JUDGMENT 1. - The appellants, four in number, were indicated before the learned Additional Sessions Judge Jhunjhunu, for having committed murder of Har Lal. Learned Judge vide judgment dated September 21, 2001 convicted and sentenced them as under : U/s. 302 IPC : Each to suffer imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 3,000/-, in default to further suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months. U/s. 147 IPC : Each to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to further suffer rigorous imprisonment for three' months. The substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case as unfolded during trial is that on February 6, 1995 informant Manbhari Devi (Pw.2) submitted a written report (Ex.D-1) at Police Station Nawalgarh to the effect that on the said day around 11.30 AM' she alongwith her husband Har Lal and daughter Kamla had gone to their field situated near the Dhani of Harnand, who was her Jeth (elder brother of Har Lal). Har Nand pursuaded Har Lal to go with him and in turn Har Lal proceeded with Har Nand. After some time she heard cries of Har Lal. She rushed to the house of Har Nand and found Har Lal lying on the ground and Har Nand, Mukh Ram, Patasi, Santosh and Mohini were giving beating to him with Jelly, Gandasi and lathis. When informant tried to intervene, she was threatened by them. Informant alongwith her daughter Kamla thereafter proceeded to the police station and handed over the report. On that report a case was registered under sections 147, 148 and 302 read with 149 IPC and investigation commenced. Dead body of Har Lal was subjected to autopsy, necessary memos were drawn, statements of witnesses were recorded, appellants were arrested and on completion of investigation charge sheet was filed. In due course the case came up for trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge Jhunjhunu. Charges under sections 147 and 302 read with, 149 IPC were framed against the appellants, who denied the charges and claimed trial. The prosecution in support of its case examined as many as 13 witnesses. In the explanation under Section 313 CrPC, the appellants claimed innocence. Three witnesses in support of defence were examined. Learned trial Judge on hearing final submissions convicted and sentenced the appellants as indicated herein above. 3. The prosecution in support of its case examined as many as 13 witnesses. In the explanation under Section 313 CrPC, the appellants claimed innocence. Three witnesses in support of defence were examined. Learned trial Judge on hearing final submissions convicted and sentenced the appellants as indicated herein above. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants while assailing the impugned judgment took us through the material on record. 4. As per Post Mortem report (Ex.P-25) as many as 64 ante mortem injuries were found on the dead body of Har Lal. In the opinion of Dr. Girish Chand Gupta (Pw.4) the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock due to extensive injuries and fractures. 5. The prosecution case is founded on the testimony of Manbhari (Pw.2) and Kamla (Pw.3). Manbhari (Pw.2) in her deposition stated that while she alongwith her husband Harlal and daughter Kamla were standing at their field, her Jeth Harnand took Harlal to his Dhani. After sometime she heard cries of her husband. She and her daughter rushed to the Dhani of Harnand and saw Harlal lying on the ground and Harnand, Mukhram, Patasi, Mohini and Santosh were inflicting injuries on the person of Harlal with Jelly, Gandasi and lathis. When she made attempt to intervene she was threatened by the assailants of dire consequences. Testimony of Manbhari gets corroboration from the evidence of Kamla (Pw.3). 6. Learned counsel for the appellants assailed the evidence of Manbhari and Kamla on the ground that they were near relatives of the deceased and since they were the chance witnesses, their evidence could not have been relied upon. This argument simply deserves to be rejected being devoid of merit. 7. It is well settled that even the testimony of chance witness may be acted upon. In Ismail v. Momin, AIR 1941 Privy Council 11 it was held that though the chance witness is not necessarily a false witness, it is proverbially rash to act upon such evidence. In the case of a chance witness, if that witness gives sufficient reasons for his presence, that evidence can be accepted. 8. Even truthful version of occurrence given by kith and kin of the deceased may be relied upon as was held in Krishna Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1993 SC 1386 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court : (Para 4) "We have gone through the evidence of the eye witnesses. No doubt Pws. 8. Even truthful version of occurrence given by kith and kin of the deceased may be relied upon as was held in Krishna Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1993 SC 1386 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court : (Para 4) "We have gone through the evidence of the eye witnesses. No doubt Pws. 1, 2, 3 and 6 are kith and kin of the deceased but they have given a truthful version of the whole occurrence. Even Ex.P-1 all the material particulars are mentioned particularly the fact that the deceased was dragged to the house of A-1 and that there he was tied and beaten. As noted already even A-1 admitted that the deceased was tied in his house but added that because of the scuffle between PW.6 and the deceased, latter was tied. Immediately after registering the crime, the SHO went to the house of A-1 and found the deceased tied and he was having bleeding injuries. Thus the time, place of occurrence and the cause of death are established beyond doubt. So far as the presence and participation of the appellants are concerned there are statements of the eye-witnesses consistently to this effect. Both the Courts below have given cogent and convincing reasons for accepting the evidence of the eye witnesses. The evidence adduced in defence is not at all material and the courts below have rightly rejected the same. The trial court acquitted Keshra Ram A-6 giving the benefit of doubt. In our view the same in any manner does not affect the evidence of eye witnesses who are the most natural witnesses. We see absolutely no merit in these appeals. The appeals are dismissed accordingly." 9. In Ram Lakhan v. State of U.P., AIR 1996 SC 3429 , held that the evidence of close relatives of deceased is not liable to be rejected on the ground of interested witnesses. What is necessary is that Court should scrutinise evidence of such witness carefully. 10. In Baitullah v. State of U.P., AIR 1997 SC 3946 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that evidence of interested witness cannot be discarded merely on ground that he is interested. It is normally expected that witness would not leave out real culprits and rope in innocent persons. 11. In Tapubha Bhagwanji v. State of Gujarat, 2002 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 10. In Baitullah v. State of U.P., AIR 1997 SC 3946 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that evidence of interested witness cannot be discarded merely on ground that he is interested. It is normally expected that witness would not leave out real culprits and rope in innocent persons. 11. In Tapubha Bhagwanji v. State of Gujarat, 2002 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 593 : AIR 2002 SC 2794 the Apex Court held as under : (Para 12) "The witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution are witnesses who in normal course of event are expected to know about the incident. Their deposition do not reveal any good reason for rejecting their evidence as untrustworthy or unreliable. Nothing has been brought on record either in cross- examination of the witnesses concerned or in any other evidence to show any good reason as to why they should falsely implicate the accused in the case. Thus rejection of their testimony on ground that they are interested witnesses being in relation of deceased, not proper." 12. In Angnoo v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 296 the Apex Court held that the fact of relationship would add to value of his evidence because he would be interested in getting the real culprit, rather than innocent persons, punished. 13. In Bolineedi Venkataramaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1994 SC 76 the Apex Court considered the case where there was bitter enmity between prosecution party and accused party, group of persons chased deceased and inflicted injuries. The presence of witnesses at place of'- occurrence was not found doubtful. It was held that being interested witnesses their evidence was subjected to greater scrutiny. Specific overt acts were attributed to accused. Corroboration of overt acts by medical and circumstantial evidence was found. Only those accused to whom specific overt acts had been attributed consistently by all witnesses were convicted. The plea that some of the accused were acquitted, the same evidence cannot be accepted against other accused, was not found tenable. 14. In Suraj Pal v. State of U.P., AIR 1994 SC 748 the Apex Court found that the medical evidence fully established the injury to eye witnesses, eye witnesses gave consistent version and it was held that their evidence: cannot be discarded on ground that they were interested witnesses or that co-accused was acquitted on self-same evidence or that there were minor variations. 15. 15. In Ram Gopal v. State of Rajasthan, 1999 (1) RLW SC 58 where the venue of the incident and time was such that no independent witness could be expected to be present the evidence of related witnesses was considered. The fact of absence of details of occurrence in FIR, which are consistent with the detailed narration of the eye witnesses in the evidence, was considered and held that the FIR cannot be rejected. 16. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1995) 8 JT (SC) 425 , the Apex Court held that We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently being partisan witness should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this court as early as in Dalip Singh's case AIR 1953 SC 364 in which this court expressed its surprise over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the members of the bar that relatives were not independent witness Speaking through VIVIAN BOSE J., the Court observed in para 25 of AIR 1953 SC) : "We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eye witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rules. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur." 17. In Thangaiya v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2005 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 227: 2005 Cri.L.J. 684 , the Apex Court indicated as under : "In a murder trial by describing the independent witnesses as 'chance witnesses' it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses, soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passers-by will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere 'chance witnesses'. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses, soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passers-by will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere 'chance witnesses'. The expression 'chance witness' is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their presence. In the instant case, the plea of the accused that PW-3 was chance witness' who has not explained how he happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence, it has to be noted that the said witness was an independent witness. There was not even a suggestion to the witness that he had any animosity towards the accused. Therefore, there is no substance in the plea that evidence of independent witness which is clear and cogent is to be discarded." 18. Law does not insist on plurality of evidence. The evidence is to be weighed and not counted. Section 134 of the Evidence Act lays down in clear terms that no particular number of witnesses is necessary for the proof of any fact. 19. Having analysed the evidence of Manbhari and Kamla from the point of view of trustworthiness we find it consistent qua appellants Harnand and Mukhram. We are however of the view that possibility of over implication of Smt. Patasi, Smt. Santosh and Smt. Mohini cannot be ruled out. Since Smt. Mohini died during trial we grant benefit of doubt to Smt. Santosh and Smt. Patasi. 20. For these reasons, we dispose of the instant appeal in the following terms : (i) We allow the appeals of Patasi @ Dhapa w/o Harnand Ram and Santosh d/o Harnand Ram and acquit them of the charges under s sections 147, 302/149 IPC. These appellants are on bail, they need not surrender and their bail bonds stand discharged. (ii) We find no merit in the appeal of Harnand Ram and Mukh Ram and it accordingly stands dismissed. These appellants are on bail, they need not surrender and their bail bonds stand discharged. (ii) We find no merit in the appeal of Harnand Ram and Mukh Ram and it accordingly stands dismissed. We instead of Section 302/149 convict Harnand Ram and Mukh Ram under section 302/34 of the IPC. We however, acquit them of the charge under section 147 IPC. Appellant Harnand Ram is on. bail, his bail bonds stand cancelled and he shall be taken in custody forthwith. (iii) The impugned judgment of the learned trial court stands modified as indicated herein above. Appeal of H and M1 Dismissed and that of P, S and M2 Allowed. *******