JUDGMENT 1. - This is a thoroughly misconceived writ petition filed by the petitioner. The petitioner was serving as an Associate Professor in the respondent No. 1 Institute. He tendered his resignation and even though the same was not withdrawn before it was accepted, he subsequently made an attempt to back out from the aforesaid resignation on the quise that the same was taken from him under duress and forced and, therefore, the respondent No. 1 Institute should riot act upon such resignation and should allow him to serve on the aforesaid post. In the prayer clause, the declaration is sought to the effect that it may be held that the resignation letter given by the petitioner is not a resignation letter and that the same was not submitted under free will and that the respondent No. 1 should ignore the said resignation. 2. The petitioner, at the relevant time, was serving as an Associate Professor in the respondent No. 1 Institute. Initially the petitioner joined one Dr. V.N. Sharma and Mrs. Alka Kurup as respondent No. 2 and 3, who were his colleagues in the Institute, as it was the allegation of the petitioner that because of their force and coercion, he had tendered resignation. Respondent No. 3 is served, but no appearance has been made on his behalf. Though the matter is pending since more than a caded, notice on the respondent No. 2 has not been served for one reason or the other. However, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 Institute submits that since the relief is claimed only against the respondent No. 1, the matter may be decided even without appearance on behalf of the respondent No. 2 and 3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, respondent No. 3 is in USA and address of the respondent No. 2 is not known. Under these circumstances, the matter is taken up today for final hearing on merits, though learned counsel for the petitioner submits that notices to respondents No. 2 and 3 may be awaited, for which he has also filed an application. Under these circumstances, the matter is taken up today for final hearing on merits, though learned counsel for the petitioner submits that notices to respondents No. 2 and 3 may be awaited, for which he has also filed an application. But in my view, considering the fact that the matter is pending since 1996, it would not be just and proper to keep the matter pending for long time as the respondent No. 1 is the main party, which has accepted the resignation and the respondent No. 2 and 3 cannot be said to be necessary party, for which matter is required to be further delayed, therefore, the matter is now being decided finally by hearing learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. 3. The petitioner was appointed in the respondent No. 1 Institute as Lecturer and he was subsequently promoted as Associate Professor. The petitioner decided to suit the said post by sending resignation dated 09.05.1996. The petitioner has not placed a copy of the said resignation letter on record, but it has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that it was mentioned in the resignation letter that same may come into effect from 17.05.1996. The respondent No. 1 has also not produced the said resignation letter on record, however, the petitioner has placed on record a copy of the letter of acceptance of the resignation, which is dated 10.05.1996 and the same is placed as Annexure-11 in the compilation. In the said acceptance letter, it has been mentioned that the resignation of the petitioner dated 09.05.1996 has been accepted and it has been decided to relieve him from service w.e.f. 17.05.1996 has been accepted and it has been decided to relieve him from service w.e.f. 17.05.1996. The said communication was sent to the petitioner by the Registrar. The petitioner thereafter started making representation by way of writing letters to the effect that such resignation was not given under free will, but was given under coercion of respondent No. 2 and 3, who were his colleagues at the relevant time and that he was forced to resign because of the same. The petitioner thereafter started making representation by way of writing letters to the effect that such resignation was not given under free will, but was given under coercion of respondent No. 2 and 3, who were his colleagues at the relevant time and that he was forced to resign because of the same. A request was thereafter made to allow him to resume his duties and since the respondent No. 1 did not permit the petitioner to resume his duties in view of his resignation, he approached this court by invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing this writ petition. 4. In the writ petition, various correspondences have been produced by the petitioner showing that he approached the respondent No. 1 Institute from time to time to allow him to resume his duties by treating his resignation as forced resignation and that the same was not given under free will. This writ petition has been resisted by the respondent No. l by filing reply, which is finding place at page No. 96 in the compilation. In the reply, the allegations made against the respondent No. 2 and 3 have been denied and it is denied that the resignation was required to be given by the petitioner because of coercion or threat given by the respondent No. 2 and 3. Averments in respect of the aforesaid denial are finding place in para 6, 7 and 8 of the writ petition. In para 12 of the reply, it has been pointed out that in fact Mrs. Alka Kurup, respondent No. 3 in the writ petition, has filed a police complaint against the petitioner recording outraging her modesty, wherein the police has submitted a charge-sheet against the petitioner under Sections 323 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code. In this behalf, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was convicted only under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code and was given benefit of Probation of Offenders Act. Be that as it may, that aspect of the matter is not relevant in the present controversy. It is not in dispute that the resignation was given on 09.05.1996, which was accepted by the respondent No. 1 Institute w.e.f. 17.05.1996. The petitioner thereafter went on making correspondences to allow him to withdraw his resignation of the ground that the same was given under coercion and threat. It is not in dispute that the resignation was given on 09.05.1996, which was accepted by the respondent No. 1 Institute w.e.f. 17.05.1996. The petitioner thereafter went on making correspondences to allow him to withdraw his resignation of the ground that the same was given under coercion and threat. Alongwith the affidavit in reply, a letter written by the petitioner to the Registrar dated 19.06.1996 has been placed on record as Annexure R-1-8, wherein the petitioner even informed the Registrar that he will be vacating the staff quarter by 7th may, 1996 and requested that he should be given time for vacating the same and subsequently, he vacated the quarter also. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submits that the petitioner was forced to resign as he was subjected to torture by respondent No. 2 and 3. He further submits that when a resignation is given under duress and force, it cannot be treated as voluntary resignation and, therefore, the respondent No. l Institute should be directed to reinstate petitioner in service ignoring such resignation. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that since the resignation was accepted by the Registrar, it was no acceptance in the eye of law. He further submits that since respondent No. 2 and who were also joined as party respondent and even respondent No. 3 was served at notice stage, yet no reply has been filed on their behalf, therefore, the allegations of the petitioner have remained uncontroverted so far as the respondent No. 2 and 3 are concerned. It is submitted that in view of the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the. resignation given by the petitioner cannot be treated as a valid resignation as per law. He also submits that the petitioner was a victim of circumstances and from time to time he made various representations, still the respondent No. l did not allow hire to withdraw his resignation nor he was allowed to serve the Institute. He, therefore, submits that it is a case of humiliation of the petitioner by the respondent No. 1 Institute and his colleagues, i.e. respondent No. 2 and 3 and under these circumstances, it may be held that the resignation was tendered by the petitioner under duress and force and the same should be treated as null and void. He, therefore, submits that it is a case of humiliation of the petitioner by the respondent No. 1 Institute and his colleagues, i.e. respondent No. 2 and 3 and under these circumstances, it may be held that the resignation was tendered by the petitioner under duress and force and the same should be treated as null and void. It is the say of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondents No. 2 and 3 were instrumental in seeing that the petitioner resigns from service. 6. In response to the said arguments, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 Institute submits that the writ petition is absolutely misconceived and whether the resignation is given under duress or otherwise, cannot be decided by this court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as such disputed question cannot be decided by this court in a writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 further submits that for deciding the controversy involved in the present case, the respondents No. 2 and 3 are not the necessary parties as ultimately the resignation was accepted by the respondent No. 1 Institute and the dispute is only between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 and the petitioner has not made any prayer against the respondent No. 2 and 3, therefore, this matter can be decided after hearing the respondent No. 1 and non-filing of reply by respondents No. 2 and 3 cannot be said to be relevant factor in deciding the controversy in question. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that the resignation in question was not accepted by the Registrar, in fact, the Registrar has merely communicated the decision taken by the Board of the respondent No. 1 as he has clearly stated in the letter of acceptance dated 10.05.1996 that he was directed to inform the petitioner that his resignation has been accepted and, therefore, he sent the said communication. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 further submits that the petitioner has never tried to withdraw his resignation at any point of time till he was communicated the decision of acceptance of his resignation and he was relieved on 17.05.1996. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 further submits that the petitioner has never tried to withdraw his resignation at any point of time till he was communicated the decision of acceptance of his resignation and he was relieved on 17.05.1996. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that since even a case was filed by the respondent No. 3 against the petitioner, he ultimately decided to quit and tendered his resignation. Learned counsel for the respondent No. l further submits that the petitioner in fact subsequently vrote a letter to the Registrar submitting that he would be vacting his staff quarter within a short time and therein he has made no complaint that he as required to tender resignation under duress of force. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, therefore, submits that this writ petition is absolutely misconceived and requires to be dismissed. 7. I have heard both learned counsels at length and gone through the averments made in the writ petitions and affidavit in reply and the documents produced therewith. In my view, the following factual aspects are not in dispute : (a) That the petitioner gave resignation on 09.05.1996. (b) That by a letter dated 10.05.1996, he was informed that his resignation is accepted and he will be relieved w.e.f. 17.05.1996. (c) That the petitioner did not made any attempt to withdraw his resignation by writing any letter till he was relieved from service, i.e. till 17.05.1996. (d) That the petitioner subsequently wrote a letter to the Registrar requesting him to allow him some time to vacate the quarter and he subsequently vacated the quarter. 8. Considering the aforesaid factual aspects, the question whether the resignation was given under duress or force is of no importance as the petitioner has admittedly never written any letter withdrawing the said resignation before the same was accepted by the respondent No. 1 Institute and he was relieved from service. So far as the aspect of acceptance of resignation is concerned, it is the respondent No. 1 who was required to accept the same and so far as the respondent No. 2 and 3 are concerned, even if the petitioner has any grievance against them, they had no say so far as the question of acceptance of resignation is concerned. So far as the aspect of acceptance of resignation is concerned, it is the respondent No. 1 who was required to accept the same and so far as the respondent No. 2 and 3 are concerned, even if the petitioner has any grievance against them, they had no say so far as the question of acceptance of resignation is concerned. The petitioner has not made may allegation against the respondent No. 1 Institute or its officers and the allegations are made by the petitioner only against the respondent No. 2 and 3 by stating that the resignation was given because of duress and force of respondents No. 2 and 3. In my view, it is impossible to accept such bald assertions made on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner when admittedly the petitioner save his resignation, which was accepted by the letter dated 10.0.1996 and ultimately the petitioner handed over the charge on 17.05.1996 and in between not a single letter was written by the petitioner to the respondent No. 1 that now there is a change of mind and he is withdrawing his resignation. In that view of the matter, the say of the petitioner that the resignation was given under duress and force is clearly an after thought as the petitioner wanted to back out from his resignation. This Court while deciding a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot decide such highly disputed question of fact as to whether the resignation was given under duress and force or whether it was given under free will. However, as pointed out earlier, it is not in dispute that the petitioner after tendering his resignation, has never made attempt to withdraw the same before it was accepted. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C. Ravichandran lyer v. Justice A.M. Bttattacharjee & Ors., reported in Judgments Today 1995 (6) SCC 339 : [1995(7) SLR 161 (SC)] . 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C. Ravichandran lyer v. Justice A.M. Bttattacharjee & Ors., reported in Judgments Today 1995 (6) SCC 339 : [1995(7) SLR 161 (SC)] . So far as the aforesaid case is concerned, it was a public interest litigation filed by an Advocate by filing writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before tite Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein a prayer was made for restraining the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa, Bombay Bar Association and the Advocates' Association of Western India, coercing Justice A.M. Bhatttacharjee to resign from the office as Judge. He also prayed for an investigation through Central Bureau of Investigation. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that after proper verification regarding the allegation auainst a judge of High Court or Chief Justice of the High Court, a complaint should be made. It has been held that in case the allegations are against the Chief Justice of the High Court, Bar should bring such complaint directly to the notice of the Chief Justice of India. So far as the issue in the present case is concerned, it has nothing to do with the said case as here in the present case, the issue involved is whether the petitioner who has required from service can ask for any declaration to the effect that the resignation should be treated as null and void as the same was given under duress. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. on the other hand, relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chand Mal Chaval v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2006) 10 SCC 258 : [ 2006(6) SLR 60 (SC)] . In the a oresaid decision, it has been held by the Supreme Court that once the resignation has been accepted, the appellant could not have claimed for a right of re-employment and no writ of mandamus can be issued for such re- employment. So tar as the law regarding resignation is concerned, now it is well-settled that the resignation can be withdrawn before it is accepted. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner himself tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the respondent No. 1 and not only that. So tar as the law regarding resignation is concerned, now it is well-settled that the resignation can be withdrawn before it is accepted. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner himself tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the respondent No. 1 and not only that. he even handed over his charge thereafter and when subsequently, he tried to make out a case that the resignation was given under duress and therefore, the same should be treated as null and void. The petitioner is very highly qualified person as he was serving as Associate Professor and, therefore, it can be presumed that he was aware about the consequences of such resignation and with open eyes he tendered such resignation and, thereafter tried to back out from the same at a subsequent stage when the resignation was accepted by respondent No. 1. Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, this court cannot give a declaration to the effect that the resignation given by the petitioner be treated as null and void and that it was given under duress and force. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, fairly submits that the petitioner is not willing to file any civil suit and the question whether the resignation was given under duress, may be decided in this writ petition. In my view, the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above, clearly shows that the petitioner on his own tendered his resignation to respondent No. 1 and after giving the resignation, he did nothing by writing any letter for withdrawal of the same till he was relieved on 17.05.1996. Not only that, even subsequently the petitioner wrote a letter to the Registrar asking for some time to vacate the quarter, wherein he has not stated that the resionation was given under duress and pressure of the respondent No. 2 and 3. In my view, so far as the respondent No. 2 and 3 are concerned, they are neither necessary party nor proper party so far as the present writ petition is concerned, as they are not the authority who has accepted the resignation of the petitioner and even no prayer has been made against them and the respondent No. 1 in its reply has clearly stated that there is no substance in any of the allegations of the petitioner about duress etc. as the resignation was accepted yby the respondent No. l Institute and thereafter, the petitioner has tried to back out from the same. 12. Considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter, in my view, the petitioner has absolutely no case for the prayer which has been made for directing the respondent No. 1 to reinstate him in service or to treat the resignation as null and void. This court is of course not concerned with any dispute that might have arisen between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 and 3 or the criminal case against the petitioner in connection with the misbehaviour of the petitioner against the respondent No. 3, as the said aspects are not required to be decided by this court. Under these circumstances, I do not find any substance in any of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. This writ petition is absolutely devoid of any merit and the same is dismissed. Notices discharged. No order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******