JUDGMENT Permod Kohli. J.:- Respondent no.1 instituted a suit for specific performance of contract/agreement to sell dated 16.8.2004 against the defendant no. 1 petitioner herein in the court of Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Nuh, in respect to land measuring 3.094 acres situated at Village Baghanki, Tehsil Nuh, District Gurgaon, Haryana. Simultaneously with the filing of the suit, an application for interim injunction was filed. The trial court vide its interlocutory order dated 28.4.2006 granted ad interim injunction restraining the petitioner/defendant herein from alienating the suit land or creating any charge thereof without seeking the prior permission of the court. The present petitioner, after appearance filed his detailed written statement and also objections to the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC and contested the same. After hearing the parties, the trial court vide its order dated 16.12.2006 vacated the stay with certain conditions. Aggrieved of the order dated 16.12.2006, respondent no.1/plaintiff filed a Civil Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of the CPC in the Court of Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Gurgaon. The Appellate Court vide impugned order has directed maintenance of status quo regarding alienation till the decision of the suit. It is this order which has been assailed in the present revision by the defendant in the suit. It may be relevant to briefly notice the factual background. Respondent no.1-plaintiff is an Advocate by profession whereas. The petitioner-defendant in the suit Dr. S.B. Sharma is a Non-Resident India. Defendant in the suit had earlier entered into an agreement for the purchase of suit land from its original owners, namely, Pyare Lal, Baghru, Bhagri, Smt. Chhoti and Smt. Murti. It appears that the owners refused to execute the sale deed in accordance with the terms of the agreement to sell and consequently defendant no.1, petitioner herein filed Civil Suit No.252 of 1996 for specific performance of the agreement. This suit was decreed in his favour on 28.2.2000. Even after passing of the decree, sale deed was not executed by the owners and the defendant initiated execution proceedings in the court of Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Nuh for execution of decree passed in Civil Suit No.252 of 1996. This execution remained pending for number of years. This suit was decreed in his favour on 28.2.2000. Even after passing of the decree, sale deed was not executed by the owners and the defendant initiated execution proceedings in the court of Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Nuh for execution of decree passed in Civil Suit No.252 of 1996. This execution remained pending for number of years. It is alleged by the petitioner herein in the written statement filed before the trial court in the present litigation that the defendant came in contact with the plaintiff who represented himself to be an Advocate. The plaintiff by his sweet talk got the agreement to sell executed from the defendant no.1 with respect to two properties. Sale deed was executed in respect to one of the properties at District Gautam Budh Nagar. He misrepresented that the sale price was the market value of the property. With regard to the property, subject matter of the present litigation, he represented to the defendant no.1 that if he enters into an agreement to sell, with respect to this property for which the execution is pending, he will ensure the execution of sale deed within six months. It is on the basis of the said assurance and mis-representation regarding the market value of the property, defendant no.1 entered into an agreement to sell on 16.8.2004 whereunder he agreed to sell the suit land for a consideration of Rs.13 ,50,000/-. Plaintiff did pay Rs.7.5 lacs and the balance amount was payable at the time of execution and registration of sale deed. Further case of the petitioner is that the ­agreement to sell was conditional. A copy of the agreement to sell is placed on record. It may be useful to refer to some of the relevant paragraphs of the agreement to sell which are reproduced here-in-below:- “AND WHEREAS the Vendor had entered into an agreement to sell and purchase in respect of the land stated herein above and more particularly described in Schedule “A” to this Agreement with the previous owners of the said land namely: 1. Mr.Pyare Lal, s/o Sh. Kuria 2. Sh. Baghru s/o Sh. Kuria 3. Smt.Bhogri w/o Sh. Kuria 4. Smt. Chhoti d/o Sh. Kuria & C/o Sh. Pyare Lal 5. Smt. Murti d/o Sh. Kuria & C/o Sh. Pyare Lal All resident of Village Baghanki, Sub Tehsil Tauru, Tehsil Nub, District Gurgaon (Haryana). Mr.Pyare Lal, s/o Sh. Kuria 2. Sh. Baghru s/o Sh. Kuria 3. Smt.Bhogri w/o Sh. Kuria 4. Smt. Chhoti d/o Sh. Kuria & C/o Sh. Pyare Lal 5. Smt. Murti d/o Sh. Kuria & C/o Sh. Pyare Lal All resident of Village Baghanki, Sub Tehsil Tauru, Tehsil Nub, District Gurgaon (Haryana). AND WHEREAS the aforesaid previous owners of the land neglected to perform their part of the contract, as a result whereof the Vendor filed a suit for specific performance in the court of Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nuh bearing Civil Case No.252/1996 having been instituted on 19.4.1996 titled and styled as Dr. S.B. Sharma v/s Mr. Pyare Lal & Others praying, inter-alia, for the specific performance of the contract in respect of the said land. The said suit was decreed in terms of the judgment dated 28.2.2000 whereby the Hon’ble Court upheld the contentions of the Vendor and directions were issued to the previous owners to execute the sale deed in favour of the Vendor in respect of the said land, on receipt of the balance sale consideration etc. As directed therein............ 2. That the vendee has already paid a sum of Rs.7,50,000/- in all to the Vendor on 24.7.2004 on account of Earnest money of Rs.1,00,000/­ (Rupees One Lac only) and another Rs.6,50,000/- (Rupees Six Lacs Fifty Thousand only) as advance towards payment of the part of the total sale consideration of Rs.13,50,000/- as mutually agreed by and between both the parties. It is further agreed by and between both the parties that the balance amount of Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Thousand Only) shall be paid by the Vendee to the Vendor at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed in favour of the vendee................ 5. That it has also been specifically agreed to by and between both the parties that this agreement to sell would hold good for a period of 6 (six) months only from the date of the execution of this agreement as the execution proceedings arising out of the suit no.252/96 are being closely watched by both the parties and vendee .has assured the Vendor of these proceedings to conclude within 6 months the Vendee being the advocate himself. In case the previous owners do not execute the sale deed in favour of the Vendor within the said period of six months and that no Sale deed can be registered in favour of the vendee by the Vendor because of the said reason thereof, the period of this agreement shall be extended by another period of six (6) months, thereby keeping this agreement in existence for a period of one year. However. in case for the above said reasons. the sale deed does not become viable after the expiry of this total period of one year. this agreement to sell shall cease to be operative as if there was no such agreement in existence at any point of time. (Emphasis supplied” 2. Earlier the defendant no.1 had executed a power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff on 24.7.2004 with respect to the suit land. It is admitted case of the parties that defendant was unable to obtain sale deed in his favour in the execution proceedings within a period of one year from the date of execution of the agreement.Consequently, defendant no.1 revoked the power of attorney given to the plaintiff vide revocation deed dated 17.8.2005 and also communicated the plaintiff vide his letter dated 17.8.2005. According to the petitioner, he also returned the earnest money of Rs.7,50,000/- vide Cheque bearing no.121641 of Punjab National Bank dated 18.8.2005. This fact finds mention in the letter dated 17.8.2005. Plaintiff received this letter which fact is admitted by him in his reply dated 1.9.2005. Plaintiff thereafter filed the present suit on 20.4.2006 for the enforcement of the agreement to sell. The suit was resisted by the present petitioner/defendant no.1 in the suit on variety of grounds. He pleaded that the plaintiff has misused his position as an advocate and exploited the defendant by misrepresentation regarding the market price of the property and also that he will get the sale deed executed in his favour by ensuring conclusion of the execution proceedings with regard to suit property which were pending in the court at Nuh. The trial court, though, initially granted ad interim injunction, however, after hearing the parties, on perusal of the written statement and on the basis of the pleadings of the parties came to the conclusion that the plaintiff does not have a prima facie case. The trial court, though, initially granted ad interim injunction, however, after hearing the parties, on perusal of the written statement and on the basis of the pleadings of the parties came to the conclusion that the plaintiff does not have a prima facie case. It also referred to the fact that the agreement to sell dated 16.8.2004 become inoperative on expiry of one year i.e. 16.8.2005 whereas the suit was filed much later on 20.4.2006. Accordingly, the application for injunction was dismissed, but the defendant was asked to place on record copy of the sale deed in the event of alienation of the property and also full particulars of the subsequent vendee as is evident from the order dated 16.12.2006 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Nuh (trial court). In the appeal preferred before the Additional District Judge Fast Track Court, Gurgaon, the Appellate Court, ordered maintenance of status quo primarily on the ground that there shall be multiplicity of the proceedings. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/defendant has strenuously argued before me that the order of the lower Appellate Court is illegal and erroneous in law. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Mr. Chetan Mittal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has attempted to argue that the plaintiff who is an advocate by profession has acted unethically and unprofessionally by trapping the petitioner who is an NRI. There are certain allegations in the written statement. It is also mentioned that some complaint has been made with the Bar Council, I refrain myself from going into this aspect of the matter, as I feel that the present revision should be decided on its own merits. It is pertinent to mention that even when no sale deed has been executed in favour of the plaintiff, he has entered into a memorandum of understanding with defendant no.2 who is respondent no.2 in this Revision Petition for further sale of the property and the respondent no.2 claims to be a bona fide purchaser. It is settled law that for grant of ad interim injunction, three conditions must co-exist- (i) prima facie case, (ii) irreparable loss and injury and (iii) balance of convenience. It is settled law that for grant of ad interim injunction, three conditions must co-exist- (i) prima facie case, (ii) irreparable loss and injury and (iii) balance of convenience. It is admitted case of the parties that in terms of Clause 5 of the agreement to sell, the sale deed was to be executed within six months on defendant no.1 obtaining sale deed in his favour from the original owners of the property in execution proceedings and this period could be extended only for six months more. Clause (5) of the agreement to sell noticed here-in-above, clearly specifies that after the expiry of total period of one year, the agreement to sell shall cease to be operative as if there is no such agreement in existence at any point of time. It is also admitted case of the parties that execution proceedings remain pending and no sale deed could be executed in favour of defendant no.1 (petitioner herein) within one year from the date of the execution of the agreement. Sale deed came to be executed in favour of defendant no. 1 only on 17.11.2005 i.e. beyond one year. It is also undisputed that the enforcement of agreement was contingent upon sale in favour of defendant no. 1 within the stipulated period and no such sale could be obtained within the stipulated period. Learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1 has stated that when the plaintiff entered into memorandum of understanding with defendant no.2, he had sought the consent of the defendant no.1. Admittedly, there is no written consent of defendant no.1. Neither he is a party to the Memorandum of Understanding signed by plaintiff with defendant no.2 nor even a witness. Had the defendant no.1 a consenting party to the Memorandum of Understanding, plaintiff at least should have obtained his written consent by some letter or communication. There is another aspect of the matter. Plaintiff entered into Memorandum of Understanding with defendant no.2 with respect to the property in question, even when he himself had no title or right over the property. Mr. Amit Rishi, counsel for respondent no.2 (defendant no.2) has admitted that there is no written consent by defendant no. 1, before or after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding. Therefore, any agreement made by plaintiff with defendant no.2 is of no consequence and cannot bind the defendant no.1. Mr. Amit Rishi, counsel for respondent no.2 (defendant no.2) has admitted that there is no written consent by defendant no. 1, before or after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding. Therefore, any agreement made by plaintiff with defendant no.2 is of no consequence and cannot bind the defendant no.1. The sheet anchor of the argument of the petitioner is that on expiry of period of one year, the agreement to sell ceases to exist and thus, the suit for specific performance based upon this agreement itself is misconceived or at least the plaintiff has no prima facie case. I am in agreement with the contention of learned counsel. Once a party fails to establish that he has a prima case, he cannot seek injunction on the ground that his suit may be rendered in fructuous or he may suffer any loss, may be irreparable. For grant of injunction, firstly, the court has to be satisfied regarding the existence of prima case and other two ingredients viz. Irreparable loss and injury and balance of convenience are to follow. The trial court, while dismissing the application for grant of interim injunction rightly observed that plaintiff does not have the prima facie case. The First Appellate Court, without disturbing this finding, or even without considering this important question granted status quo order on the ground of avoiding multiplicity of suits/proceedings. It has been observed by the lower appellate court that if the defendant is permitted to sell the property, the successor may further transfer the same and there will be no end. It may be observed that this approach of the lower appellate court is erroneous and misdirected. Without there being a prima facie case and without meeting the grounds for rejection of application by the trial court, it was not open to the lower appellate court to have interfered in the exercise of discretion merely on the ground of multiplicity of proceedings. It is settled law that interim injunction cannot be granted merely to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, unless there is prima facie case in favour of the party asking for injunction. Prima facie case means facts on record sufficient to send the parties to trial to prove and disprove their respective allegations and counter allegations. It is settled law that interim injunction cannot be granted merely to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, unless there is prima facie case in favour of the party asking for injunction. Prima facie case means facts on record sufficient to send the parties to trial to prove and disprove their respective allegations and counter allegations. But where existence of a particular fact, the sole basis for grant of relief is not disputed and such fact negate the claim of applicant, It is unfair and impermissible to impose injunction merely because court has discretion to grant injunction. Judicial discretion has to be exercised judicially and within the acknowledged and defined parameters. Execution of sale deed in favour of plaintiff was contingent upon sale in favour of defendant no.1 by the original owners within the stipulated period of six months extendable to one year. Undisputedly, the event did not occur within the specified and agreed time. In terms of mutual consent contained in the agreement, parties are relieved of the promise if event does not happen within the stipulated period. Such a contract becomes unenforceable in view of Section 35 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 4. In the totality of the circumstances, I am of the considered view that lower appellate court committed glaring illegality in granting status quo. The impugned order dated 12.2.2007 is not sustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. I order so. This Revision Petition is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs. It may be mentioned that any observation made here in this order is only for the purpose of grant or refusal of temporary injunction and is subject to out come of trial in the suit. ———————