Judgment :- This petition has been filed to call for the records in Cr.No.70 of 2005 on the file of the respondent police and quash the same. 2. A resume of facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this petition would run thus: One Manickam Pillai filed a suit in O.S.No.23 of 2004 in the Sub Court, Dindigul for specific performance of the agreement to sell executed between Silampanan Gounder and Veluchamy on the one side and himself on the other side. The said Veluchamy was one of the defendants in O.S.No.23 of 2004 in the Sub Court, Dindigul. It was he who initiated criminal action by lodging a complaint with the police who registered the case in Cr.No.70 of 2005 for the offences punishable under Sections 469, 471 and 120(B) I.P.C on the allegation that in the said suit, the receipt dated 05.12.2001 for Rs.70,000/- (Rupees Seventy Thousand only) allegedly signed by Silampanan Gounder and Veluchamy, was filed by forging the signature of Veluchamy. According to Veluchamy, Silampana Gounder happened to be the employer of Manickam Pillai who colluded with the other accused and forged such a receipt. 3. It is also the grievance of the petitioners herein who are the accused in the said F.I.R, in the course of investigating into the said crime, the police approached the Magistrate and obtained some order and in pursuance of it, the original receipt in the Sub Court, was taken away by the police to the police station for comparison etc, which according to the petitioner are totally antithetical to all norms of justice and fair play. 4. It is also the case of the petitioners that when the civil suit is pending, subsequent criminal prosecution based on the some cause of action would not arise and the F.I.R registered is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. 5. Per contra, by way of torpedoing and gainsaying, challenging and impugning the allegations and averments on the petitioners side, the learned Counsel for the second respondent would contend by placing reliance on the dictum of the Honourable Apex Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Mennakshi Marwah and another reported in (2005) 4 Supreme Court Cases 370 that subsequent criminal prosecution could rightly be proceeded and in no way, it would be a bar under any law in force. He would also submit that relating to the fact of the obtention of order from the Magistrate and taking away the original receipt from the Sub Court, the defacto complainant was not a party and he may not be held responsibility and he leaves it to the Court to decide about the correctness of the procedure adopted by the police in that regard. 6. So far this case is concerned, the dictum of the Honourable Apex Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Mennakshi Marwah and another reported in (2005) 4 Supreme Court Cases 370 as pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the second respondent, could be accepted for the foregoing reasons. Certain excerpts from the precedent cited, would run thus: "32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. While examining a similar contention in an appeal against an order directing filing of a complaint under Section 4 of the old Code, the following observations made by a Constitution Bench in M.S.Sheriff v. State of Madras [ 1954 SCR 1144 : AIR 1954 SC 397 : 1954 Cri L J 1019] give a complete answer to the problem posed: (AIR p.399, paras 15-16) "15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment. 16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This, however, is not a hard-and-fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this case, we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished." 33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. 34. In the present case, the Will has been produced in the Court subsequently. It is nobodys case that any offence as enumerated in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) was committed in respect to the said Will after it had been produced or filed in the Court of District Judge. 34. In the present case, the Will has been produced in the Court subsequently. It is nobodys case that any offence as enumerated in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) was committed in respect to the said Will after it had been produced or filed in the Court of District Judge. Therefore, the bar created by Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would not come into play and there is no embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint filed by the respondents. The view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court is perfectly correct and calls for no interference." 7. Pithily and precisely, what happened in this case is that the said Veluchamy taking exception to the receipt produced by the plaintiff in that suit, had chosen to set the criminal law in motion without invoking Section 340 Cr.P.C and also without resorting to the mandates as contained in Section 195 (1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. Undoubtedly, a person aggrieved by a document which is allegedly forged outside the Court and produced during the Court proceedings could rightly be the subject matter of criminal prosecution and there is no bar. Hence, in this view of the matter, the criminal prosecution launched by Veluchamy by getting registered the F.I.R, cannot be quashed and it could proceed as per law by the police. 8. However, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is worthy of consideration and their grievance should necessarily be remedied as the police was not right in approaching the Magistrate and getting an order so as to get the original receipt from the Sub Court, and taking it for the purpose of comparison etc. The police could not take away the original receipt from the Sub Court even armed with an order of Magistrate for the purpose of comparison. If at all, the police independently de hors the investigation being undertaken by the Sub Court to arrive at the genuineness of the receipt, they should have requested the Sub Court itself to permit the Expert chosen by the police to take photographs of the original document in the Sub Court itself and take such photographs for analysis or at the most, the police could have requested the Sub Court itself to send it to the Government Examiner for comparison and thereafter, get the original document back to the Court itself. Under no circumstances, the investigating agency should have taken into custody the original document. 9. At this juncture, the learned Counsel for the petitioners would highlight that in the same O.S.NO.23 of 2004, the said Veluchamy filed I.A.No.376 of 2005 for sending the document for expert opinion and that I.A was allowed, but before that, the document could be sent for expert opinion, the same Veluchamy had chosen to get the said F.I.R registered by the police and things had taken different shape and the police with the help of the order of the Magistrate took away the original receipt from the Court. 10. As such, I am of the considered view that the Sub Court and the Magistrate Court have not acted properly and they should have thwarted the attempt of the police from taking the original receipt from the Court. 11. Be that as it may, now then, the learned Sub Judge as well as the learned Magistrate shall take steps to see that the original receipt taken from the Court is restored to the file in O.S.No.23 of 2004 immediately. The learned Counsel for the petitioners would air his grievance that by this time, the very receipt taken from the Court might have been changed and the same might not be returned back to the Court. At this stage, no direction could be given based on such an apprehension. It is open for the petitioner to wait and see as to what document is returned back to the Sub Court, Dindigul and thereafter, the petitioners could initiate appropriate action. 12. With the above observation, this petition is closed. Consequently, connected M.P.No.2 of 2007 is closed.