S. S. KULSHRESTHA, J. This revision under section 25 of Small Causes Courts Act was brought by the applicant/defendant against the order dated 23. 11. 2005 passed by the learned Judge Small Causes Court/additional District Judge, Allahabad whereby striking off the defence under Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) on the Application 25-C moved in that behalf by the landlord/opposite parties. It is said that the Trial Court has erect while construing the first date of hearing and finding the deposits to be not in accordance with law. For the purpose of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code the date of hearing would be the date when the Court applied its mind to determine the points of controversy and not date fixed for filing of written statement. The Trial Court has fixed 12. 1. 2006 for final hearing on the points in issue and so that would be deemed to be the first date of hearing. Finding to the contrary recorded by the Trial Court holding 3. 1. 2005 to be the first date of hearing when the written statement was filed as patently illegal and against the well settled principle of law. It has also been contended that the deposit under section 30 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter re ferred as the Act) ought to have been adjusted by the Trial Court. As regards non deposit of the interest @ 9% per annum accrued on the arrears of rent was on account of lack of suitable advice from the Counsel. Subsequently, that amount was also deposited and so such lapses on the part of the defendant was to be condoned by the Trial Court. Even otherwise the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code are directory and for non deposit of the amount on the first date of hearing, if the defence is struck off it would defeat the very intendment of the legislature which is for the benefit of the tenant. 2. This revision is resisted by the landlord/opposite parties contending that the defendant came to know about filing of the suit on 7. 12. 2004 when he asked for giving the copy of plaint and other annexures would be construed to be date of first hearing. 2. This revision is resisted by the landlord/opposite parties contending that the defendant came to know about filing of the suit on 7. 12. 2004 when he asked for giving the copy of plaint and other annexures would be construed to be date of first hearing. Whatever money has made under section 30 of the Act by the defendant would not be adjusted towards the deposit under Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code. Entire admitted rent was not deposited by him. Tax is also the part of rent as its statutory and contractual liability is of the defendant. The same was not deposited by him from 1994. Further in compliance of Order XV. Rule 5 of the Code the defendant has not made deposit of the interest amount @ 9% per annum within the stipulated period and subsequent deposit cannot be validated by condoning delay as the Court had no power for the same. 3. In order to appropriate the answer to the questions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties. It shall be useful to make a brief resume of the facts. Respondents filed suit No. 23 of 2004 on 18. 8. 2004 in the Court of Judge Small Causes Court, Allahabad for the ejectment of the applicant/defendant and also for the recovery of the arrears of rent. Summons were issued to the de fendants fixing 8. 10. 2004 for filing written statement and for final hearing of the suit. Suit was transferred to another Court on 8. 10. 2004. Nobody turned upto attend the proceedings of that suit on the date fixed. Ultimately fresh sum mons were issued fixing 20. 10. 2004 for filing of written statement and final hearing. On 20. 10. 2004 service of the summons found to have not been affected on the defendant/applicant and so fresh summons were issued for 7. 12. 2004 for filing written statement and final hearing. On 7. 12. 2004 appearance has been put in by the learned Counsel for the defendant and request was made for fur nishing copy of the plaint and its annexures so that written statement may be filed. That application moved on behalf of the defendant was ordered to be put-up on 13. 1. 2005 for further orders. In the meantime on 3. 1. 2005 written statement was filed by the defendant. On 13. 1. 2005 issues were framed and on 22. 2. That application moved on behalf of the defendant was ordered to be put-up on 13. 1. 2005 for further orders. In the meantime on 3. 1. 2005 written statement was filed by the defendant. On 13. 1. 2005 issues were framed and on 22. 2. 2005 an application was moved on behalf of the plaintiff that since the defendant had not made deposits of the arrears of rent etc. in compliance of the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5, of the Code and so his defence is liable to be struck off. The application was opposed by the defendant with the contentions that he made deposit of arrears of rent under section 30 of the Act in Misc. Case No. 535 of 2000 w. e. f. March, 2000 to June, 2004 and thereafter rent was regu larly deposited in the suit under Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code w. e. f. July, 2004 till 31st December, 2005. The defendant has not committed any default in de positing the admitted rent. As regards the deposit of the interest @ 9% per an num it is contended by him that the same could not be deposited in time because of lack of suitable advice. However, that amount was subsequently deposited. Such deposit has been contended by the plaintiffs/opposite parties to be not on the first date of hearing and would not be construed to be in compliance of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code learned J. S. C. C. after hearing learned Counsel for the parties held that the applicant had failed to deposit arrears of rent together with interest @ 9% per annum on the first date i. e. , 3. 1. 2005 which according to him was the date of first hearing in the suit for ejectment, the defence of the tenant was therefore struck off. 4. The question arises for consideration in this revision is as to whether the date of filing of the written statement as mentioned in the summons i. e. , 7. 12. 2004 is the date of first hearing of the suit for ejectment and non payment or not tendering of arrears of rent together with interest and on that very date will make defence of the applicant/defendant liable to be struck off. In the in stant case 7. 12. 12. 2004 is the date of first hearing of the suit for ejectment and non payment or not tendering of arrears of rent together with interest and on that very date will make defence of the applicant/defendant liable to be struck off. In the in stant case 7. 12. 2004 was fixed as date for filing of written statement and also for final hearing of the suit but as has been described above, appearance was put in by the learned Counsel for the defendant and sought some time for filing written statement and in the meantime copy of the plaint and annexures were required to be furnished to him. That application was put up for orders on 13. 1. 2005 but the written statement was filed before to it i. e. , on 3. 1. 2005. The suit came up for hearing on 13. 11. 2005 when issues were settled. Subsequently these issues were scored out as were not required to be formulated for disposal of the suit. The date mentioned in the summons i. e. , 7. 12. 2004 would not be treated to be the date of first hearing of ejectment suit but it was the date of appear ance of the defendant as on that date Court did not take uphearing of the suit. It is only after written statement is filed, issues were framed on 13. 1. 2005 and hearing shall be deemed to have been commenced. 5. Reliance has been placed on the decisions rendered in the cases of Ved Prakash Wadhwa v. Vishwa Mohan, AIR 1982 SC 816 =1981 ARC 1 wherein Court was concerned with the same expression viz. , first hearing implied in section 20 (a) of the Act. The Apex Court, while interpreting the critical impression first hearing" enunci ated the law as under: "the question of law raised before us may perhaps be pronounced upon as it is of general importance. Section 20 (4) of the Act which we have ex cerpted above fixes the crucial date for deposit of rent as "at the first hear ing of the suit. " What is "the first hearing of the suit"? Certain decisions have been cited before us of the Allahabad High Court which indicate that "the first hearing of the suit" is when, after the framing on issues, the suit is posted for trial, that is, production of deviance. " What is "the first hearing of the suit"? Certain decisions have been cited before us of the Allahabad High Court which indicate that "the first hearing of the suit" is when, after the framing on issues, the suit is posted for trial, that is, production of deviance. In the matters of State statutes where procedure has to be pronounced upon, the practice of the Court is the best guide to interpretation and the Allahabad High Court having pronounced upon the question we think we ordinarily accept such interpretation unless there is something revoltingly wrong about the construc tion. We see none here and, therefore, adopt as correct the decision of the High Court regarding the meaning of the expression "at the first hearing of the suit. " We may, however, add that the expression "at the first hearing of the suit" is also to be found in Order X, Rule 1, Order XIV, Rule 1 (5) and Order XV, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions indicate that "the first hearing of the suit" can never the earlier than the date fixed for the preliminary examination of the parties (Order X, Rule 1) and the settlement of issues (Order XIV, Rule 1 (5 ). " 6. Identical view was expressed by the Apex Court, in the cases of Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. P. N. Kapoor 1993 (22) ALR 375 (SC ). Advaita Nand v. J. S. C. C. , 1995 (26) ALR 71 (SC ). and Sudharshan Devi and another v. Sushila Devi and another 1999 (37) ALR 496 (SC ). It was reiterated that the date fixed for filing of the written statement would not be the date of first hearing but the date when the Court has applied its mind for determination of the points would be construed to be the date of first hearing. 7. This principle is also consistent with the literal meaning of the word hearing which in its dictionary sense means listing of the evidence and plead ings in the Court of law, trial of the case. 7. This principle is also consistent with the literal meaning of the word hearing which in its dictionary sense means listing of the evidence and plead ings in the Court of law, trial of the case. It means that in order to constitute first hearing within the meaning of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code following prerequisites must co-exist: (1) There should be hearing which pre-supposed the existence of an occasion enabling the parties to be heard and the Court to hear them in re spect of the case. (2) Such hearing should be the first in point of time after due service of the summons notices on the tenant. 8. Here in this case defendant had put in appearance and desired to have copies of the plaint and its annexures. No order was passed except placing of the application for further orders on 13. 1. 2005. In the meantime written state ment was filed on behalf of the defendant and the Court applied its mind only on 13. 1. 2005 and so that would be construed to be the date of first hearing in the suit. 9. It is, however, contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the first date of hearing would be as has been defined in the Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code which provides as below : "striking off defence for failure to deposit admitted rent.- (1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and oc cupation, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, de posit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interests thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regu larly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence. Explanation 1.- The expression first hearing means the date for filing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 2.- The expression "entire amount admitted by him to be due" means the entire gross amount whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation, calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessors account and the amount, if any, deposited in any Court. Explanation 3.- (1) The expression "monthly amount due" means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occu pation at the admitted rate of rent, after making on other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority, in respect of the building on lessors account. (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, that Court may con sider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days, of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in sub-section (1), as the case may be. (3) The amount deposited under this rule may at any time be with drawn by the plaintiff: Provided that such withdrawal shall not have the effect of prejudic ing any claim by the plaintiff disputing the correctness of the amount de posited: Provided further that if the amount deposited includes any sums claimed by the depositor to be deductible or any account, the Court may re quire the plaintiff to furnish the security for such sum before he is allowed to withdraw the same. " 10. Emphasis has been laid that the date of first hearing would be the date of filing of written statement or any other date mentioned in the summons. In the instant case 7. 1. 2004 was fixed for filing written statement and also for final hearing so this alone would be the date of first hearing, the expression "date of first hearing" as specified in Expression (1) of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code is not to be read in isolation. In the instant case 7. 1. 2004 was fixed for filing written statement and also for final hearing so this alone would be the date of first hearing, the expression "date of first hearing" as specified in Expression (1) of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code is not to be read in isolation. It has to be read with other related provi sions of the Act itself, more particularly when the subject matter dealt with a different sections or part of the same statute is same or similar in nature as in case in hand I find that the matter relates to liability of rent to the landlord and consequences on failure to do so as provided under Order XV, Rule 5 of the code at the first hearing of the suit. Section 30 of the Act deals with the cir cumstances in which rent is deposited in the Court instead payment to the land lord. The affect of deposit of the rent under that section is provided under sub section (6) of section 30 of the Act. Therefore all the raised provisions have to be read together for the purpose of proper and harmonies construction. It is not only permissible but much desirable for the proper understanding. 11. Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Rishi Ram, 2002 (48) ALR 401 (SC ). set at rest the controversy with regard to the first date of hearing as has been given in the Explanation 1, Rule 5, Order XV of the Code and what has been described in Ex planation to section 20 (4) of the Act wherein it was held by the Apex Court as under: "rule 1 of Order V speaks of issue of summons. When a suit has been duly instituted a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and an swer the claim on a day specified therein. Rule 2 thereof enjoins that the summons shall be accompanied by a copy of the plaint or, if so permitted, by a concise statement. Rule 5 of Order V says that the Court shall deter mine, at the time of issuing the summons, whether it shall be for the set tlement of issues only, or for the final disposal of the suit which shall be noted in the summons. Rule 5 of Order V says that the Court shall deter mine, at the time of issuing the summons, whether it shall be for the set tlement of issues only, or for the final disposal of the suit which shall be noted in the summons. However, in every suit heard by a Court of Small Causes, the summons shall be for the final disposal of the suit. It may be apt to notice here that sub-section (3) of section 20 of the Act was deleted in U. P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 with effect from September 20, 1972 and Rule 5 was inserted in Order XV of the Civil Procedure Code which deals with disposal of the suit at the first hearing. Explanation 1 to Rule 5 of Order XV defines the expression first hearing to mean the date for fil ing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. But the said expression, as noticed above, is defined in Clause (a) of expla nation to sub-section (4) of section 20. Section 38 of the U. P. Act says that the provisions of the said Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act or in the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, the definition contained in Clause (a) of Explanation to sub-section (4) of section 20 of the Act will prevail over the definition contained in Rule 5 of Order XV of the Code of Civil Procedure as applicable to the State of U. P. It is too evident to miss that in contra-distinction to the "filing of written statement" mentioned in the definition of the said expression contained in Rule 5 of Order XV, a language employed in Clause (a) of the Explanation to section 20 (4) of the U. P. Act, refers to "the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned the summons served on the defendant. " In our view those words mean the first date when the Court proposes to apply its mind to identify the controversy in the suit and that stage arises after the defendant is afforded an opportunity to file his writ ten statement. The controversy is no longer res integra. " In our view those words mean the first date when the Court proposes to apply its mind to identify the controversy in the suit and that stage arises after the defendant is afforded an opportunity to file his writ ten statement. The controversy is no longer res integra. The aforementioned provisions fell for consideration of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor. 1993 (22) ALR 375 (SC)= 1993 (4) SCC 406 =1993 (2) ARC 451. The Bench laid down as fol lows : AIR 1993 SC 2525 = air 1993 SCW 3273 =1993 All LJ 1250 (Para 13 ). "the date of first hearing of a suit under the Code is ordinarily under stood to be the date on which the Court proposes to apply its mind to the contentions in the pleadings of the parties to the suit and in the documents filed by them for the purpose of framing the issues to be decided in the suit. Does the definition of the expression "first hearing" for the purposes of sec tion 20 (4) means something different? The step or proceeding mentioned in the summons referred to in the definition should we think, be construed to be a step or proceeding to be taken by the Court for it is, after all, a "hearing" that is the subject-matter of the definition, unless there be some thing compelling in the said Act to indicate otherwise, and we do not find in the said Act any such compelling provision. Further, it is not possible to construe the expression "first date for any step or proceeding" to mean the step of filing the written statement, though the date for that purpose may be mentioned in the summons for the reason that, as set out earlier, it is permissible under the Code of the defendant to file a written statement even thereafter but prior to the first hearing when the Court takes up the case, since there is nothing in the said Act which conflicts with the provisions of the Code in this behalf. We are of the view, therefore, that the date of first hearing as defined in the said Act is the date on which the Court proposes to apply its mind to determine the points in controversy between the parties to the suit and to frame issues, if necessary. " 12. We are of the view, therefore, that the date of first hearing as defined in the said Act is the date on which the Court proposes to apply its mind to determine the points in controversy between the parties to the suit and to frame issues, if necessary. " 12. On the basis of plethora of case law on the points including the authen ticity referred to above, the first date of hearing would be given when the Court had applied its mind. It was on 13. 1. 2005 when the Court proceeded for determination of points in issue. 13. One of the points arises in his case as to whether tender made by the defendant under section 30 of the Act was valid within the meaning of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code. It is admitted fact that the defendants have made de posit of the arrears of rent under section 30 of the Act from 1. 3. 2000 to 31. 8. 2005, details of which have been given in the reply of the plaintiff annexed with the affidavit dated 16. 12. 2005. Such deposits ought to be taken into account by the Trial Court otherwise it would render sub-section (1) of section 30 and sub section (6) of section 30 otiose. 14. Apex Court in the case of Kailash Chandra v. Mukundi Lal, 2002 (46) ALR 704 (SC ). has also observed as under: "double payment or deposit for the same period is not envisaged, nor it can be, therefore, for construing the meaning of entire amount due as occur ring in sub-section (4) of section 20 of the Act, sub-section (6) of section 30 will have to be read along with it and not in isolation. It would also save sub-section (6) of section 30 from becoming OTIOSE. The anomalies and dif ferentiation in the deposits made under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 30, though the effect is the same, would also be saved. It would only harmo nize the construction of the two provisions, namely sub-section (4) of section 20 and sub-sections (2) and (6) of section 30 of the Act. Provisions of one sec tion of a statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impos sible to effect re-conciliation between them. Raj Krushna v. Vinod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202 and Sultana Begum (supra) as also Mohd. Provisions of one sec tion of a statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impos sible to effect re-conciliation between them. Raj Krushna v. Vinod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202 and Sultana Begum (supra) as also Mohd. Sher Khan v. Raja Seth AIR 1922 PC 17. " 15. In this case deposit was made much before to the date of first hearing and thereafter admittedly tenant continued to make deposit of the rent in the suit. It has next been contended by the learned Counsel for the land lord/opposite parties that the deposit so made under section 30 (1) of the Act is in itself deficient, the tenant has not made deposit of interest amount @ 9% per annum. Undoubtedly, the defendant/applicant did not make payment of inter est @ 9% per annum on the admitted rent and he for the first time made deposit of that amount on the subsequent date. For that explanation has come from the side of the applicant/defendant that that such delay in making deposit of the interest occurred on account of improper advice by his Counsel and subsequently it was deposited. Placing reliance in the case of Shiv Prasad v. Special Judge, Allahabad and others 1996 (1) ARC 110=1996 (28) ALR 3 (Sum.) and also in the case of Bharat Bhushan Misra v. District Judge, 1990 (1) ARC 537 it is stated that three was substantial compliance of the provi sion of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code and such delay in making deposit of the in terest for which sufficient reasons have been given, would not be a lever to the landlord to give the tenant punishment for insignificant lapse. 16. Reliance has also been placed in the case of Sudhir Gupta v. Dr. S. K. Raj 1991 (1) ARC 545. However, much thrust has been laid by the learned Counsel for the oppo site party that the Court had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in making deposit in compliance of the provision of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code. See (i) Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agrawal 2003 (6) AIC 488 (SC)= air 2003 SC 1543 =2003 SCFBRC 181. (ii) M. I. Builders Put. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam AIR 2005 SC 1795. (iii) Balwant Singh v. Anand Kumar Sharma 2003 (50) ALR 765 (SC)=2003 (4) AIC 637. See (i) Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agrawal 2003 (6) AIC 488 (SC)= air 2003 SC 1543 =2003 SCFBRC 181. (ii) M. I. Builders Put. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam AIR 2005 SC 1795. (iii) Balwant Singh v. Anand Kumar Sharma 2003 (50) ALR 765 (SC)=2003 (4) AIC 637. As has already been referred, there is substantial compliance of the provisions and so small delay in making deposit of the interest amount which is a paltry sum, the defence can not be struck off. 17. Lastly, it has been contended that whatever rent was deposited did not include tax for which there is statutory liability for the tenant, as tax is also part of the rent and its direct vliability is of the defendant applicant. Reliance has been placed in the cases of- (1) Abdul Kadar v. G. D. Govindraj 2002 (48) ALR 274 (SC ). (2) Calcutta Gujrati Education Society v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation AIR 2003 SC 4278 . (3) Laxman Jiwaba Baherwade v. Bapurao Dodappa Tandale AIR 2002 SC 2266=2002 SCFBRC 607. Some rent receipts have also been file by the defendant applicant showing that the rent @ Rs. 600/- p. m was agreed and whatever subsequent receipts were filed by the land lord/opposite parties so as to show the contractual and statutory liability of tax, they are fake receipts and can not be relied upon. This is a matter of evi dence to be embarked upon by the Trial Court and at this stage contractual lia bility cannot be ascertained. In view of the aforesaid discussions there is suffi cient compliance of Order XV, Rule 5 of the Code from the side of the defendant applicant. Rent under section 30 (1) of the Act was deposited much before to the date of hearing and subsequently in the suit. Interest amount was also deposited by the defendant applicant as such there is substantial compliance on that part also. In the result impugned order dated 23. 11. 2005 passed by the learned Judge Small Causes Court/additional District Judge, Allahabad is not sustainable. 18. Revision is allowed and the impugned order is hereby set aside. Revision Allowed. .