JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, while accepting the order of reinstatement passed by the respondent-Bank as back as on 26.3.1993, has agreed with the following terms and conditions imposed by the respondent-Bank : (i) You will not pay any salary and allowances for the period you remained under suspension other than the subsistence allowance already paid to You. (ii) The lifting of suspension will be effective from the date on which you report for duty at our office Jodhpur. (iii) The final order dated 31.12.1983 and dated 30.3.1991 passed by the disciplinary authority upon you will take effect immediately. 2. In response to the above order dated 26.3.1993, the petitioner joined his services and worked in the respondent-Bank till his retirement i.e. on 31.7.1996. 3. By filing these writ petitions, it is prayed that the respondents may be directed to count the services of suspension period of petitioner i.e. 26.6.1986 to 30.3.1993, as qualifying services for the purpose of all other retiral benefits and further the respondents may be directed to pay arrears of pension and other retiral benefits accordingly in consequence of inclusion of suspension period of petitioner and further for paying interest @ 24% per annum on the delayed amount of pension, gratuity and other retiral benefits. It is required to be noted that at the relevant time the petitioner was serving in the respondent-Bank as a Branch Manager and it was alleged that he gave a loan to fictitious person and he was placed under suspension in contemplation of criminal case and departmental enquiry was also started against him. The learned trial Court after the tiral acquitted him vide judgment dated 30.1.1993 on the ground that the petitioner deposited the amount out of his pocket. Thereafter, the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated in service vide order dated 26.3.1993 by the competent authority by taking into consideration the entire aspect of the matter on the terms motioned in the order, but the department, thereafter, initiated a departmental enquiry against the petitioner and in the said departmental enquiry, charges and allegations levelled against him were proved and petitioner was awarded punishment of withholding of promotion till he attains the age of superannuation and censure. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent- Bank, Mr. Man Singh Gupta, submits that a lenient view has been taken by the respondent-Bank. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent- Bank, Mr. Man Singh Gupta, submits that a lenient view has been taken by the respondent-Bank. The petitioner being a Branch Manager has given the loan without getting proper identification and in view of the fact that the loan accounts had been adjusted and the respondent-Bank had not suffered any financial loss, therefore, a lenient view was taken, but looking to the negligency of the petitioner in performing the duties, such Branch Manager could have been removed from the services. After the retirement, the petitioner was paid pension by not treating the services during which the petitioner was under suspension. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that suspension period should be treated as on leave in view of the acquittal of the petitioner. In this behalf, he has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab & Ors. v. Shambhu Nath Singal & Ors., reported in ( 1996) l SCC 296 : [1996( 1) SLR 33 (SC)] wherein the Supreme Court has observed that the first respondent had been discharged by the criminal court for want of proper sanction and when he was reinstated in the service. he was entitled to full salary and allowances for the period during which he was kept under suspension. He has also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Union of India, reported in (1999) SCC (L&S) 1226 . So far as that case is concerned, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court ordered that suspension period should be treated as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. In the aforesaid case, the appellant before the Supreme Court was compulsory retired from the service on the ground of overstaying in a foreign country and the Central Administrative Tribunal had set aside the order of compulsory retirement and remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority. In the aforesaid matter, no specific order was passed treating the suspension period and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court has held that suspension period is required to be treated as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. 5. In the aforesaid matter, no specific order was passed treating the suspension period and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court has held that suspension period is required to be treated as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, on the other hand, has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in 1997 (2) SLR 396 . The Supreme Court has observed in that case as under : "Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that under Rule 72(3) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Joining Time, Suspension, Dismissal and Removal) Rules, 1991 (for short, the 'Rules'), the Rule cannot be applied to the appellant nor would be respondents be justified in treating the period of suspension of appellant, as the period of suspension, as not being warranted under the Rules. We find no force in the contention. It is true that when a Government servant is acquitted of offences, he would be entitled to be re-instated. But the question is : whether he would he entitled to all consequential benefits including the pensionary henetits treating, the suspension period as duty period as contended by Shri Ranjit Kumar ? The object of sanction of law behind prosecution is to put an end to crime against the society and laws thereby intends to restore social order and stability. The purpose of prosecution ofa public servant is to maintain discipline in service, integrity, honesty and truthful conduct in performance of public duty or for modulation of his conduct to further the efficiency in public service. The Constitution has given full faith and credit to public acts. Conduct of a public servant has to be an open book; corrupt would be known to everyone. The reputation would gain notoriety. Though legal evidence may be insufficient to bring home the guilty beyond doubt or full-proof. The act of reinstatement sends ripples among the people in the office/locality and sows wrong signals for degeneration of morality, integrity and rightful conduct and efficient performance of public duty. The constitutional animation of public faith and credit given to public acts, would be undermined. Every act or the conduct of a public servant should be to effectuate the public purpose and constitutional objective. Public servant renders himself accountable to the public. The constitutional animation of public faith and credit given to public acts, would be undermined. Every act or the conduct of a public servant should be to effectuate the public purpose and constitutional objective. Public servant renders himself accountable to the public. The very cause for suspension of the petitioner and taking punitive action against him was his conduct that led to the prosecution of him for the offences under the Indian Penal Code. If the conduct alleged is the foundation for prosecution, though it may end in acquittal on appreciation or lack of sufficient evidence, the question emerges; whether the Government servant prosecuted for commission of defalcation of public funds and fabrication of the records, though culminated into acquittal, is entitled to be reinstated with consequential benefits ? In our considered view, this grant of consequential benefits with all back-wages etc. cannot be as a matter of course. We think that it would be deleterious to the maintenance of the discipline if a person suspended on valid considerations is given full back-wages as a matter of course, on his acquittal. Two courses are open to the disciplinary authority, viz., it may enquire into misconduct unless, the self same conduct was subject to charge and on trial the acquittal was recorded on a positive finding that the accused did not commit the offence at all; but acquittal is not on benefit of doubt given. Appropriate action may be taken thereon. Even otherwise, the authority may. on reinstatement after following the principle of natural justice, pass appropriate order including treating suspension period as period of not on duty, (and on payment of subsistence allowance etc.) Rules 72(3), 72(5) and 72(7) of the Rules give a discretion to the disciplinary authority. Rule 72 also applies, as the action was taken after the acquittal by which date rule was in force. Therefore, when the suspension period was treated to be a suspension pending the trial and even after acquittal, he was reinstated into service, he would not be entitled to the consequential benefits. As a consequence, he would not be entitled to the benefits of nine increments as stated in para 6 of a the additional affidavit. He is also not entitled to be treated as on duty from the date of suspension till the date of the acquittal for purpose of computation of pensionary benefits. As a consequence, he would not be entitled to the benefits of nine increments as stated in para 6 of a the additional affidavit. He is also not entitled to be treated as on duty from the date of suspension till the date of the acquittal for purpose of computation of pensionary benefits. The appellant is also not entitled to any other consequential benefits as enumerated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the additional affidavit." 6. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that at the time reinstating the petitioner i.e. 26.3.1993, it was clearly mentioned in the reinstatement order that he will not be paid any salary or allowance for the period during which he was kept under suspension and subject to the final order passed by the disciplinary authority in the pending enquiry in this behalf. Subsequently, the departmental enquiry was initiated and the petitioner was subjected to punishment of censure and withholding of promotion till he reaches the age of superannuation. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has relied upon Regulation 15 framed by the Bank, which is as under : "15. Pay allowances and treatment of service on termination of suspension : (1) Where the competent authority holds that the officer employee has been fully exonerated or that the suspension was unjustifiable, the officer employee concerned shall be grant the full pay to which he would have been entitled, had he not been suspended, together with any allowance of which he was in receipt immediately prior to his suspension, or may have been sanctioned subsequently and made applicable to all officer employees. (2) In all cases other than those referred to in sub-regulation (1), the officer employee shall be granted such proportion of pay and allowances as the Competent Authority may direct : Provided that the payment of allowances under this sub- regulation shall be subject to all other conditions to which Such allowances are admissible : Provided further that the pay and allowances granted under this sub regulation shall not be less than the subsistence and other allowances admissible under regulation 14. (3)(a) In a case falling under sub-regulation (1), the period of absence from duty shall, for all purposes, be treated as a period spent on duty : (b) In a case falling under sub-regulation (2), the period of absence from duty shall not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the Competent Authority specifically directs, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it shall be so treated for any specific purpose." 7. In the instant case, after the conclusion of the departmental enquiry the petitioner was found guilty and was awarded punishment of censure and withholding of promotion till attaining the age of superannuation and it was also decided later on that his suspension period shall not be treated as on duty. The respondent Bank as per aforesaid sub-regulation (3)(b) of Regulation 15, decided not to treat the said period on duty, in fact, as per the regulation itself said period is not required to be treated on duty unless there is a specific direction of the Competent Authority. 8. Considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the respondent-Bank was justified in not treating the suspension period as on duty as it is not the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has been exonerated fully in the departmental enquiry. When in the departmental enquiry the petitioner was found guilty by the competent authority, no interference is called for by this Court against the said decision of the competent authority on the question about treating the period during which he was under suspension as not on duty. It is an admitted fact that after retirement, the pension has already been paid to the petitioner by the respondent-Bank. 9. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner may be permitted to make a representation to the concerned authority with a request that the intervening period may be treated as on duty so far as pensionary benefits are concerned. Permission is accordingly, granted. If such representation is made, the concerned authority shall decide the same in accordance with law and as deemed fit within a period of two months from the date of receipt of such representation and whatever may be decision, the same shall be communicated to the petitioner without any further delay. Permission is accordingly, granted. If such representation is made, the concerned authority shall decide the same in accordance with law and as deemed fit within a period of two months from the date of receipt of such representation and whatever may be decision, the same shall be communicated to the petitioner without any further delay. However, such decision on the representation shall be acceptable and binding to the petitioner and the same shall not be subject to further proceedings. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on this aspect of the matter and the concerned authority shall be free to decide the said representation as deemed fit and the observations made in this order may not come in the way for the concerned authority in deciding such represntation. 10. Subject to the above liberty, regarding making representation, these writ petitions are dismissed. Notice discharged. No order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******