S. U. KHAN, J. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. Revision is withdrawn/treated to be withdrawn to this Court under Section 24, C. P. C. 3. This revision is directed against order dated 5-10-1988 passed by Civil Judge, Rampur rejecting the execution application of plaintiff applicant numbered as execution case No. 24 of 1986 filed for execution of decree passed in second appeal No. 1458 of 1974 by this Court on 5-10-1981 (reported in Rampur Engineering Co. Ltd. v. State & Ors. , AIR 1981 All. 396 ) arising out of O. S. No. 109 of 1972 filed by plaintiff applicant against defendant respondents. 4. The relief claimed in the suit was for a decree directing the defendants to renew the lease of land admeasuring 39. 08 acres for a further period of 30 years w. e. f. 10-5-1972. The case set up in the plaint was that the erstwhile princely State of Rampur entered into an agreement dated 28-10-1941 with M/s. J. L. Kamlapati Singhaniya agreeing to grant the land in dispute on certain terms. The plaintiff came to acquire the rights of M/s. J. L. Kamlapati Singhaniya under that agreement with certain modifications in a series of transactions. Thereafter, Government of Rampur (which was a princely state at that time) made the grant of the land in dispute to the plaintiff by an instrument dated 29-6-1949. The essential terms of the lease dated 29-6-1949 were that the lease would operate from 10-5-1942 and terminate on 9-5-1972, that the land in question admeasuring 39. 08 acres, which was at that time in possession of the plaintiff, might be held by the lessee free of rent during the period of the said lease, that all buildings, bungalows, factories, go-downs, offices, outhouses etc. constructed by previous lessee J. L. Kamlapati Singhaniya and transferred by them to the plaintiff would be deemed to have been constructed with the consent of the lessor and lessee was granted right to reconstruct other buildings, that on the expiry of the period of the lease, it could be renewed for a further period of 30 years on the same terms and conditions and after the lapse of 60 years from 10-5-1942, the plaintiff would have the option to acquire full ownership of the said land on payment of Rs. 19,500/- to the lessor. 19,500/- to the lessor. The other important clause in the lease-deed was that in the event of lease not being renewed on the expiry of the period of lease the lessee will be entitled to sell or remove the buildings, plant machinery etc. unless the State pays to the lessee compensation at a figure to be mutually agreed upon (these facts and terms are mentioned in the judgment of the second appeal also ). 5. In the second appeal, it was held that the deed of 29-6-1949 was not a lease-deed but a rent free grant under Government Grants Act, 1895 (previously known as Crown Grants Act, 1895 ). It was further held that the right conferred on the plaintiff by the last aforesaid clause (of renewal and purchase) was indefeasible and the plaintiff had asked for the renewal that the Government could not refuse it. It was further held that the plaintiff had asked for the renewal and the Defendant State acted illegally in refusing to renew the grant for a period of 30 years from 10-9- 1972. (Para-8 ). 6. In the second appeal, it was held that the instrument in question could not be treated to be a lease- deed because there was no consideration mentioned as required by Section 105 of the T. P. Act, however, in para-7, it was further held that "be that as it may, the validity of the instrument does not seem to have been challenged at the trial on the ground of want of consideration in the sense in which it is required for lease as defined by Section 105 of Transfer of Property Act and this aspect of the matter need detain me no longer". 7. The bone of contention is Para-11 of the judgment of the second appeal, which is last paragraph of the judgment and is quoted below : "in the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The defendant State of Uttar Pradesh shall grant the land having an area of 39. 08 acres specified at the foot of the plaint to the plaintiff Company for a further period of 30 years from 10th May, 1972 on the same terms and conditions as are contained in Ext. 2. The defendant State of Uttar Pradesh shall grant the land having an area of 39. 08 acres specified at the foot of the plaint to the plaintiff Company for a further period of 30 years from 10th May, 1972 on the same terms and conditions as are contained in Ext. 2. The necessary instrument of grant shall be executed and registered within three months from the date on which the plaintiff signifies to the defendant State of Uttar Pradesh through the Collector Rampur and through the Chief Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh at Lucknow, its readiness and willingness to take the grant on payment of the necessary expenses on the execution and registration of the same in its favour, which it must do within three months from today. The plaintiff shall be entitled to its costs throughout from defendant-respondent No. 1. " (Underlining supplied) 8. In the aforesaid judgment of the second appeal, it was also noted in paragraph-3 that Government of Uttar Pradesh acquired all the rights and the liabilities of the lessor under the grant in question on the merger of princely State of Rampur in the Union of India. 9. The bone of contention in between the parties is as to whether plaintiff signified its assent within three months from the judgment of second appeal as was required by the said judgment or not. The case of the plaintiff decree-holder in the execution was that on 5-10-1981 readiness and willingness had been signified through some letter sent Under Postal Certificate (U. P. C.) to Collector Rampur. 10. In the impugned order, it has been mentioned that earlier also execution application was filed, which was registered as execution case No. 46 of 1983, which was dismissed in default on 26-9-1986. 11. It was stated on behalf of the defendant judgment-debtors that absolutely no information signifying readiness and willingness was sent by the plaintiff decree-holder and the letter dated 5-10-1981 was never sent by the plaintiff or received by the decree-holder. On behalf of the Collector, judgment-debtor Rajpal Singh, clerk, Record Room, Collectrate, Rampur was examined. He stated that whatever letters or documents were received, which were meant for the Collector, were sent to the Collector after recording them in the dak bahi and in the dak bahi for the period from 1-10-1981 to 16-2- 1982, the alleged letter dated 5-10-1981 was not mentioned. 12. He stated that whatever letters or documents were received, which were meant for the Collector, were sent to the Collector after recording them in the dak bahi and in the dak bahi for the period from 1-10-1981 to 16-2- 1982, the alleged letter dated 5-10-1981 was not mentioned. 12. U. P. C. is not an evidence of receipt; even as an evidence of sending the letter. U. P. C. has got very weak value. The Executing Court accepted the contention of the learned Counsel for the judgment- debtors that such important information could be sent through registered post or delivered directly after obtaining receipt in the office of the Collector. Executing Court also mentioned that on the copy of the alleged letter neither there was any stamp of the plaintiff nor it was signed by any Director of the Company. The letter was sent by one Mr. Zaidi. Mr. Zaidi, who was an employee of the plaintiff company, in his oral statement before the Executing Court admitted that he was not authorized to execute any agreement on behalf of the company and he was not authorized to promise on behalf of the company to advance any money. Sri Zaidi also admitted that there was no dak bahi mentioned by the plaintiff company in which letters sent by the company were noted. Ultimately, Executing Court concluded that no such letter as alleged to have been sent to Collector Under Postal Certificate on 5-10- 1981 was, in fact, sent. After recording these findings, execution application was rejected on 5-10-1988, which order has been challenged through this revision. 13. Learned Counsel for the applicant has assailed the findings of the Court below. Learned Counsel has further argued that in any case filing of the first execution application on 23-12-1983 should be treated to be intimation of readiness and willingness and Executing Court could very well extend the time fixed for the said purpose in the judgment of second appeal. 14. There is absolutely no error in the finding of fact recorded by the Court below. The Supreme Court in AIR 1994 SC 678 , "gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao v. E. V. ", has held in Paragraph-60 as under : " (60) Gadakhs version that he sent the letter dated 16th May, 1991 (Exh. Q) under certificate of posting is unbelievable. A certificate of posting is easy to procure and does not inspire confidence. The Supreme Court in AIR 1994 SC 678 , "gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao v. E. V. ", has held in Paragraph-60 as under : " (60) Gadakhs version that he sent the letter dated 16th May, 1991 (Exh. Q) under certificate of posting is unbelievable. A certificate of posting is easy to procure and does not inspire confidence. Moreover, the circumstances belie his version. With his considerable means and past experience of elections, he would have sent such a letter by registered post to ensure its delivery and create cogent evidence of its despatch. Moreover, he would not merely send such a letter but have his denial published in newspapers because of its significance during elections. We have no doubt that Gadakhs conduct belies his belated denial at the trial. " 15. When huge rights are conferred on performance of extremely negligible duty, then the duty must promptly and punctually be performed in spirit as well as letter. Slightest omission in performance of such duty entails denial of the right (in this regard reference may be made to right of pre-emption ). If rights and duties are almost proportional then some latitude or condonation might be granted if one party does not perform his duty punctually. However in case of huge dis-proportionality in rights and duties, absolutely, no latitude is warranted. In the facts and circumstances of the case, property worth crores of rupees even in 1981 could be had by the plaintiff decree-holder by virtue of the judgment of the second appeal by mere by signifying its asset. Slightest possible laxity in signifying the assent, therefore, cannot be condoned. Plaintiff decree-holder was excepted to exhaust all modes of communication of assent. However, plaintiff decree-holder did not do even the minimum required by it, i. e. sending the letter through registered post. 16. As far as the argument of extension of time is concerned, firstly the Executing Court rightly held that it had no jurisdiction to extend the time. In this regard, an authority of Supreme Court has been cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent reported in Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2007 (3) JCLR 150 (SC) : 2007 (2) 8 AWC 1513 (SC), wherein it has been held that High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction cannot vary the terms of decree in execution. In this regard, an authority of Supreme Court has been cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent reported in Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2007 (3) JCLR 150 (SC) : 2007 (2) 8 AWC 1513 (SC), wherein it has been held that High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction cannot vary the terms of decree in execution. Moreover, as stated earlier, there is absolutely no ground to extend the time even if such power is presumed to be avoidable to the Executing Court. 17. Some more authorities have been cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent, which I do not consider necessary to discuss. 18. In respect of extension of time, following authorities have been cited by learned Counsel for the applicant decree-holder : (1) Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo, (1982) 1 SCC 159 . (2) Someshwar Dayal v. Widow of Lalman Shah, AIR 1958 All. 488 (V. 45 C. 120 ). (3) M. V. Kshirsagar v. B. K. Jadhav, AIR 1970 Bom. 398 (V. 57 C. 67 ). (4) K. Kalpana Saraswathi v. P. S. S. Somasundaram Chettiar, 1980 (1) SCC 630 . (5) B. P. Mishra v. K. K. Jha & Ors. , AIR 1972 Pat. 322 (V. 59, C. 90 ). (6) M. R. Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 SC 882 (V. 48 C. 141 ). 19. In the first authority, it was held by the Supreme Court that if Revenue Divisional Officer passed an order of payment of arrears of rent and order of eviction in case of default, then time for payment of arrears might be extended. 20. In the other five authorities, provisions of Specific Relief Act and Section 148 of C. P. C. were considered and it was held that time to pay balance sale consideration fixed under decree for specific performance could be extended by the Court. 21. None of the above authorities apply to the situation and the facts and circumstances of the present case. 22. Even the period of 30 years from 1972 expired in 2002. The argument of learned Counsel for the applicant is that if retrospective renewal of the lease is granted then since 2002, petitioner applicant will become owner of the land on payment of Rs. 19,500. 23. Accordingly, there is no merit in the revision, hence it is dismissed. 24. However there is one disturbing feature, which requires to be noticed. The argument of learned Counsel for the applicant is that if retrospective renewal of the lease is granted then since 2002, petitioner applicant will become owner of the land on payment of Rs. 19,500. 23. Accordingly, there is no merit in the revision, hence it is dismissed. 24. However there is one disturbing feature, which requires to be noticed. This revision was filed without any stay application. Stay application was filed in 2003 and stay order was granted on 12-5- 2003, which is quoted below : "issue notice. Until further orders of the Court, construction in dispute shall not be demolished. " (Revision was also admitted on the same date, i. e. 12-5- 2003 ). 25. The Court wonders as to way possession was not taken from the applicants by the respondents or as to why eviction proceedings were not initiated until 12-5-2003. 26. The respondent State shall ascertain as to why officers concerned did not initiate proceedings for eviction against the applicants and shall take necessary action against them. 27. The respondent state is at liberty to realise damages for use and occupation at the proportionate (period wise) market rate of the land in dispute from the applicants, through process of law, since after three months from the judgment of the second appeal till actual vacation. Damages may be realised even for the period during which stay order granted in this revision remained in operation for the reason that the stay order was obtained by the applicant without any reasonable ground. Revision dismissed. .