JUDGMENT 1. - By this writ petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 6.8.2007 whereby she has been suspended from the office of Chairman, Municipal Board, Gangapur City. 2. The facts, in brief, of the case are that the petitioner was elected as a Member of the Municipal Board, Gangapur City in August 2005 from Ward No. 31 and she was further elected as Chairman to the said Municipal Board in August 2005 itself. It is stated in the writ petition that the petitioner contested the election as a Congress I candidate and Smt. Shobha Gurjar, wife of the respondent No. 2, was elected as Vice Chairman who belongs to Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP). The respondent No. 2, husband of Smt. Shobha Gurjar also belongs to BJP and is an active politician of the area, therefore, with ulterior motive, he filed complaint against the petitioner to the President of BJP on 17.12.2006. The President, BJP forwarded the same to the Minister, Local Self Government by name with the recommendation to make inquiry in the matter and take action thereon. The Director on receiving the said complaint got conducted the inquiry through the Regional Deputy Director, Local Self Department, Government of Rajasthan, Kota. The Regional Deputy Director, Kota submitted his report on 11.4.2007 wherein nothing adverse was found against the petitioner. It is also stated in the writ petition that the proceedings were ordered to be dropped by the Minister, Local Self Government on the said complaint on 30.4.2007. But in the month of April 2007, the respondent No. 2 submitted another complaint against the petitioner to the Chief Minister to take action thereon which was later on inquired into by the Deputy Director (Regional), Local Self Government, Kota wherein out of 42 allegations only 8 allegations were prima facie found proved. A notice dated 4.7.2007 came to be issued by the Deputy Director, Local Self Department, Jaipur to the petitioner whereby 8 charges were levelled against the petitioner and her explanation was sought. On receipt of the explanation, the State Government had issued suspension order dated 6.8.2007. 3. The State of Rajasthan and Deputy Secretary, Local Self Department have filed joint reply to the writ petition and denied the fact that the Regional Deputy Director, Kota found the first complaint to be frivolous. On receipt of the explanation, the State Government had issued suspension order dated 6.8.2007. 3. The State of Rajasthan and Deputy Secretary, Local Self Department have filed joint reply to the writ petition and denied the fact that the Regional Deputy Director, Kota found the first complaint to be frivolous. In fact, the report of the Regional Deputy Director, Kota indicates that the number of charges are required to be inquired into separately. They have further submitted that before receipt of the report of the Regional Deputy Director dated 11.4.2007, another complaint was received from the respondent No. 2 on 3.4.2007, and on inquiry, out of 42, eight charges were prima facie found proved. The explanation of the petitioner was sought. The petitioner filed reply to the said allegations/charges mentioning therein that the Executive Officer has not put up any note of dissent and expressed difficulty, therefore, she is not prima facie guilty of misconduct nor abused her position as such member/Chairman as referred in Section 63(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1959 in any manner. The explanation/reply was not found satisfactory, the order of suspension was passed on 6.8.2007 after being satisfied that continuance of the petitioner in the office may not be desirable looking to the serious nature of the charges. 4. The submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that the first as well as the second complaints were politically motivated and the Government was bent upon to suspend her without following the provisions of Section 63 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1959’). Further submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that a bare perusal of the gist of the charges would reveal that (1) charge No. 1 relates to issuance of patta of a public land without verifying the documents, (2) charge No. 2 relates to not holding to auction of the land but allotting the same at scheduled rate of Rs. 21,886/-, (3) permit construction contrary to Master Plan, (4) charge No. 4 relates to allowing the construction without permission, (5) charge No. 5 relates to issuance of patta to Smt. Pushpa Devi without verifying the documents of title, (6) charge No. 6 relates to issuance of patta to Smt. Indra Agarwal in absence of any documents of ownership and old possession on record, (7) charge No. 7 relates to regularisation of land without seeking approval of the Committee of Cabinet and (8) issuance of patta to Devendra Pal Singh contrary to the rules with mala fide intention. Out of the aforesaid eight charges, charges No. 1 to 7 relates to irregularities or violation of rules/circular and not seeking approval whereas only in charge No. 8, it has been mentioned that issuance of patta to Devendra Pal Singh is illegal and the same has been issued with mala fide intention, without any particulars of malafide. On the face value of the charges, same are not of such nature which warrants suspension during pendency of the inquiry. 5. Counsel for the petitioner also submits that neither the terms "misconduct" nor "abuse of power" have been defined in the Act of 1959. The said terms are also not defined in any other peri materia Act. Even in service jurisprudence also, the term "misconduct" is not defined and mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performing the duty will not make any particular act misconduct. There was also no material before the Government to satisfy itself that there was any oblique/ulterior motive in even issuing the patta to Devendra Pal Singh which makes the action malafide. Further submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that in the matter of suspension of the elected representative much care and caution is to be taken, more particularly, when a qualified Executive Officer well acquainted with municipal law is posted in each municipality and who is under obligation to put a note of dissent under Section 68 of the Act where the proceeding or order of any committee, Chairman, Vice Chairman or of any member is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and rules made thereunder or detrimental to interest of Board, and send the same to the District Collector to prevent the aforesaid illegalities and irregularities. But in the present case, no such note of dissent was put up. But in the present case, no such note of dissent was put up. Otherwise also, the aforesaid alleged orders could have been rectified under Section 300 of the Act of 1959. The petitioner bonafidely believed that her orders are as per municipal law, therefore, she is not responsible for the alleged irregularities or illegalities and her suspension is arbitrary. 6. Mr. B.L. Sharma, Senior Advocate also submits that even in case of alleged misconduct of elected representative before issuance of suspension order the Government must examine whether alleged misconduct prima facie makes out the case of corruption, embezzlement, ulterior/oblique motive or not and further when the record of entire case is available with the Government whether there are chances of tempering with the record and or not and further whether it would be impracticable to hold the inquiry while keeping the incumbent on the post particularly when suspension in case of exoneration turns into interim removal. The aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been examined by the Government, and the suspension was the consequence of initiation of regular inquiry, therefore, suspension of the petitioner is arbitrary. 7. The submissions of Mr. Bharat Vyas, Additional Advocate General and Mr. R.R Garg counsel for the respondent No. 2 is that an elected Member in municipality is subjected to the provisions of Municipal Law and Section 63 contains the procedure for inquiry and further according to Sections 63(4) and 63(5) during pendency of the inquiry an elected Member can be suspended and removed on finding the charges proved. Further submissions of the counsel for the respondents is that the source of the complaint is not material and only the contents of the complaint are material in order to see whether any misconduct is made out or not in a preliminary enquiry and after seeking explanation, on being satisfied that gross misconduct is prima facie proved and further that it is not desirable to continue then the incumbent can be suspended pending regular inquiry. Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Suresh Chand Singhal v. State of Rajasthan & anr. reported in 2005(3) WLC (Raj.) 255. 8. I have gone through the record of the writ petition and further considered the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties. 9. Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Suresh Chand Singhal v. State of Rajasthan & anr. reported in 2005(3) WLC (Raj.) 255. 8. I have gone through the record of the writ petition and further considered the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties. 9. Before proceeding further, it would be worthwhile to reproduce suspension order dated 6.8.2007 and quote Sections 63, 68 and 300 of the Act of 1959 which are as follows : Suspension order dated 6.8.2007. " jktLFkku ljdkj Lok;Rr 'kklu foHkkx jkt0] t;iqjA dzekad@i02@p@ ( 215 ) tkap@Mh,ych@07@1388 fnukad% 06-08-2007 vkns'k Jherh xhrk nsoh u:dk v/;{kk uxj ikfydk xaxkiqj flVh ds fo:) in dk nq:i;ksx djus dh f'kdk;rk izkIr gksus ij mldh izkjfEHkd tkap mi funs'kd {ks=h; LFkkuh; fudk; foHkkx] dksVk ls djok;h x;hA tkWap fjiksVZ esa vkjksi izFke n`"V;k izekf.kr ik;s tkus ij mudk Li"Vhdj.k izkIr djus gsrq uksfVl tkjh fd;k x;kA Jherh xhrk nsoh u:dk v/;{kk }kjk izLrqr tokc larks"kizn ugha ik;s tkus ds dkj.k muds fo:) jktLFkku uxj ikfydk vf/kfu;e] 1959 dh /kkjk 63 ds vUrxZr U;kf;d tkap djk;s tkus dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;k gSA pwafd Jherh xhrk nsoh u:dk v/;{kk uxj ikfydk xaxkiqj flVh ds fo:) yxk;s x;s vkjksi xaHkhj izd`fr ds gSa] blfy, budk v/;{k in ij cus jguk lehphu ugha gSA vr% jktLFkku uxj ikfydk vf/kfu;e] 1959 dh /kkjk 63 ( 4 ) ds vUrxZr iznRr 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, jkT; ljdkj ,rn~}kjk Jherh xhrk nsoh u:dk v/;{kk uxj ikfydk xaxkiqj flVh dks v/;{k ,oa lnL; in ls rqjUr izHkko ls fuyfEcr djrh gSA vkKk ls ,lMh ( vks0ih0 g"kZ ) 'kklu mi lfpo Sections 63, 68 and 300 of the Act of 1959 "63. Removal of members : (1) The State Government may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) and (3), remove a member of a board on any of the following grounds, namely : (a) that he has absented himself from the meetings of the board for more than three consecutive months or three consecutive ordinary general meetings, whichever is the longer period, without leave of the board : Provided that the period during which such member was in jail as an under trial prisoner or as a detenu or as a political prisoner shall not be taken into account, (b) that he has failed to comply with the provisions of section 61, (c) that after his election he has incurred any of the disqualification mentioned in section 18 or section 26 or has ceased to fulfil the requirement of section 24] (d) that he has- (i) been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, or (iii) been guilty of any disgraceful conduct, or (iv) otherwise 2[XXX] abused in any manner his position as such member: Provided that an order of removal shall be passed by the State Government after such inquiry as it considers necessary to make either itself or through 3[such existing or retired officer not below the rank of State Level Services] or authority as it may direct and after the member concerned has been afforded an opportunity of explanation. (1A) the power conferred by sub-section (1) may be exercised by the State Government of its own motion or upon the receipt of a report from the Board in that behalf or upon the facts otherwise coming to the knowledge of the State Government. Provided that until a member is removed from office by an order of the State Government under this section, he shall not vacate his office and shall, subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (4), continue to act as, and to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of a member and shall as such be entitled to all the rights, and be subject to all the liabilities, of a member under this Act. (2) Notwithstanding anything, contained in sub- section (1) where it is proposed to remove a member on any of the grounds specified in clause (c) or clause (d) of the sub-section (1) as a result of the inquiry referred to in the proviso that sub-section and after hearing the explanation of the member concerned, the State Government shall draw up a statement setting out distinctly the charge against the member and shall send the same for inquiry and findings by judicial officer of the rank of a District Judge to be appointed by the State Government for the purpose. (3) The judicial officer so appointed shall proceed to inquire into the charge in the prescribed manner, hear the member concerned if he makes appearance, record his findings on each matter embodied in the statements as well as on every other matter he considers relevant to the charge and send the record along with such findings to the State Government, which shall thereupon pass 5[final orders or order for re-enquiry by any such other officer as may be deemed proper.] (4) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the State Government may place under suspension a member against whom proceedings have been commenced under this section until the conclusion of the final order and the member so suspended shall not be entitled to take part in any proceedings of the board or otherwise perform the duties of a member thereof. (5) Every final order of the State Government passed under this section shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall be final and no such order shall be liable to be called in question in any court. 68. Powers of executive officers including custody of records.-(l) The Executive Officers shall be responsible for the custody of all the records of the board including all papers and documents connected with the proceedings of the board and all the committees and shall arrange for performance of such duties arrange for performance of such duties relating to the proceedings of such bodies as they may be respectively impose. (2) Where any proceeding or order of a board or of any of its committees or of the chairman or vice-chairman or of any member is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder or is detriment to the interest of the board, the Executive Officer shall put up a note of dissent and report the matter to the Collector of the district and the State Government: Provided that in relation to a Corporation, this sub-section shall have effect as if the words "the Collector of the district and" were omitted therefrom : Provided further that the mere putting up of a notice of dissent and a report of the matter to the Collector and the State Government will not operate as a stay to the proceeding or the order. (3) After examining the note of dissent reported under sub-section (2), the State Government or any officer authorised by it in this behalf may make such order as it thinks fit which shall be binding on the board. (4) The Executive Officer shall have the power, subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder to authenticate under his signatures all licences, permissions and orders which may be granted or given by the board under this Act and no licence or permission or order shall be legal and valid unless it has been so authenticated by the Executive Officer. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 78, the Executive Officer shall exercise such other powers of the board as may be prescribed. 300. Power to call for records.-(l) The State Government or any authority authorised in this behalf by the State Government, may for the purpose of being satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed or purporting to have been passed, under this Act, by or on behalf of any board, its chairman, vice-chairman, any member, or officer, or a Collector or other officer appointed by the State Government in that behalf call for the relevant record, any may, in doing so, direct that, pending the examination of such record, such order shall be held in abeyance and no action till the decision of the State Government or of the authority authorised in this behalf by the State Government under sub-section (2). (2) On examining the records the officer or authority authorised as aforesaid may reverse or modify such order." (emphasis supplied) 10. The Division Bench of this Court in Jan Mohd. v. The State of Rajasthan reported in 1992(2) WLC (Raj.) 463 , considered the entire law on the subject existing up to that date and held that on receipt of the preliminary enquiry report, when the Government decides to issue a notice to the delinquent Chairman or the Member of the Municipal Board under Section 63(2) of the Act of 1959 to show cause why definite charges be not framed against him and be referred to a Judicial Officer, that is that stage where the proceedings start against the Chairman or the Member of the Municipal Board and the State Government has power to suspend the Chairman or a Member of a Municipal Board simultaneously when it decides to issue him a notice of show cause under Section 63(2) of the Act of 1959. Para 61 of the aforesaid judgment is as follows: "In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are firmly of the view that the proceedings against a Chairman or member of the Municipal Board commence when the preliminary enquiry report submitted to the Government is considered by the Government and the Government applies its mind to it and comes to the conclusion that a further probe in the matter is essential. For the removal of the holder of an elected public office that is Chairman or Member of the Municipal Board, if the Government decides to issue a notice to the incumbent under Section 63(2) of the Act to the delinquent Chairman or the Member of the Municipal Board to show cause why definite charges be not framed against him and be referred to a Judicial Officer, that is that stage where the proceedings start against the Chairman or the Member of the Municipal Board and the State Government has power to suspend the Chairman or a Member of a Municipal Board simultaneously when it decides to issue him a notice of show cause under Section 63(2) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. The suspension of a Chairman or a Member of a Municipal Board pending enquiry being an interim measure the suspension does not result in civil or evil consequences and it is not penal in character. The suspension of a Chairman or a Member of a Municipal Board pending enquiry being an interim measure the suspension does not result in civil or evil consequences and it is not penal in character. Enough safeguards have been provided in the Section so that no arbitrary, capricious or malafide suspension may take place. However, we will like to add a word of caution that the holders of these elective public posts cannot be equated with Government servant and, therefore, before a holder of an elected post is suspended, the Government must have sufficient reasons to do so. Care should be taken that such suspensions should be arbitrary and the suspensions of such elected representatives should not be brought about for political motives or consideration." (emphasis supplied) 11. In the aforesaid judgment, it has been further held that the suspension does not result in any civil or evil consequences and it is not penal in character. Enough safeguards have been provided in the Section so that no arbitrary, capricious or mala fide suspension may take place. It has also been held that the holders of elective public posts cannot be equated with Government servant, therefore, before a holder of an elected post is suspended, the Government must have sufficient reasons to do so. It was also held that care should be taken that such suspensions of such elected representatives should not be brought for political motives or consideration. 12. The Supreme Court in para 6 of the State of Punjab v. Ram Singh Ex-Constable reported in (1992) 4 SCC 54 gave meaning to the term "misconduct" and held that it must be improper and wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty, and further its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. Relevant portion of para 6 is as follows : " The word ‘misconduct’ though no capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. Relevant portion of para 6 is as follows : " The word ‘misconduct’ though no capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty, the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve " (emphasis supplied) 13. The Supreme Court in the case of Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of Punjab reported in (2002) 3 SCC 667 while dealing with the municipal law has observed that "misconduct" has not been defined in the Act. The same is the position in the Act of 1959. The Court has further held that word "misconduct" is ante thesis of the word "conduct". Ordinarily the expression "misconduct" means wrong or improper conduct, unlawful behaviour, misfeasance, wrong conduct, misdemeanor. Since there are different meanings of that expression, the same has to be construed with reference to the subject and the context wherein it occur. Regard has to be paid to the aims and objects of the statute. The aim and object of the Act is to make better provision for administration of municipalities. In the said case, the criticism of house tax assessment list by an elected representative was not covered by the term "misconduct" for the reason that the incumbent was the elected representative and exercising his functions in the interest of public 14. The relevant portions of Para Nos. 9, 10, 14 and 15 of the aforesaid judgment are as under: 9. "Misconduct" has not been defined in the Act. The word "misconduct" is antithesis of the word "conduct". Thus, ordinarily the expression "misconduct" means wrong or improper misconduct, unlawful behaviour, misfeasance, wrong conduct, misdemeanour etc. The relevant portions of Para Nos. 9, 10, 14 and 15 of the aforesaid judgment are as under: 9. "Misconduct" has not been defined in the Act. The word "misconduct" is antithesis of the word "conduct". Thus, ordinarily the expression "misconduct" means wrong or improper misconduct, unlawful behaviour, misfeasance, wrong conduct, misdemeanour etc. There being different meanings of the expression "misconduct", we therefore, have to construe the expression "misconduct", with reference to the subject and the context wherein the said expression occurs, regard being had to the aims and objects of the statute. The appellant herein is an elected Municipal Councillor to a democratic institution i.e. Local body. The aim and object of the Act is to make better provisions for administration of municipalities. The municipality is a democratic institution of self-governance consisting of local people, for the local people and by Vie local people. The prime object of the local body is to serve the local people and to provide amenities and service to the people residing within the municipality. 10. It is no doubt true that a citizen or a Municipal Councillor must obey the law duly passed by the legislature or the municipal council. The observance of rule of law by all citizens and Municipal Councillors is one of the basic requirements of working of a democracy. The rule of law which is obeyed not only by the officers and public servants of the State or local bodies, but by all the citizens and holders of elected offices, is a precondition of a healthy and successful democracy. No responsible person in a democracy could incite the people to disobey the rule of law duly enacted. But situations may arise where responsible persons or those who hold elected offices may feel that it is their duty to criticize the law either promulgated by the State or by the municipal council as illegal, arbitrary or ultra vires and against the public interest and invite the people to come for discussion on the subject. Can such a conduct be attributed as a "misconduct"? 14. Here, the appellant criticised the house tax assessment list and asked the taxpayer to come to him for sorting out the grievances. The appellant as an elected representative of the ward held his office in trust for the public and was expected to exercise his functions in the interest of the public. 14. Here, the appellant criticised the house tax assessment list and asked the taxpayer to come to him for sorting out the grievances. The appellant as an elected representative of the ward held his office in trust for the public and was expected to exercise his functions in the interest of the public. This being the case, his criticism of the house tax assessment list was in furtherance of what he believed to be in public interest. Keeping in view the aim, object and the scheme behind the provisions of the Act and also in the context the expression "misconduct" has been used, such a criticism by the appellant against the house tax assessment list cannot be construed as "misconduct". We are, therefore, of the view that the criticism by the appellant of the house tax assessment list prepared and finalised by the Council did not constitute "misconduct" within the meaning of the expression "misconduct" occurring in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act. 15........ According to us, what is contemplated in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act is that the loss of revenue must be direct result of misdemeanour of a Municipal Councillor. We, therefore, find that here is no rational nexus between the act attributed to the appellant and the alleged loss in revenue to the Council. Before we part with this question, we are deposed to go into the question, whether in real sense, there was any loss in revenue to the Council by the alleged criticism of house tax assessment list. The charge against the appellant was that because of his acts, there was difficulty in realisation of house tax and, therefore, loss in revenue was caused to the Council. It is not disputed that house tax assessment list was a new list and 85% of the taxpayers did not pay the house tax. It, therefore, does not mean that house tax dues were lost and became unrecoverable. In fact, there was no loss in revenue and only the recovery of taxes were deferred. It is not disputed that arrears of tax can be recovered as arrears of land revenue by the Collector. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that, in fact, there was no loss in revenue to the Council. In fact, there was no loss in revenue and only the recovery of taxes were deferred. It is not disputed that arrears of tax can be recovered as arrears of land revenue by the Collector. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that, in fact, there was no loss in revenue to the Council. The appellant was exercising only his democratic right of fair criticism of the house tax assessment list prepared and finalised by the Council and such an act has no rational nexus with the alleged loss in revenue suffered by the Council. We are, therefore, of the view that the charge levelled against the appellant was totally outside the scope of clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act." (emphasis supplied) 15. Similarly, the Supreme in Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab in 2001 WLC (SC) Civil 677 : (2001) 6 SCC 260 has interpreted the term "abuse of power" in the case of removal of the President of the Rajpura Municipal Council. The relevant portion of paras 7, 9, 10 and 11 of the aforesaid judgment is as follows : "7. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the terms for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. That a returned candidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge the duties related therewith during the term specified by the relevant enactment is a valuable statutory right not only of the returned candidate but also of the constituency or the electoral college which he represents. Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held. Therefore, a case of availability of a ground squarely falling within Section 22 of the Act must be clearly made out. A President may be removed from office by the State Government, within the meaning of Section 22, on the ground of "abuse of his powers" (of President), inter alia. This is the phrase with which we are concerned in the present case. 9. A President may be removed from office by the State Government, within the meaning of Section 22, on the ground of "abuse of his powers" (of President), inter alia. This is the phrase with which we are concerned in the present case. 9. the phrase "abuse of powers" as providing a ground for proceeding under Section 22 is not defined in the Act. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Edn., 1999) gives the meaning of "abuse" as ‘to depart (a person) physically or mentally", "to damage (a thing)". In Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 1, p. 402) it is so stated." "ABUSE As noun.-It has been said that the word is not a term of art in the law and that its everyday popular sense is well known; but that its proper signification when employed depends upon the context and subject matter. In its largest sense, ill-use or improper treatment of another; misuse. In the plural as used with reference to the authority of governmental commissions to correct ‘abuses’, the word has been held to mean a disregard of duty imposed by law; any improper use of a right or privilege." The word "abuse as occurring in Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 came up for consideration of this Court in M. Narayuanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala. This Court observed; (AIR p. 1118, para 10) "‘Abuse’ means misuse i.e. Using his position for something for which it is not intended. That abuse may be by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise than those means. The word 'otherwise' has wide connotation and if no limitation is placed on it, the words ‘corrupt’, ‘illegal’, and ‘otherwise’ mentioned in the clause become surplusage, for on that construction every abuse of position is gathered by the clause. So some limitation will have to be put on that word and that limitation is that it takes colour from the preceding words along with which it appears in the clause, that is to say, something savouring of dishonest act on his part. The contention of the learned counsel that if the clause is widely construed even a recommendation made by a public servant for securing a job for another may come within the clause and that it could not have been the intention of the legislature. But in our view such innocuous acts will not be covered by the said clause. The contention of the learned counsel that if the clause is widely construed even a recommendation made by a public servant for securing a job for another may come within the clause and that it could not have been the intention of the legislature. But in our view such innocuous acts will not be covered by the said clause. The juxtaposition of the word 'otherwise' with the words ‘corrupt or illegal means’, and the dishonesty implicit in the word ‘abuse’ indicate the necessity for a dishonest intention on his part to bring him within the meaning of the clause. 10. To find the meaning of a word or expression not defined in an enactment the courts apply the "subject-and-object rule" which means-ascertain carefully the subject of the enactment where the word or expression occurs and have regard to the object which the legislature has in view. For ego the strict grammatical or etymological propriety of language, even its popular use; let the subject or the context in which they are used and the object which the legislature seeks to attain be your lenses through seeks to attain be your lenses through which look for the meaning to be ascribed. "In selecting one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule that the meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. Therefore, when the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicographers.... Judge Learned Hand cautioned 'not to make a fortress out of the dictionary’ but to pay more attention to 'the sympathetic and imaginative discovery’ of the purpose or object of the statute as a guide to its meaning." "11. The expression "abuse of powers" in the context and setting in which it has been used cannot mean use of power which may appear to be simply unreasonable or inappropriate. It implies a wilful abuse or an intentional wrong. An honest though erroneous exercise of power or an indecision is not an abuse of power. A decision, action or instruction may be inconvenient or unpalatable to the person affected but it would not be an abuse of power. It implies a wilful abuse or an intentional wrong. An honest though erroneous exercise of power or an indecision is not an abuse of power. A decision, action or instruction may be inconvenient or unpalatable to the person affected but it would not be an abuse of power. It must be such an abuse of power which would render a Councillor unworthy of holding the office of President. Inasmuch as an abuse of power would entail adverse civil consequences, the expression has to be narrowly construed. Yet again, the expression employed in Section 22 is "abuse of his powers, or of habitual failure to perform his duties". The use of plural-powers, and the setting of the expression in the framing of Section 22 is not without significance. It is suggestive of legislative intent. The phrase "abuse of powers" must take colour from the next following expression-"or habitual failure to perform duties". A singular or casual aberration or failure in exercise of power is not enough; a course of conduct or plurality of aberration of failure in exercise of power and that too involving dishonesty of intention is "abuse of powers" within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act. The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action or error of decision." (emphasis supplied) 16. The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in Tarlochan Dev Sharma (supra) has been relied and referred to by this Court in Pradeep Hinger v. The State of Rajasthan (SBCWP No. 3740/2007 decided on 16.9.2007) where in a case of alleged misconduct of not taking action in respect of Plot No. 5 and 23-A, which were illegally allotted and allotment of land to his party members, was considered by the Court while adjudicating on the issue of suspension from the office of Chairman, Municipal Council. This Court, while considering the said misconduct, has held that when there is no specific motive/embezzlement/corruption imputed against the incumbent in the allegations levelled against him, then the order of suspension appears to be in consequence of only initiation of inquiry by the State Government under Section 63(2) of the Act of 1959 and there appears to be no reason available for suspension of the petitioner from the post of Chairman, Municipal Council as the respondents failed to prove that the presence of the petitioner on the post of Chairman, Municipal Council, Pali may prejudice the inquiry to be conducted by the competent authority under sub-section (2) of Section 63 of the Act of 1959. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is as follows : "This Court has only examined whether from the facts it is a case of passing of suspension order in routine manner and in consequence of the decision of the State Government to 'proceed under sub-section (2) of Section 63 alone or it has some specific reason for suspending the petitioner. The comments be read only in the context and not out of context to prejudice the enquiry against the petitioner or in favour of the petitioner. In view of the above legal position and the facts came on record, the order of suspension of the petitioner appears to be in consequence of only initiation of enquiry by the State Government under Section 63(2) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 and there appears to be no reason available for suspension of the petitioner from the post of Chairman, Municipal Council, Pali as the respondents failed to prove that the presence of the petitioner on the post of the Chairman, Municipal Council, Pali may prejudice the enquiry to be conducted by the competent authority under sub-section (2) of Section 63 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 in any manner. Therefore, the order of suspension of the petitioner vide Annexure 11 dated 11.06.2007 deserves to be quashed. ............................................. (emphasis supplied) 17. The submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that the inquiry has been politically motivated and the submission of the counsel for the respondents is that the source of the complaint is not material and it is the contents of the complaint which are to be inquired into. ............................................. (emphasis supplied) 17. The submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that the inquiry has been politically motivated and the submission of the counsel for the respondents is that the source of the complaint is not material and it is the contents of the complaint which are to be inquired into. From the record it appears that the Government has taken sufficient care to inquire into the charges only which were not the part of the earlier complaint or the issue was left open. There are no allegations of malafide against the Preliminary Enquiry Officer, the officer who examined the Preliminary Enquiry Report and the reply submitted by the petitioner, against the Minister In-charge and further they are not the party to the writ petition. Mere suspicion cannot be treated as proof of political motivation or mala fide intention. Otherwise also, the source of the complaint is not material and it is the contents of the complaint which are to be inquired into. The State Government found some material for inquiry, therefore, there is nothing wrong in initiation of the inquiry. Therefore, the contention of malafide is rejected. 18. This Court in the case of Smt. Vimla Devi Vyas v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.- (SBCWP No. 3729/2007 decided on 17.8.2007) has considered in detail that the suspension of an elected representative is to be resorted only when the State Government is satisfied that a fair inquiry shall be reasonably impracticable without exercising such powers, and the satisfaction so arrived at must be recorded though it is not required to be communicated to the person concerned till demanded. This Court has further relied on Vimla Devi’s case (supra) and quoted the relevant portions of the said judgment on pages No. 5 and 6 of Laxman Singh v. State of Rajasthan (SBCWP No. 2213/2007 decided on 3.10.2007) which are as follows : "The power to take disciplinary action against an elected member/office bearer is available to the State, however, that should be exercised with all caution by keeping in mind that it may not hurt democratic values as well as autonomy of the Board. The power as given under Section 63 of the Act of 1959 including a power to place a member/office bearer of the Municipal Board under suspension should be exercised sparingly and only after reaching at a conclusion that holding of a fair inquiry against a delinquent shall be almost impossible without resorting to his/her suspension. It must be understood that suspension of an elected member virtually amount to put the voice of people to whom he/she represents in abeyance and such action is an exception to the democratic values, therefore, all possible efforts should always be made to conduct an inquiry by maintaining high traditions of democracy. In a democratic system the conduct and image of peoples representative is one of prima consideration, therefore, the person conducting inquiry should conclude it as expeditiously as possible by maintaining all fairness and objectivity irrespective of the fact that the member/office bearer is under suspension or not." "The basic philosophy to keep the authority of an elected representative of people in absence by way of suspension is that his acts on face appears against the interest of people, and his/her continuation in office may effect the process of investigation, hence, in every case where State desire to exercise powers under Section 64(4) of the Act of 1959, it must satisfy itself that a fair inquiry shall be reasonably impracticable without exercising such powers and the satisfaction so arrived must be recorded though it is not required to be communicated to the person concerned till demanded. What it appears that the State Government in every case where a decision is taken to hold an inquiry as per the provisions of Section 63 of the Act of 1959 in quite routine manner places the delinquent under suspension. The theory of suspension as applicable in service jurisprudence cannot and should not be imposed or adopted in the matters imposed or adopted in the matters relating to the elected persons." (emphasis supplied) 19. In the case of Laxman Singh (supra), after perusing the record, this Court came to the conclusion that it was the mechanical exercise of power on the part of the respondents in placing the petitioner under suspension which makes the order bad in the eye of law. In the case of Laxman Singh (supra), after perusing the record, this Court came to the conclusion that it was the mechanical exercise of power on the part of the respondents in placing the petitioner under suspension which makes the order bad in the eye of law. Relevant portion of page 7 of the said judgment is as follows : "In the instant matter I have gone through the record available and found that the respondents just on framing of the charge placed the petitioner under suspension. It was not at all examined by the respondents as to how and why the suspension of the petitioner is warranted. The mechanical exercise of powers on the part of the respondents in placing the petitioner under suspension is apparent. The competent authority while making an order for suspension of the petitioner made a note, that reads as follows : bl izdj.k esa xzke iapk;r ds ljiap dk vfrdze.k gksuk fl) ekuk gS blfy;s ljiap dks fuyafcr djus dk vkns'k fn;k tkrk gSA---------- ,lMh 03-04-2007 " The decision taken by the competent authority is not at all in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in the case of Smt. Vimla Devi (supra) and, thus, for the reasons referred therein the order of suspension is certainly bad in eye of law. 20. The counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on Division bench judgment reported in 2005(3) WLC (Raj.) 255, Suresh Chand Singhal v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. While considering the scope of Section 63(4) of the Act of 1959 and other judgments of this Court particularly of Jan Mohd.’s case (Supra) held that without preliminary enquiry report, show cause notice and reply of the incumbent, there could not have any occasion to place the matter for suspension before the State Government which had to consider whether inquiry was fit to be initiated under Section 63 of the Act of 1959 or not. The counsel for the respondents submits that in this particular case the aforesaid procedure has been followed. 21. Before proceeding to deal with the issue of suspension under Section 63(4), I would like to refer to the scheme of the Act of 1959. The Municipal Board and Municipal Council & Municipal Corporation are constituted under Section 7 and 8 respectively whereas the composition of the Board is under Section 9. 21. Before proceeding to deal with the issue of suspension under Section 63(4), I would like to refer to the scheme of the Act of 1959. The Municipal Board and Municipal Council & Municipal Corporation are constituted under Section 7 and 8 respectively whereas the composition of the Board is under Section 9. Section 12A provides for election of the Board Section 23 provides for general elections. Section 24 relates to the persons qualified for being members. Section 26 provides for general disqualifications for members. Section 32 to Section 60 with the election. Section 63 relates to removal of members. Section 68 relates to powers of executive officers including custody of records, note of dissent as well as its consequences Section 300 relates to power to call for the record by the Government to decide the correctness, legality, propriety of any order passed or purported to have been passed by the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, any member or officer or Collector. The aforesaid scheme would reveal that the qualification under Section 24 of the Act for reserve seat/general seat is that he must attained the age of 21 years, therefore, the legislature in its wisdom provided two safeguards to the elected representative, as indicated above, in Sections 68 and 300 of the Act. Therefore, the elected representative who bonafidely believes that the Executive Officer has rightly prepared a note sheet and approves the same even if there was any irregularity/illegality, then the same could also have been rectified under Section 300 of the Act. 22. In a democratic set up, an elected representative is the voice of the people to whom he represents and much care and caution is to be taken while suspending an elected representative because the suspension during pendency of the inquiry even if the delinquent is exonerated, then it would result in interim removal on account of having fixed term of five years. The suspension may not be treated as punishment but in the case of exoneration, it proves some time worse than removal. In a democracy governed by Rule of Law once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by prescribed procedure known to law. In a democracy governed by Rule of Law once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by prescribed procedure known to law. A returned candidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge the duties related therewith during the term specified by the relevant enactment is a valuable statutory right not only of returned candidate but also of constituency or the electoral college which he represents. Suspension from such an office is a serious matter. As indicated above, the same turns to be an interim removal. Therefore, the Government must satisfy with regard to the fact that continuation of the person on the elected post would seriously prejudice the fair procedure of the inquiry or it is reasonably impracticable to hold the inquiry without suspension or the fact of not putting the dissenting note by the Executive Officer under Section 68(2) of the Act of 1959 bona fidely believed by the Chairman/Member that the order is valid or there is no other way permissible to rectify the alleged misconduct by invoking the provisions of Section 300 of the Act of 1959. The question involved in the present case is that although the elected representative is subjected to Section 63 of the Act but whether the provisions of Section 63 were followed while suspending the petitioner or whether the inquiry can continue without suspension of the petitioner. 23. The upshot of the above discussion is that an elected representative is having a valuable right of holding the statutory fixed term. The suspension results in curtailment of fixed statutory period, therefore, the same is a serious matter and the same should not be made in violation of Section 63(2) and (4) of the Act of 1959 and the procedure laid down and settled by this Court, malafide and in an arbitrary manner. Further sufficient care and caution is to be taken while scrutinising the case for suspension which may result in interim removal in case the inquiry results in exoneration and further the authority concerned must satisfy that misconduct is a gross misconduct and it is reasonably impracticable to continue the elected representative in office during pendency of the inquiry. Further sufficient care and caution is to be taken while scrutinising the case for suspension which may result in interim removal in case the inquiry results in exoneration and further the authority concerned must satisfy that misconduct is a gross misconduct and it is reasonably impracticable to continue the elected representative in office during pendency of the inquiry. It is also to be seen that suspension should not be mere consequence of inquiry, otherwise the suspension becomes arbitrary. 24. In the instant case, the record was called from the respondents on 14.09.2007 which contains the initiation of inquiry on receipt of the complaint of Vice-chairman, Mrs. Shobha Singh dated 3.4.2007 in public hearing at Chief Minister’s residence on 3.4.2007. The said complaint is on the joint letter head of Shobha Singh and her husband, Brahm Singh, respondent No. 2 who belongs to the BJR There is reference of earlier complaint dated 17.12.2006 in the note sheet wherein none of the allegations was found proved. Therefore, the Department further compared both the complaints and sent the same for inquiry to the Deputy Director (Regional), Kota in respect of the points which have already not been inquired into and a finding was given. The said preliminary inquiry was concluded in the month of June, 2007 and after seeking explanation, it was found that the reply was not satisfactory. The actions are contrary to the regularisation rules of the Government and has caused loss to the Municipal Council, therefore, inquiry under Rule 63 was proposed. Shri Jitendra Sharma, Executive Officer did not file any reply, therefore, action under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 was also proposed. The Local Self Minister after perusing the file held that the allegations are prima facie proved, therefore, the petitioner be suspended so that inquiry may not be influenced. It was also proposed that Smt. Shobha Singh-Vice Chairman, Municipal Board, Gangapur City be handed over charge of Chairman. The Local Self Minister after perusing the file held that the allegations are prima facie proved, therefore, the petitioner be suspended so that inquiry may not be influenced. It was also proposed that Smt. Shobha Singh-Vice Chairman, Municipal Board, Gangapur City be handed over charge of Chairman. The relevant note sheet dated 3.8.2007 is as under: i=koyh dk voyksdu fd;kA Jherh xhrk nsoh] v/;{kk] u0ik0 xaxkiqj flVh ds fo:) izFke n`"V~;k vkjksi izekf.kr gSA vr% tkap izHkkfor u gks bl gsrq bUgsa rqjUr izHkkl ls fuyfEcr fd;k tkdj u0ik0 vf/kfu;e] 1959 dh /kkjk 63 ds vUrxZr izdj.k tkWap esa fHktok;k tkuk rFkk lkFk gh Jherh 'kksHkk flag] mik/;{k] u0ik0 xaxkiqj flVh dks vLFkkbZ rkSj ij u0ik0 xaxkiqj flVh ds v/;{k ds in dk dk;ZHkkj lkSaiuk izLrkfor gSA ,lMh izrki flag fla?koh jkT; ea=h uxjh; fodkl ,oa Lok;Rr 'kklu " 25. During the course of arguments, the Additional Advocate General has submitted that the Executive Officer has also been suspended but nothing has been said about not putting the note of dissent and exercise of the power under Section 300 of the Act of 1959. Therefore, erroneous decision taken by the Chairman with the assistance of the Executive Officer will not be covered by the term "misconduct" unless some motive/oblique motive/ulterior motive is given. Only in charge No. 8, the words "mala fide intention" have been used without specifying the same in what manner the beneficiary was connected with the petitioner. 26. Therefore, erroneous decision taken by the Chairman with the assistance of the Executive Officer will not be covered by the term "misconduct" unless some motive/oblique motive/ulterior motive is given. Only in charge No. 8, the words "mala fide intention" have been used without specifying the same in what manner the beneficiary was connected with the petitioner. 26. Charge No. 8 and its reply are as under: Charge No. 8: ;g gS fd vki }kjk Jh nsosUnzikyflag iq= Jh d`ikyflag dks 52 oxZ xt Hkwfe [kljk uEcj 280@557 dk vkMZj'khV ds eqrkfcd 24-02-2006 dks iV~Vk fn;k x;kA ;|fi iV~Vs dh izfr i=koyh esa layXu ugha gSA vki }kjk fnukad 24-09-2005 dks v/;{k egksn; rkyqdk fof/kd lfefr ds le{k fnukad 24-09-2005 dks izkFkZuk i= is'k fd;k Fkk fd izkFkhZ us mDr edku flok; pd Hkwfe esa cuk j[kk gS ,slh fLFkfr esa izkFkhZ dks iV~Vk ugha fn;k tk ldrk vkSj izkFkhZ ds }kjk mDr QSlys dh vihy is'k ugha dh gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa uxjikfydk xaxkiqj flVh }kjk iV~Vk fn;k tkuk laEHko ugha gSA blds ckotwn Hkh vki }kjk jktdh; Hkwfe dk fu;e fo:) o cnfu;rhiwoZd iV~Vk tkjh fd;k tkuk tkfgj gksrk gSA Reply to the Charge No. 8: ;g vkjksi la[;k 8 vLohdkj gS ;g fd bl izdj.k esa leLr dk;Zokgh bZvks0ds0 }kjk vius Lrj ij dh xbZ gS esjs le{k izFke ckj fnukad 06-02-2006 uksV'khV ds iSjk la[;k 7 esa izLrqr dh gS ftlesa bZvks }kjk ;g fVIi.kh dh xbZ gS fd mDr Hkwfe ij dCtk/kkjh Jh nsosUnz iky flag dks iV~Vk fn;k tkuk fu;ekuqlkj gSA ftlds lkFk ,y0,0 dh fjiksVZ Hkh layXu dh Fkh bZvks dh fjiksVZ ds vuqlkj izdj.k dh oLrqfLFkfr bl izdkj FkhA bl fo"k; ij fLFkfr ;g gS fd rkyqdk fof/kd lfefr ds le{k tokc izLrqr djus ds le; izkFkhZ vkosnd dk dkSu lh Hkwfe ij dCtk gS dh fLFkfr Li"V ugha Fkh D;ksafd [kljk ua0 280 ( [kkrsnkjh ) o 280@557 ( flok;pd ) nksuksa Hkwfe fcYdqy fudVre fLFkr gSA bl fo"k; ij rglhynkj xaxkiqj flVh ds i= fnukad 18-11-2005 ds }kjk fLFkfr Li"V gqbZ Fkh fd vkosnd dk edku [kljk ua0 280 esa gSA rRdkyhu le; lu~ 1999 esa rglhynkj ds i= dzekad vkj0,0@39@922 fnukad 09-04-1999 ds }kjk izkFkhZ nsosUnz iky dk edku [kljk ua0 280 ds lkFk&lkFk [kljk ua0 280@557 esa 52 oxZ ehVj gksuk crk;k gSA blfy;s rkyqdk lfefr ds le{k fnukad 24-09-2005 dks mDr [kljk ua0 dh iw.kZ :i ls lgh fLFkfr Li"V ugha gksus ds dkj.k o rkyqdk lfefr }kjk tokc ds fy;s vkSj vf/kd le; iznRr ugha djus ds dkj.k tks tokc izLrqr fd;k x;k oks ml le; ds vuqlkj fof/k vuqlkj FkkA ;fn tYnckth esa dksbZ tokc izLrqr dj fn;k tkrk rks vfu;ferrk gks ldrh FkhA i'pkrorhZ fLFkfr esa Jheku~ mi ftyk dysDVj egksn; ds vkns'k fnukad 16-11-2005 dh ikyuk esa iVokjh gYdk o ikfydk vfHk;Urk }kjk ekSds dh HkkSfrd tkap dh tkdj fLFkfr Li"V gksus ij vkosnd dks [kljk ua0 280@557 esa dCts ds vk/kkj ij uxjh; fodkl ds ifji= fnukad 26-05-2000 ds rgr iV~Vk tkjh fd;k x;k tks fu;e fo:) ugha gS rFkk fdlh izdkj dh cnfu;rh izekf.kr ugha gksrh gSA layXu nLrkostksa esa 16-11-2005 dh Nk;k izfr lu~ 1999 ds rglhynkj ds i= dzekad 09-04-1999 dh Nk;k izfr dk voyksdu QjekosaA mDr fjiksVZ ds vk/kkj ij bZvks ds izLrko dks ;Fkk izLrkfor djrs gq, fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zokgh djus ds vkns'k fn;s D;ksafd jkT; ljdkj ds ifji= fnukad 26-05-2000 esa ,slh Hkwfe dk fu;eu djus dk izko/kku gS vr% jkT; ljdkj ds mDr ifji= ds vuqlkj dh xbZ dk;Zokgh dks fof/k lEer ekurs gq, eSaus lgefr iznku dh vr% vkjksi la[;k 8 [kkfjt QjekosaA ;g gS fd izkFkhZ dkaxzsl ds fVfdV ij u0ik0 xaxkiqj flVh dk v/;{k pquk x;k Fkk orZeku esa jktLFkku esa ljdkj Hkktik dh gS tks jktuSfrd }s"krk ls dk;Z dj jgh gS izkFkhZ lnSo u0ik0 ,oa fof/k ds vuqlkj dk;Zokgh djus esa fo'okl j[krh gSA izkFkhZ dks o"kZ 2005 esa u0ik0 e.My xaxkiqj flVh dk v/;{k pquk x;k Fkk rc ls vkt rd dksbZ f'kd;r ugha gS dsoyek= mik/;{k tks Hkktik ls gS tks vius jktuSfrd LokFkZ ds fy;s u dsoy my tqyqy f'kdk;r djrk gS cfYd jktuSfrd ny dh nqgkbZ nsdj izkFkhZ ds fo:) dk;Zokgh djkdj LFkkuh; Lrj ij viuh jktuSfrd dn c<+kus dk iz;kl dj jgk gSA " 27. The explanation of the petitioner to the charge No. 8 is that in compliance of the order of the Deputy Collector dated 16.11.2005, the Patwari as well as the Engineer of the municipality physically verified the land and reported that the khasra No. 280/557 is in possession of the applicant 1 and he is entitled for regularisation as per the Government circular dated 26.5.2000. Further the aforesaid position was not clear while the reply was filed before the Taluka Legal Aid Committee. Otherwise also, no further particulars of malafide have been given, therefore, the aforesaid charge alone 5 can also not be termed as gross misconduct and further cannot be made basis of suspension of the petitioner. 28. In the aforesaid three judgments of the Supreme Court in the State of Punjab (supra), Baldev Singh (supra) and Tarcholan Dev Sharma (supra), it has been held that the expression ‘misconduct’ has to be construed with 1 reference to the subject and context wherein the said expression occurs, having regard to the aims and objects of the statute. The aims and objects of the Act of 1959 are to make better provision for administration of municipalities and to serve the local people and further to provide amenities and service to the people residing within municipality. As discussed above, 1 two safeguards under Section 63(2) and Section 300 of the Act of 1959 have been provided to the elected representative and when no note of dissent as required under Section 62 of the Act of 1959 was put up by the Executive Officer and the elected representative bonafidely believed that her orders are as per municipal law, therefore, the alleged misconduct cannot be termed as 2 gross misconduct and further for suspension no oblique motive, embezzlement and corruption has been imputed against the petitioner, therefore, the suspension is consequence of the inquiry. 29. There are no further allegations of embezzlement or corruption, therefore, the alleged misconduct is not gross misconduct and in my view, the matter requires to be examined further on the issue whether it was reasonably impracticable to hold inquiry against the petitioner while continuing in the office of Chairman. 30. 29. There are no further allegations of embezzlement or corruption, therefore, the alleged misconduct is not gross misconduct and in my view, the matter requires to be examined further on the issue whether it was reasonably impracticable to hold inquiry against the petitioner while continuing in the office of Chairman. 30. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the record is with the State Government and there is no apprehension of tampering with the record, therefore, there was no material before the State Government to arrive at the conclusion that "continuation of the petitioner as Chairman may influence the inquiry", used by the Minister in proceedings of suspension, and further using the words in the suspension order dated 6.8.2007 that "it is not desirable to keep the petitioner on the post" used by the Deputy Secretary are not sufficient as there was no material before the State Government to arrive at the said conclusions. 31. As discussed above, in all the charges finding is that the allotment/regularization is contrary to law, policy and without verifying the title documents, without any allegation of corruption, embezzlement, ulterior motive which may be on account of some error of judgment and in respect of none of the charges the State Government has taken cognizance under Section 300 of the Act of 1959, therefore, the charges cannot be termed as gross misconduct. 32. While summing-up the entire case, I am of the considered view that to an elected representative assistance of a Rajasthan Municipal Service Officer i.e. the Executive Officer who is well acquainted with the municipal law is provided and the alleged misconduct could have been prevented the Executive Officer by putting a note of dissent under Section 68(2) of the Act of 1959, and further the same could have been rectified by the State Government under Section 300 of the Act of 1959. There are neither allegation of corruption nor embezzlement nor the alleged misconduct has been done with ulterior/oblique motive. Therefore, the alleged misconduct could not be termed as gross misconduct for issuance of suspension order by merely mentioning the same as gross misconduct. Before passing the order of suspension, no sufficient care and caution has been taken to arrive at the conclusion that continuation of the Member/Chairman would prejudice the inquiry. The same is mere consequence of inquiry. In charge Nos. 1 to 8 there are no allegations of corruption/ulterior/oblique motive. Before passing the order of suspension, no sufficient care and caution has been taken to arrive at the conclusion that continuation of the Member/Chairman would prejudice the inquiry. The same is mere consequence of inquiry. In charge Nos. 1 to 8 there are no allegations of corruption/ulterior/oblique motive. Charge No. 8 lacks the basic particulars of mala fide intention. When the entire record is with the Government then there is no basis to record that in case the petitioner is allowed to continue as Chairman then she would influence the inquiry and the charges are of serious nature, therefore, it is not desirable to continue her on the post. The satisfaction must also be recorded by the Government that it is reasonably impracticable to hold an inquiry by keeping the elected representative on the post whose tenure is fixed and in case, she is exonerated then the suspension would turn into interim removal. The Government has not taken into consideration the law discussed by Division Bench of this Court in the cases of the Jan Mohd. (supra), Pradeep Hinger (Supra), Vimla Devi (Supra) and Laxman Singh (supra) wherein aforesaid proposition of taking care and caution before suspending the incumbent has been laid down, therefore, the suspension of the petitioner is arbitrary and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 33. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the order of suspension dated 6.8.2007 is quashed. However, the respondents are directed to conclude the inquiry within three months and the petitioner is expected to co-operate with the inquiry.Writ Petition Allowed. *******