J U D G M E N T Heard Sri G.Hemachalam, learned counsel representing the legal representatives of the appellant and Sri T.Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel representing respondent. 2. Ground Nos.2 to 4 in the second appeal are the substantial questions of law, which had been pointed out and argued in elaboration by the counsel on record. The said substantial questions of law are as hereunder. 2. Whether Ex.A-1 agreement of sale executed on insufficient stamp paper worth of Rs.2/- standing in the name of the third party other than the vendor or vendee is valid in the eye of law for seeking specific performance on the basis of it. 3. Whether the lower appellate court is correct in decreeing the suit for specific performance by drawing adverse interference on the basis of evidence on record. 4. Whether the lower appellate court is correct in decreeing the suit for permanent injunction relying upon the weakness of the defendant in the absence of any documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff to prove her prima facie possession and title in respect of suit. schedule property by reversing the finding of the trial court wherein it is held that the plaintiff has no prima facie possession or title. 3. The appellant herein, the unsuccessful defendant, aggrieved by the reversing decree and judgment in A.S.No.38 of 1996 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam, had preferred the present second appeal and since the appellant died, the legal representatives were brought on record and they are at present prosecuting the present second appeal. Respondent in this second appeal, the plaintiff in the suit, instituted a suit in O.S.no.48 of 1985 on the file of the District Munsif, Tekkali. 4. On the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties having settled the issues the court of first instance recorded the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 4 and D.W.l, marked Exs.A-1 to A- 5 and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for and dismissed the suit. 4. On the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties having settled the issues the court of first instance recorded the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 4 and D.W.l, marked Exs.A-1 to A- 5 and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for and dismissed the suit. The matter was carried by way of appeal A.S.No.53 of 1992 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Sompet, transferred and re-numbered as A.S.No.38 of 1996 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam, and the appellate court after framing the point for consideration at para 8, on appreciation of evidence available on record, came to the conclusion that the court of first instance recorded erroneous findings and in the light of the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 4, the attestors, the plaintiff is bound to succeed and accordingly reversed the decree and judgment of the court of first instance. Hence, the present second appeal is filed. 5.Sri G.Hemachalam, learned counsel representing the appellant made the following submissions. The learned counsel would submit that here is an unfortunate case where the defendant, an illiterate woman, is said to have executed an agreement of sale. The learned counsel also would submit that she had taken a specific stand that the document in question is a forged document and also had taken a stand that the same was brought into existence with a view to harass her with the assistance of the attestors. The learned counsel also would submit that even if the evidence of P.W.3, the scribe, to be taken into consideration it is highly doubtful whether the document was executed by the executant at all. Even otherwise the scribe had not explained that the contents of the document had been read over and explained to her. The learned counsel placed strong reliance on a decision in SRI KISHORE RAY THAKUR BIJE V. SMT. BASANTI KUMAR DAS AND OTHERS(1). While further elaborating the submissions, the learned counsel would submit that on mere probabilities totally ignoring the evidence of P.W.3 and giving preference to the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 4, the interested witnesses in P.W.1, the appellate court had reversed the well considered judgment of the court of first instance and hence the same cannot be sustained. 6. While further elaborating the submissions, the learned counsel would submit that on mere probabilities totally ignoring the evidence of P.W.3 and giving preference to the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 4, the interested witnesses in P.W.1, the appellate court had reversed the well considered judgment of the court of first instance and hence the same cannot be sustained. 6. Per contra Sri T.Niranjan Reddy, the learned counsel representing the respondent, the plaintiff, in all thoroughness had taken this court through the findings which had been recorded by the appellate court commencing from paras 10 to 22 and would submit that the appellate court had recorded convincing reasons why the appellate court had disagreed with the findings of the court of first instance and the appellate court being a final court of fact inasmuch as no specific question of law as such is involved in this second appeal, the second appeal deserves a dismissal. The learned counsel also in elaboration had taken this court through the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 4 in particular apart from the evidence of P.W.1 and would maintain that merely because P.W.3 the scribe had deposed in a particular fashion, on that ground alone the relief cannot be denied to the plaintiff. 7. The substantial questions of law, which had been argued in elaboration, already hadbeen referred to supra. This is a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 31.1.1982 and also for the relief of permanent injunction. The respective pleadings of the parties in short are as hereunder. It was pleaded in the plaint that the defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule land to the plaintiff for Rs. 13,050/- only at the rate of Rs.80/- per cent for wet lands and at the rate of Rs.35/- per cent for dry lands and executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff on 31.1.1982 subject to the condition that the defendant is bound to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within six months from the date of the agreement and the defendant received Rs.10,000/- only at the time of the agreement as an advance and delivered possession of the plaint schedule properties to the plaintiff on the same day. It is further stated that when the plaintiff expressed his willingness to pay the balance of Rs.3,050/- and to meet the expenses for necessary stamp, registration etc, the defendant did not register the sale deed as agreed. Hence, the plaintiff sent a registered lawyer’s notice dated 8.7.1985 to the defendant to perform her part of contract, but the defendant did not send any reply. The plaintiff was in exclusive peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property from the date of agreement till today and had been raising crop and enjoying the same. Since the defendant was proclaiming that she would trespass into the plaint schedule lands and threatening to invade into the same, the plaintiff filed the present suit. 8. The appellant herein as defendant, no doubt who is no more at present filed a written statement taking specific stand that the agreement of sale in question was a rank forgery got up for the purpose of harassing the defendant in collusion with the attestors. It is further stated that prior to the filing of the suit one Sidaparia Simhachalam, son of late Appanna, was managing the suit schedule property on behalf of the defendant. The plaintiffs husband, who was styling himself as P.Annayya and working at triping, had disputes with the defendant and a panchayat was held before the president of triping coolie workers union and bearing that grudge in mind the plaintiffs husband got the suit documents forged in the name of the plaintiff and filed the suit vexatiously in order to grab away the suit schedule property. The defendanl was not present at the time of the execution of the suit document in the village, and hence, the question of executing the suit document did not arise at Megavaram group. Taking advantage of the illiteracy and helpless state of the defendant, who is an old widow, the plaintiff forged the suit document and the suit was barred by limitation. 9. On the strength of the pleadings, the following issues were settled before the court of first instance. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance? 2. Whether the agreement dated 31.1.1982 is true? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for? 4. To what relief? 10. 9. On the strength of the pleadings, the following issues were settled before the court of first instance. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance? 2. Whether the agreement dated 31.1.1982 is true? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for? 4. To what relief? 10. On behalf of the respondent-plaintiff, P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-5 were marked and on behalf of the deceased first appellant-defendant, D.W.l was examined. The learned District Munsif came to the conclusion that the agreement of sale dated 31.1.1982 is not true, valid and binding, and hence, the respondent-plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance or the relief of peimanent injunction and ultimately dismissed the suit. 11. The appellate court framed the following point for consideration at para 8. “Whether the judgment and decree of the lower court is erroneous warranting interference by the appellate court?” 12. The appellate court appreciated the evidence available on record and recorded findings at paras 10 to 22 and ultimately came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is bound to succeed and accordingly allowed the appeal. 13. The relief of specific performance is a discretionary relief. The respective pleadings of the parties and the issues settled and the findings in nutshell, which had been recorded, already had been referred to supra. P.W.1 is the plaintiff, P.W.4 is the brother of the plaintiff, P.W.2 is said to be close associate of the family of P.W.l. P.Ws.2 and 4 are the attestors of the agreement of sale dated 31.1.1982, marked as Ex.A- 1; Ex.A-2 is the copy of the registered notice; Ex.A-3 is the copy of telegram and Exs.A-4 and A-5 are the postal receipts. As against this evidence, the evidence of D.W.1 is available on record. 14. The court of first instance mainly in the light of the evidence of P.W.3 the scribe disbelieved the document in controversy Ex.A-1 and negatived the relief. The appellate court relied upon the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 4, the attestors of Ex.A-l, apart from the evidence of P.W.l, and in a had not given much weight to the evidence of P.W.3 and also the evidence of D.W.1 and came to the conclusion that the court of first instance had dismissed the suit on erroneous grounds and reversed the same. 15. 15. It is no doubt true that as can be seen from the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 4 they deposed in one voice relating to execution of Ex.A-1 by D.W.1 in favour of P.W.1. That is not the end of the matter. The evidence of P.W.3 is very crucial for the reason that P.W.3 is the scribe of the document Ex.A-1. P.W.3 is not interested, in any way whereas at the earliest point of time in the pleading itself the first appellant-defendant had taken the stand that with the assistance of the attestors P.Ws.2 and 4 this document was brought into existence by P.W. 1. In the light of this stand taken at the earliest point of time in the pleading, the evidence of P.W.3 would assume importance. The material discrepancies even otherwise in the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 4 also had been taken into consideration by the court of first instance and the appellate court had ignored the same. The factum of possession of the suit land also had been taken into consideration while reversing the decree and judgment of the court of first instance, by the appellate court. 16. It may be appropriate to have a look at the findings, which had been recorded by the appellate court at para 20 in relation to the evidence of P.W.3, and the said findings are as hereunder. “No doubt there is confusion in the evidence of P.W.3. But a careful reading of P.W.3 shows that P.W.3 supported the plaintiff on material particulars. In the cross-examination P.W.3 deposed that the defendant has not signed in the agreement Ex.A-1 and the defendant present in the court is not the person who affixed her thumb impression in Ex.A-1 and that person was aged 25 years and red in colour. Whereas the person shown to him in the open court on the date of giving evidence is old woman of black colour and she has not affixed her thumb impression in the agreement of sale Ex.A- 1. On thee basis of this evidence, the learned counsel for the defendant argued that Ex.A-1 is a fabricated document. Whereas the person shown to him in the open court on the date of giving evidence is old woman of black colour and she has not affixed her thumb impression in the agreement of sale Ex.A- 1. On thee basis of this evidence, the learned counsel for the defendant argued that Ex.A-1 is a fabricated document. But the defendant is forgetting that P.W.3 in the chief-examination fully supported in the case of the plaintiff on all material facts like writing the agreement of sale Ex.A-1 by him, affixing of thumb impression by the vendor, receiving of the advance amount of Rs.10,000/- by the vendor and the vendor agreeing to sell the suit land and also delivering of the suit lands to the plaintiff. The evidence of P.W.3 is that he scribed agreement of sale Ex.A- 1 on 31.1.1982 in a watch shop opposite to Tekkali police station. The plaintiff paid Rs.10,000/- to the defendant. The defendant and plaintiff are giving the details and he wrote them in the agreement of sale Ex.A-1. The defendant affixed her thumb impression. The plaintiff gave money to him. He counted the amount and paid it to the defendant. It was agreed that the balance of sale consideration would be paid in six months. Therefore P.W.3 admitted that the defendant executed the agreement of sale after receiving an advance amount of Rs.10,000/- but in the cross-examination P.W.3 stated that the woman shown to him in the court has not affixed her thumb impression and he further stated that no advance amount was paid to her. The woman who executed Ex.A-1 on 31.1.1982 was 25 years old, she is lean and red in colour. On the basis of this only evidence, the defendant argued that P.W.3 has not supported the case of the plaintiff and Ex.A-1 is a fabricated document. The identify of the vendor in the court will not destroy the entire evidence of P.W.3, P.W.3 is giving evidence 9 years after the execution of Ex.A- 1. Therefore it is natural for him to confuse himself. In Ex.A-1 the name of the vendor is found and he identified his signature as the scribe of the document. Further the identity of the property is not in dispute and it belongs to the defendant. There is no necessity for the plaintiff to fabricate the document. Therefore it is natural for him to confuse himself. In Ex.A-1 the name of the vendor is found and he identified his signature as the scribe of the document. Further the identity of the property is not in dispute and it belongs to the defendant. There is no necessity for the plaintiff to fabricate the document. The only circumstances the defendant explained is that the husband of the plaintiff bore grudge against her and therefore he fabricated this document in the name of his wife to harass the defendant and to knock away her property. The defendant has not explained the seriousness of the dispute, which led the husband of the plaintiff to take such revenge to knock away her property. Therefore, the defence taken by the defendant as to the motive aspect of the plaintiffs husband fabricating the document Ex.A-1 is not supported by evidence. At the end of the crossexamination P.W.3 deposed that the agreement Ex.A-1 is a true and genuine document. A careful reading of the evidence of P.W.3 shows that P.W.3 corroborated the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 4. Therefore the agreement of sale is a true and genuine document.” 17. In the light of the clear evidence of P.W.3, this Court is of the considered opinion that the reversed of the decree and judgment dismissing the suit filed for specific performance and permanent injunction made by the court of first instance, by the appellate court cannot stand to the test of legal scrutiny. 18. In a suit for specific performance, the parties are expected to approach the court with clean hands while praying for the discretionary relief. Here, it is doubtful relating to the identity of the executant herself. The specific answers given by P.W.3 would create serious doubt relating to the identity of the person who in fact had executed Ex.A-1. When such crucial aspect itself is in controversy, this Court is of the considered opinion that the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 4, the attestors, who may be otherwise interested in P.W.1, may not improve the situation so as to strengthen the case of the plaintiff. When. that being so the reasons recorded by the court of first instance being convincing reasons, the reversal made by the appellate court cannot be sustained. 19. When. that being so the reasons recorded by the court of first instance being convincing reasons, the reversal made by the appellate court cannot be sustained. 19. Accordingly, the decree and judgment of the court of first instance are hereby restored and the decree and judgment made by the appellate court are hereby set aside. Accordingly, the second appeal is hereby allowed with costs throughout. --X--