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2007 DIGILAW 228 (MP)

Vrindavan S/o Mathura v. Jaipratap S/o Mahadev

2007-02-26

K.K.LAHOTI

body2007
JUDGMENT K.K. Lahoti, J. 1. This is plaintiffs appeal aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Rewa in Civil Appeal No. 7-A/1986 dated 21-11-1989, by which the judgment and decree passed by IVth Civil Judge Class-II, Rewa in Civil Suit No. 18-A/1981 dated 21-7-1986 was reversed. The Appellate Court while reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissed the suit of appellants. 2. This appeal was admitted on 10-7-1990 on the following substantial question of law: Whether the first Appellate Court was justified in reversing the judgment and decree impugned despite the fact that the judgment debtor Defendant No. 3 Ramkhilawan neither filed any appeal nor made a party to the first appeal? On 6-3-2002 one more substantial question of law was framed which reads thus: Could there be any gift of immovable property in favour of Jaypratap Singh (R-l) without execution of a valid gift-deed attested by two witnesses? 3. This matter was heard and decided on 25-6-2002, but the respondents filed an application for recalling of judgment and decree dated 25-6-2002 on the ground that during the pendency of appeal plaintiff Ramavatar died on 12-1-2001, but without impleading the legal representatives of Ramavatar namely Triveni Singh and Chunni Bai a decree was passed. As a decree was passed against a dead person so the order be recalled. This application was registered as M.C.C. No. 1003/2002 and vide order dated 31-1-2003 the judgment and decree dated 25-6- 2002 were recalled. Thereafter the appellants filed an application I.A.No. 598/2003 and M.(C).P. No. 843/2003 which were heard and decided on 2-5-2003 and this Court allowed the application for substitution of legal representatives of Ramavatar and abatement was set aside. Thereafter the matter is heard afresh. 4. After recalling of order dated 25-6-2002 on 31-1-2003 the respondents filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure on 24-4-2003. Along with the aforesaid application the respondents filed photo copy of gift deed dated Miti Jeth Suti Ekadashi Samvat 2036 (year 1979) and an order dated 10-9-1980 in M.J.C. No. 26/1971 by Second Civil Judge Class-II, Rewa deciding an application under Order 39 Rule 2A of Code of Civil Procedure Code. 5. Along with the aforesaid application the respondents filed photo copy of gift deed dated Miti Jeth Suti Ekadashi Samvat 2036 (year 1979) and an order dated 10-9-1980 in M.J.C. No. 26/1971 by Second Civil Judge Class-II, Rewa deciding an application under Order 39 Rule 2A of Code of Civil Procedure Code. 5. The appellants assailed the judgment and decree passed by the Court below on following grounds: (a) That in case there is no evidence on record showing that the disputed Land Survey Nos. 922 and 924 of village Khadda fell into the share of Mathura. (b) That the admission made in Civil Suit No. 335-A/1980 was wrongly taken into consideration by the Appellate Court. In fact the aforesaid admission was explained by the appellants. Apart from this the parties in previous suit were not the same so the admission is not binding in the present suit. (c) That the respondents had not filed any gift deed before the Court below, in absence of any gift deed the Appellate Court erred in holding that Mathura gifted the property in favour of Jaipratap Respondent No. 1. In absence of any registered document in this regard, the aforesaid findings are perverse. (d) That the application filed by the respondents under Order 41 Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Code, cannot be allowed. There is no explanation for non-filing of aforesaid document before the Courts below. Apart from this the gift deed is on a simple paper, neither registered nor bears any endorsement that the aforesaid gift was accepted by Jaipratap, in absence of which the document neither can be admitted in evidence nor can be relied on. (e) That another document which is filed is an order dated 10-9-1990 is in respect of proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2-A of Code of Civil Procedure Code, which relates to breach of temporary injunction and finding in the aforesaid proceedings will not affect the merits of the present case. It is submitted that the application under Order 41 Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Code, may be dismissed and this appeal be allowed. 6. The respondents supported the judgment and decree and submitted following contentions: (a) That there is an admission on behalf of appellants in Civil Suit No. 335-A/1980 in which appellants admitted the fact that the disputed land fell into the share of Mathura who was plaintiff in that suit. 6. The respondents supported the judgment and decree and submitted following contentions: (a) That there is an admission on behalf of appellants in Civil Suit No. 335-A/1980 in which appellants admitted the fact that the disputed land fell into the share of Mathura who was plaintiff in that suit. (b) That the admission is binding on the appellants and they cannot take a different plea. (c) That the Appellate Court has rightly considered the aforesaid admission and has recorded a finding that in view of aforesaid admission the plaintiffs cannot take any different plea. (d) Apart from this there is no evidence in the case that the disputed lands were not partitioned in the earlier partition between the parties and in absence of this the plea of defendants was reliable that the aforesaid land fell into the share of Mathura in earlier partition. (e) That Mathura gifted the property by gift deed and this fact was not in dispute and on the basis of aforesaid gift deed name of respondent Jaipratap was mutated in the revenue records. (f) That the gift deed could not be produced before the Court below and has been filed in the present appeal along with the application under Order 41 Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Code. That only after framing the second substantial question of law the gift deed has been filed. The gift deed is necessary for the just decision of the case and the documents filed by the respondents along with an application under Order 41 Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Code, may be received in evidence. It is submitted by the respondents that the present appeal has no substance and may be dismissed. 7. To appreciate the rival contention of the parties, it would be appropriate to refer the pleadings. The parties are closely related to each other. The family tree is as under: The suit was filed by Vrindawan, Ramsunder, Rajrup, Ramavatar, Jamuna, and Dadua. Initially Ramkhilawan was plaintiff, but subsequently he was made defendant by filing an application under Order 1 Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure Code, by the plaintiffs and on 3-3-1982 the aforesaid application was allowed by the trial Court and Ramkhilawan was transposed as defendant on the same day. By the same application Mahadev was also impleaded as defendant. Initially Ramkhilawan was plaintiff, but subsequently he was made defendant by filing an application under Order 1 Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure Code, by the plaintiffs and on 3-3-1982 the aforesaid application was allowed by the trial Court and Ramkhilawan was transposed as defendant on the same day. By the same application Mahadev was also impleaded as defendant. The dispute is in respect of Land Survey No. 922 area 0.47 acres and Survey No. 924 area 2.27 acres of village Khadda, Tehsil Sirmour. The plaintiff pleaded that the aforesaid land belongs to the plaintiffs and of Mathura. The disputed lands were a garden and except these disputed lands other lands were partitioned between the brothers and since then they are in possession of the property, but on the disputed land all are irt joint possession. That Mathura got mutated the name of Jaipratap on 24-3-1980 on the basis of a gift deed. This mutation was effected by the Patwari without any intimation to the plaintiff. No notice was published in the village and by playing fraud the defendants have got mutated name of Jaipratap on the aforesaid land. That the defendants are trying to dispossess the plaintiffs on the aforesaid ground so it was prayed that the aforesaid mutation be declared as null and void. On the aforesaid ground the suit was filed. 8. The defendants filed the written statement and contested the suit on merits. The defendant Jaipratp, Mahadev and Ramkhilawan filed separate written statements. The defendant Jaipratap stated that the aforesaid land belongs to Mathura Singh and were not joint lands though before the partition in the family it was joint land. Before 35 years of filing of the suit there was a partition between the plaintiff and Mathura Singh. At the time of partition Mathura Singh and defendant Mahadev were joint. The Defendant No. 1 was serving Mathura and by gift deed name of Defendant No. 1 Jaipratap was got mutated by Mathura in the revenue papers. This fact was well within the knowledge of plaintiffs and a public notice was also issued in this regard. In additional pleas Jaipratap has pleaded that before 35 years the properties were partitioned and after the partition Mahadev and Mathura were residing jointly. Mahadev was taking care of Mathura by food and clothes. Mahadev gifted the land in favour of Jaipratap. In additional pleas Jaipratap has pleaded that before 35 years the properties were partitioned and after the partition Mahadev and Mathura were residing jointly. Mahadev was taking care of Mathura by food and clothes. Mahadev gifted the land in favour of Jaipratap. hat Mathura filed a civil suit before the 4th Civil Judge Class-II in which except Vrindawan others admitted the plaint. Defendant Mahadev also filed similar written statement with the same additional pleas. The defendant Ramkhilawan also supported the plaintiff by filing similar written statement. 9. The trial Court framed issues and after recording evidence arrived at following findings: (i) That the disputed Land Survey Nos. 922 and 924 belongs to the plaintiff, (ii) The admission in Civil Suit No. 335-A/1990 has been explained by the plaintiff on the ground that no relief was sought by Mathura against these persons so the written statement of admission was filed, but in fact the aforesaid land was not and cannot be treated that of defendant exclusively. (iii) That in the revenue papers these lands are recorded jointly in the name of plaintiffs and defendants and all are having equal shares. (iv) That the mutation order has been passed on the basis of gift deed, but no gift deed or patta was filed in favour of Jaipratap. The plaintiffs were not parties in the mutation proceedings, nor any notice was issued to them. (v) That at the time of death of Mathura his son Vrindawan, Mahadev were joint and after 3 years of his death there was a partition by Vrindawan and Mahadev. On recording following finding the trial Court found that: (a) the disputed land belongs to the plaintiff and they are in possession of the aforesaid land. (b) That the mutation in favour of Jaipratap and Mahadev is null and void. With the aforesaid findings the trial Court decreed the suit of plaintiffs/appellants. 10. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree the respondent preferred an appeal. The Appellate Court reconsidered the matter and recorded following findings: (1) That the Civil Suit No. 335-A/80 was filed by Mathura Singh and after his death Mahadev Singh, Vrindavan and Shyamabai were substituted. The suit was filed against Sukhinandan, Ramdas, Shobnath Singh, Gaya Singh, Ramkripal Singh, Hanuman Singh, Ramavatar (Plaintiff No. 4) Rajrup (Plaintiff No. 3), Dadua (Plaintiff No. 6) Bhagwandin and Jamuna (Plaintiff No. 5). The suit was filed against Sukhinandan, Ramdas, Shobnath Singh, Gaya Singh, Ramkripal Singh, Hanuman Singh, Ramavatar (Plaintiff No. 4) Rajrup (Plaintiff No. 3), Dadua (Plaintiff No. 6) Bhagwandin and Jamuna (Plaintiff No. 5). The aforesaid dispute was in respect of disputed lands of this suit. Mathura Singh pleaded in Civil Suit No. 335-A/1980 that he got these lands in mutual partition and is in possession as owner. That settlement patta was in the name of all six brothers, but the land fell into exclusive share of Mathura and he is in possession of the land. In para 11 it was pleaded that Defendant Nos. 7 to 13 (his brothers, present plaintiffs) are not interfering in the possession nor they have denied their tide, but to avoid any objection in future they were made party. (2) In the aforesaid suit Defendant Nos. 7, 9, 10 and 11 filed a written statement D-l in which the plaint was admitted. The aforesaid admission was made by Ramavatar Plaintiff No. 4, Bhagwandin (now died), Dadua Plaintiff No. 6 and Jamuna Plaintiff No. 5. On the basis of aforesaid admission the Appellate Court found that the aforesaid admission is binding on the plaintiffs. (3) The Appellate Court also considered the explanation of plaintiffs and recorded finding that merely no relief was sought against defendants, plaintiffs herein, and because of this they admitted the allegations of plaint will not be round, not to consider the aforesaid admission. Until and unless previous admission is withdrawn successfully, then it is binding on the plaintiffs. Though Rajrup (Plaintiff No. 3) had not made admission, but he is not appearing in the present suit to contend that he opposed the suit of Mathura, Vrindawan was substituted after the death of Mathura, so he is bound with the allegations in the plaint. On the basis of aforesaid the Appellate Court recorded a finding that in the partition between the brothers the disputed lands fell into the exclusive share of Mathura and he was exclusive owner. (4) In para 14 the appellate Court considered the plea of appellants that these lands were not partitioned in the previous partition and were kept as joint lands. The Appellate Court found that in this regard there are no pleadings by the plaintiffs and the evidence adduced in absence of the pleadings cannot be accepted. (4) In para 14 the appellate Court considered the plea of appellants that these lands were not partitioned in the previous partition and were kept as joint lands. The Appellate Court found that in this regard there are no pleadings by the plaintiffs and the evidence adduced in absence of the pleadings cannot be accepted. So far as the revenue record khasra Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-3 are concerned, the Appellate Court found that though the aforesaid lands are recorded as joint lands but on the basis of evidence adduced by the defendants, these documents are rebutted. That there was partition between the brothers in which these lands fell into the share of Mathura. Looking to the area of land in dispute, the aforesaid land cannot be partitioned amongst 6 brothers. That the lands were gifted by Mathura in favour of Jaipratap and on the basis of this his name was recorded in the revenue papers. Vrindawan separated himself after taking share from Mathura and was residing separately and he cannot challenge the gift by Mathura in favour of Jaipratap. Recording aforesaid findings the appellate Court found that infact the lands belonged to Mathura who got these lands in partition and thereafter gifted these lands to Jaipratap and dismissed the suit of appellants. 11. In this case, the plaintiffs have filed the suit challenging the mutation order in favour of Jaipratap. The case of plaintiff is that the aforesaid land is joint land of plaintiffs and mutation order in favour of Jaipratap was null and void. Firstly, this question may be seen whether the mutation order effected in favour of Jaipratap on the strength of gift deed was valid in law or not. The aforesaid mutation was effected because of gift made by Mathura in favour of Jaipratap. From the perusal of record it is apparent that no such gift deed was produced before the Court below. For the first time before this Court the aforesaid gift deed has been produced along with an application under Order 41, Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Code. From the perusal of gift deed filed before this Court it is apparent that it is on a simple paper, neither on stamp nor registered. Sections 122 and 123 of Transfer of Property Act, (hereinafter referred to as 'Act' for short) provides gift and the manner in which gift is to be made. From the perusal of gift deed filed before this Court it is apparent that it is on a simple paper, neither on stamp nor registered. Sections 122 and 123 of Transfer of Property Act, (hereinafter referred to as 'Act' for short) provides gift and the manner in which gift is to be made. For ready reference Sections 122 and 123 of Act are quoted as under: 122. "Gift" - "Gift" is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. Acceptance when to be made - Such acceptance must be made during the life time of the donor and while he is still capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void. 123. Transfer how effected - For the purpose of making a gift of immovable property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. For the purpose of making a gift of movable property, the transfer may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered. 12. In this case there is no evidence that the aforesaid gift was accepted on behalf of donee by Mahadev, because at that time Jaipratap was minor and was not in a position to accept the gift. Apart from Section 123 of the Act a "gift" is to be made by a registered instrument and in this case in absence of any registered document as required under Section 123 of the Act the aforesaid "gift" cannot be treated as a. valid gift. The aforesaid document was compulsorily registrable and require stamp duty. In absence of which the document which has been produced before this Court under Order 41 Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Code, cannot be accepted. And the application accordingly in this regard is rejected. 13. The aforesaid document was compulsorily registrable and require stamp duty. In absence of which the document which has been produced before this Court under Order 41 Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure Code, cannot be accepted. And the application accordingly in this regard is rejected. 13. As no document was produced before the Court below and the document which has been produced before this Court has not been admitted in evidence, in absence of which the mutation order effected in favour of respondent Jaipratap was not sustainable under law and the trial Court had rightly set aside the mutation order. 14. Now another question may be seen that whether there is an admission in the previous Suit No. 335A/1980 and the plaintiffs are bound by the aforesaid admission. Except Rajrup or his father Awadh @ Raghuwar, Bhagwandin, Ramavtar, Jamuna, Dadua were party who filed written statement of admission. The plaintiff Vrindawan also succeeded Mathura by substitution and the pleading in the plaint may be treated as an admission on his behalf. 15. Now the question remains whether the pleading in the previous suit may be treated as an admission and on the basis of this whether the suit of plaintiff may be dismissed. The Apex Court in Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil and another, (1977) 2 SCC 49 considered that the admission before being used against any person must not only be proved, but also the party must be confronted at the stage of cross-examination with its previous admission. For ready reference certain paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under: 15. The decision of this Court in Bharat Singh's case is that: Admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them. Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. Admissions proved are said in the decision to be admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether the party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. 16. Admissions proved are said in the decision to be admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether the party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. 16. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent even though not confronted with the admission would be bound by his admissions and the appellant would be entitled to rely on the admissions as admissible. There is the observation in the very next sentence in the aforesaid decision of this Court that "the purpose of contradicting the witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission". It, therefore, follows that admission is relevant and it has to be proved before it becomes evidence. 17. If admission is proved and if it is thereafter to be used against the party who has made it the question comes within the provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. The provisions in the Indian Evidence Act that 'admission is not conclusive proof are to be considered in regard to two features of evidence. First, what weight is to be attached to an admission? In order to attach weight it has to be found out whether the admission is clear, unambiguous and is relevant piece of evidence. Second, even if the admission is proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act and if it is to be used against the party who has made it, "it is sound that if a witness is under cross-examination on oath, he should be given an opportunity, if the documents are to be used against him, to tender his explanation and to clear up the point of ambiguity or dispute. This is a general salutary and intelligible rule" (See Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit). The Judicial Committee in that case said, "it has to be observed with regret and with surprise that the general principle and the specific statutory provisions have not been followed". The general principle is that before any person is to be faced with any statement he should be given an opportunity to see that statement and to answer the same. The Judicial Committee in that case said, "it has to be observed with regret and with surprise that the general principle and the specific statutory provisions have not been followed". The general principle is that before any person is to be faced with any statement he should be given an opportunity to see that statement and to answer the same. The specific statutory provision is contained in Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act that "A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him". Therefore, a mere proof of admission, after the person whose admission it is alleged to be has concluded his evidence, will be of no avail and cannot be utilised against him. 16. In this case the plaint and written statement of previous suit were not proved by the respondents in accordance with law. Apart from this the aforesaid admission has been explained by the plaintiffs that in the previous suit, no relief was sought against the plaintiffs, so the aforesaid written statement was filed by the plaintiffs to support Mathura. This explanation has been considered by the trial Court and found that the aforesaid explanation is acceptable and found admission explained. When an explanation is made in respect of admission, then it does not bind a party to whom it amounts to estoppel. The aforesaid admission has to be determined by keeping in view the circumstances in which it was made and to whom it was made. Recently the Apex Court in Rakesh Wadhawan and Ors. v. Jagdamba Industrial Corporation and Ors. (2002) 5 SCC 440 held thus: The Appellate Authority, in arriving at a finding to the contrary, was deeply impressed by the fact that in the family litigation for partition of the property, the plaintiffs therein had alleged rate of rent of these premises as Rs. 1800 p.m. and this averment was not disputed by the landlord herein, who was one of the defendants therein. The Appellate Court overlooked some very relevant facts. 1800 p.m. and this averment was not disputed by the landlord herein, who was one of the defendants therein. The Appellate Court overlooked some very relevant facts. The plaintiffs in the partition suit were not the landlords realizing the rent; that was the landlord herein who was realizing the rent from the tenants. By an interim order the Civil Court had restrained the tenants from making payment of rent to the litigating parties and had directed the rent to be deposited in the Court so as to be available for distribution to the party found entitled at the end to release of the rent. The written statement filed in the civil suit by the plaintiff landlord herein did not contain any admission as such; there was a mere failure to object. In that suit, rent payable by the tenants herein was not a subject-matter of controversy; it was a side issue. Admission is only a piece of evidence and can be explained; it does not conclusively bind a party unless it amounts to an estoppel. Value of an admission has to be determined by keeping in view the circumstances in which' it was made and to whom. A mere failure to object cannot be placed on a footing higher than an admission. If the two clear-cut admissions made by the tenants, referred to hereinabove, were to be weighed against the landlord's mere failure to object about a wrong averment as to rate of rent in a case where it was not a point in issue, then no interference other than the one of the rate of rent being Rs. 2000 p.m. could have been drawn. To that extent, the finding arrived at by the Appellate Authority suffers from perversity and should have been set aside by the High Court even in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. On the material available on record, no inference other than the rent of the suit premises being Rs. 2000 p.m., excluding water and electricity charges, can be drawn. We hold it accordingly. (Emphasis supplied) In this case it is apparent that the admission was properly explained by the plaintiffs and it was accepted by the trial Court. Apart from this one factual position remains uncontroverted. The previous Suit No. 335-A/1980 was filed by Mathura, against only other defendants and present plaintiffs were only proforma party. We hold it accordingly. (Emphasis supplied) In this case it is apparent that the admission was properly explained by the plaintiffs and it was accepted by the trial Court. Apart from this one factual position remains uncontroverted. The previous Suit No. 335-A/1980 was filed by Mathura, against only other defendants and present plaintiffs were only proforma party. Mathura specifically pleaded that no relief was prayed against these persons and only they were made party to avoid any future complications. In the aforesaid circumstances, if such admission was made, then it was properly explained by the plaintiffs and if the trial Court after due appreciation of evidence found that the aforesaid admission has been properly explained, no fault is found. The Appellate Court only considered the pleadings in reference to the parties of previous suit. When Rajrup was not party in the previous suit how this admission may bind him. Vrindawan was substituted after the death of Mathura, he has appeared as witness in the suit. There was no admission by Rajrup in the matter. In the present case the matter has to be decided on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties. The Appellate Court apparently erred in presuming that Rajrup had not contested the case of Mathura, then he is bound by the pleading of the previous suit. The aforesaid findings of Appellate Court is apparently erroneous and are not sustainable under law. 17. As stated hereinabove in the present case there is no evidence that in partition this land fell into the share of Mathura. Khasra entries which are placed on record as Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 clearly shows that the aforesaid land continued to be recorded as joint land of both the parties. Ex.P-3 is the khasra entry of the year 1978-79 which affirmed the contention of appellant. When this land fell into the share of Mathura in the partition then why these lands continued in joint name of both the parties has not been explained by the defendants, which fact also goes against the defendants. 18. In the plaint only prayer was made to set aside the mutation entry and the mutation of land in the name of Jaipratap. Previous to it all the lands were recorded in the name of all the brothers of plaintiffs and the aforesaid mutation was effected on the strength of gift deed by Mathura in favour of Jaipratap. 18. In the plaint only prayer was made to set aside the mutation entry and the mutation of land in the name of Jaipratap. Previous to it all the lands were recorded in the name of all the brothers of plaintiffs and the aforesaid mutation was effected on the strength of gift deed by Mathura in favour of Jaipratap. The revenue authorities without issuing any notice to the plaintiffs mutated the aforesaid lands in the name of Jaipratap, which were in the name of all the plaintiffs. The aforesaid gift deed was not admissible in evidence and the revenue authorities apparently erred in directing mutation in favour of Defendant No. 1. 19. In view of aforesaid discussion the suit of plaintiffs deserves to be decreed and accordingly following decree is passed in favour of plaintiffs: (1) That the suit of plaintiffs is decreed and the mutation order in respect of Land Survey Nos. 922 and 924 of village Khadda dated 24-3-1980 is declared null and void and the revenue authorities are directed to restore the entries which were in existence prior to 24-3-1980. (2) Costs of this litigation shall be borne by the respondents. Counsel fee Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only). Order accordingly.