Judgment 1. These two applications are directed against the order dated 10.5.1996 passed by learned Chief judicial Magistrate, Saran at Chapra, in Mashrakh P.S. case No. 09/96 dated 11.1.1996 whereby and whereunder learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence against the petitioners. 2. An F.I.R. was drawn vide Mashrakh P.S. Case No. 09/96 dated 11.1.96 on the basis of statement of one Babulal Gupta to this effect that on 10.1.1996 at about 4.30 P.M. while he was sitting at his shop, all on a sudden 7-8 motorcycles, on each motorcycle two persons were boarded, who were variously armed with fire arms, stopped there. It has been further alleged that just thereafter Tarkeshuar Singh, petitioner of Cr. Misc. No. 6124/98, son of Ram Bahadur Singh, ordered to shoot him and thereafter Rustam Khan, who is said to be personal body guard of Tarkeshwar Singh, fired upon Shatrughan Prasad, brother of the informant, and, as such, Shatrughan fell down. Just thereafter it has further been alleged that Deo Nath Rai, petitioner of Cr. Misc. No. 3193/99, and Munna Singh lifted his brother, who along with Jitendra Singh, Sanjeev Kumar and 7-8 unknown persons, whom the informant is said to have identified, proceeded to flee away in the direction of Mashrakh. The occurrence was seen by witnesses Raj Narain Singh, Dr. Satyendra Kumar Sharma, Quamuddin Khan and Baban Sah. Annexure-2 of the petition is supervision note of Dy. 5.P., who seems to have made supervision in presence of other police officials. From this annexure it appears that the informant Babulal Gupta has supported his earlier version rather by giving a graphic account of events has clearly stated about participation of Tarkeshwar Singh and Deo Nath Rai and others. Similarly, Quamuddin whose name also fall in the fardbeyan of the informant, has supported the occurrence. Another witness Baban Sah has also supported the factum of allegation as stated in the fardbeyan. Prem Kumar Gupta, another witness, has also joined the informant and aforesaid witnesses. Of course some of the witnesses, in such supervision, has not stated about participation of the aforesaid petitioners or their persons. 3. Learned Chief judicial Magistrate, Chapra, while passing impugned order has recorded that chargesheet under Secs. 364,302,201/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 27 of the Arms Act has been received against accused persons cited in Column-3 of the chargesheet. Of course some of the witnesses, in such supervision, has not stated about participation of the aforesaid petitioners or their persons. 3. Learned Chief judicial Magistrate, Chapra, while passing impugned order has recorded that chargesheet under Secs. 364,302,201/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 27 of the Arms Act has been received against accused persons cited in Column-3 of the chargesheet. He heard learned A.P.P. and perused the contents of the case diary and other materials on record and passed cognizance order. He referred contents of the case diary in paragraphs 35,36,37, 43,56 wherefrom he arrived at his conclusion that prima facie case against Tarkeshwar Singh, Munna Singh and one Deo Nath Rai and Rustam Khan for offence under Secs. 364, 302, 201/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 27 of the Arms Act was made out but he bifurcated the investigation against Sanjeev and Jitendra, against whom investigation was shown to be pending and, so, he passed order by spliting case of accused Sanjeev and Jitendra against the aforesaid four accused persons and passed order of cognizance. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners, learned Counsel for the informant and learned A.A.G. 11 for the State have been heard. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners Sri S.B.K. Manglan has relied upon several case laws but it would not be relevant to deal with the said decisions at this juncture keeping in view the fact that main emphasis was given on behalf of the petitioners to this effect that learned Magistrate was not within the competence and jurisdiction to pass order in respect of cognizance when investigation was shown to be pending against the aforesaid petitioners, i.e. Tarkeshwar Singh and Deo Nath Rai. According to him, the chargesheet was submitted only against Munna Singh and with regard to other accused persons investigation was shown to be pending. The order of cognizance was brought to the notice of the petitioners in the month of December, 1997 although chargesheet was submitted on 10.5.96. Emphasis has been given to the relevant provisions of sec. 190 Cr.P.C. which is quoted as follows: 190. Cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate - (1) Subject to the provisions of the Chapter, any Magistrate of the 1st Class, and any Magistrate for the second class specially empowered in this behalf under Sub-sec. Emphasis has been given to the relevant provisions of sec. 190 Cr.P.C. which is quoted as follows: 190. Cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate - (1) Subject to the provisions of the Chapter, any Magistrate of the 1st Class, and any Magistrate for the second class specially empowered in this behalf under Sub-sec. (2), may take cognizance of any offence: (a) upon receiving e complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under Sub-sec. (1) of Such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try, So, it has been argued that only after conclusion of investigation order in respect of cognizance should have been passed, before which such order is illegal. 6 In reply, so as to counter aforesaid submission on behalf of the petitioners, learned A.A.G. 11 joined by learned Counsel for the informant have submitted that aforesaid contention of the petitioners is wholly misconceived. The meaning of word cognizance has been settled by the Hon ble Apex Court in the Raghubansh Dubey case, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1967. It means cognizance of the offence not the offenders. They have also referred relevant provisions of Sec. 173(2) Cr.P.C. in support of their contention and according to them even learned Magistrate is entitled to summon additional accused persons against whom he considers that there was good evidence after perusal of the statement recorded by the police u/s. 161 Cr.P.C. and other documents referred to in sec. 173(2) even without examination of witnesses in court. Reliance has alto been placed reported in 2001(6) SCC 670 : AIR 1978 SC 1568 : 2001 (8) SCC 522 . According to their submission, there was no occasion for the investigating agency or even superior police officer to have withheld submission of chargesheet against the petitioners when there was ample material against them and recorded of statement of witnesses u/s. 164 Cr.P.C. The facts which find corroboration in the above-mentioned paragraphs of the impugned order itself. According to their submission, there was no occasion for the investigating agency or even superior police officer to have withheld submission of chargesheet against the petitioners when there was ample material against them and recorded of statement of witnesses u/s. 164 Cr.P.C. The facts which find corroboration in the above-mentioned paragraphs of the impugned order itself. They have also submitted that mere technicalities in the garb of continuance of investigation to frustrate the purpose of law so as to book the culprit and expeditious disposal of the case should not fee come in the way in the given situation with which we are confronted with the present case. In the given situation, even if the police submitted final report against them the Magistrate will not be precluded from passing of the same cognizance order against them, putting them on trial on the basis of the sufficient material, which has been collected in course of investigation. The learned Magistrate, as per their further submissions is within the jurisdiction and domain for taking (sic) order of cognizance of the offence in its entirety not (sic) or splitting of investigation of those accused persons whose complicity as stated in the F.I.R. supported by several witnesses examined in course of investigation (sic). It was not within the competence of police machinery to withheld submission of chargesheet against them on the plea that investigation is pending against them when there was ample material. The Investigating agency was only supposed to collect material and produce the same before cognizance taking Magistrate and it was jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate to decide as to who should be put on trial and who should be left out on the basis of material, so furnished before the learned Magistrate by investigating agency. 7. From the aforesaid discussions, it is apparent that the petitioners are named in the F.I.R., against whom there appears complicity and their involvement and even their plea of alibi is not to be considered at this stage rather such plea should be considered by the competent court of law when witnesses are supposed to face their test of their cross examination and the truth could be elucidated by statement of proper evaluation of their evidences not at this stage. It is not the business of the investigating agency (sic) as to whose statement is correct and which suffers from falsity. 8. It is not the business of the investigating agency (sic) as to whose statement is correct and which suffers from falsity. 8. In the facts and circumstances, there does not appear any illegality or jurisdictional error in the impugned order. Having considered aforesaid facts and circumstances and respective arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, I do feel that such continuance of investigation should not have been shown just to defeat the ends of justice on the pretext of procedural observance of the law. The learned Magistrate has rightly taken cognizance of the offence and within his competence to see as to who should be put on trial and finding sufficient materials in paragraphs 35,36,37,43 and 56 of the case diary which is also apparent even in the form of corroboration of the allegation even from the supervision note of the Superintendent of Police by some of the witnesses cited in the F.I.R. itself. It cannot be said that cognizance order has been passed illegally. In the facts and circumstances, no interference is required in the impugned order. 9. In the result, these applications stand dismissed.