JUDGMENT Hon’ble Krishna Murari, J.—Heard Sri I.N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for State-respondents and Sri Shiv Avtar Sharma appearing for respondent No. 3. 2. By means of this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the award dated 22.5.2004 passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court U.P. Saharanpur under Section 33-C(2) of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act (for short the Act) directing the petitioners to pay a sum of Rs. 48,875/- as wages for the period 1.2.1994 to 11.7.1995 and the consequential order dated 22.7.2004 passed by Deputy Labour Commissioner, U.P. Saharanpur Kshetra, Saharanpur under Section 33-C (1) of the Act for recovery of the said amount. 3. Facts giving rise to the dispute are as under : Respondent No. 3 was appointed as Kamdar vide order dated 8.10.1954 in the year 1965. The post of Kamdar was re-designated as Ganna Gram Sewak and later on as Cane Supervisor (Ganna Paryavekshak) vide order dated 5.7.1989/4.8.1989. The said post was upgraded to the post of Rajkeey Ganna Paryavekshak. The post held by respondent No. 3 is Group ‘C’ post. A notice dated 12.4.1993 was issued to respondent No. 3 informing him that he would retire from service on 31.3.1994 on attaining the age of 58 years. The validity of the said notice was challenged by respondent No. 3 before this Court by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 46131 of 1993 on the ground that he is entitled to continue in service till he attains the age of 60 years. Initially, counter affidavit was called for. When no counter affidavit was filed on 4.5.1995 following order was passed : “Issue notice. No counter affidavit has been filed till today. In spite of earlier direction no instruction has been obtained. Thus, upon prima facie satisfaction there will be an interim order staying the operation of impugned order dated 12.4.1993 at Annexure 2 to the writ petition until further orders. Sd/ A Chakrabarti, J. 4. In pursuance to the aforesaid interim order of this Court, respondent No. 3 joined his post on 12.7.1995 and worked till 31.1.1996 when his services came to an end on attaining the age of 60 years. He was paid salary for the period 12.7.1995 to 31.1.1996, however he was not paid salary for the period 1.2.1994 to 11.7.1995. In pursuance to the aforesaid interim order of this Court, respondent No. 3 joined his post on 12.7.1995 and worked till 31.1.1996 when his services came to an end on attaining the age of 60 years. He was paid salary for the period 12.7.1995 to 31.1.1996, however he was not paid salary for the period 1.2.1994 to 11.7.1995. Respondent No. 4 moved an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act claiming salary for the period 1.2.1994 to 11.7.1995. Respondent No. 2/Presiding Officer, Labour Court U.P. Saharanpur vide order dated 22.5.2004 allowed the said application and awarded wages amounting to Rs. 48,875/- for the said period and Rs. 1,000/- as cost. Subsequently, on an application moved by respondent No. 3 under Section 33-C (1) of the Act, Deputy Labour Commissioner, U.P. Saharanpur Region, Saharanpur issued notices to the petitioners for recovery of the awarded amount as arrears of land revenue. 5. It has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that in exercise of powers conferred by Section 33-C(2) of the Act, there must be a existing right of the workman and since the dispute whether age of superannuation of the respondent No. 3 is 60 years or 58 years is still sub-judice and there is no final adjudication in that regard, the application filed by respondent No. 3 claiming wages for the said period was not at all maintainable and has wrongly and illegally been allowed. In support of the contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on judgments of Hon’ble apex Court in the case of M/s Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. Chandigarh v. Shri Suresh Chand and another, 1978 FLR 383 and P.K. Singh and others v. Presiding officer and others, (1988) 3 SCC 457. Reference has also been made to a decision of learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of U.P. State Electricity Board and another v. Jhagreshwar Prasad and another, 1982 Lab IC 284. 6. Reference has also been made to a decision of learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of U.P. State Electricity Board and another v. Jhagreshwar Prasad and another, 1982 Lab IC 284. 6. In reply, it has been contended on behalf of respondent No. 3/workman that since the interim order was passed in his favour in writ petition No. 46131 of 1993 filed by him as such he was entitled to be reinstated back in service till he attained the age of 60 years and he was also entitled for payment of wages for the said period and in this view of the matter application filed by him under Section 33-C(2) of the Act has rightly been allowed. 7. I have considered the arguments advanced on behalf of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. It is undisputed that as per notice dated 12.4.1993, respondent No. 3 was to superannuate on 31.3.1994 on attaining the age of 58 years. Said notice was put to challenge before this Court wherein an interim order was passed on 4.5.1995 in pursuance whereof he joined back the post on 12.7.1995 and continued to work till 31.1.1996. Equally undisputed is the fact that he has been paid salary for the period 12.7.1995 to 31.1.1996 during which he has worked. 9. The scope and ambit of the provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the Act stands well settled by pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners and various other pronouncements. Reference may be made to the following observations made by Hon’ble apex Court in paragraph 12 of the judgment in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. The Workmen, AIR 1974 SC 1604 : “It is now well settled that a proceeding under S. 33-C(2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or comutation follows upon an existing right to the money or the benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for. In Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. This calculation or comutation follows upon an existing right to the money or the benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for. In Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar, AIR 1968 SC 218 , it was reiterated that proceedings under S. 33-C (2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the position of an executing Court. It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer." 10. In M/s Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. Chandigarh (supra), it has been observed as under : “............It is now well settled as a result of several decisions of this Court that a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. But the right to the money which is sought to be computed must be an existing one that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the Industrial Workman, and his employer...........It is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject matter of an industrial dispute in a reference under S. 10 of the Act......” 11. Thus, it is clear that under Section 33-C(2), the Labour Court is called upon to compute in terms of money a benefit to which a workman is entitled on the basis of a pre-existing right which is either already adjudicated upon or provided for and arises in the course of or in relation to the relationship between the workman and his employer. Incidental matters can be inquired into by the Labour Court for such computation. But it is not entitled to investigate that the workman had a right to the relief claimed or that the employer had corresponding obligation. In other words, where it has to be determined whether the workman had a right to the relief claimed by him, then such determination cannot be made as a matter incidental to the computation of the benefit claimed by him. Such determination is left to be made by the adjudicatory process. 12. In the present case, there was a dispute as to whether respondent No. 3 was entitled to continue in service till 58 years or 60 years. Obviously, it was not a case where relief could have been granted to the respondent No. 3 without determining that he had a right to continue in employment and to be paid wages on account thereof till he attained the age of 60 years. Before respondent No. 4 could claim computation of wages for the said period it had to be found in his favour in the first instance that he had a right to continue in service till he attained the age of 60 years. This could only be determined in appropriate adjudication proceedings and could not be assumed by the labour Court in exercise of jurisdiction confirmed by Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 13. Admittedly, the dispute was pending adjudication before this Court in writ petition No. 46131 of 1993 filed by respondent No. 3. Under the interim order dated 4.5.1995 respondent No. 3 was reinstated back in service and was allowed to be continued till he attained the age of 60 years on 31.1.1996 For the period he was worked he was entitled to payment of wages and admittedly the same has been paid to him by the petitioners. Dispute before the labour Court/respondent No. 2 was in respect of payment of wages for the period 1.2.1994 to 11.7.1995 during which respondent No. 3 has not actually worked. Whether he would be entitled for payment of wages of the said period would depend upon the adjudication, yet to be made by this Court in writ petition No. 46131 of 1993 as to whether he was entitled to continue in service till he attained the age of 60 years or was liable to be superannuated at the age of 58 years. There being no pre-existing right vested in respondent No. 3 or the corresponding obligation upon the petitioners to make payment of wages for the disputed period, the application under Section 33 C(2) filed by respondent No. 3 was not at all maintainable. 14. Obviously, the Presiding Officer/respondent No. 2 fell in error in directing the petitioners to pay emoluments to the respondent No. 3 in proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act for the period he had not worked without any pre-determination of the question that respondent No. 3 was entitled to continue in service and had a right to be paid salary. 15. In view of the above, the impugned order passed by Labour Court and consequential notice issued under Section 33-C(1) are not liable to be sustained in law and deserves to be set aside. 16. As a consequence, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order dated 22.5.2004 passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court U.P. Saharanpur (Annexure-6) and consequential order dated 22.7.2004 passed by Deputy Labour Commissioner, U.P. Saharanpur Kshetra, Saharanpur (Annexure 7) are hereby quashed. 17. Respondent No. 3 has already been paid wages for the period he has worked under the interim order of this Court. However payment of wages for the period 1.2.1994 to 11.7.1995 shall depend upon, the adjudication to be made by this Court in writ petition No. 46131 of 1993 with regard to the question as to whether respondent No. 3 was entitled to be superannuated at the age of 58 years or 60 years and the consequential order which may be passed in that regard. ————