Judgment :- S.J. Mukhopadhaya, J. In both these writ appeals, as common question of law involved, based on common rules and the respondents being common, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Both the appellants, N.Easwaran and N.Natarajan, who were in the services of the State Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as the Bank), retired on 31st Jan., 1984 and 31st July, 1992 respectively. As per rule 8 (c) of the State Bank of India Employees Pension Fund Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) as was in vogue at the time of their retirement, they having appointed in the service beyond the age of 38 years, were not eligible for admission into the banks pension fund scheme. In the aforesaid background, the appellant, N.Easwaran, preferred W.P. No.6691/96 challenging the validity of 38 years of age of entry into service, as was prescribed under Rule 8 (c). During the pendency of the writ petition, rule 8(c) was amended vide notification No.CDO/ADM/SPL/7597, dated 14th Feb., 1997, enhancing the age of entry into service from 38 years to 48 years for entitlement of pension, but by amendment of Rule 8 (a), it was made applicable only to those, who retired on or after 1st Nov., 1993. In view of amendment to rule 8 (c), a number of retired employees became eligible for pension, i.e., those who were appointed after 38 years of age but prior to 48 years, but it was restricted to those who retired on or after 1st Nov., 1993. Faced with such situation, the appellant, N.Easwaran has also raised question of constitutional validity of cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993, as imposed vide amended rule 8 (a). A separate writ petition was preferred by the appellant, N.Natarajan for extension of benefit of the pension scheme in his favour. Both the aforesaid writ petitions were heard by learned single Judge, separately, and were dismissed by two separate impugned judgments, dated 14th Aug., 2003, in W.P. No.6691/96 (preferred by N.Easwaran) and 16th July, 2004, in W.P. No.693/00 (preferred by N.Natarajan) for common reasons shown therein. 3. The brief facts of the case of the appellants are as follows : The appellant, N.Easwaran, was born on 25th Jan., 1924, and was appointed on 1st Oct., 1962, against a Class IV post of "Mattey", in the pantry of the bank. 3. The brief facts of the case of the appellants are as follows : The appellant, N.Easwaran, was born on 25th Jan., 1924, and was appointed on 1st Oct., 1962, against a Class IV post of "Mattey", in the pantry of the bank. He was confirmed in the services of the bank on 1st Oct., 1963, and finally retired from the post of "Record Keeper" (clerical cadre) on 31st Jan., 1984, on attaining 60 years of age. He served the bank for a period of about 21 years and 4 months and received gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, as also Provident Fund. From the date of birth and appointment of appellant, N.Easwaran, it will be evident that this appellant was appointed in the services of the bank at the age of 38 years and 9 months. Being more than 38 years of age at the time of appointment, admittedly he was not entitled for pension. The other appellant, N.Natarajan, was born on 15th July, 1932. According to him, he was initially appointed as "Messenger" in Tirupur Branch of State Bank of India, but no formal order of appointment was issued for a period of 17 years. Some time on 28th April, 1969, having fell ill, he could not attend the service till 28th Feb., 1970. He rejoined duty in the same branch on 1st March, 1970, but was not paid salary for the period from 1st March, 1969 to 28th Feb., 1970. While in service, the Branch Manager obtained an application on 6th Aug., 1970, and issued a formal order of appointment on 5th Nov., 1970, as a "Godown Watchman". Later on, he was promoted to the post of "Bill Collector" (clerical post); he was elected as General Secretary of the State Bank of India Staff Union, Madras, and finally retired on 31st July, 1992, on attaining the age of 60 years. According to him, he having been initially appointed in the year 1952 (i.e.) 17 years prior to 28th Feb., 1969, was below 38 years of age at the time of original appointment. On the other hand, according to the bank, this appellant, having been appointed by order dated 5th Nov., 1970, was more than 38 years at the time of his original appointment. On the other hand, according to the bank, this appellant, having been appointed by order dated 5th Nov., 1970, was more than 38 years at the time of his original appointment. If the stand taken by the bank is accepted, the appellant, N.Natarajan, being more than 38 years of age at the time of appointment, was also not eligible for the benefit under Rule 8 (c). 4. The questions required to be determined in these appeals are :- i) Whether the cut-off age of 38 years for appointment in service as was prescribed under unamended Rule 8 (c) is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India ? ii) Whether the cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993, prescribed vide impugned amended Rule 8 (a) vide notification dated 14th Feb., 1997, is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India ? 5. For determination of the aforesaid issues, it is desirable to notice and discuss the relevant rules. The Central Board of the Bank, in exercise of powers conferred by Section 50 of the State Bank of India Act, 1955, (Act 23 of 1955), after consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and previous sanction of the Central Government, framed rules, namely, "State Bank of India Employees Pension Fund Rules, 1955", (hereinafter referred to as Rules, 1955) . Under Rule 7, while provision made as to from which date an employee of the bank may become a member of the fund, the ineligibility for membership was prescribed under rule 8, as quoted hereunder :- "8. Save a provided in rule 25, no employee shall be eligible to become a member of the fund -- (a) if he is a member of the Imperial Bank of India Employees Pension and Guarantee Fund or if he is engaged in any country outside India and appointed for service in such country; (b) if he is below 21 years of age; (c) if he is over 38 years of age; or (d) whose service is specially declared by the Bank to be non-pensionable." By separate circular No.PER:29:87 dated 2nd May, 1987 and No.PER/43/88 dated 20th Sept., 1988, under Employees Pension Fund Rules, age for admission, revision of pension, etc., was circulated. A separate family pension and medical benefit scheme was also introduced on 20th Nov., 1996. 6. A separate family pension and medical benefit scheme was also introduced on 20th Nov., 1996. 6. As per original rule, 20 years of service was required for earning pension, but subsequently, for earning minimum pension, the period has been brought down to 10 years of service. When the age of superannuation was 55 years, for the purpose of earning pension under the scheme, maximum age of 35 years was prescribed. Subsequently, age of superannuation having enhanced to 58 years, the maximum age for earning pension was enhanced to 38 years. It appears that the minimum period for earning pension having been brought down to 10 years of service, the respondent issued impugned amendment vide notification dated 14th Feb., 1997, gazetted on 5th April, 1997, amending rule 8 in the following manner :- "2. (a) In rule 8 of the State Bank of India Employees Pension Fund Rules (hereinafter call as Principal Rules), the words and figures "on or after 11. 1993" may be added after the words "member of the fund". (b) In sub-rule (c) of rule 8 of the Principal Rules for figure "38" the figure "48" shall be substituted." 7. In support of first issue whether cut-off age of 38 years as was prescribed in unamended rule 8 (c) is ultra vires Article 14, learned counsel for the appellant contended that such prescription of age has no nexus with the object to achieve and thus it is arbitrary. It was refuted by the counsel for the bank. However, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, as discussed below, and in view of the present amendment to rule 8, it is not necessary to give detailed reasoning for upholding rule 8 (c). .8. In the case of State Bank of India – Vs – Kannaiah & Ors. Reported in AIR 2003 SC 3860 , rule 8 of State Bank of India Employees Pension fund Rules fell for consideration. It was noticed that the minimum age limit under rule 8 (b), which was 21 years, was subsequently reduced to 18 years. Similarly, maximum age limit of 35 years, as was prescribed under rule 8 (c) was enhanced from 35 to 38 years. It was noticed that the minimum age limit under rule 8 (b), which was 21 years, was subsequently reduced to 18 years. Similarly, maximum age limit of 35 years, as was prescribed under rule 8 (c) was enhanced from 35 to 38 years. The Supreme Court observed that the reason for prescribing maximum age limit of 35 or 38 years, as the case may be, was to enable the employee to render minimum service of 20 years as contemplated vide Rule 22 of the Pension Fund Rules. We have already noticed that when 55 years was the age of superannuation, 35 years maximum age limit was prescribed under rule 8 (c) to enable the employee to render atleast 20 years of service. Subsequently, when the age of superannuation was enhanced to 58 years, the maximum age limit of entry into service was enhanced to 38 years for the purpose of pension to enable an employee to complete atleast 20 years of service. Now, in view of the fact that minimum period of service for earning minimum pension has been reduced to 10 years, it appears that the age of entry into service has been enhanced to 48 years. Thus, there being a specific nexus with the minimum period of service to be rendered by an employee of the bank, prescription of 38 years of age in unamended rule 8 (c) cannot be held to be arbitrary. The first issue is accordingly answered in the negative, against the appellant and in favour of the bank. .9. So far as the second issue, i.e., whether the cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993, as introduced vide impugned amendment (dated 14th Feb., 1997), amending rule 8 (a) is arbitrary and ultra vires, for deciding such issue, it is desirable to notice the rival contentions of the parties and certain judgments of this Court and the Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993, has no nexus with the object to achieve and has been introduced in an arbitrary manner in a fortuitous circumstances. On the other hand, according to the counsel for the bank, such cut-off date has some nexus. Inspite of repeated questions, learned counsel for the bank was not in a position to state as to why the cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993 was selected for distinguishing the retired employees of the bank. On the other hand, according to the counsel for the bank, such cut-off date has some nexus. Inspite of repeated questions, learned counsel for the bank was not in a position to state as to why the cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993 was selected for distinguishing the retired employees of the bank. It was merely submitted that the scheme may have been made applicable from 1st Nov., 1993, in other nationalised banks and, therefore, such date has been prescribed, but such submission has no legs to stand in absence of any such pleading or document in support of such stand. The other submission of the counsel for the respondent bank was that the case of the appellant is covered by Supreme Court decision in V.Kasturi – Vs – Managing Director, State Bank of India reported in JT 1998 (7) SCC 147 :: AIR 1999 SC 81 . That was a case in which the employee resigned from the banks service on 31st July, 1984, after completing 20 years and 9 months of pensionable service. Having resigned from service, he was not allowed pension under the Employees Pension Fund Rules. As per old rule 22 (1) (c), an employee, for earning pension, was to serve atleast 25 years in the bank. Subsequently, by an amendment, the eligibility criteria was relaxed with effect from 20th Sept., 1986, prescribing 20 years of pensionable service, irrespective of age. After such amendment, an employee, who resigned more than two years back on 31st July, 1984, claimed for pensionable benefit on the ground that he had completed 20 years of pensionable service. Having noticed that the amended rule 22 (1) (c) came into effect prospectively from 20th Sept., 1986, the Supreme Court held that the employees, who have retired would not become entitled to pension on the basis of the amended rule. 10. In the present case, irrespective of completion of 20 years of service, a class of employees, including the appellants, were ineligible for pension due to maximum age of 38 years prescribed for entry into the service. All of them, including the appellants, were above 38 years of age when they were taken in the regular service of the bank. They were not eligible irrespective of their date of retirement, i.e., whether they retired prior to 1st Nov., 1993, or thereafter. All of them, including the appellants, were above 38 years of age when they were taken in the regular service of the bank. They were not eligible irrespective of their date of retirement, i.e., whether they retired prior to 1st Nov., 1993, or thereafter. The ground for challenge in the present case is that, in view of amended rule 8 (c), though such retired employees, who had completed more than 20 years of service, but were not eligible due to maximum age limit of 38 years as was prescribed, most of them have been made eligible, age of 38 years having been enhanced to 48 years, but due to arbitrary cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993, prescribed vide amended rule 8 (a), others who are similarly situated have been deprived of such benefit, as because they retired prior to 1st Nov., 1993. 11. We have noticed the relevant rules, including the impugned amended rule 8 (a) and rival contentions of both the parties. Similar matter fell or consideration in the case of D.S. Nakara – Vs – Union of India reported in AIR 1983 SC 130 . In the said case, the Supreme Court noticed a memorandum dated 25th May, 1979 and 23rd Sept., 1979, liberalising the form for computation of pension in respect of employees governed by Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1972, who retired on or after 1st March, 1979. The cut-off date of 1st March, 1979, was challenged to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme court dealing with the scope, content and manner of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, held that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, but it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of such legislation. Any order, however, has to pass the test of permissible classification and for that two conditions must be fulfilled, viz., (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group; and (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the statute. The classification may be founded on differential basis according to the object sought to be achieved, but what is implicit in it is that there should be nexus, i.e., casual action between the basis of classification and object of the statute in consideration. Article 14 condemns discrimination, not only by a substantive law, but also be law of procedure. While dealing extensively the circumstances under which reasonable classification can be made, the Supreme Court in the said Nakaras case held that all persons in similar circumstances are to be treated alike, in privilege conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation and there should not be any discrimination between one person and another, if as regards the subject matter of legislation their position is substantially the same. The Court also made the following observation :- "15. Thus the fundamental principle is that Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation which classification must satisfy the twin tests of classification being founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question." That was a case limited to non-contributory pension or retirement pension paid by the Government to its erstwhile employees and the purpose and object underlying it. The Court, while proceeded to examine whether there was any rational behind the eligibility qualification, having noticed that the division which classified pensioners into two classes was not based on any rational principle, the Court held the same discriminatory. The date of retirement having found irrelevant, in Nakaras case, the Supreme Court further held as follows :- "49. ......... The words "who were in service on 31st March, 1979 and retiring from service on or after that date" excluding the date for commencement of revision are words of limitation introducing the mischief and are vulnerable as denying equality and introducing an arbitrary fortuitous circumstance can be served without impairing the formula. Therefore, there is absolutely no difficulty in removing the arbitrary and discriminatory portion of the scheme and it can be easily severed." 12. Therefore, there is absolutely no difficulty in removing the arbitrary and discriminatory portion of the scheme and it can be easily severed." 12. In another case of Dhan Raj – Vs State of J & K reported in AIR 1998 SC 1747 , the Supreme Court noticed that the drivers and conductors in J & K State Road Transport Corporation were entitled to pensionary benefits in terms with the Government Order dated 3rd Oct., 1986 even if they have retired from service of the Corporation prior to 9th June, 1981. Having found no justifiable criteria for the State Government to draw the line between those who retired earlier and those retired after 9th June, 1981, though both such set of employees were equally placed in the same Undertaking/Corporation and all having served in the organisation for more than 20 years, the Supreme Court held that denying such right to such a person, i.e., those who retired before the cut-off date, was without any sound reasoning and any justifiable differentia would be against the spirit of the Constitution. In a recent case of State Bank of India – Vs L.Kannaiah & Ors. reported in AIR 2003 SC 3860 , a circular extending pensionary benefit to security guards of the State Bank of India with effect from 1st Jan., 1965, subject to restriction of age limit of 35 years, which was later extended to 38 years, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court. Having noticed the age limit, which was 35 years and later on enhanced to 38 years and crucial date for admission to pension fund, the Supreme Court held as follows :- "5. It should be noted that the age limit under clause (b) of Rule 8 was reduced to 18 years and the age limit under Clause (c) was increased to 38 years by means of amendments made during the pendency of the writ petition. The Bank issued circular No.68, dated 28th March, 1959 and another staff circular No.69 (date not known) extending the pension fund benefits to certain excluded categories of employees. The ex-serviceman, except those drawing a nominal pension of Rs.35 and below belonged to the excluded category. However, by means of staff circular No.18 dated 4. The Bank issued circular No.68, dated 28th March, 1959 and another staff circular No.69 (date not known) extending the pension fund benefits to certain excluded categories of employees. The ex-serviceman, except those drawing a nominal pension of Rs.35 and below belonged to the excluded category. However, by means of staff circular No.18 dated 4. 1974, the Bank management decided to admit all whole-time permanent employees to the benefits of the provident and pension funds subject to their respective service rules and the rules of the funds. Para 3 of the circular reads as follows :- "Consequently, all ex-servicemen hitherto classified under excluded category may now be admitted to the benefits of the State Bank of India Employees Provident and Pension fund with effect from 1. 1965 or from the date of their confirmation, whichever is later, irrespective of the nature and the quantum of military pension drawn by them."........" In the said case of State Bank of India (supra), the Supreme Court held that there was no discernible basis for fixing the cut-off date of 1st Jan., 1965. 13. In the present case, as pointed out, the appellants were similarly placed in one class like those who retired after 1st Nov., 1993 and had completed more than 20 years of service, but were not entitled for pension in view of age limit of 38 years fixed under Rule 8 (c). All those class of persons, including the appellants, who had completed 20 years of service and were below 48 years, were made eligible for pension by impugned amended rule 8 (c) by which age limit under clause (c) was increased from 38 to 48 years, but simultaneously, while amending Rule 8 (a), by introduction of the cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993, while the appellants have been disallowed the benefit, but others, who were similarly situated, have been provided with the benefit of pension only on the ground that they have retired on or after 1st Nov., 1993. 14. As noticed earlier, the respondent-Bank or its counsel failed to give the rational behind fixing the cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993. It has been noticed that Article 14 forbids class legislation, but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. 14. As noticed earlier, the respondent-Bank or its counsel failed to give the rational behind fixing the cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993. It has been noticed that Article 14 forbids class legislation, but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In the present case, the respondents having failed to satisfy the twin tests of classification founded on intelligible differentia distinguishing between the set of persons grouped together from those who have been left out, like the appellants, and that differentia having no rational and having no nexus to the object to be achieved by the statute in question, we hold that the cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993, as prescribed by insertion in amended rule 8 (a) vide notification dated 14th Feb., 1997, is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 15. So far as the Supreme Court decision in the case of V. Kasturi – Vs – The Managing Director, State Bank of India (supra) is concerned, therein the Supreme Court considered the amended Rule 22 (1) by insertion of a new sub-rule (c) with effect from 20th Sept., 1986. The validity of amended Rule 8 (c), particularly the cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993, prescribed for eligibility after enhancement of the age limit from 38 to 48 years was not under consideration. Though the said amendment has been made from a prospective date, but it has been allowed in favour of a group of employees, who retired much prior to such amended Rule 8 (c) i.e., retired upto 1st Nov., 1993. Benefits having been given to such employees, the question of applicability of the rule from prospective or retrospective date is not required to be seen in the present case, except the question whether the cut-off date is arbitrary or such classification is founded on an intelligible differentia to distinguish persons or things that are grouped together. 16. In view of the findings as recorded above, we set aside the impugned judgments dated 18. 2003 and 17. 2004, passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. Nos. 16. In view of the findings as recorded above, we set aside the impugned judgments dated 18. 2003 and 17. 2004, passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. Nos. 6691/96 and 693/00 with direction to the respondents to grant pensionary and other consequential retrial benefits to the appellants and other similarly situated persons, who are entitled in terms with amended rule 8 without taking into consideration the cut-off date of 1st Nov., 1993, and pay the benefits from the date the amended rule 8 has come into force, within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. Both the writ appeals are allowed with the aforesaid observations. We assess the costs to the extent of Rs.10,000/= (Rupees Ten Thousand only) for each case, to be paid by the bank to each of the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case.