JUDGMENT 1. - The plaintiff-petitioner has challenged the order dated 18.4.2007 whereby his application filed under Order 7 Rule 14(3) CPC to place on record certified copies of the report of handwriting expert and his statement recorded in another suit between the same parties, in relation to the same property was rejected by the trial court. He has also challenged the order dated 18.7.2007 whereby his application filed under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC seeking review of the earlier order was rejected. 2. I have heard Shri Arun Bhandari, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri R.K. Agarwal, the learned counsel for the respondents. 3. Shri Arun Bhandari, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the suit has been filed by the petitioner for cancellation of the sale deed dated 20.11.84 and rent note dated 20.11.1984 primarily on the ground that the plaintiff never executed any such sale deed, nor did he sign any such rent note. His signatures on these two documents are forged. Even otherwise such documents, especially the sale deed, was not admissible in evidence because no stamp duty has been paid thereupon, nor the same has been got registered under the Indian Registration Act. Such document, there#ore, cannot convey any title. It was argued that the necessity to file the suit arose when the defendants tried to obtain lease deed of the disputed property from the Jaipur Development Authority. The plaintiff even filed first information report on 14.4.98 against the defendants on allegation of forgery for offences under Sections 120B, 420, 464, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. However, the police submitted final report on 7.12.1998 and thereafter the petitioner submitted a protest petition on 12.5.99 which was accepted by the trial court and cognizance taken. The defendants are presently facing trial. An application was filed by the plaintiff for taking on record the report of the handwriting expert and his statement recorded in another trial in the suit which was filed by none other than the defendant Smt. Ram Lalli and Shri Radhey Shyam Sharma against the present petitioner as plaintiff. Controversy involved in the earlier suit was the same whether the sale deed dated 20.11.1984 and the rent note dated 20.11.1984 are forged or not. Controversy involved in the earlier suit was the same whether the sale deed dated 20.11.1984 and the rent note dated 20.11.1984 are forged or not. Shri Arun Bhandari while inviting attention to the written statement filed by the plaintiff in the earlier suit argued that a specific objection was raised in the written statement that the aforesaid document i.e. rent note dated 20.11.1984 was forged. Merely because no issue was framed on that respect in that trial did not in any manner dilute the plea. It was argued that since the handwriting expert whose report and statement as Ex.A-43, A-44 and A-45 and Ex.3 in the earlier suit are sought to be placed on record, has already expired, such documents in the shape of certified copies can always be taken in evidence by the Court in the present case by recourse to Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act which permit evidence recorded in another trial to be taken on record subject to fulfillment of certain conditions. Shri Arun Bhandari, learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his arguments relied on the judgments of Sitaji & Ors. v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 601 , Kadiam Paparao v. Siddireddy Satyanarayana & Ors., AIR 1983 A.P. 257 , Chittoor Co-op. Town Bank Ltd. v. T. Krishnaiah Chetty & Anr., AIR 1983 A.P. 259 , Krishnayya Surya Rao Bahadur Garu & Anr. v. Venkata Kumara Mahipathi Surya Rao, Bahadur Garu, Rajah of Pittampur, AIR 1933 PC 202 , Karri Venkata Narasayyamma & Anr. v. Pentapati Venkata Rattamma & Anr., AIR 1957 (AP) 378 , Sarvabhotla Thotapalle Chendikamba : v. Kanala Indrakanti Viswanathamayya & Ors., AIR 1939 (Madras) 446 , Shiv Charan Lal through L.Rs. v. Lakhan Lal & Ors., (2007) WLC (Raj.) UC 540 . Shri Arun Bhandari, argued that certified copies of the documents sought to be placed on record were applied for by the petitioner on 9.2.07 and were obtained on 26.3.2007 from Registry of this Court from records of the Civil First Appeal No. 207/03. He argued that all documents are genuine documents obtained from Court records and since certified copies were received late, they could not be filed earlier. Mere production of these documents would not in any manner cause any prejudice to the defendants because they can always be compensated by payment of reasonable amount as cost. He argued that all documents are genuine documents obtained from Court records and since certified copies were received late, they could not be filed earlier. Mere production of these documents would not in any manner cause any prejudice to the defendants because they can always be compensated by payment of reasonable amount as cost. It was, therefore, prayed that the writ petition be dismissed. 4. Shri R.K. Agrawal, the learned counsel representing the respondents opposed the writ petition and argued that the impugned order by which the application of the petitioner filed under Order 7 Rule 14(3) CPC was rejected is perfectly valid and comprehensive order. The learned trial court rightly, rejected the application because plaintiff-petitioner was allowed number of opportunities to give his evidence. Earlier also he has filed application under Order 7 Rule 14 which was allowed by order dated 26.7 2004 on payment of cost of Rs. 500/- though by that time already three adjournments had been granted to him. He was still thereafter granted many more dates for recording evidence and lastly he concluded his evidence on 8.5.06. On conclusion of the evidence of the defendants, the plaintiff was further allowed various dates for his evidence in rebuttal which was closed on 24.1.2007. Still thereafter he filed another application under Order 7 Rule 14 CPC on 9.2.07. which was allowed on 26.3.2007 on payment of cost of Rs. 1,500/-. It was thereafter when the matter was listed for final arguments on 16.4.07 that he filed yet another application. The learned Appellate Authority was, therefore, perfectly justified in rejecting the application. Shri R.K. Agarwal submitted that the evidence recorded in another case could not be taken into account in arriving at the decision in the present case. In support of his arguments he relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in Mitthulal & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 3 SCC 529 . It was argued that the sole purpose of the petitioner is to unnecessarily delay the completion of the trial and decision in the present case. 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions, perused the material on record and studied the cited case law. 6. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 3 SCC 529 . It was argued that the sole purpose of the petitioner is to unnecessarily delay the completion of the trial and decision in the present case. 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions, perused the material on record and studied the cited case law. 6. What is evident from the above narration and material forming part of the record is that while the present suit has been filed by the petitioner seeking a declaration that he is the owner of the disputed property and, further that the sale deed dated 20.11.1984 is forged and void document and therefore, does not in any manner affect the title of the plaintiff-petitioner and further that the rent note dated 20.11.1984 is also a forged document and that the plaintiff-petitioner cannot be on that basis treated as tenant in his own house. The defendant in the present case had filed the earlier suit against the petitioner herein seeking his ejectment from the disputed premises on the ground that the same was let out to him on monthly rate of Rs. 500 vide rent note dated 20.11.1984 and that he has not paid the amount of rent for last three years and therefore committed the default. The written statement that was filed in that suit by the plaintiff herein has been produced for the perusal of the Court. It would be evident from the written statement that the petitioner herein as defendant in that suit had taken a categorical plea that the alleged rent note executed by the petitioner dated 20.11.1984 was in fact a forged document and that.the petitioner never executed any such document, nor did he ever sign the same and his signatures were also forged. The petitioner was in possession of the plot no. 43 and house was constructed thereupon since April, 1977. Issue no.4 that was framed in the trial of the earlier suit was whether the rent note dated 20.11.1984 was forged and fabricated and that the defendant in that suit (plaintiff herein) did not execute any such rent note, nor did he sign the same and that his signatures have been forged. Another issue at no. Issue no.4 that was framed in the trial of the earlier suit was whether the rent note dated 20.11.1984 was forged and fabricated and that the defendant in that suit (plaintiff herein) did not execute any such rent note, nor did he sign the same and that his signatures have been forged. Another issue at no. 5 was to the effect that whether the defendant in that suit (plaintiff herein) did not take the premises on rent from the plaintiff in that suit (defendants herein) and that he was in possession of the same as its owner and that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between them. The rent note was exhibited in that suit as Exhibit-43. The statement of handwriting expert K. Kumar recorded in that suit as DW-7, the sale deed, the rent note, the sample of the signatures of plaintiff, the report of handwriting expert which were all produced and accepted in that case were sought to be placed in the present case by obtaining certified copies thereof from this Court in the pending first appeal of the petitioner. 7. Arguments that have been advanced by both the parties in support of the impugned order can be divided into two parts. The first argument is that the application was filed belatedly after the earlier two applications to the same effect were filed by the plaintiff and number of adjournments were granted to him to adduce his evidence and also that his evidence in rebuttal was recorded. Secondly, the documents exhibited in another trial and statements recorded therein could not be allowed to be taken on record in the present case which is an altogether different trial. I would however consider the second argument first which is whether the statements recorded and documents exhibited in another trial can be allowed to be taken on record in the present case which is a separate trial. Learned counsel for the petitioner has on this aspect of the matter relied on Section 33 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and various judgments in support of his plea. Learned counsel for the petitioner has on this aspect of the matter relied on Section 33 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and various judgments in support of his plea. He has argued that evidence of handwriting expert K. Kumar and his report exhibited in the earlier trial which in fact was relating to the same disputed property and between the same parties can be taken in evidence in view of Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, particularly when the aforesaid witness Shri K. Kumar has since died and, therefore, it is now not possible for the petitioner to procure his evidence otherwise. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sitaji & Ors., supra was considering the question with regard to admissibility of the ancient entries in the handwriting of father, grand father and great grand ,father of the panjis which have panjikars who are professional genealogists and systematically maintain pedigree tables in the community of Naithal Brahmins. The function of the panjis referred in the judgment is similar to the one of 'Bahl-Bhats' in different part of our State. The Supreme Court held that apart from the entries which were ancient and had come from proper custody and also were admissible under Section 32(2) and 32(6) of the Evidence Act, the evidence of the witness who is dead is proved then it was admissible under Section 33. Krishnayya, supra was a case in which Privy Council for invoking Section 33 of the Evidence Act held that all issues in two proceedings need not be the same and test is that person who tested the evidence was fighting battle for himself and party to later proceedings. The Madras High Court in Sarvabhotla Thotapalle Chendikamba, supra held the statement as to relationship made by a person having special means of knowledge made in prior litigation when the question as to relationship was not in dispute is a statement made ante litem motam and is admissible in subsequent litigation with reference to Section 32(5) of the Evidence Act. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Karri Venkata Narasayyamma, supra held that not only the evidence recorded in a judicial proceeding but also before a person authorised by law to take evidence is relevant in subsequent judicial proceedings or in later stage of some judicial proceedings subject to the conditions mentioned in the provision when the person is dead or cannot be found. Shiv Charan Lal, supra was a case where the plaintiff merely sought to produce certain copies of the court proceedings without getting them formally proved and exhibited in evidence. The Court permitted him to do so with the direction that this would not affect the rights of the parties to address the Court on the question of admissibility or relevancy or otherwise of documents at the time of final disposal. So far as the judgment of Mitthu Lal, supra, cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is concerned, that was a case in which evidence in the cross case was made basis for sustaining the finding of conviction against the accused and in that context the observations were made by the Court that evidence recorded in another case cannot be taken into account in arriving at the decision. The issue as to the fulfillment of conditions of Section 33 was not adverted by the Supreme Court in that case. 8. Section 33 of the Evidence Act provides that evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding, or before any person authorised by law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of proving, in a subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable. This is subject to the proviso that the proceeding in the earlier suit must be between the same parties and that the adverse party in the first proceeding has had the right and opportunity to cross-examine and that the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding. 9. In the instant case, what is not and cannot be disputed is that earlier proceedings were between the same parties as are the parties to the present suit though the difference is that while the plaintiff in the present suit was defendant in the earlier suit and the defendants in the present suit were the plaintiff there. 9. In the instant case, what is not and cannot be disputed is that earlier proceedings were between the same parties as are the parties to the present suit though the difference is that while the plaintiff in the present suit was defendant in the earlier suit and the defendants in the present suit were the plaintiff there. The statements of handwriting expert would have to be seen with reference to the documents which the plaintiff wants to produce in the present case. It is not in dispute that the defendants who were plaintiffs in the s earlier trial have had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. It is also not in dispute that the issues that are involved in the present case are substantially the same as in the earlier trial. The reason that is cited by the plaintiff petitioner for relying on the evidence of the handwriting expert in the earlier trial is that that expert can now no longer be produced in evidence because he is dead. Though this plea is resisted by the defendants respondents on the premise that the evidence of an expert can again be procured by subjecting the very same documents to examination yet again and the plaintiff petitioner having failed to apply for the same cannot be now permitted to rely on the evidence in the earlier suit. But that argument does not. contest the correctness of the proposition that the evidence in the earlier suit on the same subject matter and between the same parties upon fulfillment of the three conditions given in the proviso to Section 33 would be relevant, in the present suit as well because the witness whose statement was recorded is now dead. 10. In my considered view, therefore, when between the same parties in relation to the same disputed property and during the trial of issues which were substantially the same, already evidence of expert witness is recorded, requiring. the parties to again obtain the expert evidence would not be a sound exercise of judicial discretion. 11. 10. In my considered view, therefore, when between the same parties in relation to the same disputed property and during the trial of issues which were substantially the same, already evidence of expert witness is recorded, requiring. the parties to again obtain the expert evidence would not be a sound exercise of judicial discretion. 11. Coming to the next argument that the plaintiff having earlier prayed for and obtained.number of adjournments for producing evidence in main and thereafter evidence in rebuttal should not be allowed to produce the certified copies of the evidence in earlier trial particularly when the matter is fixed for final arguments, on perusal of the impugned I do not find that plaintiff indeed was granted number of adjournments and earlier twice his, application under Order 7 Rule 14 was allowed on payment of cost of Rs. 500/- and Rs. 1,500/- respectively. Now the petitioner merely wants to bring on record the documents in questions with reference to the statement of handwriting expert whom the defendants had the opportunity to cross-examine. The relevancy of those documents not being open to question in view of the discussion made above, merely because of delay in making the application on the part of the plaintiff, permission to take them into consideration cannot be refused particularly when this is the only controversy involved in the suit whether the rent deed and the agreement to sale contained the genuine or forged signature/s of the plaintiff-petitioner. And inconvenience on account of delay 1 caused to the petitioner can be compensated by way of suitable cost. Such cost however has to be exemplary. In the facts of the case even when earlier twice the applications of the plaintiff were allowed under the same provision i.e. under Order 7 Rule 14, since it is third application that was made, ends of justice would be met if the application is allowed subject to the plaintiff 1 petitioner making payment of cost of Rs. 5,000/- to the defendant-non- petitioner before the trial court. 12. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 18.4.2007 and 18.7.2007 are quashed and set aside and the documents referred to supra are allowed to be taken into consideration by the trial court, 2 subject to plaintiff-petitioner making payment of sum of Rs. 5,000/- to the defendant-non-petitioner.Writ Petition Allowed. *******