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2007 DIGILAW 2144 (ALL)

Kashi Naresh Mehrotra v. Roop Narayan Chaudhari

2007-08-16

JANARDAN SAHAI

body2007
JUDGMENT : Janardan Sahai, J. This application for amendment of the written statement has been filed in the present revision directed against a decree of the Judge Small Causes Court in a suit for rent and ejectment filed by the respondent Raj Narain Chaudhury against the applicant and proforma defendants respondents Shashi Kala and others. In para 1 of the plaint it is alleged that the defendant applicant Kashi Naresh Mehrotra is a tenant of the premises on behalf of the plaintiff. In para 3 of the plaint it is stated that the plaintiff got the property in dispute in a family settlement dated 3.8.1988. In the written statement the family settlement has been denied. What has been admitted is that the defendant applicant was a tenant of the plaintiffs father but it has been denied that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant. It was alleged that an agreement of sale of the disputed shop was executed by Raj Narain Chaudhury plaintiffs father in favour of one D.R. Basudeva on 17.10.1984 and that D.R. Basudeva transferred his rights under the agreement of sale in favour of the defendant applicant Kashi Naresh Mehrotra by a deed dated 31.5.1988. The suit was decreed and the finding is that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Although the amendment application seeks to incorporate several pleas but the plea for the addition of which the arguments centred is one relating to Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act that the plaintiffs father as karta of the Hindu Undivided Family had executed a contract of sale transferring all, ownership rights, possession and landlordship rights in favour of one D.R. Basudeva and that D.R. Basudeva executed a registered agreement dated 31.5.1988 by which he on receiving payment of Rs. 1 lac from the defendant allowed the defendant to continue in possession in part performance of the contract. The original pleading did not contain any averment that possession was transferred in part performance to D.R. Basudeva or by D.R. Basudeva to the applicant. 2. I have heard Sri Ajit Kumar, counsel for the applicant and Sri Vinod Slnha, counsel for the respondents. 3. It was submitted by counsel for the applicant that the amendment is to incorporate the plea of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act which is only clarificatory in nature. 2. I have heard Sri Ajit Kumar, counsel for the applicant and Sri Vinod Slnha, counsel for the respondents. 3. It was submitted by counsel for the applicant that the amendment is to incorporate the plea of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act which is only clarificatory in nature. It is meant to elaborate the plea which was already taken in the written statement that there was an agreement of sale in favour of D.R. Basudeva who had transferred his rights in favour of the applicant Kashi Naresh Mehrotra. In support of his contention counsel for the applicant has relied upon a large number of authorities on the point that the amendment can be allowed at any stage of the proceedings; that delay in seeking the amendment by itself is no ground for rejection of the amendment and in case the amendment does not bring about any change in the nature of the case the amendment ought to be allowed. It is submitted that apart from his tenancy rights the applicant's possession is additionally protected u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. 4. On the other hand it is contended by Sri Vinod Sinha, the landlord's counsel that neither on the terms contained in the two agreements nor under the original pleadings the plea of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is available to the applicant. He also submits that the applicant entered into possession as a tenant and is estopped from taking the plea of Section 53A of the Act and the amendment has been sought to delay the proceedings for if allowed adducing of evidence in proof of the plea newly incorporated would have to be permitted. 5. The copy of the agreement of sale is Annexure-5 to the stay application. It bears a recital that the shop in dispute was in the tenancy of the applicant Kashi Naresh Mehrotra. There is no term in the agreement of sale transferring the possession of the shop in dispute to D.R. Basudeva. The copy of the deed by which D.R. Basudeva transferred his right to the applicant is Annexure-3 to the stay application. This deed also does not contain any term transferring possession to the applicant. Apparently therefore the plea of Section 53A does not arise. The copy of the deed by which D.R. Basudeva transferred his right to the applicant is Annexure-3 to the stay application. This deed also does not contain any term transferring possession to the applicant. Apparently therefore the plea of Section 53A does not arise. The original written statement also does not contain any plea that possession was transferred either to D.R. Basudeva or by D.R. Basudeva to the applicant. 6. Sri Ajit Kumar, counsel for the applicant however placed reliance upon the language of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and submitted that it is not the requirement of that Section that the possession be transferred to the prospective purchaser in case the prosecutive purchaser is already in possession. Undoubtedly the Section also applies if "the transferee being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract...." The words "continues in possession in part performance indicate that the continuance in possession should be attributable to the part performance of the contract." The language of the section makes it implicit that contunity of possession of the transferee contemplated in the section must be agreed upon as a term of the contract for then alone would the possession be attributable to the part performance of the contract. In absence of any such term in the agreement of sale in favour of D.R. Basudeva or in the assignment made by D.R. Basudeva in favour of the applicant, it cannot be said that the possession of the applicant is continuing in part performance of the contract. Sri Ajit Kumar however relied upon a decision of the Patna High Court in Nagar Khan and Others Vs. Gopi Ram Agarwala, . In that case one Lakhan Sau owner of the property had executed an agreement of sale in favour of the defendant. Subsequently Lakhan Sau transferred the property to the plaintiff by two sale deeds. The defendant resorted to the protection u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff resisted the plea alleging that possession was not delivered by the owner of the property to the defendant but rather was taken by the defendant forcibly. Subsequently Lakhan Sau transferred the property to the plaintiff by two sale deeds. The defendant resorted to the protection u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff resisted the plea alleging that possession was not delivered by the owner of the property to the defendant but rather was taken by the defendant forcibly. From the facts stated in the judgment it appears that in pursuance of the agreement the defendant had obtained two sale deeds from the other owners but Lakhan Sau who subsequently sold the property to the plaintiff did not turn up to get the sale deed executed by him in favour of the defendant registered on the appointed date. It was held that Section 53A was intended to prevent fraud and therefore if the possession was taken over by the defendant independently and not from the owner, the requirement of the Section was nevertheless complete from the facts stated in the Judgment it is not clear whether there was any agreement between the parties, for transfer of possession in part performance before the sale deed. The case appears to have been decided on its own facts. However if the Patna High Court meant to take the view that a purchase is entitled to the protection of Section 53A of the Act against the vendor even though the contract of sale does not contemplate delivery of possession before the sale deed in part performance, I am in respectful disagreement with the view. What is sought to be protected by Section 53A of the Act is the possession which the prospective purchaser takes from the vendor in part performance of the agreement of sale. The implied precondition for the application of the Section is an agreement between the parties providing for delivery of possession or for the continuance in possession of the transferee in part performance. In quite similar circumstances, the matter has been considered by this Court. In M.K. Gupta and Ors. v. Special Judge, Allahabad and Ors. 2000 (1) ARC 589 , the petitioners were tenants. The owners sold the building and proceedings for eviction were brought by the purchasers u/s 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on the basis that the petitioners had become their tenants. In M.K. Gupta and Ors. v. Special Judge, Allahabad and Ors. 2000 (1) ARC 589 , the petitioners were tenants. The owners sold the building and proceedings for eviction were brought by the purchasers u/s 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on the basis that the petitioners had become their tenants. The petitioners denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and claimed to be in possession on the basis of an agreement of sale executed by the erstwhile owners. It was found that the agreement of sale did not contain any recital that the petitioners were being put into possession or that they may continue in possession. It was held that in the absence of such a term in the agreement, the protection of Section 53A was not available to the petitioners. In A.K. Dwivedi v. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and Ors. 2005 (6) ALR 228, It was held that if the possession was not delivered by the landlord in part performance of the agreement but was taken illegally the protection of Section 53A of the Act is not available. 7. Sri Ajit Kumar next contended that D.R. Basudeva stepped into the shoes of the owner and therefore when he assigned his rights under the agreement of sale in favour of the defendant tenant applicant it would be deemed that the applicant was continuing in possession in part performance of contract. I am not inclined to accept this submission. It is well settled that an agreement of sale does not confer any interest in the property agreed to be sold. R. N. Chaudhury continued to be the owner of the property even after the agreement. For the purposes of Section 53A he would be treated as the transferor and unless the agreement for sale executed by him had contained a term that possession is being transferred or would be transferred in part performance the Section would not apply. The rights of D.R. Basudeva were only such as were conferred upon him by the agreement of sale. Even the right to receive rent was not transferred to him. As the agreement does not provide for transfer of possession to D.R. Basudeva, he could not transfer any better rights to the applicant. The rights of D.R. Basudeva were only such as were conferred upon him by the agreement of sale. Even the right to receive rent was not transferred to him. As the agreement does not provide for transfer of possession to D.R. Basudeva, he could not transfer any better rights to the applicant. The fact that the agreement of sale in favour of D.R. Basudeva does not contain any such recital regarding transfer of possession or that of the rent makes it evident that there was neither any intention to transfer possession to which D.R. Basudeva not indeed any such transfer of possession which R.N. Chaudhury was capable of making was made. Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act therefore does not come into play. Reliance was placed by Sri Ajit Kumar upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Hamzabi and Ors. v. Syed Karemuddin 2001 ACJ 735 : 2001 (1) AWC 337 (SC), wherein it was held that when a mortgagor/vendee agrees to sell the mortgaged property to the mortgagee/putative vendee in possession the mortgagee's status is subsumed or merged in his rights as a putative vendee u/s 53A against the transfer. The decision does not help the applicant. The applicant does not claim that his tenancy rights merged in his rights as a putative vendee but claims the protection u/s 53A in addition to his tenancy rights. 8. Reference may now be made to the other submissions made and authorities relied upon by Sri Ajit Kumar. Some of the authorities cited are on the point that it is open to the defendant to take all defences available to him. In this connection reliance was placed upon Order VIII, Rule 2, C.P.C. and the cases relied upon are Juggilal Kamlapat Vs. Pratapmal Rameshwar, ; Shyam Sundar Lal and Another Vs. Din Shah and Others and Sheth Maneklal Mansukhbhai Vs. Hormusji Jamshedji Ginwalla and Sons, In support of the submission that the tenant is estopped from challenging the title of the landlord who has inducted him into possession but there is no estoppel against him challenging the derivative title of the transferee landlord and Section 116 of the Evidence Act does not put a bar upon such a challenge, the authorities cited are Laik Ahmad v. Smt. Surjo 1978 (4) ALR 96 ; Hanumanthaiya Vs. Thavakal San and Another, and S.A.A. Annamalai Chettiar Vs. Thavakal San and Another, and S.A.A. Annamalai Chettiar Vs. Molaiyan and Others, The other cases relied upon are on the point that the plea of Section 53A can be taken as a defence and that even if a suit for specific performance is not filed the defence of Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act can yet be taken Chaman Lal v. Smt. Surendra Kumar AIR 1983 P&H . Then there were cases cited regarding the scope of Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C. The cases cited on the point that an amendment can be made at any stage of the proceedings and delay by itself is not a ground for rejecting an amendment are Vineet Kumar Vs. Mangal Sain Wadhera, (1984) 3 SCC 352 New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Ghulam Mohd. Tunda and Others, (1990) ACJ 177 In Radhey Shyam Agarwal v. U.P. State 1980 ARC 254, this Court in a revision u/s 115 remanded the case permitting the plaintiff to take the plea of non-applicability of Act No. 13 of 1972. 9. An amendment in the plaint can be allowed at any stage of the proceedings and even in a revision which like an appeal is also a continuation of the suit. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the nature of the appellate and revisional jurisdictions in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar Vs. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, (1969) 2 SCC 74 It was held therein that a revision is only one of the modes of exercising powers conferred by a statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked in a wider and larger sense. Section 115 of the CPC it was said circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the Jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior court. In Radhey Lal v. Special Judge, Bulandshahr and Ors. 1993 ACJ 914 : 1993 (2) AWC 1284 , it was held that a revision is a continuation of the suit like an appeal. There is no bar therefore to entertaining an application for amendment of the pleadings at the revisional stage. However the permission to allow the parties to amend the pleadings at the revisional stage especially in a case where the amendment would necessitate leading of evidence is to be exercised sparingly. There is no bar therefore to entertaining an application for amendment of the pleadings at the revisional stage. However the permission to allow the parties to amend the pleadings at the revisional stage especially in a case where the amendment would necessitate leading of evidence is to be exercised sparingly. The reason is that a decree and that usually after long years of contest has come into existence in favour of the respondent and permission to adduce evidence in support of a new plea could virtually amount to a retrial relegating the parties back to another long innings. The reluctance of the Court to grant the permission at the appellate or the revisional stage should be greater where the plea sought to be set up is based on facts which were within the knowledge of the party when the pleadings were filed. An amendment which does not require the necessity of leading evidence may however be granted in proper cases. Mere delay may not be a sufficient ground for rejecting an amendment application but delay is certainly one of the factors which has to be taken into account by the Court while disposing of the amendment application. In this case the written statement was amended four times. All the pleas which are sought to be taken by the amendment application are based upon facts which were in the knowledge of the applicant when the written statement was filed. The amendment is not in respect of any subsequent development. In such circumstances it has been held in Punjab National Bank v. N.K. Bajaj 2002 (2) ARC 501 : 2002 (5) AWC 3538 , that the amendment should not be allowed. In another case Sushil Kumar v. Xth Additional District Judge, Bareilly 1996 (2) ARC 560 : 1996 (3) AWC 1884 , it was held in respect of an amendment sought at the revisional stage that the plea regarding the date of construction of the premises would require additional evidence and should not ordinarily be allowed at the revisional stage. Similar view was taken in Shiv Lal v. District Judge, Moradabad and Anr. 1996 (1) ARC 159. In Devendra Mohan and Others Vs. Similar view was taken in Shiv Lal v. District Judge, Moradabad and Anr. 1996 (1) ARC 159. In Devendra Mohan and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2004) 3 AWC 2162 , it was held that an amendment if it changes the very nature of the case or if it relates to facts in the knowledge of the party at the time of presenting the pleading should not be permitted unless satisfactory explanation is furnished for not introducing those pleadings at the initial stage. In that case an amendment sought to be made after the case had remained pending for about 13 years was refused. All the pleas including those in paras 24, 41 and 42 of the written statement which the petitioner has sought to raise by amendment arise out of facts which were in the knowledge of the applicant ever since the suit was filed. The suit is an old one of the year 1991. The amendments sought are of wide range and if allowed would necessitate permission to lead fresh evidence, which in this case would mean a virtual retrial and setting aside of the decree. It is also settled that even in the absence of a pleading, questions of law and Jurisdiction which go to the root of the case and arise out of the existing material on the record can be permitted to be raised in the revision. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for amendment of the written statement at this stage. Dismissed.