JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.S. Kulshrestha, J.—In view of conflict of opinion rendered by a Bench of two learned Judges in Criminal Appeal No. 7549 of 2006, Arimardan v. State of U.P. connected with 9 other appeals, regarding interpretation of proviso to Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (as amended by The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005) (for short Cr.P.C.), this reference has been placed before this Bench. 2. The facts of this case may be noticed in brief. Criminal Appeal No. 7549 of 2006, Arimardan v. State of U.P., connected with 9 other criminal appeals (referred above), were brought under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. against the judgment and order of the Sessions Judge convicting and sentencing the accused appellants for various offences. At the time of hearing of bail application moved alongwith the memorandum of appeal(s) request appears to have been made on behalf of the State to furnish adequate time to them for filing the written reply as is required under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. so as to facilitate the disposal of the bail application. However, objections were raised by the learned counsels for the appellants that the proviso added to Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. is directory in nature and in fact no time should be given to the Public Prosecutor to show-cause in writing against the release of the appellants on bail as there was sufficient notice of the filing of bail application along with memorandum of appeal in view of Rule 18(3) Chapter XVIII of the Rules of Court. Hon. Sri Mukteshwar Prasad, J gave decision rendering proviso added to Section 389(1) to be mandatory and the Public Prosecutor has to be given an opportunity of hearing and to oppose the grant of bail to the convict who has been found guilty for committing heinous offences. Hon. Sri B.A. Zaidi, J was of the opinion that the use of word “shall” in the proviso would not make the requirement of giving show-cause notice to the Public Prosecutor to be compulsory. It has no such mandatory import. Further placing reliance on the decision given by the Apex Court in the case of Sheikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar and others, (2006) 1 SCC 46 , proviso to Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. was construed to be directory as this would also be in furtherance to the cause of justice and to avoid inconvenience to the appellant(s). 3. Further placing reliance on the decision given by the Apex Court in the case of Sheikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar and others, (2006) 1 SCC 46 , proviso to Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. was construed to be directory as this would also be in furtherance to the cause of justice and to avoid inconvenience to the appellant(s). 3. Learned counsel for the appellants placing reliance on the decisions given by the Apex Court in the cases of Sheikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar and others, (2006) 1 SCC 46 ; Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Katak, AIR 1955 SC 425 ; Narayan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 7737 and also the principle of interpretation (as has been referred in the decision of Hon. Sri B.A. Zaidi, J) have submitted that procedural law is not to be tyrant but an aid to justice. The provisions of the procedural enactment ought not to be construed in the manner which would leave the Court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. To the contrary on behalf of the State it was submitted that the provisions as contained in Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. are clear and unambiguous and a plain reading of proviso to Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. is not capable of any other interpretation except giving opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against the release of appellant(s) on bail in the classes or category of offences referred therein. 4. The principal controversy revolves round the interpretation of the expression “shall give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release” occurring in proviso to Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. The question which requires consideration as to whether the arrangement made in the proviso is mandatory or directory in nature having in regard the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005 through which this proviso was added to section 389(1) Cr.P.C. and object sought to be achieved. Since it is a matter of general importance and so the notice of the reference was given to the High Court Bar Associations both at Allahabad and Lucknow. Presidents and Secretaries of Bar Associations and certain Senior Advocates submitted that the purpose of proviso to Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. is not to bar the hearing of the bail application in appeal without giving opportunity for showing cause in writing to the Public Prosecutor. Presidents and Secretaries of Bar Associations and certain Senior Advocates submitted that the purpose of proviso to Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. is not to bar the hearing of the bail application in appeal without giving opportunity for showing cause in writing to the Public Prosecutor. If a very restricted interpretation is given to the said proviso, the protection afforded by the principal Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. will be virtually reduced to vanishing point, defeating the very object of the Code or at least the convict would be required to suffer incarceration for some more time on these technicalities or niceties, even when his appeal and bail application are well merited. The proviso, it is urged, does not completely bar the hearing of bail of convicted person of an offence of the type described thereunder, but introduces a safeguard in the sense that when the Court find the written reply in the matter necessary to appreciate the points involved in admitted the accused on bail, may give show-cause notice to the Public Prosecutor. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the procedural Law should be interpreted in the manner which avoids hardship to the convict. 5. The Learned Advocate General has submitted that language of the proviso to Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. is clear and there being no ambiguity therein, the only possible manner in which it can be interpreted is that the opportunity is to be given to the Public Prosecutor for show-cause in writing against the release of the appellant. The proviso has to be strictly construed as it creates a bar for the release of the convicted person for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years unless opportunity is given to the Public Prosecutor to give reply in writing. It was also urged by him that any provision which provides specific arrangement must be strictly construed and cannot be given an enlarged meaning at the discretion of the Court. Since the accused appellant is found guilty for offences specified in the proviso and so his bail application should not be allowed in routine manner as it would adversely affect the interest of society. Since the accused appellant is found guilty for offences specified in the proviso and so his bail application should not be allowed in routine manner as it would adversely affect the interest of society. The learned Advocate General submitted that in certain cases evidence adduced in the trial Court are required to be referred in the• Court so as to appreciate the points taken at the time of disposal of bail application. It was further submitted by him that the object of introducing the provision was clearly to limit the powers of the appellate Court under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. for granting bail unless reply in writing is called for. 6. The scheme of statutory provision may now be examined. Section 389 Cr.P.C. reads as under: 389—Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail.—(1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond. Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release. Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail. (2) The power conferred by this Section on an Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto. (2) The power conferred by this Section on an Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto. (3) Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the Court shall,— (i) Where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or (ii) Where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail, order that the convicted person be released on bail unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders of the Appellate Court under sub-section (1), and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended. (4) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment for life, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of this Section contemplate suspension of sentence by the appellate Court only pending appeal. Sub-section (3) can be invoked for interim relief before the convicting Court only in cases where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and is on bail where the offence for which he has been convicted is bailable and he is on bail. Further sub-section (1) enjoins that where convict for offence(s) applies for grant of bail, the appellate Court while granting bail has to record reasons in writing. But the powers under sub-section (1) for certain categories of offences can be exercised only after the fulfilment of certain requirements as are envisaged in the proviso added to this Section. The language of proviso would not justify the taking up of the bail application by the appellate Court without giving opportunity for showing cause in writing against the grant of bail. This proviso requires a show-cause notice to the Public Prosecutor before passing an order by the Court on the bail application of the convict in the offences enumerated in the proviso thereof. This proviso requires a show-cause notice to the Public Prosecutor before passing an order by the Court on the bail application of the convict in the offences enumerated in the proviso thereof. The object of the main Section as the history of its legislation shows and the decided cases indicate that the bail of the convicted persons may be considered for the reasons recorded under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. The proviso engrafts an exception on the general powers of the Court. In deed, in view of the aforesaid facts, there is statutory prohibition against the grant of bail to the convicted persons in the offences provided in the provision unless opportunity is given to Public Prosecutor. This proviso appears to have been conceived in an attempt to find out the evidence against the convict. 7. Proviso to sub-section (1) is self explanatory and takes within its’ fold three categories of offences punishable with death sentence or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term not less than ten years. This proviso manifestly shows that it is meant• to give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against the release of the accused in such heinous offences warranting severe punishment not less than 10 years. 8. Now to ascertain whether this proviso to sub-section (1) is mandatory or directory in nature, in the first place it may be mentioned that construction of the proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. Therefore, the proviso in question has to be construed harmoniously with the provisions of sub­section (1) to which it is a proviso. As we have already mentioned that immediately after the presentation of appeal, sub-section (1) of Section 389 Cr.P.C. begins to operate. If a person convicted for the offences punishable with death sentence or imprisonment for life or imprisonment not less than 10 years applies for bail, opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for filing reply in writing is a necessary concomitant before taking the bail application for disposal and if no such procedure is followed, it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to get the bail order cancelled as being otherwise than in accordance with procedure prescribed by law. In order to prevent this result in certain category of offences the proviso makes it obligatory to the Court to call for written reply. In order to prevent this result in certain category of offences the proviso makes it obligatory to the Court to call for written reply. It, therefore, stands to reason and is consistent with the principle of harmonious construction of statute that in exercise of power of granting bail in the heinous offences opportunity shall have to be given to the Learned Public Prosecutor so as to prevent unwarranted result in the operation of sub-section (1) of Section 389 Cr.P.C. 9. Again reference to statement of Objects and Reasons is permissible for understanding the background, antecedent, state of affairs in relation to the statute sought to remedy [See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 9th Edition 2004 at page 218]. Statement of Objects and Reasons of ‘Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005’ (Act No. 25 of 2005) CCI - II 163: 2005 LLT-II-163] reads as under: Having regards to the recommendations made by the Law Commission and the National Police Concessioner, the observations made by the Courts and the suggestions received from the State Governments and others and with a view to removing certain difficulties or lacunae felt in its working, it has been found necessary to amend various Sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Law Commission of India in its One Hundred And Fifty Fourth Report on The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Vol. I, made the following recommendation on the subject : 5.6 Clause 38: This clause adds a proviso of sub-section (1) of Section 389 of the Code to the effect that the Appellate Court would give notice to the prosecution before releasing a convicted person on bail, if he was convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years. It also enables the prosecution to move an application for cancellation of such bail granted by the Appellate Court. Having regard to the fact that the convicted person after being released on bail by the Appellate Court continues to indulge in committing crime, such a provision is necessary. 10. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s. Price Waterhouse and another, AIR 1998 SC 74 . 10. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s. Price Waterhouse and another, AIR 1998 SC 74 . The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures’ defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See The State of Gujarat and others v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and another, JT 1998 (2) SC 253). It is contrary to all Rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. This may also be mentioned that Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and others, AIR 1962 SC 847 ). 11. Further to give effect to the Legislative intention, a purposive interpretation should be applied. Reliance may be placed in the case of K.L. Gupta and others v. The Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, AIR 1968 SC 303 (Para 9); Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal and others, AIR 2005 SCW 654 ; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless Geneal Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 1023 (Para 33) and Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court Chandigarh, (1990) 3 SCC 68 . Thus taking into consideration clear and unambiguous language and the Legislative intendment, we are of the view that proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 389 is mandatory. 12. Before parting from this topic we would desire to make an observation. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of uncertainty in the law except in cases where specific provision in that behalf is made in individual statutes. 12. Before parting from this topic we would desire to make an observation. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of uncertainty in the law except in cases where specific provision in that behalf is made in individual statutes. Here in the proviso there is a slight ambiguity in the language employed in it, which has also given rise to the disputed question of construction as regards the applicability of the expression ‘punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term not less than ten years’ whether one is charged or actually sentenced to that period. We consider that it would be conducive to clarify as well as to the avoidance of unnecessary technical objections giving occasion for litigation. 13. The entire submission on the part of learned Advocate General with regard to the applicability of the proviso rest on the meaning of the word “convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years”. Actual awarding of sentence is not relevant for the attraction of proviso to Section 389. Reliance is placed on the expression punishable defined by the Apex Court in the case of Sube Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others, (1989) 1 SCC 235 wherein it is said to mean : “The word ‘punishable’ is ordinarily defined as deserving of or cable or liable to punishment, punishable within statute providing that defendant may have ten (sic) peremptory challenges if offences charged is ‘punishable’ with death or by life imprisonment; means deserving of or liable to punishment; capable of being punished by law or right, may be punished, or liable to be punished, and not must be punished. We find ourselves unable to accept the argument in view of the clear language of the proviso to sub-section (1). To say that the proviso refers only to the offence(s) for which death sentence or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years is provided in the penal statute and its applicability has nothing to do with the sentence virtually awarded, would make the proviso practically futile and un-meaningful. It was also observed by the Apex Court in the case of P.S. Sathappan (Dead) By LRs. It was also observed by the Apex Court in the case of P.S. Sathappan (Dead) By LRs. v. Andhra Bank Ltd. and others, 2004 SCW 5934 that in the guise of purposive construction one cannot interpret a Section in a manner which wound lead to a conflict between the Sections of the same Section. If all the categories of offences wherein lesser punishment is also provided and awarded are taken within its sweep, it would be contrary to the legislative spirit. Where the Legislature intended to provide opportunity of giving show-cause in writing it meant that the heinous offences should not go unresponded. While keeping the third category of offences wherein imprisonment for not less 10 years is provided would itself show that its applicability would not be widened for the offences wherein the sentence less than 10 years is awarded. Here the proviso relating to the offence punishable with imprisonment for life would be strictly construed keeping in view the minimum sentence so provided in the proviso. It cannot take within its purview the offences where the lesser imprisonment is awarded. In this context, the expression “not less than” would mean imprisonment should be 10 years or more and would cover only those offences for which punishment could be imprisonment for a clear period of 10 years or more. 14. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 389 Cr.P.C. mandates the appellate Court for giving opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing before hearing bail application of the convict sentenced (1) to death; (2) imprisonment for life; and (3) imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years. This proviso would not come into play when the appeal is preferred by a convict sentenced to less than 10 years. Conclusion : 1. Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 389 Cr.P.C. requiring a show-cause notice to the Public Prosecutor before passing an order by the Court on the bail application of the convict in the offences enumerated in the proviso thereof, is mandatory. This prohibition is not applicable where the appeal is preferred by a convict sentenced to less than 10 years. 2. Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 389 Cr.P.C. requiring a show-cause notice to the Public Prosecutor before passing an order by the Court on the bail application of the convict in the offences enumerated in the proviso thereof, is mandatory. This prohibition is not applicable where the appeal is preferred by a convict sentenced to less than 10 years. 2. Impugned order passed by Hon’ble Sri Mukteshwar Prasad, J. holding that the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 389 casts an obligation on the appellate Court to give opportunity for showing cause in writing to the Public Prosecutor before proceeding to make the hearing of the bail application of the convict in the category of offences enumerated thereof is in consonance with the spirit of legislation and so it is, hereby affirmed subject to the limitations as given in point No. 1 above. The contrary view expressed by Hon. Sri B.A. Zaidi, J is set aside. —————