JUDGMENT I. MAHANTY, J. — The appellant Muralidhar Satpathy, has filed the present writ appeal against an order dated 23.11.2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.371 of 2006*, partly allowing the same by quashing cognizance under Section 138 N.I. Act, but declining to quash a criminal proceeding against the appellant under Section 420/34 I.P.C., which is now pending in the Court of the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar (arising out of G.R. Case No.3507 of 2004). 2. The Writ Petition (Crl.) No.371 of 2006 was disposed of by the learned Single Judge of this Court vide Order dated 23.11.2006, inter alia, with the following observations: “In the instant case, as transpires from the F.I.R. and the Case Diary, in fact, there is no Real Estate Business of the petitioner and accused Pradeep Satpathy or either of them. Ac¬cordingly, the decision cited above cannot be attracted to the present case. In the result, the proceeding initiated against the petitioner including the order of taking cognizance under Section 138 of N.I. Act is quashed, but so far as the proceeding under Section 420/34 I.P.C. is concerned,it shall continue against him. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of.” 3. Sri G. Rath, Sr. Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as well as under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing a criminal proceeding, the learned Single Judge, has failed to apply the proposition of law formulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & others, AIR 1992 SC 604 and has not considered, whether the allegations made in the F.I.R. and the evidence collected by the police are so absurd that no reasonable person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused.He further submitted that in the present case, the principles evolved in Ch. Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) should have been applied. He further submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the true scope of the judgment rendered in the case of Haridaya Ranjan Pd. Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) should have been applied. He further submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the true scope of the judgment rendered in the case of Haridaya Ranjan Pd. Verma and others v. State of Bihar and another, AIR 2000 S.C. 2341 , inasmuch as, since the ingredients of Section 420/34 I.P.C. have neither been expressly stated nor indirectly suggested in the F.I.R., so as to constitute an offence of cheat¬ing by the appellant, the criminal proceeding against the appel¬lant ought to be quashed. 4. Sri Rath, learned counsel for the appellant drew the attention of the Court to the F.I.R. in the present case and the same is extracted hereinbelow : “To The Officer-in-Charge, Lingaraj P.S., Old Town, Bhubaneswar. Sir, With no constraint, I am informing you to take immediate action that in the month of October, 2003, one Pradip Satpathy, S/o. Muralidhar Satpathy, 20, Housing Board Colony, Nageswar¬tangi, BBSR told me that his father being a Retd. Chief Engineer, has started a real estate business. For that he needs some cash urgently which he will return within one month. He asked me to help in this regard. Accordingly, I went to his home & consulted with his Father who also asked me to invest. Then, I arranged about 14,50,000/- (Fourteen Lakh Fifty Thousand) from my friends & handed over to him in his father’s presence in good faith and believe. But unfortunately, he did not keep his promise & did not return my money after several requests. During this period, he has given me several dates to return the money, but every time he failed taking one plea and the other. Today when I went to his house at 2. PM and asked him to return my money, he abused me in filthy language & threatened me to do away with my life. Having lost all hopes, I am filing this F.I.R. for immediate legal action against him. Yours faithfully, Sd/- 28.10.2004 Bhubaneswar Tapas Kumar Sahoo Advocate, Plot No.216/40/1, Aerodrome Area, BBSR, Ph-9437143054 Sd/- T. Sahoo 28.10.2004 Received the report. It reveals a Cog. Case U/s.420/294/506/34 I.P.C. Registered P.S. Case No.205/04 and I am taking up the investigation. Issue a copy of the FIR to the Complt. Free of cost. 28/x/04 7.05 PM Sd/-Illegible 28/x/04 IIC, Lingraj PS.” 5. It reveals a Cog. Case U/s.420/294/506/34 I.P.C. Registered P.S. Case No.205/04 and I am taking up the investigation. Issue a copy of the FIR to the Complt. Free of cost. 28/x/04 7.05 PM Sd/-Illegible 28/x/04 IIC, Lingraj PS.” 5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the informant who claims to be a practising advocate at Bhubaneswar lodged an F.I.R., before the police, alleging that one Pradeep Satpathy (son of the present appellant) wanted a loan from him for one month, i.e., in the month of October’ 2003, by telling him that his father (present appellant) being a retired Chief Engineer, had started a Real Estate Business, for which, he (Pradeep Satpathy) needs some cash urgently and will return the same within one month. The F.I.R. further indicates that he (Pradeep Satpathy) asked him (informant) to help him in this re¬gard. Accordingly, the informant went to his (Pradeep Satpathy’s) home and consulted with his (Pradeep Satpathy’s) father. He (Appellant) also asked him (informant) to invest the money. The F.I.R. further reveals that the informant claims to have arranged about Rs.14,50,000/- from his friends and handed over to him (Pradeep Satpathy) in his father’s presence. In the F.I.R., after narrating the aforesaid events, the complaint is as follows : “But unfortunately, he (Pradeep Satpathy) did not keep his (Pradeep Satpathy) promise and did not return my money after several requests. During this period, he (Pradeep Satpathy) has given me (informant) several dates to return the money, but every time, he (Pradeep Satpathy) failed taking one plea and the other.” Further, on the date of lodging the F.I.R., the informant claims that he had gone to Pradeep Satpahty’s house at 2.00 P.M. and asked him (Pradeep Satpathy) to return the money but Pradeep Satpathy abused him in filthy language and threatened him to do away with his life.Having lost all hopes, the informant filed the F.I.R. for immediate legal action against him (Pradeep Satpathy). 6. The learned Addl.Govt. Advocate, on the other hand supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge and opposed this application and submitted that since a prima facie case had already been found by the learned Single Judge, the appellant ought to face trial, and this is not a case where the order of cognizance ought to be quashed. 7. 6. The learned Addl.Govt. Advocate, on the other hand supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge and opposed this application and submitted that since a prima facie case had already been found by the learned Single Judge, the appellant ought to face trial, and this is not a case where the order of cognizance ought to be quashed. 7. A detailed analysis of the F.I.R. is necessary in the present case, inasmuch as, the entire F.I.R. as a whole reveals an alleged transaction of ‘loan’ between the informant and Pra¬deep Satpathy (son of the present appellant) and contains the following allegations: (i) The informant claims that Pradeep Satpathy had informed him that his father (present appellant) was retired a Chief Engineer and had started a Real Estate Business. (ii) Pradeep Satpathy had asked the informant for a loan and promised to return the same within one month. (iii) The informant handed over the cash to Sri Pradeep Satpathy. (iv) Pradeep Satpathy did not return the money to the informant. (v) Pradeep Satpathy abused the informant and threatened him and, therefore, the informant sought for legal action against Pradeep Satpathy. Therefore, on a complete reading of the F.I.R., it is clear that the only allegation made against the present appellant is that the informant had consulted with the present appellant and it is alleged that the present appellant asked the informant to ‘invest’ “and that the money had been handed over by the inform¬ant to Pradeep Satpathy in the ‘presence’ of the present appel¬lant.” 8. It is also clear that the learned Single Judge has also taken a note of the limited nature of allegation against the present appellant contained in the F.I.R. but the learned Judge held that, since it is alleged in the F.I.R. that the appellant had asked the informant to ‘invest’ the money, it cannot be held that there is no material in the F.I.R. and the Case Diary dis¬closing fraudulent misrepresentation and inducement for passing with money. Now, it needs to be determined as to whether the appellant could be prosecuted under Section 420 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code for having asked the informant to “invest” the money and/or for having been allegedly been “present” at the time when the informant claims to have handed over the money to Pra¬deep Satpathy. 9. Now, it needs to be determined as to whether the appellant could be prosecuted under Section 420 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code for having asked the informant to “invest” the money and/or for having been allegedly been “present” at the time when the informant claims to have handed over the money to Pra¬deep Satpathy. 9. From a reading of the F.I.R., it is clear that, it is not the case of the informant that the present appellant had asked for the loan nor it is a case that the appellant had ever informed him that he had started any Real Estate Business. The F.I.R. indicates that Pradeep Kumar Satpathy had informed the informant about the so called Real Estate Business said to have been started by the present appellant. Therefore, whether in fact, Pradeep Satpathy has started a Real Estate Business or not is of no consequence vis-a-vis the allegation levelled against the present appellant. It is further clear that the informant has not made any allegation that the present appellant had ever informed him that he had started any Real Estate Business. Therefore, from the facts noted hereinabove, it is to be determined as to whether the allegation against the present appellant, to the extent of “asking the informant to invest money” at all attracts the provision of Section 420 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code. It also needs to be ascertained as to whether the informant had advanced a “loan” or had made an “investment” in the real estate business ? 10. From the F.I.R., it is clear that, the informant was approached by Pradeep Satpathy “for a loan” and the essential allegation in the complaint in the F.I.R. relates to the “non-refund of the said loan”. In this case, it is apparent that the word ‘invest’ has been used in the F.I.R. by the informant as a ‘synonym’ for the word ‘loan’ although the two words carry dif¬ferent meanings and are not synonymous. It is also clear from the statement of the informant in the F.I.R., that, the accused (Pradeep Satpathy) has given him three cheques towards the ‘loan’ taken by him. It is also clear from the statement of the informant in the F.I.R., that, the accused (Pradeep Satpathy) has given him three cheques towards the ‘loan’ taken by him. This clearly establishes the fact that, the entire allegation contained in the F.I.R., relates only to a ‘loan’ advanced by the informant to the said Pradeep Satpathy and not for an ‘investment’ and the mere consent of the appellant for the ‘loan’ by his son and his alleged ‘presence’ at the time of handing over the money to his son, Pradeep Satpathy also does not and cannot attract any criminal liability on the part of the appellant far less constitute a charge under Section 420 I.P.C. 11. Apart from the aspects dealt with hereinabove, it is also necessary to take note of the fact that the informant, who is a practising advocate, does not state the following aspects in the F.I.R. : (a) the date on which, he has been approached by the said Pra¬deep Satpathy for the said loan; (b) the date on which he consulted the appellant regarding the ‘investment’; (c) nor does the informant give the date on which, he claims to have handed over the cash to the said Pradeep Satpathy and; (d) further also does not disclose the identity of the ‘friends’ from whom the informant allegedly collected such huge amount of cash for the purpose of giving the loan to said Pradeep Satpathy. 12. In the case at hand, the entire allegation in the F.I.R. except, stating that the informant had consulted the appellant before advancing the loan to the appellant’s son (Pradeep Satpathy) and that the informant had handed over the money as ‘loan’ to Pradeep Satpathy in the presence of the appel¬lant, no further specific act has been attributed to him. 13. It is well settled proposition of law that, in order to attract an offence under Section 420 I.P.C., there should be material to show that : (i) the accused caused the destruction of some property or some change in such property or in the situation thereof; (ii) the above act destroyed or diminished the value or utility of such property or affected it injuriously; (iii) the accused did it with intention or knowledge that he was likely to cause loss or damage to the public or to any per¬son; (iv) the causing of such damage or injury was wrongful. (v) the loss or damage caused amounted to Rs.50/- or more. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that none of the aforesaid attributes is satisfied in the present case for attracting an offence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. Learned counsel further submits that the facts are emanate from the F.I.R., concerning the present appellant, are limited to the appellant (father of Pradeep Satpathy) having told the informant to ‘invest’ and allegedly being ‘present’ in his house at the time when the informant gave the loan in cash to Pradeep Satpa¬thy. Learned counsel also submits that even accepting these allegations against the appellant (without admitting to be cor¬rect), even then, the aforesaid acts on the part of the appel¬lant,do not constitute any offence under the I.P.C. far less an offence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. 15. The Apex Court in the case of Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B., AIR 1954 SC 724 , observed that in order to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered. In the case of G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, 2000 (3) SCC 693 , the Apex Court indicated: “As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must, ‘dishonestly’ or ‘fraudulently’ induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional...” A guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, ‘mens-rea’ on the part of that person must be established (See AIR 1956 SC 575 : Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay). In the second part, the inducement should be intentional...” A guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, ‘mens-rea’ on the part of that person must be established (See AIR 1956 SC 575 : Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay). The aforesaid decision of the Apex Court was relied upon by this Court in the case of Uma Shankar Mishra v. State of Orissa; 2003 (II) OLR-35, wherein one of us (B.P. Das, J.) came to hold that in the said case the allegation against the petitioner was limited to the extent that the petitioner had disbursed the awarded amount but no other act has been attributed to the peti¬tioner and, therefore, this Court came to hold that no offence under Section 420 I.P.C., as alleged can be said to have been committed by the petitioner thereunder. 16. In a more recent case of Mukesh Dhirubhai Ambani v. Prafulla Kumar Mishra, 2006 (I) OLR-551, Hon’ble Shri Justice R.N. Biswal,J. on analyzing the facts in the said case, as well as the law laid down by the Apex Court, in so far as the princi¬ples of quashing of cognizance is concerned, quashed the criminal proceeding on the ground that “the complaint therein, did not disclose any offence or was frivolous and vexatious.” 17. Thus, on a consideration of all the facts, as noted hereinabove, we are of the view that this is a fit case for quashing the order of cognizance and the proceeding in G.R. Case No.3507 of 2004 pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar against the present appellant Muralidhar Satpathy, since, we are of the opinion that the allegation contained in the F.I.R. against the present appellant, are so absurd that no reasonable person can reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the present appellant; and further since the chances of an ultimate conviction are so bleak that no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal proceeding to continue against the appellant. Accordingly, we set aside the part of the Judgment of this Court, dated 23.11.2006 passed in W.P.(C) No.371 of 2006 relating to Section 420/34 I.P.C. and consequently, quash the order of cognizance under Section 420 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code against the present appellant. Accordingly, we set aside the part of the Judgment of this Court, dated 23.11.2006 passed in W.P.(C) No.371 of 2006 relating to Section 420/34 I.P.C. and consequently, quash the order of cognizance under Section 420 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code against the present appellant. The Writ Appeal is allowed. B. P. DAS, J. I agree. Appeal allowed.