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Rajasthan High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 2222 (RAJ)

Sita Devi v. Bishamber Dayal

2007-11-20

MOHAMMAD RAFIQ

body2007
JUDGMENT 1. - Present writ petition arises out of an application filed under Section 6 of the Rent Control Act, 2001 (for short the Act) by the petitioner-landlord for revision of rent. The petitioner-landlord let out a shop to the respondent No. 1 in old Subji Mandi, Dholpur on 20.12.1985. Initial amount of rent settled between the parties was As. 400 per month which by mutual consent was later increased to Rs. 475 per month. The Act of 2001 was enforced w.e.f. April, 1, 2003. Petitioner-landlord filed application under Section 6 of the Act on June 30, 2003 for revision of the rent as per the statutory formula prescribed therein on the basis of initial amount of rent of Rs. 400/- . Non-petitioner-tenant filed reply to that application on 5.11.2003. Rent Tribunal upon examining evidence and hearing the parties by its order dated 3.5.2005 revised the rent from As. 400 to Rs. 1068/- w.e.f. 1.4.2003. 2. Non-petitioner-tenant filed appeal against the aforesaid order before the Appellate Rent Tribunal. In tie meantime, the legislature enacted Rajasthan Rent Control (Second Amendment) Act, 2005, which received consent of the President of India on June 11, 2006. This amendment Act which was enforced by notification of State Government dated January 19, 2006, amended clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) & sub-section (2) of Section 6 so as to substitute the existing rate of 7.5% by 5% per annum. Now as per the amended provision, originally agreed amount of rent was to be increased, instead of 7.5%, by 5% per annum for a period of every ten years and thereafter the sum so arrived had to be again increased by such formula for a further period of ten years in similar manner till the date of commencement of the Act i.e. April 1, 2001 was arrived at. Appellate Rent Tribunal on the basis of amended provisions allowed the appeal and reduced the increased amount of Rs 1,068/- per month which was calculated by applying the rate of 7.5%, to Rs. 810/- per month at the rate of 5%. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-landlord has preferred this writ petition. 3. For the facility of reference, Section 6 of the Act of 2001, as it was originally enacted, is reproduced. hereunder : "6. 810/- per month at the rate of 5%. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-landlord has preferred this writ petition. 3. For the facility of reference, Section 6 of the Act of 2001, as it was originally enacted, is reproduced. hereunder : "6. Revision of rent in respect of existing tenancies.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in arty agreement, where the premises have been let out before the commencement of this Act, the rent thereof shall be liable to be revised according to the formula indicated below : (a) where the premises have been let out prior to 1st January, 1950, it shall be deemed to have been let out on 1st January, 1950 and the rent payable at that time shall be liable to be increased at the rate of 7.5% per annum and the amount of increase of rent shall be merged in such rent after ten years. The amount of rent so arrived at shall again be liable to be increased at the rate of 7.5% per annum in similar manner upto the year of commencement of this Act, (b) where the premises have been let out on or after 1st January, 1950, the rent payable at the time of commencement of the tenancy shall be liable to be increased at the rate of 7.5% per annum and the amount of increase of rent shall be merged in such rent after ten years. The amount of rent so arrived at shall again be liable to be increased at the rate of 7.5% per annum in similar manner upto the year of commencement of this Act. Illustration : If the rent was Rs. 100/- per month on 1st January, 1950, it shall become As. 175/- per month on 1st January, 1960. It shall become As. 306.30 per month on 1st January, 1970 and Rs. 536.30 per month on 1st January, 1980. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where the period of ten years for merger of increase of rent under sub-section (1) is not completed upto the year of commencement of this Act, the rent at the rate of 7.5% per annum shall be increased upto the year of the commencement of this Act and the amount of increase or rent shall be merged in rent. (3) The rent arrived at according to the formula given in sub-sections (1) and (2) shall, after completion of each year from the year of commencement of this Act, again be liable to be increased and paid at the rate of 5% per annum and the amount of increase of rent shall be merged in such rent after ten years. Such rent shall further be liable to be increased at similar rate and merged in similar manner till the tenancy subsists. (4) The rent revised as per formula given under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be payable, after the commencement of this Act, from the date agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant or where any petition is filed in a Rent Tribunal from the date of filing of such petition. 4. Section 3 of the Amendment Act, 2005 which sought to amend clauses (a), (b) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 6, is also reproduced hereunder : "3. Amendment of Section 6, Rajasthan Act No. 1 of 2003 - In Section 6 of the principal Act, (i) in clause (a) of sub-section (1), for the existing expression "7.5%", wherever occurring the expression "5%" shall be substituted, (ii) in clause (b) of sub-section (1), for the existing expression "7.5%" wherever occurring, the expression "5%" shall be substituted, (iii) the existing illustration appearing after clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be deleted, (iv) in sub-section (2), for the existing expression "7.5%", the expression "5%" shall be substituted." 5. Looking to the significance of questions involved in the petition as to whether reduction of rate of 7.5% per annum by which amount of base rent was to be increased to only 5% per annum as a result of the aforesaid amendment, would be enforced with effect from April 1, 2003 when the Act of 2001 was enforced or whether such amended provision would come into force from January 19, 2006 from which date the Amendment Act, 2005 was actually notified, members of the Bar were invited to address the Court following legal questions : (i) Whether the rent required to be revised with effect from commencement of tenancy as per the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 would as a result of reduction of rate from 7.5% to 5% pursuant to amendment in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act of 2001 vide Rajasthan Rent Control (Second Amendment) Act of 2005 notified by the Government on 19.1.2006 would require revision of such rent from the date of commencement of tenancy on notional basis or only from that date when the Act of 2005 was notified? (ii) Whether reduction of rate from 7.5% to 5% of notional increase of the rent for the period prior to the date of commencement of the Act of 2001 with effect from 1.4.2003 would be retrospective in nature or only prospective? (iii) Whether the prescription of 7.5% as the rate at which the rent was. required to be revised as per the originally enacted Section 6 of the Act of 2001 created any vested right in favour of the landlord and whether such right as a result of Amendment Act of 2005 whereby rate of revision is reduced from 7.5% to 5% can be allowed to be taken away in absence of any express intention of the legislature to retrospectively amend the aforesaid provision or whether, in the alternative, such an amendment as per the language used in Section 6 of the Act of 2001 which requires the rent to be notionally determined from the date of commencement of the tenancy as per the intention so expressed by the legislature be applied retrospectively? 6. 6. During the course of arguments however with the help of all the learned counsel who intervened to assist the Court in the matter, a significant question cropped up for consideration which can be articulated as under : (iv) Whether only the landlord has right to approach the Rent Tribunal for revision of the rent as per the provisions of.Section 6 of the Act or whether the tenant can also in the cases where rent has already been revised at the originally prescribed rate of 7.5%, can also approach the Rent Tribunal for re-revision of the same at the rate of 5% for the period from the date of commencement of tenancy till the commencement of the Act of 2001? 7. I had the benefit of hearing not only Shri R.K. Gaur, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri D.K. Garg, the learned counsel for the respondent but also the able arguments of the learned counsels who offered to assist the Court as interveners. 8. Shri R.K. Gaur, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the Appellate Rent Tribunal has acted in excess of its jurisdiction and has committed a material irregularity and gross error of law in holding that Section 6 of the Act has the retrospective effect even though legislature has not expressed any such intention in the Amendment Act of 2005. The learned Appellate Tribunal overlooked the fact that the legislature deliberately left the applicability and enforcement of the Amendment Act, 2005 to be determined by the State Government by a notification published in the official gazette as is evident from sub-section (2) of Section 1 thereof. The Government issued such notification on 22.02.2006 and enforced the said Act with immediate effect. The amended formula on the basis of reduced rate could not therefore be applied to an already concluded matter where the Rent Tribunal had already revised the rent. It was argued that Section 6 of the Act of 2001 had created substantive right in favour of the landlord and therefore even after amendment such rights which accrued to the landlord as vested rights cannot be withdrawn by retrospectively applying the amended provisions. Substantive rights are generally operative prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if that affects vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive. Substantive rights are generally operative prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if that affects vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive. Shri R.K. Gaur argued that retrospective effect can only be given where there are express words in the Statute indicating intention of the Legislature to that effect which necessarily implies such retrospective operation. The Rent Tribunal had passed the order on the basis of the existing provisions of law then available and validity of that order could also be therefore examined by the Appellate Rent Tribunal only on the basis of the unamended provisions of Section 6. Shri R.K. Gaur in support of his arguments relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 740 and Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 3609 . 9. Shri D.K. Garg, the learned counsel for the respondent however opposed the writ petition and argued that section 6 was even though amended by the Amending Act of 2005, but in so far as the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act of 2001 are concerned, the use of the word "substituted" is of great significance. In fact, it is a case of substituting the rate of 7.5% per annum by 5%. It was argued that substitution would completely obliterate the existing provision ' and bring the new one in its place. Substitution involves both repeal and re-enactment and therefore intention of the legislature for reducing the rate from 7.5% to 5% being evident from the language of the Amending Act of 2005, even if the appeals are pending and/or if decided, the revised rent would be liable to be re-revised accordingly. It was argued that appeal is continuation of the proceedings and therefore mere fact that the order had been passed by the Rent Tribunal, such order having not attained finality, even otherwise, cannot be projected as vested right. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the judgments cf Supreme Court in Dhannalal v. D.R Vijayvargiya & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2155 and Balwant Singh v. Darshan Singh & Ors., 2006 (1) WLC (SC) Civil 567 : 2006 DNJ (SC) 266 . The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the judgments cf Supreme Court in Dhannalal v. D.R Vijayvargiya & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2155 and Balwant Singh v. Darshan Singh & Ors., 2006 (1) WLC (SC) Civil 567 : 2006 DNJ (SC) 266 . Shri D.K. Garg also referred to Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 which was enforced w.e.f. April 1, 2003 and argued that Section 20 of that Act provides i special provision in respect of pending cases that if the Court finds that juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward him to the Juvenile Justice Board which shall pass orders. The Act was thus applied to even pending matters at the appellate stage. He in this connection cited the division bench judgment of this Court in Vikram @ Bangali v. State of Raj., D.B. Criminal Jail Appeal No. 753/1999 decided on February 20, 2004 . He also argued that if a Statute has come into operation during pendency of the appeal, the appellate Court has to take judicial notice of the same and give effect to the provisions thereof even though the same was enforced subsequent to the passing of the order under challenge. 10. Shri S.K. Gupta, vdho appeared in the matter in response to the notice to the Bar by this Court, argued that the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act of 2001 are merely in the form of protection to the tenant and if such a provision has undergone an amendment when the appeal is pending, there is no embargo either in the Act or otherwise to apply such amended provision even to the pending appeals. He argued that even if the appeal is decided and the order has become final and if in the meantime, the Amendment Act of 2005 has come into force, the concluded orders can be reopened and re framed at the instance of the tenant because originally envisaged rate of 7.5% has been reduced to 5% by way of substitution. He argued that even if the appeal is decided and the order has become final and if in the meantime, the Amendment Act of 2005 has come into force, the concluded orders can be reopened and re framed at the instance of the tenant because originally envisaged rate of 7.5% has been reduced to 5% by way of substitution. He argued that even if an order of revision of rent under Section 6 has been passed by the Rent Tribunal, it can be on the basis of amended Section 6 revised by the Appellate Tribunal and if the Appellate Tribunal has also upheld it, the aggrieved party can approach this Court by filing writ of certiorari. It 5 was argued that no provision of law can be allowed to be interpreted in such a manner which gives rise to uncertainty and disparity in its application by the courts, for every such provision must receive the same interpretation and should be applied uniformally. 11. Shri L.L. Gupta, the learned counsel who also offered to assist the 3 Court in response to the notice issued to the Bar however argued that Section 6 of the Act of 2001 has to be read with Section 14 and on conjoint reading of the two provisions, it would be evident that right to approach the Court for revision of rent has been conferred only upon the landlord and the tenant would have no right to apply the Court for rent revision. He further 5 argued that since Section 14(1) which contains the procedure for deciding petitions filed under Section 6 of the Act refers to only landlord, therefore, the tenant would have no right to approach the Court for such a rent revision. While referring to Section 29 of the Act of 2001, Shri L.L. Gupta argued that the Act of 2001 has been given overriding effect over any other enactment, o therefore, no other Act can be relied in aid of the argument that amended Section 6 would have only prospective application. He also referred to the meaning of the word "substitution". Shri L.L. Gupta, relied on the judgment of New Theaters (Carnatic Talkies) Ltd. Coimbatore v. N. Vajrapani Naidu, AIR 1984 SC 1 , Zohrabi v. Arjuna & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 101 , Mithilesh Kumari & Anr. He also referred to the meaning of the word "substitution". Shri L.L. Gupta, relied on the judgment of New Theaters (Carnatic Talkies) Ltd. Coimbatore v. N. Vajrapani Naidu, AIR 1984 SC 1 , Zohrabi v. Arjuna & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 101 , Mithilesh Kumari & Anr. v. Prem Behari Khara, AIR 1989 SC 1247 , Vijay v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2006 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 720 : (2006) 6 SCC 289 and Mithu Lal v. The State of Raj. & Ors., 2005 (1) WLC (Raj.) 758 . 12. Shri R.K. Agarwal, the learned counsel who appeared as intervenor in the matter argued that the amended provision of Section 6 would apply even to the pending matters because the rate of 7.5% as earlier prescribed has since been substituted by the rate of 5% and therefore it will apply to all pending proceedings. It was argued that such an application of law on pre-existing facts for the purpose of giving benefit to the tenant cannot be described as retrospective or retrospective. In support of his arguments, Shri R.K. Agarwal, learned counsel relied on the judgment of Ramji Purshottam (Dead) by LRS. & Ors. v. Laxmanbhai D. Kurlawala (Dead) by LRS. & Anr., 2004 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 568 : (2004) 6 SCC 455 . 13. Shri J.P. Goya[, the learned counsel who appeared as intervenor also argued that the right to approach the Court for revision of the rent has been conferred only upon the landlord as evident from Section 6 and 14 of the Act. He argued that Section 6 of the Act provides that the rent shall be revised with effect from the date of commencement of Act of 2001 on the basis of the rate of rent agreed upon between the parties at the time of commencement of tenancy, both the dates would remain the same even when the rate by which the base rent was to be revised, has been decreased from 7.5% to 5%. He further clarified his argued by submitting that the order of revision of rent passed under Section 6 which has attained finality cannot be reopened with the aid of the amended Section 6 though at the same time the pending proceedings in the Court, whether at the original stage, or the appellate stage would be governed by the amended law by virtue of doctrine is pedence. In support of this argument, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of Lakshmi Narayan Guin & Ors. v. Niranjan Modak, AIR 1985 SC 111 . It was argued that the amended provision cannot be said to be retrospective in nature as the intention of the legislature is to revise the rent though from the anterior date but only on notional basis. He in this respect relied on the judgment in Gujraj Singh etc. v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 412 and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Smt. Ogarn & Ors., 1992 (1) WLC (Raj.) 356 . He argued that the present one cannot be said to be a case of vested or accrued right being withdrawn as the formula prescribed by Section 6 has not been repealed but substituted which has the effect of complete obliteration of the existing provision from the enactment which also involves simultaneous re-enactment on the same subject. Section 6 can be applied only when the repealing Act does not indicate contrary intention to substituted provision. In the present case however that intention is evident from the substituted provision by indicating a different rate on which the base rent shall be revised form the date of commencement of tenancy till the date of commencement of Act of 2001. Such a provision has to be enforced and applied even if brought on the Statute at the time of appellate stage. He argued that-Section 6 is not substantive right but merely gives a protection to the tenant. 14. Shri G.C. Lunia, the learned counsel who intervened in the matter submitted that unlike in the earlier Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, Section 6 does not provide for determination of standard/fair rent but has given a fixed formula for revision of the rent. It was argued that when the originally given rate of 7.5% has been substituted by 5% per annum, only that rate would be applied to revise the originally settled rent as the substitution involves both repeal and re-enactment. Shri Lunia in this connection relied on the judgment in Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., AIR 1969 SC 504 and argued that the process of substitution consists of two steps namely, the first, old rule is made to cease to exist and the new rule is brought into existence in its place. Shri Lunia in this connection relied on the judgment in Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., AIR 1969 SC 504 and argued that the process of substitution consists of two steps namely, the first, old rule is made to cease to exist and the new rule is brought into existence in its place. He further argued that the right to get the rent revised as per the provisions of Section 6 cannot be confined to just landlord as the same would be discriminatory. Even in cases where the orders have been passed by the Rent Tribunal under Section 6 and have even been upheld by the Appellate Tribunal, with the amending Act, 2005 having reduced the rate of revision, such orders would be liable to be revised at the instance of either of the parties including the tenant. If that were not to be so, it would tantamount to perpetuating an illegality and continuous wrong to the tenant. It was argued that Section 6 has sought to strike a balance by providing for such a formula which works for the benefit of both tenant and the landlord and therefore restricted and rigid construction cannot be made of such a beneficial legislature. 15. Shri N.K. Maloo, the learned counsel also intervened in the matter and submitted that when a subsequent provision by amending the existing Act incorporate certain provisions therein by way of substitution, thi. Act originally enacted thereafter has to be read and construed as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with same pen and ink and the old words scored out. He in this connection relied on the judgment of Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shamrao V. Parulekar & Ors. v. District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay & Ors., AIR 1952 SC 324 and Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Orissa, 1991 Supp (1) SCC page 81 . Shri N.K. Maloo further argued that substitution of pre-existing provision and its replacement by a new provision results in repeal of that part of the Act and then reenactment of new provision. Substitution cannot therefore be just read as amendment even though it may have been categorized as such. In support of this argument, he relied on Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2004) 8 SCC 1 page 14 . Substitution cannot therefore be just read as amendment even though it may have been categorized as such. In support of this argument, he relied on Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2004) 8 SCC 1 page 14 . Shri N.K. Maloo further argued that none of the provisions of Act of 2001 has created any embargo for the tenant in approaching the Court to get the rent revised in terms of Section 6. Even though Section 6 may have used the word landlord, by mere reason of that fact, it cannot be read into such a way as to deny the right of revision to the tenant which would tantamount to frustrating the intention of the legislature which in fact it did not wish. He argued that whatever is not prescribed expressly cannot be read impliedly. 16. Shri Manoj Kumar Sharma, learned counsel also intervened in the matter and argued that the provisions of law when inserted into an enactment and more particularly by substituting an existing law has to be construed in such a manner that it is applied to all its subject mandatorily and uniformally, for doing so would tantamount to creating discriminating against the persons who are otherwise similarly situated. Shri Manoj Sharma in support of his arguments relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in Management of Good year India Ltd. v. Shri K.G. Devessar, AIR 1985 SC 1759 . 17. Shri Bipin Gupta, learned counsel who also intervened in the matter argued that when the legislature has not intended the provisions of the amended Section 6 to be only prospective in nature, by mere use of the word "substitution" such an intention cannot be ascribed to it. Referring from the law of lexicon, he argued that the word "substitute" means 'substitute' is one placed for or under another to transact or do some business. While relying on the judgment of N.N. Chakravarty, I.A.S. (Retd.) v. State of Assam & Ors., AIR 1960 Assam page 11 he argued that the word 'substitute' in similar cases may be employed to be meant by replacement of previous one by another which might be equal to it but differently expressed. Shri Bipin Gupta further argued that it is a matter of legislative practice to provide while enacting an amending law, that an existing provision shall be deleted and a new provision substituted. Shri Bipin Gupta further argued that it is a matter of legislative practice to provide while enacting an amending law, that an existing provision shall be deleted and a new provision substituted. Such deletion would have the effect of repeal of the existing provision. This procedure would therefore involve both repeal and the enactment. Shri Bipin Gupta in this connection cited the judgment of Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 740 . 18. Shri Mohit Gupta, the learned counsel who also appeared as intervenor argued that an acquired or accrued right is different than the mere right. Right falling under Section 6 of the Act is not a right of an enduring nature. What is unaffected by repeal is a right acquired or accrued under the Act so long as the decree is not passed. Shri Mohit Gupta in this connection cited the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vishwant Kumar v. Madan Lal Sharma & Anr., (2004) 4 SCC 1 . 19. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel representing the parties as also the intervenors in the matter. 20. Everything in the present matter would turn out on the fact of substitution of originally provided rate of 7.5% in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 6 by mere 5% vide Section 3 of the Second Amendment Act, 2005. The substitution in legal parlance is understood to mean repeal of the old one and re-enact in its place of the new one. Now in the context of the present case, when the substitution of the rate of 7.5% by 5% is analyzed, it would be evident that according to Section 6, supra, the rent would be liable to be increased at that rate of 5% per annum from the date of commencement of tenancy upto the date of commencement of the Act at every span of ten years, which means that once the cycle is complete upto 10 years, the increased rate would merge into the base rent and the sum so arrived at then shall form the basis for making further increase at the same rate till the time the date of commencement of the Act of 2001 is reached which is 1st April, 2003. Whatever.may be the rate, whether 7.5% as earlier provided and after substitution, 5% per annum, indicated parameters on which the formula provided for by Section 6 is to be applied remains the same namely, increase in the amount of rent shall have to be worked out starting from the date of commencement of the tenancy till the. date of commencement of Act of 2001. This has been often used legislative practice to provide for substitution of old provision by implanting new provision in its place. Substitution thus means that while enacting and amending a law, an existing provision shall be deleted and a new provision in its place substituted. Such a course has the effect of simultaneous repeal of the existing provision and re-enactment of the new one. Substitution therefore in the situational contest implies an exercise of amendment for repeal and re-enactment both. Though in practice also referred to as the amendment but it involves both repeal and simultaneous re-enactment. There is thus no vacuum and no discontinuity, although, one may call it a change in continuity. I am therefore not persuaded to uphold the argument which Shri Raj Kumar Gaur, the learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to built on the basis of judgment of Supreme Court in Bhagat Ram Sharma, supra, because in that judgment although the Supreme Court held that were substitution did not imply that the provision which was called in question in that case would relate back to 1.11.1956, the appointed date for reorganisation of the States. But in para 18 of the self same judgment their Lordships also held that amendment of substantive law is not retrospective unless expressly laid down or by necessary implication inferred. In the present case however it should be clear that both at the time, when the rate at which the rent was to be revised was 7.5% and after amendment by way of substitution, it is 5%, the basic parameters remain the same that the rent shall have to be revised starting from the commencement of the date of tenancy till the time of commencement of Act of 2001 and it is the ultimately arrived at sum on the basis of formula prescribed in Section 6 which would then form the basis for further increase/revision of the rent. Reduced rate shall thus by necessary implication take effect from the date when the originally provided rate was made effective. The substituted rate would therefore by necessary implication have the retrospective effect. 21. I am fortified in my views from the Constitutional Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Shamrao v. Parulekar & Ors. , supra, wherein their Lordships in para 7 held as under : "7. The construction of an Act which has been amended is now governed by technical rules and we must first be clear regarding the proper canons of construction. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that , would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. This is the rule in England : see Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, page 207, it is the law of America : see Crawford on Statutory Construction, page 110 and it is the law which the Privy Council applied to India in ' Keshoram Poddar v. Nundo Lal Mallick, 5411nd App 152 (PC) at p. 55 . Bearing this in mind, it will be seen that the Act of 1950 remains the Act of 1950 all the way through even with its subsequent amendments. Therefore, the moment the Act of 1952 was passed and section 2 came into operation, the Act of 1950 meant the Act of 1950 as amended by section 2, that is to say, the Act of 1950 now due to expire on the 1st of October, 1952." 22. This very proposition of law was reiterated by the Supreme court in Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. & Anr., supra, wherein in para 25 of the judgment it was held as under : "The new provisions are thus, in the absence of any inconsistency or absurdity, deemed to have always formed part of the provisions originally enacted. This very proposition of law was reiterated by the Supreme court in Orient Paper & Industries Ltd. & Anr., supra, wherein in para 25 of the judgment it was held as under : "The new provisions are thus, in the absence of any inconsistency or absurdity, deemed to have always formed part of the provisions originally enacted. That being the position in law, as an inevitable corollary, the notification issued under Section 1(3) is deemed to be applicable to the principal Act with the subsequently substituted retroactive provisions written into it, and, no further notification under Section 1(3) in respect of Act 4 of 1989 is, therefore, required xxxxxxxxx," 23. As to the meaning of the word "substitution", the Supreme Court In Zile Singh, supra, in para 25 of the judgment held as under : "Substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation, ibid, p. 565). If any authority is needed in support of the proposition, it is to be found in West U.P. Sugar Mills Assn. and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2002) 2 SCC 645 , State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwal, (1996) 5 SCC 60 , Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga and Co., (1969) 1 SCC 255 and A.L.V.R.S.T. Veerappa Chettiar v. S. Michael & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 933 . In West U.P. Sugar Mills Association and Ors.'s case (supra) a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that the State Government by substituting the new rule in place of the old one never intended to keep alive the old rule. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances centering around the issue the Court held that the substitution had the effect of just deleting the old rule and making the new rule operative. In. Mangilal Pindwal case (supra) this Court upheld the legislative practice of an amendment by substitution being incorporated in the text of a statute which had ceased to exist and held that the substitution would have the effect of amending the operation of law during the period in which it was in force. In. Mangilal Pindwal case (supra) this Court upheld the legislative practice of an amendment by substitution being incorporated in the text of a statute which had ceased to exist and held that the substitution would have the effect of amending the operation of law during the period in which it was in force. In Koteswar's case (supra) a three-Judge Bench of this Court emphasised the distinction between 'supersession' of a rule and 'substitution' of a rule and held that the process of substitution consists of two steps : first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place. 24. In Ramkanali Colliery of BCCL v. Workmen by Secy. Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Singh & Anr., (2001) 4 SCC 236 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while revisiting Bhagat Ram Sharma, supra held that the usual principles of finding out the rights of the parties flowing from an amendment of a provision should be applied and if there is a vested right and that right is taken away, necessarily the law will have to be retrospective in effect. Their Lordships in para 8 of the judgment held as under : "In Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India this Court stated that it is a matter of legislative practice to provide while enacting an amending law, that an existing provision shall be deleted and a new provision substituted. If there is both repeal and introduction of another provision in place thereof by a single exercise, the expression "substituted" is used. Such deletion has the effect of the repeal of the existing provision and also provides for introduction of a new provision. In our view there is thus no real distinction between repeal and amendment or substitution in such cases. If that aspect is borne in mind, we have to apply the usual principles of finding out the rights of the parties flowing from an amendment of a provision. If there is a vested right and that right is to be taken away, necessarily the law will have to be retrospective in effect and if such a law retrospectively takes away such a right, it can no longer be contended that the right should be enforced. However, that legal position, in the present case, does not affect the rights of the parties as such." 25. However, that legal position, in the present case, does not affect the rights of the parties as such." 25. In Mithilesh Kumari & Anr., supra, also the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Statutes coming into operation during pendency of the appeal may be taken note of by the appellate Court and given effect to. The Statute in question was Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act (45 of 1988). It was held that such subsequent event could be taken note of by the appellate Court and the suit could be held to be not maintainable in respect of the retrospective operation of the Act. But before doing so, the Court has to be satisfied that the Statute is in fact retrospective. It was held that a Statute can be held to be retrospective even by necessary implication and it was not necessary that it must be so expressed in the very terms of the Section to be construed. In para 21 of the judgment their Lordships held as under : We read in Maxwell that it is a fundamental rule of English Law that no statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly at the time of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. A retrospective operation is, therefore, not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be that the statute is in fact retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the statue if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed. However, a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. We must look at the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former State of Law and what the legislation contemplated. We must look at the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former State of Law and what the legislation contemplated. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole, as in this case, may relate to a time antecedent to their commencement. The presumption against retrospectivity may in such cases be rebutted by necessary implications from the language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be construed. The question is whether on a proper construction the legislature may be said to have so expressed its intention. 26. In New Theaters (Carnatic Talkies) Ltd. Coimbatore, supra, also the question was whether the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act extended to the town of Coimbatore w.e.f. 19.2.1958 during the pendency of appeal arising out of the suit for eviction, which was d-much before would also apply to the pending appeals and during the pendency of the appeal in Supreme court, Section 9 thereof. was amended in 1960 in view of which, the Court could direct the sale of a part only of the land and was not compelled to pass order in respect of the entire land. It was held that amended Section 9 would operate retrospectively and affect the rights of the parties in the pending appeal. 27. In Ramji Purshottam (Dead) by LRS. & Ors., supra, the Supreme Court while interpreting the provisions of Section 12 Explanation III of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 held that giving prospective benefit of Statute on antecedent facts when law came into force during pendency of proceedings applied on the date of judgment to pre-existing facts for the said purpose and this cannot be described as retrospectivity. Gajraj Singh etc., :supra, was a case in which the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 6 of the General Clauses Act analyzed the effect of the repeal and held that whenever an Act is repealed, it must be considered, except as to transactions past and closed, as if it had never existed. Gajraj Singh etc., :supra, was a case in which the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 6 of the General Clauses Act analyzed the effect of the repeal and held that whenever an Act is repealed, it must be considered, except as to transactions past and closed, as if it had never existed. The effect thereof is to obliterate the Act completely from the record of the Parliament as if it had never been passed by it, it never existed except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it was existing law. 28. In Dhannalal, supra, the Supreme court while analyzing the fact of repeal of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which prescribed limitation for filing claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal held that the benefit of the said provision would be available even if the claim petition is pending on the date on which sub-section (3), supra was repealed and such petitions could not be dismissed as being barred by limitation on the date of its limitation. 29. In Lakshmi Narayan Guin & Ors., supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was extended to a particular area after passing of eviction decree but during pendency of the appeal, tenant would be entitled to claim protection available under the Act. The appeal being continuation of the suit, change in law pending appeal was required to be taken into consideration by the appellate Court. 30. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, supra, the division bench of this Court while considering the effect of repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Section 92-A of which provided the limit of Rs. 15,000/-as no fault liability compensation held that reveal of the said Act does not impede grant of enhanced compensation under the provisions of Section 140 even in case where accident has occurred prior to the commencement of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 31. The argument that a right having accrued in favour of the landlord to get the rent settled at the time of commencement of the tenancy revised and recovered at the rate of 7.5% if got crystallized before the Amending Act 2005 was notified by the Government, proceeds on the unfounded notion that right to get the rent at the rate of 7.5% is a vested right and therefore accrued one. As rightly pointed by the learned counsel Shri G.C. Lunia, this has to be viewed from the historic perspective because when the predecessor Act of 2001 namely the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 was in force, its Section 6 left the field wide open for determination of standard/fair rent for the landlord which could be based on the evidence of adjpinmilar premises and in fact, restriction placed by way of outer limit for determination of such rent was struck down. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of that Act which sought to somewhat restrict/limit the extent of the rent revision was declared unconstitutional by division bench of this Court in Khem Chand v. State of Raj. & Anr., D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1193/97, 1999 (2) WLC (Raj.) 228 . The legislature in Section 6 of the new enactment by prescribing the limit of increase and at the same time providing for notional benefit for the period intervei,ing the date of commencement of tenancy and date of commencement of the new Act has tried to strike a balance between the interest of the landlords and the tenants. However, prescription of the limit beyond which the rent cannot be notionally increased for the period anterior to the date of commencement of the Act of 2001 and even for the subsequent period, intention of the legislature in substance is to provide a protection to the tenants against arbitrary and fanciful increase in the amount of rent by the landlords. Nevertheless, this provision acts for the benefit of both the landlord and the tenant while retaining its basic character of striking a balance between the two conflicting interest. This has done away with the provisions of the repealed enactment by providing a fixed formula with zero discretion to the courts which may eventually lead to reduction of this kind of litigation between landlords and tenants and regulate their inter se relationship in a peaceful manner. Thus beneficial legislation if it is, for both the sections of the society. This cannot however be described either as an accrued right or a vested right. While therefore interpreting Section 6 of the Act of 2001, the courts have to be conscious of the historic perspective and the mischief for which old law did not provide and the remedy therefore provided for by the new law. 32. This cannot however be described either as an accrued right or a vested right. While therefore interpreting Section 6 of the Act of 2001, the courts have to be conscious of the historic perspective and the mischief for which old law did not provide and the remedy therefore provided for by the new law. 32. Constitutional bench of the Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. (supra) while relying on Heydon's case (1984) 3 Co Rep 7a (V) in para 22 of the judgment held that in order to properly interpret the provisions of Article 286, it is necessary to consider how the matter stood immediately before the Constitution came into force, what was the mischief for which the old law did not provide and the remedy which has been provided by the Constitution to cure that mischief. It would be profitable to extract para 22 of the said judgment in extenso : "(22) It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when-'Heydon's case', (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a (V) was decided that ....for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered : 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act, 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd. What remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and 4th. The true reason of the remedy, and then the office of all the judges as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and 'pro privato commodo', and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, `pro bono publico'." 33. In-' In re, Mayfair Property Co.', (1898) 2 Ch 28 at p. 35 (W) Lindley M.R. in 1898 found the rule "as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported 'Heydon's case (V)'. 34. In ' Eastman photographic Material Co. In-' In re, Mayfair Property Co.', (1898) 2 Ch 28 at p. 35 (W) Lindley M.R. in 1898 found the rule "as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported 'Heydon's case (V)'. 34. In ' Eastman photographic Material Co. v. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks', 1898 AC 571 at p. 576 (X) Earl of Halsbury re-aff irmed the rule as follows : "My Lords, it appears to me that to construe the Statute in question, it is not only legitimate but highly convenient to refer both to the former Act and to the ascertained evils to which the former Act had given rise, and to the later Act which provided the remedy. These three being compared I cannot doubt the conclusion." It appears to us that this rule is equally applicable to the construction of Article 286 of our Constitution. In order to properly interpret the provisions of that Article it is, therefore, necessary to consider how the matter stood immediately before the Constitution came into force, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide and the remedy which has been provided by the Constitution to cure that mischief." 35. Adverting now to the question whether the rent once revised as per the originally provided rate of 7.5% can be re-revised after the amending Act of 2005 was notified in cases where the order has been passed by the Rent Tribunal as per the original text of Section 6. In that, then there may be two kind of cases where the order has attained finality, say either before the appellate court or even upto this Court and the other category of cases may be where the order passed by the Rent Tribunal is under challenge before the Appellate Rent Tribunal and in certain cases may be even before this Court and lis is pending. Although appeal in law is taken as continuation of the original proceedings but pendency of the dispute in writ petition can be taken at no lesser pedestal because this Court also while exercising its power of judicial review under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has to be guided by legal and constitutional parameters. 36. Although appeal in law is taken as continuation of the original proceedings but pendency of the dispute in writ petition can be taken at no lesser pedestal because this Court also while exercising its power of judicial review under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has to be guided by legal and constitutional parameters. 36. Coming back to the original question, it must be noted that what is being propagated by one section of the lawyers is that in cases where the rent has been revised by the Rent Tribunal as per the originally provided rate of 7.5% per annum, more particularly where such orders have attained finality, they cannot be reopened so as to re-revise the rent as per the subsequently reduced rate of 5%. That argument does not merit acceptance in view of the law so extensively discussed in the foregoing paras that right to get the rent revised, is statutorily regulated right and would therefore be governed by the provisions under the Statute and therefore cannot be accepted as vested or accrued right. If the legislature by substituting the original rate of 7.5% per annum has reduced it to just 5% per annum, such revision shall have to be made from the date of commencement of tenancy till commencement of the Act of 2001 accordingly, two parameters being the same even for revision of rent by both old rate and new rate, the intention of the legislature, thus evident by necessary implication, is clear to apply the new rate retrospectively. Reference in this connection may be usefully made to the observations of the Supreme Court in Vijay v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 720 : (2006) 6 SCC 289 , in para 10 of which their Lordships held as under : "10 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx The inhibition against retrospective construction is not a rigid rule. It does not apply to a curative or a clarificatory statute. If from a perusal of the statute, intendment of the legislature is clear, the court will give effect thereto. For the said purpose, the general scope of the statute is relevant. Every law that takes away a right vested under the existing law is retrospective In nature." 37. In the same judgment, the Supreme Court in para 12 of the report observed as under : "12. The appellant was elected in terms of the provisions of a statute. For the said purpose, the general scope of the statute is relevant. Every law that takes away a right vested under the existing law is retrospective In nature." 37. In the same judgment, the Supreme Court in para 12 of the report observed as under : "12. The appellant was elected in terms of the provisions of a statute. The right to be elected was created by a statute and, thus, can be taken away by a statute. It is now well settled that wen a literal reading of the provision giving retrospective effect does not produce absurdity or anomaly, the same would not be construed to be only perspective. The negation is not a rigid rule and varies with the intention and purport of the legislature, but to apply it in such a case is a doctrine of fairness. When a law is enacted for the benefit of the community as a whole, even in the absence of a provision, the statute may be held to be retrospective in nature. The appellant does not and cannot question the competence of the legislature in this behalf." 38. A related argument has also been made by one side representing interest of the landlord that the rent once revised as per the old rate of 7.5% cannot be reduced by applying the rate of 5% if the order passed by the Rent Tribunal has attained finality because right to get the rent revised has been conferred by the legislature on the tenant alone and not on the landlord. Heavy reliance has been placed on Section 6 of the Act of 2001 which inter alia provides that "where the premises have been let out before the commencement of this Act, the rent thereof shall be liable to be revised according to formula" indicated in that section. Reference has also been made to Section 14 of the said Act which provides for the procedure for revision of rent. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 provides that "the landlord may seek revision of rent under Section 6 or 7 by submitting a petition before the Rent Tribunal." Interpretation that is sought to be placed on these two provisions is that it should be read therein that they denied the right to get the rent revised to the tenant, such right having been by expressed words reserved only to the landlord. But implicit therein is the argument that revision can be only made upwards and not downwards. In other words, the rent by the process of revision can be only increased and not decreased. If this argument is accepted, the obvious consequences would be that while the provisions of the law would remain the same for all the landlords and the tenants providing for revision of rent at the rate of 5% per annum, the old rate of 7.5% having been substituted by the new rate. One class of the landlords, who are vigilant enough and in certain cases where their petitions were decided early, were fortunate enough to get the rent revised at the old rate of 7.5%. Other class in whose cases the orders could not be passed by the Rent Tribunal either because they did not approach it timely or because the matters remained pending would be then dealt with as per the new rate of 5% with the obvious advantage thereof going to the tenants. That would result in a very absurd situation where there will be two classes of landlords and two classes of tenants. In other words, though the old rate by which the rent was to be revised, having been completely obliterated from the Statute, the landlords of the first category would be in an advantageous position vis-a-vis landlords of the second category. Such an interpretation would thus lead to a hostile discretion between the landlord and tenants who are otherwise identically situate. In spite of the legislature having provided in Section 6 and 14 of the Act for the landlords to approach the Rent Tribunal, those provisions of the Act of 2001 along with various other provisions shall have to be interpreted in such a way as to make their harmonious l construction with an avowed objective of ensuring that the application of the enactment to its subject is even handed and uniform and is not discriminatory giving rise to incongruous and absurd consequences. Efforts should be towards ensuring that construction that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice and absurdity or anomaly leading to inconsistency in the system which the Statute purports to regulate should be avoided at any cost. 39. Efforts should be towards ensuring that construction that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice and absurdity or anomaly leading to inconsistency in the system which the Statute purports to regulate should be avoided at any cost. 39. The Hon'ble Supreme court in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. & Anr., (2002) 4 SCC p. 105 while interpreting the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 held that where there is scope of two possible constructions, a reasonable and common sense approach deserves to be adopted rather than preferring a construction that would lead to'absurd results. An interpretation which seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the Court and leads to absurd consequence and incongruous results that are so obvious should also be avoided with a view to implement the scheme of the legislation and making the enactment workable. Their Lordships in para 15 of the judgment observed as under : "15 ........ xxxxx........ xxxx...... xxxx..... If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation then the court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature. This task often is not an easy one and several difficulties arise on account of variety of reasons, but all the same, it must be borne in mind that it is impossible even for the most imaginative legislature forestall exhaustively situations and circumstances that may emerge after enacting a statute where its application may be called for. It is in such a situation the court's duty to expound arises with a caution that the court should not try to legislate. While examining a particular provision of a statute to find out whether the jurisdiction of a court is ousted or not, the principle of universal application is that ordinarily the jurisdiction may not be ousted unless the very statutory provision explicily indicates or even by inferential conclusion the court arrives at the same when such a conclusion is the only conclusion. Notwithstanding the conventional principle that the duty of Judges is to expound and not to legislate, the courts have taken the view that the judicial art of interpretation and appraisal is imbued with creativity and realism and since interpretation always implied a degree of discretion and choice, the courts would adopt, particularly in areas such as, constitutional adjudication dealing with social and defuse rights. Courts are therefore, held as "finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing" (see Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways, All ER at p. 1071 D, WLR at p. 732 , State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR at p. 1957 . If a language used is capable of bearing more than one construction, in selecting the true meaning, regard must be had to the consequences, resulting from adopting the alternative constructions. A construction that results In hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity qr anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the system which the statute purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference should be given to that construction which avoids such results." 40. It is trite law that while making interpretation of a particular provision of law, there is always marginal area in which the courts mould or creatively interpret the rules but in doing so, they have to give due regard to the true and legal meaning of the enactment and the language used therein. The observations of their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Elphistone Spinning and Weaving Col Ltd. (supra) in para 17 of the judgment are in this respect apt to quote : "17. .... While examining a particular statute for finding out the legislative intent it is attitude of Judges in arriving at a solution by striking a balance between the letter and spirit of the statute without acknowledging that they have in any way supplemented the statute would be the proper criterion. The duty of Judges is to expound and not to legislate is a fundamental rule. There is no doubt a marginal area in which courts mould or creatively interpret legislation and they are thus finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing. (See : Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways Inc., WLR, P. 732 and State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh . But by no stretch of imagination a Judge is entitled to add something more than what is there in the statute by way of a supposed intention of the legislature. (See : Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways Inc., WLR, P. 732 and State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh . But by no stretch of imagination a Judge is entitled to add something more than what is there in the statute by way of a supposed intention of the legislature. It is, therefore, a cardinal principle of construction of statutes that the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed.." 41. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC p. 738 while elaborating upon the same principle of the law relating to interpretation of statutes observed in para 12 of the said judgment as under : "12........ xxxxx ........... xxxx .......... The construction to be placed on a provision like this has to commend to justice and reason. It has to be a reasonable construction to promote the ends of justice. The words "could be tried together with the accused" in Section 319(1) cannot be said to be capable of only one construction. If it was so, approach to be adopted would be different since the intention of Parliament is to be respected despite the consequences of interpretation. There is, however, a scope for two possible constructions. That being the position, a reasonable and common sense approach deserves to be adopted and preferred rather than a construction that would lead to absurd results of Respondent 1 escaping the trial despite passing of an order against him on the court's satisfaction under Section 319(1) and despite the fact that the proceedings against him have to commence afresh..." 42. Amendment in section 6 of the Act of 2001 substituting the rate of 7.5% by 5% was brought about by the legislature while retaining the core of the originally enacted provision that the earliest settled rent shall be revised from the date of commencement of tenancy till commencement of the Act of 2001. Rights/obligations in whatever form available in the Act of 2001 are attached to the premises which are let out. Moving the Court by either of the parties for enforcement thereof is only incidental. Rights/obligations in whatever form available in the Act of 2001 are attached to the premises which are let out. Moving the Court by either of the parties for enforcement thereof is only incidental. Rights and obligations flowing from any of the provisions of the Act shall have to be therefore uniformly applied and enforced. Intention of the legislature was thus to relieve and unburder the tenants of differential amount @ 2.5% of the rent per annum. When framers of the law intended that benefit to go to the tenants, a prohibition for them to approach the forum of Rent Tribunal cannot be read in the Act, which in fact was envisaged contrarily by reduction of such rate at a later stage. When the power has been conferred on the Rent Tribunal under Section 6 read with Section 14 of the Act of 2001 to undertake the exercise of revision of rent, the party at whose instance the process for revision of rent is initiated before the Rent Tribunal would therefore not be a much significant aspect of the matter as the Tribunal in any case shall be guided by the same principles of law and the formula for rent revision and the procedure provided thereunder for dealing with an appropriate application preferred before it even at the instance of a tenant. 43. As a result of the discussion made above, the questions that are proposed in the beginning of this judgment are answered thus : (i) that the revision of the rent as per Section 6 of the Act of 2001 shall have to be made at the reduced rate of 5% pursuant to amendment in clauses(a) and (b) of sub-section (1) & sub-section (2) of Section 6 vide Rajasthan Rent Control (Second Amendment) Act of 2005 from the date of commencement of tenancy on notional basis. (ii) that the rate of 7.5% in the original text of Section 6 having been substituted by 5% by the amending Act of 2005, revision of rent from the Commencement of tenancy till the commencement of Act of 2001 with effect from 1st April, 2003 shall have to be made at the reduced rate of 5% per annum on notional basis, the legislature having substituted the old rate by the new one expressed its intention by necessary implication to apply it retrospectively from the date of enforcement of the Act of 2001. Substituted rate would thus apply retrospectively. (iii) that the prescription of the rate of 7.5% by which the rent was required to be revised as per the originally enacted Section 6 of the Act of 2001 did not create any vested or accrued right in favour of the landlord and therefore there does not arise any question of any such right being taken away. The legislature having substituted the old rate by the new one and reduced the same from 7.5% to the reduced rate therefore by necessary implication would apply retrospectively. (iv) that although Section 6 and Section 14 of the Act of 2001 are so worded as to apparently confer the right only to the landlord to approach the Rent Tribunal for notional revision of the rent but in the situation arising as a result of substitution of the rate of 7.5% to 5%, supra, the reduced rate introduced by way of substitution alone would have to be applied for increase in the amount of rent settled at the time of commencement of tenancy till commencement of the Act of 2001 i.e. 1st April, 2003 as per the formula given in Section 6 and the sum so arrived at then shall form the basis for further increase in the rent. In order, therefore, not to deny the benefit in the reduction of rate at which the rent has now been intended to be notionally increased for the period anterior to the date of commencement of Act of 2001, the tenants would also have the right to approach the Rent Tribunal for necessary adjustments in the amount of the revised rent as per the reduced rate of 5% and for the same reason, therefore, the Appellate Rent Tribunal would also have the powers to do so. 44. In view of the aforesaid answers to the four questions formulated at the beginning of this legal discourse, in my considered opinion, the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has not committed any error of law in re-revising the rent as per the Amending Act of 2005 on reduced rate of 5% which was earlier revised by the Rent Tribunal at the originally prescribed rate of 7.5%. 45. Result of the aforesaid discussion is that the present writ petition fails and is therefore dismissed though with no order as to costs.Writ Petition dismissed. *******