O R D E R This criminal petition is filed to quash the charge sheet, in C.C. No. 569 of 2003, on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Sircilla, Karimnagar District in Cr. No. 29 of 2003 of Mustabad Police Station, for the offence under Section 309 IPC. 2. The allegations in the charge sheet are that the petitioner herein, a resident of Mustabad village, had attempted to commit suicide demanding sanction of a Government Junior College at Mustabad Mandal Headquarters. On 15.08.2003 at 10.00 hours the Mandal Revenue Officer, Mustabad made a complaint stating that on the same day the petitioner hereirn had given him a call that he would commit suicide jumping down from the Telephone tower, Mustabad at or before 12.00 hours on 15.08.2003 if the Junior College was not sanctioned to Mustabad Mandal Headquarters and that he had also demanded that the functioning of the Junior College be commenced immediately from ZPSS school on a shift basis. The Sub-Inspector of Police, Mustabad P.S. (L.W.7) rushed to the telephone exchange at Mustabad, made systematic and tactful efforts and got the accused down from the telephone exchange tower at 15-35 hours. The confession statement of the accused was recorded and a bottle of petrol and a match box were seized from his possession. L.Ws- 1 to 4 were examined and their detailed statements recorded. As the accused had complained of chest pain he was immediately sent to Sircilla for treatment. While undergoing treatment the petitioner absconded from the hospital. On 29.08.2003 he was apprehended at his residence and, on interrogation, is said to have admitted his guilt. He was arrested, brought to the police station, issued an arrest card and the formalities of his arrest was completed. 3. According to the charge sheet, from the facts collected during investigation, it was established that the accused had earlier organized a fast-unto-death demanding sanction of a Government Junior College at Mustabad Mandal Headquarters. The Chairman, Zilla Parishad, Karimnagar had assured him that he would seek sanction from the Hon’ble Chief Minister and had pursuaded to him to call off his stir. As there was no response to his request, that a college be established at Mustabad Mandal Headquarters, the petitioner-accused had decided on self-immolation burning himself with petrol and jumping from the top of the Microwave Tower. As there was no response to his request, that a college be established at Mustabad Mandal Headquarters, the petitioner-accused had decided on self-immolation burning himself with petrol and jumping from the top of the Microwave Tower. Accordingly on 15.08.2003 he had sent a notice to the Mandal Revenue Officer and had climbed on top of the Telephone exchange tower, at Mustabad at 0800 hours, with a bottle of petrol demanding sanction orders from the government as well as an announcement by the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh through Radio and T.V. channels regarding sanction of a government Junior College at Mustabad Headquarters. On intervention by the police his plan was foiled. The witnesses, examined during investigation, stated that the accused was cleverly brought down from the tower and the petrol can taken away from him. 4. Sri K. Balagopal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that an attempt to commit an offence involves three stages, the first is where the idea or the intention to commit the offence is entertained, the second when preparation is made to commit the offence and the third when deliberate overt steps are taken to commit the offence. Learned Counsel would submit that such overt acts, in order to constitute an offence, must be an act during the course of committing that offence, and that it is necessary that such act or acts must be deliberately done and must manifest a clear intention to commit the offence reasonably proximate to the consummation of the offence. Learned Counsel would submit that in this case, while the petitioner-accused had informed everybody that he was going to commit suicide on 15th August 2003 at 12.00 noon and had climbed on top of the tower at 8.00 AM with a can of petrol in his hand, he was persuaded to come down at 15-35 hours. Learned Counsel would submit that the very fact that the petitioner did not commit suicide by 12.00 noon and had not carried out his threat till 1.30 p.m would show that, at the proximate point of time, the intention to commit suicide was not manifest. Learned Counsel would submit that the very fact that the petitioner did not commit suicide by 12.00 noon and had not carried out his threat till 1.30 p.m would show that, at the proximate point of time, the intention to commit suicide was not manifest. Learned Counsel would further submit that the investigating officer had himself stated that he had made systematic and tactful efforts to get the accused down which would establish that the accused was not physically, or through the use of force, prevented from committing the offence, but was persuaded to change his mind and come down from the top of the tower. Learned counsel would submit that the test, to attract the ingredients of the offence of attempting to commit suicide under Section 309 I.P.C, is the manifestation of a clear intention to commit the offence reasonably proximate to its consummation. Learned counsel would contend that as such an intention to commit suicide is not manifested, even on a reading of a charge sheet as a whole and accepting the allegations made therein as true, the ingredients of Section 309 IPC are not attracted. Learned Counsel would place reliance on RAMAMOORTHY @ VANNIA ADIKALAR VS. STATE(1) RAM SUNDER DUBEY VS. STATE (2), MANGERAM BHAIRURAM VS. LAL CHHATRA-MOHANSINGH(3) , STATE OF U.P. VS. RAM CHARAN(4), MALKIAT SINGH VS. STATE OF PUNJAB(5) and STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VS. MOHD. YAKUB(6). 5. Before examining these contentions, it is necessary to note Section 309 IPC which reads thus: “Whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any act towards the commission of such offence, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend tone year, or with fine, or with both.” 6. Now the judgments relied upon on behalf of the petitioner. 7. In Ramamoorthy(1 supra), on 08.12.1986 at 3.00 pm the petitioner had commenced a fast-unto-death before Ambur town police station demanding that the Inspector of Police, Ambur town, and the District Collector, be suspended and Sri Subramani, who was detained, be set at liberty. The petitioner was arrested, at 5.30 p.m on 10.12.1986, after Dr. Sekhar of the Ambur Government Hospital had examined him. The petitioner was given medical treatment in the hospital which he did not refuse and was ultimately prosecuted for attempting to commit suicide in respect of the incidents which had occurred between 08.12.1986 and 10.12.1986. The petitioner was arrested, at 5.30 p.m on 10.12.1986, after Dr. Sekhar of the Ambur Government Hospital had examined him. The petitioner was given medical treatment in the hospital which he did not refuse and was ultimately prosecuted for attempting to commit suicide in respect of the incidents which had occurred between 08.12.1986 and 10.12.1986. The prosecution alleged that a placard was kept at the place of the fast and that pamphlets had also been distributed. In this context the Madras High Court observed: “........The first contention which is based more on facts has to be now scrutinized. The petitioner inCrl. M.P. No. 533/87 had commenced his fast-unto-death, opposite to Ambur town Police Station. The records forwarded under S. 173, Cr.P.C. to the trial Magistrate show that the petitioner had certain demands, which necessitated his commencing the fast. The demands were that the District Collector and the Inspector of Police Mbur town, had to be suspended and that Subramani of Kamma Krishapally had to be released from preventive detention. The fast of the petitioner commenced at 3 p.m. on 08.12.1986 and virtually ended at 5.30 p.m on 10.12.1986 when he was arrested. The very averment made by the prosecution shows, that the fast was not really intended to last till the death of the petitioner, but would have terminated in the event of his demands having been met, by the authority, whomsoever it might be. In the event of non-compliance with the demands made, the attitude of the petitioner must indicate, the necessity or otherwise of prosecuting him for the alleged commission of an offence under S. 309, I.P.C. Soon after his arrest, the petitioner was taken before Dr. Sekar, the Medical officer attached to the Government Hospital, Ambur. The doctor found that the general condition of the petitioner was not satisfactory and therefore he was admitted as an in-patient at 7.30 p.m. and was discharged at 9.30 a.m. on 14.12.1986. Without any demur, the petitioner underwent treatment in the hospital and, the time of his discharge, his healthcondition was found to be in a very good state. The attitude of the petitioner in accepting medical facilities at the hospital without any protest and, after discharge, having forgotten his earlier vow to fastunto-death, will certainly indicate that the petitioner did not have the mens rea to destroy himself. The attitude of the petitioner in accepting medical facilities at the hospital without any protest and, after discharge, having forgotten his earlier vow to fastunto-death, will certainly indicate that the petitioner did not have the mens rea to destroy himself. To establish the offences under S. 309, I.P.C., the prosecution must show, that the act of the accused amounted to an attempt and that the attempt was complete by doing an act towards the commission of suicide. There can be no doubt that, if a person refraining from taking bodily sustenance for the purpose of destroying his own life, being conscious of the probable consequences and having at that time sufficient mind to will destruction of life, ingredients of S. 309, I.P.C. will be attracted. On the other hand, as in this case, if the proposed fast-unto-death had been commenced with certain demands and even before they were conceded, the petitioner chooses to get himself treated without protest, it will only indicate that there was neither sufficient mind nor will to destroy himself. If that be so, his being conscious of the probable consequences does not at all arise. Suicide has not been defined in the Penal Code and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chenna Jagadeeswar’s case (1988 CrI.L.J. 549) has extracted the comprehensive definition of suicide’ by Emile Durkheim, an eminent sociologist of the 19th century, which reads as follows (at p. 556 of CrI.L.J.) “The term suicide is applied to all cases of deaths resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he knows will produce this result. An attempt is an act thus defined but falling short of actual death.” In our country, fasting is undertaken for several causes. It cannot be disputed that the peculiar difficulty about suicide by starvation is that it is a long drawn out process, could be interrupted or given up at any stage. Unless there is some overt declaration by the accused of his opinion to fast-unto-death, coupled with such conduct, to positively show that he intended to persevere to the bitter end, the provision of S. 309 I.P.C. will not come into play. Unless there is some overt declaration by the accused of his opinion to fast-unto-death, coupled with such conduct, to positively show that he intended to persevere to the bitter end, the provision of S. 309 I.P.C. will not come into play. Even if there be such intention in the beginning, one may have always to make an allowance for the possibility of the change in mind and breaking the fast before it becomes dangerous in this case, it is fairly clear, that the petitioner abstained from taking food for approximately three days with the object of bringing pressure to bear upon the authorities, so as to force them to remedy his grievances, and his life was never actually in danger upto the time he broke his fast and further his subsequent conduct would categorically proclaim that he had never intended to carryon fasting upto the point of death “ (emphasis supplied). 8. In Ram Sunder Dubey2, the petitioner-accused, an employee in the Mental Hospital, Bareilly, on his being suspended from service, was said to have attempted to commit suicide resorting to a hunger strike. Alleging that his being placed under suspension was unfair and discriminatory, and demanding that he be reinstated into service, the petitioner went on a hunger strike on 27th of February, 1960. On 01.03.1960, the Station House Officer of Bareilly Kotwali, on finding that the condition of the accused had deteriorated, transferred him to the hospital. While admitting that he had gone on a hunger strike the accused denied that he intended to fast onto death. He produced evidence to show that he was taking lemon juice during the continuation of his fast. The Allahabad High Court observed: “.....It is important to note that the prosecution has not chosen to produce any evidence to show that the accused persisted in his fast even after his arrest. There is no suggestion in this case that the authorities were ever obliged to resort to forcibly feeding and it seems that eventually the accused must have agreed to take food in the normal way. He himself says that he gave up his fast when he found that action was being taken to redress his grievances. There is no suggestion in this case that the authorities were ever obliged to resort to forcibly feeding and it seems that eventually the accused must have agreed to take food in the normal way. He himself says that he gave up his fast when he found that action was being taken to redress his grievances. I find therefore that there is no evidence of any clear intention on the part of the accused to kill himself: signs of starvation had only just begun to appear when he was arrested; and it would seem that eventually he himself voluntarily gave up the fast that he had undertaken. In the circumstances I am unable to agree with the findings arrived at by the courts below, for there appears to be no justification for holding that the accused actually attempted to commit suicide. All that the evidence on record proves is that he abstained from taking food for three or four days with the object of bringing pressure to bear on the authorities so as to force them to remedy his grievances. It does not appear that his life was ever actually in danger up to the time when he broke his fast and there is nothing on the record that would show that he had ever intended to carry on casting to the point of death.........” (emphasis supplied). 9. In MANGERAM BHAIRURAM (3), the Nagpur High Court held: “......The question as to what constitutes an attempt to commit an offence within the meaning of that section was exhaustively discussed in Asgarali Pradhamia Vs. Emperor, 61 C1 54: (AIR (20) 1933 Cal. 893: 35 Cr.L.J. 97) and I am in respectful agreement with the view of the Division Bench that an accused is liable for attempt when his failure to commit an offence is not due to any act or omission of his own, but to the intervention of some factor independent of his own volition. The vital words in S. 511; Penal Code, are “does any act towards the commission of the offence”: and it follows that if an accused, intending to administer something capable of causing a miscarriage, administers a harmless substance his act cannot amount to an act towards the commission of the offence of causing a miscarriage. The vital words in S. 511; Penal Code, are “does any act towards the commission of the offence”: and it follows that if an accused, intending to administer something capable of causing a miscarriage, administers a harmless substance his act cannot amount to an act towards the commission of the offence of causing a miscarriage. Similarly, if a man with intent to hurt another by administering poison, prepares and administers some innocuous substance, believing it to be poisonous, he cannot be convicted of attempted poisoning. This was the opinion of Stevens J.C. in Empress Vs. Mt. Rupai Panku, 9 C.P.L.R. (Cr.) 14, who pointed that while the accused intended to administer poison to her husband, the act which she committed was merely the administration of a harmless substance. This view is reinforced by the illustrations to S. 511, Penal Code. In illus. (a) the accused had done an act towards the commission of the theft of jewels by breaking open a box which he found to be empty. That is, the theft would have been committed but for the circumstance that a factor independent of his own volition intervened to inhibit it. The same applies to illus. (b) in which the accused thrust his hand into another man’s pocket and found that there was nothing init. Similarly, as Blackburn and Mellor JJ. Decided in Regina Vs. Hensler, (1870) 11 Cox. C.C. 570, an accused may be convicted of an attempt to steal a watch although he is frustrated by the fact that the watch was securely fastened by a guard “ (emphasis supplied) 10. In RAM CHARAN(5), the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed: “......While, in our view, it is not possible to give a precise or exhaustive definition of “attempt” it may be broadly stated that an intentional act which a person does towards the commission of an offence but which fails in its object through circumstances independent of the volition of that person is “attempt” ....” (emphasis supplied). 11. What constitutes an attempt to commit an offence is a mixed question of law and fact, depending largely on the circumstances of the particular case. Attempt defies a precise and exact definition. Broadly speaking, all crimes which consist of the commission of affirmative acts are preceded by some covert or overt conduct which may be divided into three stages. 11. What constitutes an attempt to commit an offence is a mixed question of law and fact, depending largely on the circumstances of the particular case. Attempt defies a precise and exact definition. Broadly speaking, all crimes which consist of the commission of affirmative acts are preceded by some covert or overt conduct which may be divided into three stages. The first stage exists when the culprit first entertains the idea or intention to commit an offence. In the second stage, he makes preparations to commit it. The third stage is reached when the culprit takes deliberate overt steps to commit the offence. Such an overt act or step, in order to be criminal, need not be the penultimate act towards the commission of the offence. It is sufficient if such act or acts were deliberately done, and manifest a clear intention to commit the offence aimed, being reasonably proximate to the consummation of the offence. In order to constitute an attempt, first, there must be an intention to commit a particular offence, second, some act must have been done which ‘would necessarily have to be done towards the commission of the offence, and, third, such act must be proximate to the intended result. 12. The measure of proximity is not in relation to time and action but in relation to intention. In other words, the act must reveal, with reasonable certainty, in conjunction with other facts and circumstances and not necessarily in isolation, an intention, as distinguished from a mere desire or object, to commit the particular offence, though the act by itself may be merely suggestive or indicative of such intention. Attempt begins where preparation ends. A person commits the offence of attempt to commit a particular offence when (t) he intends to commit that particular offence and (it) he, having made preparations and with the intention to commit the offence, does an act towards its commission; must be an act during the course of committing that offence (MOHD.YAKUB(6)). 13. An attempt to commit the offence is a direct movement towards the commission after preparations are made. In order that a person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime he must be shown first to have had an intention to commit the offence, and secondly to have done an act which constitutes the actus reus of a criminal attempt. In order that a person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime he must be shown first to have had an intention to commit the offence, and secondly to have done an act which constitutes the actus reus of a criminal attempt. An attempt is an act done with intent to commit that crime, and forming part of a series of acts which would constitute its actual commission if it were not interrupted. The point at which such a series of acts begins cannot be defined, but depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. The test for determining whether the act constitutes an attempt or mere preparation is whether the overt acts already done are such that if the offender changes his mind, and does not proceed further in its progress, the acts already done would be completely harmless (Malkiat Singh5). 14. In the present case the petitioner, without any demur, came down from the tower. The attitude of the petitioner in coming down from the tower, on being persuaded to do so, and after having come down to have forgotten his earlier vow to commit suicide, would indicate that the petitioner did not have the mens rea to kill himself by committing suicide. To attract the ingredients of an offence under S. 309 I.P.C., it must be shown, that the act of the accused amounted to an attempt and that the attempt was complete by doing an act towards the commission of the offence. In this case, the proposed act of committing suicide had commenced with certain demands and, even before they were conceded, the petitioner chose to give up on his own volition, albeit with some persuasion, which only indicates that there was neither sufficient intention nor the will to put an end to his life. It does not appear that the petitioner’s life was ever actually in danger, upto the time when he was persuaded to come down from the tower nor can it be said that he intended to carry out his threat to the point of death. An accused is liable for attempt when his failure to commit an offence is not due to any act or omission of his own volition, but due to the intervention of some factor independent of his own volition. An accused is liable for attempt when his failure to commit an offence is not due to any act or omission of his own volition, but due to the intervention of some factor independent of his own volition. An intentional act which a person does towards the commission of an offence but which fails in its object through circumstances, independent of the volition of that person, is “attempt”. In the present case, the petitioner abandoned his attempt to commit suicide not due to external force or through circumstances independent of his own volition. The allegation in the charge sheet, that he was persuaded to come down from the tower, would indicate that, on being persuaded to do so, the petitioner on his own volition came down from the tower. 15. Even on a reading of the allegations in the charge sheet as a whole and in its entirety, and accepting them as true, it cannot be said that the ingredients attracting the offence under Section 309 I.P.C are made out. The proceedings in C.C.No.569 of 2003, on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Sircilla, Karimnagar are accordingly quashed. The Criminal Petition is allowed. --X--