Trust filed the suit in his name without clearly stating that the suit was laid on behalf of the plaintiff Trust. But realising the mistake, subsequently the plaint was amended and by virtue of amendment, the plaintiff Trust has been shown as the plaintiff. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that the suit is by an individual and not by the plaintiff Trust and hence not maintainable cannot be sustained. Whatever defects found in the original plaint have been subsequently rectified. But realising the mistake, subsequently the plaint was amended and by virtue of amendment, the plaintiff Trust has been shown as the plaintiff. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that the suit is by an individual and not by the plaintiff Trust and hence not maintainable cannot be sustained. Whatever defects found in the original plaint have been subsequently rectified. Hence the said contention is also bound to be rejected. 11. The next contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the notice terminating the lease was not issued on behalf of the plaintiff Trust and hence the tenancy has not been validly terminated in accordance with law. Exhibit A-2 is the copy of the notice. The appellant/defendant does not deny the receipt of the said notice. The said notice was issued terminating the tenancy by the end of the month i. e. by 31.10.1990 and directing the defendant to hand over possession of the suit property on 1.11.1990. Of course, the person issuing the notice is shown to be Badrinarayanan. Title alone, disregarding the contents of the notice, cannot be taken into account to decide whether it is a notice issued by Badrinarayanan in his individual capacity or a notice in the name of the plaintiff Trust. The substance and not the form of notice is material. The notice, according to the opinion of this Court, is a notice issued on behalf of the plaintiff Trust and not by Badrinarayanan in his individual capacity. In the notice, it was made clear that the Rent Controller had given a finding that the suit property was the property of the plaintiff Trust and hence notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 terminating tenancy was being issued. That itself is enough to show that the notice was issued on behalf of the plaintiff Trust and not by Badrinarayanan in his individual capacity. The questions of law have been correctly decided by the lower Court. The findings of the questions of fact cannot be termed perverse warranting interference in this second appeal. 12. For all the reasons stated above, this Court comes to the conclusion that the lower Courts have correctly decided the above said issues in favour of the plaintiff and rejected the defence case of the appellant/defendant. The well considered findings of the lower Courts do not deserve any kind of interference in this appeal. 12. For all the reasons stated above, this Court comes to the conclusion that the lower Courts have correctly decided the above said issues in favour of the plaintiff and rejected the defence case of the appellant/defendant. The well considered findings of the lower Courts do not deserve any kind of interference in this appeal. The judgments of the lower Courts deserve to be confirmed with the result that the appeal should fail and accordingly, the Second Appeal shall be dismissed with costs. 13. In the result, this Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.