JUDGMENT Mahesh Grover, J.:- The appellant has filed the present appeal against judgment and order of sentence dated 25.1.2000 of the Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur (hereinafter described as ‘the trial Court’) vide which he has been convicted under Section 304-B of the I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to a pay a fine of Rs.5000/-. In default of payment of fine, he has been directed to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for four months. 2. On 23.10.1992 at about 2.00 P.M., the appellant is said to have poured kerosene on his wife-Smt. Seema Wanti and set her on fire. She breathed her last on 30.10.1992, but before dying, she left behind a dying Crl.Appeal No.184-SB of 2000 -2- .... declaration recorded in the presence of PW2-Dr. Sudhir Khichi, who attested the same. 3. The F.I.R. was lodged on 24.10.1992 by PW5-Jugal Kishore, father of the deceased, who alleged that he had married his daughter-Seema Wanti to the appellant on 8.4.1992 and at the time of marriage, sufficient dowry was given. However, the appellant and his mother were still dissatisfied and used to mal-treat the deceased on account of bringing less dowry. The demand of colour television and gold chain were made repeatedly. The demands were reiterated on the day of Diwali, but the complainant expressed his inability to meet the same which led to the incident on 23.10.1992. On the fateful day, the complainant was stated to be present in the hose of the appellant where a quarrel erupted on account of demand of dowry and thereafter, the appellant is alleged to have sprinkled kerosene on the deceased and his mother ignited the fire. The complainant took his daughter to the hospital where she died after a week. 4. The police, after completion of investigation, submitted a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. as the complicity of the appellant and his mother in the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B/ 34 of the I.P.C. was, prima facie, established. 5. The Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur, to whom the case was entrusted in the first instance, charge sheeted the appellant and his mother under Sections 304-B and 302 of the I.P.C. to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 6. 5. The Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur, to whom the case was entrusted in the first instance, charge sheeted the appellant and his mother under Sections 304-B and 302 of the I.P.C. to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 6. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses including PW5-Jugal Kishore, the complainant and father of of Seema Wanti, PW1-Dr.Gurmanjit Rai, who conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of Seema Wanti, PW2-Dr.Sudhir Khichi in whose presence the dying declaration was made by the deceased and PW3- Dr.Jaspreet Singh, who reported her to be fit to make statement and who also sent intimation regarding her death on 30.10.1992. 7. In their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant and his mother stated that they were innocent and that they never mal-treated or tortured the deceased for bringing insufficient dowry nor any demand of dowry was made and rather, she died due to accidental burns while igniting the stove in the kitchen. 8. DW1- Shri Vaishno Dass Marriya and DW2-Surinder Kumar were examined by the appellant and his mother in their defence. Bed-head ticket EX-DX relating to the deceased was also tendered in evidence. 9. After appraisal of the entire evidence before it, the trial Court, vide its impugned judgment, convicted and sentenced the appellant and acquitted his mother-Pushpa Wati of the charge framed against her as she was found to be innocent. 10. While assailing the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court, learned counsel for the appellant contended that there was an inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. The incident is said to have taken place on 23.10.1992 at about 2.00 P.M. while the F.I.R. was lodged at 1.55/2.35 P.M. on 24.10.1992. On the basis of this, he argued that the delay becomes fatal to the case of the prosecution. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the dying declaration which was relied upon by the trial Court does not inspire any confidence as the deceased is said to have suffered 95% burn injuries and was an educated lady. In view of this, he urged that if one is to examine the record, it is revealed that the dying declaration had been thumb marked which is also not clearly visible and the same creates a doubt as it appears to have been procured. In view of this, he urged that if one is to examine the record, it is revealed that the dying declaration had been thumb marked which is also not clearly visible and the same creates a doubt as it appears to have been procured. He argued that in a case where a person has received 95% burn injuries, it is not possible that he or she would be able to put his or her thumb impression properly and thus, the dying declaration in the instant case cannot be believed. To support this contention, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported as 1998(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 142 – State of Punjab Versus Gian Kaur. 12. Further, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the presence of the complainant in the house of the appellant was highly unnatural and it appears that he has been introduced simply to prop up the story of the prosecution. 13. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant was not present at the time of occurrence because he was in Chandigarh as has been proved from the statements of DW1 and DW2. 14. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State contended that there is over-whelming evidence against the appellant and it cannot be said that he was not guilty of having committed the offence of causing death of his wife. He further contended that the dying declaration was recorded in the presence of PW2-Dr.Sudhir Khichi, who also attested the same and, thus, a great authenticity is attached to it. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported as 1988(2) R.C.R. 534 – State of Punjab Versus Amarjit Singh. 15. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 16. In a case of this kind, where a woman loses her life within a few months of her marriage, the circumstantial evidence has to be read and examined in that perspective. In the instant case, the marriage of the appellant with the deceased had taken place on 8.4.1992, whereas she was subjected to burn injuries on 23.10.1992 and on that account, she died on 30.10.1992. In the instant case, the marriage of the appellant with the deceased had taken place on 8.4.1992, whereas she was subjected to burn injuries on 23.10.1992 and on that account, she died on 30.10.1992. The proximity of the date of occurrence to the date of marriage is so close that it, in itself, explains the state of marriage and relation which must have existed between the appellant and the deceased. 17. In my opinion, the presumption of law under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act for committing an offence under Section 304-B of the I.P.C. is straight-away attracted against the appellant. 18. This, when read with the statement of PW5-Jugal Kishore, complainant, leaves hardly any ambiguity in the mind of the Court that the deceased was tormented for bringing less dowry and ultimately she was done to death for not satiating the demands of dowry. 19. That apart, the deceased left behind a dying declaration, which has been exhibited on record as EX-PC. A perusal thereof does not suggest any overt pressure on the deceased and the thumb mark is clearly visible on it. Besides, the same has been recorded in the presence of PW2-Dr.Sudhir Khichi, who also attested the same as having been written in front of him. His signatures appear at two points below the thumb impression of the deceased. There is, thus, no reason to disbelieve the statement of the deceased made before her death. 20. The dying declaration, Exhibit PC, which is in Gurmukhi, when translated in English, reads as under:- “My father Jugal Kishore is a school teacher. We are residents of ward No.11, Fatehgarh Churian. My marriage was solemnized with Raman Kumar son of Kishan Chand, Khatri, R/o Ward No.7, Fategarh Churian about 6 months ago i.e. on 8.4.92. At the time of my marriage, my father Jugal Kishore had given me sufficient dowry. But, my mother-in-law Pushpa Wanti w/o Kishan Chand and my husband Raman Kumar used to force me to bring coloured T.V., one chain of gold and other articles from my parents. Being poor, my parents could not provide the aforesaid articles to me. Due to which, my motherin- law Pushpa Wanti and my husband Raman Kumar used to give taunts to me, regarding which I had disclosed to my parents also. Being poor, my parents could not provide the aforesaid articles to me. Due to which, my motherin- law Pushpa Wanti and my husband Raman Kumar used to give taunts to me, regarding which I had disclosed to my parents also. They (my parents) made to understand the family of Raman Kumar that they have five daughters and have a big family, due to which, they could not give more dowry articles. Yesterday, i.e. on 23.10.92, my father Jugal Kishore came to meet me. It was about 2.00 P.M., my mother-in-law Pushpa Wanti and my husband (slip pasted) asked my father (slip pasted) and as to why he had not brought the demanded articles. I went to prepare tea for my father (slip pasted). Pushpa Wanti taunted that she would not allow such a daughter-in-law to stay in their house, who belongs to a poor family. Thereafter, my husband picked up cane containing kerosene oil and poured the same on me all of a sudden and Pushpa Wanti set me on fire with a match stick. I became unconscious. My father tried his level best to rescue me. My mother-in-law and husband Raman Kumar have set me ablaze out of greed for dowry. My father brought me here in the hospital for treatment. I am undergoing treatment. Action may be taken. They also used to ask me to bring coloured T.V. on Diwali from my parents. I am making my statement at my own while in the enjoyment of my right five sense.” In Smt.Laxmi Versus Om Parkash and others, 2001(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 359, a two-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court summed up the law in relation to the dying declaration in the following words:- “(1) A dying-declaration not being a deposition in Court,neither made on oath nor in the presence of the accused and therefore not tested by cross-examination is yet admissible in evidence as an exception to the general rule against the admissibility of hearsay. The admissibility is founded on the principle of necessity. The weak points of a dying declaration serve to put the Court on its guard while testing its reliability and impose on the Court an obligation to closely scrutinise all the relevant attendant circumstances. (2) A dying declaration, if found reliable, can form the basis of conviction. (3) A court of facts is not excluded from acting upon an uncorroborated dying declaration for finding conviction. (2) A dying declaration, if found reliable, can form the basis of conviction. (3) A court of facts is not excluded from acting upon an uncorroborated dying declaration for finding conviction. (4) A dying declaration, as a piece of evidence, stands on the same footing as any other piece of evidence. . (5) If has to be judged and appreciated in the light of the surrounding circumstances and its weight determined by reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidenced. (6) It is, as if the maker of the dying declaration was present in the Court, making a statement, stating the facts contained in the declaration, with the difference that the declaration is not a statement on oath and the maker thereof cannot be subjected to cross-examination. (7) If in a given case a particular dying declaration suffers from any infirmities, either of its own or as disclosed by other evidence adduced in the case or circumstances coming to its notice, the Court may as a rule of prudence look for corroboration and if the infirmities be such as render the dying declaration so infirm as to prick the conscience of the Court, the same may be refused to be accepted as forming safe basis for conviction. (8) A dying declaration made to a police officer is admissible in evidence, however, the practice of dying declaration being recorded by investigating officer has been discoursed and this Court has urged the investigating officers availing the services of Magistrate for recording dying declaration if it was possible to do so and the only exception is when the deceased was in such a precarious condition that there was no other alternative left except the statement being recorded by the investigating officer or the police officer later on relied on as dying declaration.” In a recent judgment reported as Mutu Kutty and another Versus State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, 2005(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 639, the law in relation to evidentiary value of dying declaration as laid down by the Apex Court from time to time, has been concised by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the following terms:- “(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details, as to occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (ix) Normally the Court is order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot be prevail. (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted.” 21. When the dying declaration of the deceased in the instant case is tested in the light of the above extracted law laid down by the Supreme Court, I am convinced that it is free from blemish and suspicion and was a voluntary expression of an anguished and a wronged woman. Hence, it would be safe to base the conviction of the appellant on this dying declaration. 22. So far as the plea of alibi is concerned, the same was disbelieved by the trial Court and nothing has been shown to this Court which could persuade to take a contrary view on this aspect of the matter. 23. Hence, it would be safe to base the conviction of the appellant on this dying declaration. 22. So far as the plea of alibi is concerned, the same was disbelieved by the trial Court and nothing has been shown to this Court which could persuade to take a contrary view on this aspect of the matter. 23. The plea of delay in lodging the F.I.R. is also without merit as the same was lodged within a proximate time lapse and in any case, in view of the dying declaration of the deceased, it loses its significance. 24. Having regard to the aforesaid, there is no hesitation to uphold the conviction of the appellant as recorded by the trial Court. 25. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant pleaded that the occurrence is of the year 1992, whereas the appeal had been filed in the year 2000 and thus, the appellant has faced the brunt of the criminal prosecution for the last 15 years. In view of this, he submitted that some lenient view of the situation may be taken. 26. For the offences of this kind where a young girl is initially subjected to brutality in her matrimonial home and then subjected to a most painful form of death and in such an incident which borders on the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C., no leniency can be shown to the perpetrators as they subject the entire society to the depravity of their minds and diabolism of their deeds, which are fuelled and propelled by their greed for material objects. 27. On the basis of the above discussion, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed while upholding the impugned judgment and order of sentence. —————————