JUDGMENT Honble Ashok Bhushan, J.—Learned Counsel for both the parties have been heard. 2. By this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing three orders, firstly order dated 13th March, 1980 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) by which as a result of summary Court martial, the petitioner has been sentenced with six months rigorous imprisonment in civil prison and dismissal from service, secondly the order dated 28th April, 1980 by which sentence of three months rigorous imprisonment was remitted but the punishment of dismissal was maintained and thirdly the order dated 20th May, 1986 by which the petitioners representation to take back him in service was rejected. 3. Brief facts necessary for deciding the issues raised in the writ petition are; the petitioner was enrolled as Gunner in Indian Army in the year 1974 and at the relevant time he was posted in State of Gujarat. On 1st November, 1979 the petitioner took twelve days leave to go to his native place, i.e., district Kanpur Nagar (State of Uttar Pradesh). He sent a telegram for extension of his leave on which twelve days further leave was granted but thereafter the petitioner further stayed without any information and came back to join in the regiment after 58 days. A Summary Court martial was held on 15th March, 1980 and the petitioner was found guilty of charge "without sufficient cause overstaying leave granted to him". The petitioner was sentenced to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment in civil imprisonment and was also dismissed from service as a result of Summary Court martial. The petitioner was handed over to jail authorities of Surendra Nagar, Gujarat to undergo imprisonment. On an application made by the petitioner, by an order of Commander Headquarters 38 Artillery Brigade three months sentence was remitted but the punishment of dismissal was not changed. On 13th March, 1986 the petitioner sent an application to the Chief of the Army Staff praying for taking him back in service by setting aside the Summary Court martial. The petitioners prayer for taking him back in service was refused and vide letter dated 20th May, 1986 he was communicated at his village address Kanpur that he having been dismissed after Summary Court martial cannot be taken back in service. 4. The petitioners prayer for taking him back in service was refused and vide letter dated 20th May, 1986 he was communicated at his village address Kanpur that he having been dismissed after Summary Court martial cannot be taken back in service. 4. Sri Subodh Kumar learned Counsel appearing for the Union of India has raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition in this Court. Sri Subodh Kumar contended that petitioner at the relevant time having posted in the State of Gujarat where the petitioner was awarded imprisonment and dismissal, there is no territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition for challenging the Summary Court martial and consequent dismissal from service in this Court. Reliance has been placed by Sri Subodh Kumar on the Full Bench judgment of this Court in 2002(5) A.W.C. 4542; Rajendra Kumar Mishra v. Union of India and others. 5. Sri V.S. Pujari, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that part of cause of action arose in the State of Uttar Pradesh, hence this writ petition is fully maintainable in this Court. He submitted that petitioners prayer for taking back him in service made to the Chief of the Army Staff was rejected and the said order was communicated to the petitioner at Kanpur (State of Uttar Pradesh), hence part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the writ petition is fully maintainable in this Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1681, Union of India and another v. Sri Ladulal Jain, judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 5118 of 1981 (Sri Rameshwar Prasad Gupta v. Union of India and others) and the judgment of Apex Court reported in 2006 (5) Supreme 751 , Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and others. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that two punishments, first imprisonment for six months and second dismissal from service could not have been awarded to the petitioner under Section 71 of the Army Act, 1950 and the award of two punishments is without jurisdiction and the petitioner was entitled to be taken back in service. 6. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. 6. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. The issue to be decided first is as to whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition for the relief as claimed in the writ petition. As noted above, the Summary Court martial was held in the State of Gujarat where the petitioner was present at the relevant time and sentence of undergoing six months rigorous imprisonment and dismissal from service was also awarded in the State of Gujarat. The petitioner was also sent in District Jail Surendra Nagar (State of Gujarat) for serving his sentence where three months sentence was remitted but punishment of dismissal was unchanged. The cause of action to challenge the Summary Court martial and the punishment awarded to the petitioner including the dismissal from service arose within the State of Gujarat. The petitioner was present at the time of Summary Court martial, the order of Summary Court martial was served to him in the State of Gujarat and he also served imprisonment of sentence in the State of Gujarat. The judgment relied by the Counsel for the petitioner in Union of Indias case (supra) was a case where the Apex Court had occasion to consider Section 20 clause (a) and (b) of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. A suit was instituted against the Union of India and Northern Frontier Railway having its headquarters at Pandu, district Gauhati (State of Assam) for claim of recovery of a sum of Rs. 8,250/-. The question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Gauhati was raised. It was alleged in the plaint that cause of action arose at Pandu, which is within the jurisdiction of the Court at Gauhati, the place where notice under Section 80 of the Code was duly served upon the defendant railway and that the suit was filed in the Court within the jurisdiction of which the defendant railway had its principal place of business by virtue of its headquarters being at Pandu. In the said background the Apex Court held that Union of India carries on the business of running railway and the Union Government can be sued in a Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the headquarter of the railway run by the Union is situated. Following was laid down in paragraph 16 of the said judgment : "16. In the said background the Apex Court held that Union of India carries on the business of running railway and the Union Government can be sued in a Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the headquarter of the railway run by the Union is situated. Following was laid down in paragraph 16 of the said judgment : "16. In view of what we have said above, we hold that the Union of India carries on the business of running railways and, can be sued in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati within whose territorial jurisdiction the head-quarters of one of the railways run by the Union is situated. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs." 8. The above case was on facts of its own case. The said case has no application in facts of the present case. 9. The second case relied by Counsel for the petitioner is case of Sri Rameshwar Prasad Gupta (supra). The petitioner of that case was posted at Lonawala Yard in the Central Railway where he was removed from service. In the said case the submission of the petitioner was that the order of removal was served at district Allahabad, hence this Court had jurisdiction. The Court took the view that the question of lack of jurisdiction could not be permitted to be raised at late stage of hearing. In the said case the Court did not permit the respondents to raise the question of lack of territorial jurisdiction at such late stage. 10. The next case relied by Counsel for the petitioner is Om Prakash Srivastavas case (supra) where the writ petition was filed at Delhi High Court challenging that petitioner is being tried in several cases contrary to the extradition decree. The Delhi High Court in its judgment accepted that it may have jurisdiction but it was of the view that the grievance can be more effectively dealt with by the Allahabad High Court. The Apex Court laid down following in paragraph 18 of the said judgment: "18. In the instant case the High Court has not dealt with the question as to whether it had jurisdiction to deal with the writ petition. It only observed that the Delhi High Court may have jurisdiction, but the issues relating to conditions of prisoners in the State of U.P. can be more effectively dealt with by the Allahabad High Court. In the instant case the High Court has not dealt with the question as to whether it had jurisdiction to deal with the writ petition. It only observed that the Delhi High Court may have jurisdiction, but the issues relating to conditions of prisoners in the State of U.P. can be more effectively dealt with by the Allahabad High Court. As noted supra, there were two grievances by the appellant. But only one of them i.e. the alleged lack of medical facilities has been referred to by the High Court. It was open to the Delhi High Court to say that no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. The High Court in the impugned order does not say so. On the contrary, it says that jurisdiction may be there, but the Allahabad High Court can deal with the matter more effectively. That is not certainly a correct way to deal with the writ petition. Accordingly, we set-aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter to it for fresh hearing on merits. A prayer has been made for release of the appellant on parole for the reasons indicated in the application. We are not inclined to pass any order on the said application. The same is rejected." 11. In the above case, the Apex Court set-aside the order of Delhi High Court and remitted the matter for fresh hearing since the High Court had not held that it had no territorial jurisdiction. The above case is distinguishable and has no application in facts of the present case. 12. In above view of the matter, it cannot be held that any part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to challenge the punishment awarded by Summary Court martial dated 15th March, 1980. However, the submission much pressed by Counsel for the petitioner is that since the petitioner has sent an application to the Chief of the Army Staff from district Kanpur for taking him back in service, which was rejected and communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 20th May, 1986 at Kanpur (U.P.), the petitioner had cause of action to challenge the said decision of not taking him back in service before this Court. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents the allegations made in paragraph 9 and 10 of the writ petition, i.e., representation of the petitioner to the Chief of the Army Staff for his reinstatement on 7th October, 1985, rejection of the said request and communication at Kanpur vide letter dated 20th May, 1986 has not been denied. Thus in so far as the prayer of the petitioner to quash the order dated 20th May, 1986 refusing reinstatement of the petitioner in service, it can be held that this Court has territorial jurisdiction since the representation was sent from Kanpur and the refusal of the same was also communicated at Kanpur. In support of the petitioners prayer to quash the order dated 20th May, 1986 same submission is pressed by the petitioner, i.e., the punishment of dismissal as well as imprisonment of six months was not permissible within the meaning of Army Act, 1950 and the said punishment being without jurisdiction, the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated. 13. In view of the above, I have proceeded to consider the above submission of the petitioner on merits. The submission of the petitioner is that on the basis of Summary Court martial the petitioner cannot be both punished for imprisonment of six months and dismissal from service. For appreciating the submission, it is necessary to look into Section 39 and Section 71. Section 39 and Section 71 of the Army Act are extracted below : "39. The submission of the petitioner is that on the basis of Summary Court martial the petitioner cannot be both punished for imprisonment of six months and dismissal from service. For appreciating the submission, it is necessary to look into Section 39 and Section 71. Section 39 and Section 71 of the Army Act are extracted below : "39. Absence without leave.—Any person subject to this Act who commits any of the following offences, that is to say,— (a) absents himself without leave; or (b) without sufficient cause overstays leave granted to him; or (c) being on leave of absence and having received information from proper authority that any corps, or portion of a corps, or any department, to which he belongs, has been ordered on active service, fails, without sufficient cause, to rejoin without delay; or (d) without sufficient cause fails to appear at the time fixed at the parade or place appointed for exercise or duty; or (e) when on parade, or on the line of march, without sufficient cause or without leave from his superior officer, quits the parade or line of march; or (f) when in camp or garrison or elsewhere, is found beyond any limits fixed, or in any place prohibited, by any general, local or other order, without a pass or written leave from his superior officer; or (g) without leave from his superior officer or without due cause, absents himself from any school when duly ordered to attend there, shall, on conviction by Court-martial, be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned." "71. Punishment awardable by Courts-martial.—Punishment may be inflicted in respect of offences committed by persons subject to this Act and convicted by Courts-martial, according to the scale following, that is to say,— (a) death; (b) transportation for life or for any period not less than seven years; (c) imprisonment either rigorous or simple, for any period not exceeding fourteen years; (d) cashiering, in the case of officers; (e) dismissal from the service; (f) reduction to the ranks or to be a lower rank or grade or place in the list of their rank, in the case of warrant officers; and reduction to the ranks or to a lower rank or grade, in the case of non-commissioned officers : Provided that a warrant officer reduced to the ranks shall not be required to serve in the ranks as a sepoy; (g) forfeiture of seniority of rank, in the case of officers, junior commissioned officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers; and forfeiture of all or any part of their service for the purpose of promotion, in the case of any of them whose promotion depends upon length of service; (h) forfeiture of service for the purpose of increased pay, pension or any other prescribed purpose; (i) severe reprimand or reprimand, in the case of officers, junior commissioned officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers; (j) forfeiture of pay and allowances for a period not exceeding three months for an offence committed on active service; (k) forfeiture in the case of a person sentenced to cashiering or dismissal from service of all arrears of pay and allowances and other public money due to him at the time of such cashiering or dismissal; (l) stoppage of pay and allowances until any proved loss or damage occasioned by the offence of which he is convicted is made good." 14. The plain words of Section 71 provides that punishments may be inflicted in respect of offences committed by persons subject to this Act and convicted by Courts-martial, according to the scale. Section 71 read with Section 73 of the Army Act clearly indicate that punishment of dismissal can also be imposed in addition to the punishment of rigorous or simple imprisonment. Thus the submission of the petitioner that punishment of dismissal and punishment of imprisonment cannot be awarded together as a result of Summary Court martial cannot be supported by plain reading of provisions of the Army Act. Thus the submission of the petitioner that punishment of dismissal and punishment of imprisonment cannot be awarded together as a result of Summary Court martial cannot be supported by plain reading of provisions of the Army Act. The punishment awarded to the petitioner cannot be held to be without jurisdiction or void. No relief can be granted to the petitioner in this writ petition. 15. The writ petition is dismissed. ————