1. Civil Miscellaneous First Appeal (CIMA) No. 241/2002 is directed against the judgment and order dated 22nd of November, 2001 passed by District Judge, Rajouri whereby and where under reference under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act made by the Collector-appellant came to be rejected. 2. Civil Miscellaneous First Appeal (CIMA) No. 36/2002 is directed against order dated 26th of February, 2002 passed by District Judge, Rajouri in the execution petition filed by the respondents award holders whereby the Salary Head of the Collector-appellant came to be attached. 3. It is profitable to notice brief facts of the case herein. Land of the respondents, description of which is given in the impugned orders, came to be acquired by the Collector-appellant and final award came to be passed on 18th of January, 1991. The awarded amount came to be received by the Award holders through their attorney Mohd Bashir Khan under protest with a request to make a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, for short, `the Act. Accordingly, reference was made. Learned District Judge, Rajouri accepted the reference under Section 18 of the Act and enhanced the compensation vide Award/judgment and order dated 26thof March, 1994. 4. It appears that Collector feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 26th of March, 1994 passed by learned District Judge, Rajouri, challenged the same by the medium of appeal before this Court. This Court dismissed the appeal and Collector preferred second appeal which came to be dismissed and the award/judgment came to be upheld by this Court and again a SLP was filed before the Supreme Court that too came to be dismissed. 5. It appears that the Collector, on his own, made the reference on 2nd of April, 1999 under Section 31 of the Act, disputing the apportionment of the compensation on the ground that the apportionment statement was not prepared by his predecessor in accordance with Government Order No. LB/10 of 1980 dated 23rd of February, 1980 and the provisions of Agrarian Reforms Act. 6. The respondents resisted the reference by the medium of objections. The following issues came to be framed:- " Whether the reference is time barred; OPR. 1. Whether the instant reference u/s 31 of the L. A. Act is not maintainable in view of the findings recorded on reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act; OPR. 2. 6. The respondents resisted the reference by the medium of objections. The following issues came to be framed:- " Whether the reference is time barred; OPR. 1. Whether the instant reference u/s 31 of the L. A. Act is not maintainable in view of the findings recorded on reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act; OPR. 2. Whether there is a dispute with regard to the apportionment of compensation viz-a-viz the interest, rights and titles of the interested parties; OPP. 3. Whether the amount received by the Claimants is more than their entitlement and the same is recoverable from them; OPP. 4. Whether excess amount of compensation has been received by claimant Mohd Bashir Khan by the power of attorney; OPP. Relief." 7. Issue nos. 1 and 2 came to be treated as preliminary issues. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the reference court dismissed the reference vide judgment and order dated 22nd of November, 2001. The Collector has challenged the said judgment and order by the medium of CIMA No. 241/2002. 8. Respondents-award holder filed an execution petition before District Judge, Rajouri. Vide order dated 26th of February, 2002, Salary Head of the Collector-Deputy Commissioner, Rajouri came to be attached. Feeling aggrieved, the Collector preferred appeal, CIMA No. 36/2002. : 9. The core question involved in CIMA No. 241/2002 is whether reference in terms of Section 31 of the Act was maintainable. The reply is in negative for the following reasons. 10. The Collector has passed the final award on 18th of January, 1991. It is profitable to reproduce last para of the award herein:- "Therefore, in exercise of the powers vested in me U/S of the J&K Land Acq. Act. 1990 (SVT) I, M. S. Qureshi Assistant Commissioner (Rev) Collector Land Acquisition Rajouri do hereby award Rs. 7,93,787.83 as compensation payable to the land owners i.e. inherits of restoree Abdullah." 11. The proceedings before the Collector had come to an end. The Collector has not mentioned any where that there was any dispute about the apportionment but directed/held that compensation was payable to the land owners. The land owners through Attorney received the compensation under protest and filed application for making reference under Section 18 of the Act in order to determine the adequacy of the compensation. The Collector has not mentioned any where that there was any dispute about the apportionment but directed/held that compensation was payable to the land owners. The land owners through Attorney received the compensation under protest and filed application for making reference under Section 18 of the Act in order to determine the adequacy of the compensation. The reference came to be decided in favour of the award holder-land owners, ultimately came to be upheld by this court and Apex Court. Thereafter, in 1999, the Collector, on his own, made a reference under Section 31 of the Act which was not warranted at all. Had there been any dispute about the apportionment then the Collector who has passed the award on 10th of January, 1991, would have determined apportionment or would have made the reference under Section 31 of the Act before making reference under Section 18 of the Act or along with that reference. But it appears that the present reference is just aimed at to deprive the award holders from receiving the enhanced compensation Award/amount, It is just aimed at to give a slip to law. 12. It is beaten law of the land that reference under Section 31 of the Act can be made before final award is passed The Final award came to be passed in the year 1991. The parties had not raised any dispute about the apportionment and accordingly no reference under section 31 came to be made. Thus only on this ground, reference under Section 31 of the Act was not maintainable. My this view is fortified by the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in SLJ 1982 page 206 titled as The Custodian Evacuee Property Vs. Amarnath & ors . It is profitable to reproduce para 5 of the judgment herein. "5. Thirdly, whereas a reference u/s 31 can be made only before the award is made, a reference u/s 18 can be made only after the award has been made. There are reasons to support this interference. Amarnath & ors . It is profitable to reproduce para 5 of the judgment herein. "5. Thirdly, whereas a reference u/s 31 can be made only before the award is made, a reference u/s 18 can be made only after the award has been made. There are reasons to support this interference. To begin with, an award u/s 11 contemplates decision on three points: (i) the area of the land acquired; (ii) the amount of compensation payable for it; and (iii) its apportionment among its claimants Unless the order of the Collector decision onceontains a all the aforesaid three points, it cannot acquire the status of an award envisaged by Section 11, A reference u/s 31 on the other hand pre-supposes inability on the part of the Collector to give a decision on the question of the apportionment of the compensation settled by him, or on the question of the title of its claimant to receive the same, clearly, therefore, a reference u/s 31 is made at a stage when the award has not come into existence. The other reason is provided by Sub-section (2) of Section 32, which while making a provision for depositing the amount of compensation, speaks of that court alone to which a reference u/s 18 would be competent, in case the interested persons do not consent to receive it, after the Collector has made an award in terms of Section 11. This clearly implies that after the award has been made, a reference u/s 18 alone is competent. Lastly, after the award has been filed by the Collector in terms of section 12, it becomes final between him and the persons interested, and is conclusive evidence of the area of the land acquired, the compensation awarded for it, and its apportionment among the persons interested. To assume power in the Collector to reopen the award at his sweet will by making a reference u/s 31 will bring section 12 into conflict with Section 31 and destroy the finality attached to an award. In order to harmonize these two provisions, power in him to make a reference u/s 31 shall not be envisaged after he has made the award." 13. In order to harmonize these two provisions, power in him to make a reference u/s 31 shall not be envisaged after he has made the award." 13. The reference was also not maintainable for the reasons that Collector has passed the award in 1991 and his Successor-in-office had no jurisdiction and power to probe into the matter afresh, virtually after a lapse of nine years from the date of passing the award, the Collector has suo moto made the reference in hand which is beyond his power and competence. My this view is supported by the judgment of this Court titled Angrez Singh v. Sh. Chaman Lal Gupta reported as 1985 KLJ 318. It is profitable to reproduce relevant portion of para 6 of the judgment herein:- ".....These applications were under no provision of law, because, after the award was announced and in the absence of any reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, Collector was not empowered to probe into the matter fresh. Because as between him and the parties named in the award, the Award had become final and conclusive not only as regards the area and value of the land, but as regards apportionment of the compensation among persons interested. Therefore, he could not have taken cognizance of these applications. But, unfortunately, collector seems to have, in ignorance of law, proceeded to have inquired the matter afresh........" 14. My view is also supported by a judgment titled as Swami Sukhanand v. Samaj Sudhar Samiti and anr reported as AIR 1962 J&K 59. It is profitable to reproduce para 19 this judgment herein:- "It does not appear to us to be reasonable that although a party cannot successfully ask for a reference under S. 18 on account of efflux of time, he can achieve the same object by moving the Collector to invoke S. 31. And the fact that S.31 does not set any limit of time will make it possible for a Collector to make a reference to court after many years, even after a valid reference under S. 18 has been adjudicated upon by a court and has been confirmed by the ultimate appellate court. All that need happen is perhaps that the person who moves the Collector under S. 31 must be one who was not a party to the proceedings initiated by a reference under S. 18. All that need happen is perhaps that the person who moves the Collector under S. 31 must be one who was not a party to the proceedings initiated by a reference under S. 18. In other words, a person who had no notice of the acquisition proceedings and who had not asked for a reference under S. 18, who has in fact kept away from the scene for many long years, can come up to the Collector claiming that the land acquired really belongs to him and that he is entitled to compensation and thereby induce the Collector to make a reference under S. 31. That indeed would be a strange situation. We are unable to agree that S. 31 of the Act can be so construed as to render such an eventuality possible. It could not have been the intention of the legislature to arm the Collector with such unlimited powers which he could, if he so chooses, exercise after the lapse of any length of time irrespective of whether the dispute had previously been referred to a court on a reference under S. 18 and has been finally decided between the parties after a protracted litigation. And we do not see any reason why the Collector after he has done with his award, should still continue to function of his own motion under S. 31. On the contrary, we think that each of these two sections has a separate scope and ambit and can come into play only under entirely different circumstances. "While the right under S. 18 arises only after an award under S. 11 is made by the Collector, S. 31, will come into play only before the Collector makes an award in respect of the apportionment of the compensation which would invoke the ascertainment of the persons to whom the compensation is payable." 15. The collector had no power and competence to make reference under Section 31 of the Act because the reference under Section 18 of the Act came to be granted by the District Judge, Rajouri and the award/order has attained finality. Apex Court in a case titled Mehar Rusi Dalai v. Union of India and Ors. reported as AIR 2004 SC 3491 also laid down the same law. It is profitable to reproduce para 21 and 22 of the judgment herein:- "21. Apex Court in a case titled Mehar Rusi Dalai v. Union of India and Ors. reported as AIR 2004 SC 3491 also laid down the same law. It is profitable to reproduce para 21 and 22 of the judgment herein:- "21. it is thus clear that persons who have notice of acquisition proceedings would have to apply for a Reference under Section 18. To be noted for a Reference under Section 18 Reference could be in respect of the measurement of the land and/or the amount of compensation and/or in respect of persons to whom it is payable and/or for apportionment of compensation amongst persons interested. Section 30 merely deals with apportionment of compensation when the amount of compensation has been settled. Thus, as set out in the above mentioned cases, Section 18 is to be invoked when a person claiming a pre-existing right has notice of the acquisition proceedings, whereas Section 30 comes into play only if a person had no notice of the acquisition proceedings or the rights came into existence after the acquisition proceedings. It is clear that the person who had notice of the acquisition proceedings and who, by virtue of Section 50, is debarred from filing a Reference under Section 18 cannot be allowed to apply for a Reference under Section 30. In this case, this court has already held that the respondents were not entitled to apply for a Reference under Section 18. This meant that they were not entitled to seek a Reference not just in respect of the compensation but also for apportionment of the compensation. Once it has been held that they had no right to move under Section 18 there was no question of their being permitted a party, who cannot apply under Section 18, to apply under Section 30 would be to render Section 30 nugatory. 22. The High Court has also erred in holding that the claim for apportionment was not barred by principle of res judicata or principles analogous thereto. As has been set out hereinabove the respondents had filed Writ petition No. 1603/96 challenging the Award as excessive. One of the grounds for claiming the Award as excessive was as follows: "Petitioners submit that thus while assessing or determine that the compensation the Special land Acquisition Officer- Respondent no. As has been set out hereinabove the respondents had filed Writ petition No. 1603/96 challenging the Award as excessive. One of the grounds for claiming the Award as excessive was as follows: "Petitioners submit that thus while assessing or determine that the compensation the Special land Acquisition Officer- Respondent no. 4 ought to have considered the share of the tenants/lessees documents including the Ministry of Defence on the basis of hiring and as to that extent the compensation ought to have been reduced." Thus in that Writ Petition they had already claimed that their share as tenants/lessees should have been taken into consideration. That Writ petition came to be dismissed. The S. 1. P filed against that Writ Petition was withdrawn by them. To claim apportionment on the ground that they had share as tenant or lessee is in fact nothing else but an attempt to reduce the compensation. The prayer asked for now is identical to the prayer made earlier." 16. No doubt, no time limit is prescribed for making any reference under Section 31 of the Act corresponding to Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act (1) 1984 (Centre), but the reference is to be made within the reasonable time. If a reference was made under Section 18 of the Act, why at that point of time or even before the reference under Section 31 of the Act was not made or why joint reference was not made. Thus only on this score, reference under section 31 of the Act was not maintainable. It came to be made after a long time. Apex Court in a case titled as P. K. Sreekantan & Ors. v. P. Sreekumaran Nair & ors. reported as 2007 SCW 53 held that reference under Section 30 should be made within reasonable time. It is profitable to reproduce para 17 of the judgment herein: "However, it is to be noted that there is no time limit for seeking reference under Section 30 of the Act, though it should always be done within a reasonable time. The reasonableness of time flows from the need for a finality to judicial proceedings." 17. In the given circumstances, reference was not competent and maintainable. Viewed thus, the trial court has rightly dismissed the reference. 18. The reasonableness of time flows from the need for a finality to judicial proceedings." 17. In the given circumstances, reference was not competent and maintainable. Viewed thus, the trial court has rightly dismissed the reference. 18. Order passed by District Judge in execution petition which is impugned in CIMA No. 36/2002 has become in fructuous and meaningless by the subsequent developments for the following reasons. 19. Learned counsel for the parties admitted that the enhanced amount stands deposited before the Registry of this Court. 20. In the given circumstances, CIMA No. 241/2002 merits to be dismissed and CIMA No. 36/2002 merits to be disposed of with a direction that the impugned order stands rendered infructuous. 21. It is worthwhile to mention herein that the Collector has suo moto dragged the respondents in a fresh lis for a period of more than nine years and caused delay in making payment. 22. As discussed above, reference was made when the lis had come to an end and there was no scope for making a reference in terms of Section 31 of the Act after the judgment/award passed by the District Judge Rajouri. It pains me to observe herein that Collector land Acquisition -State has dragged the award holders from pillar to post and post to pillar. 23. The respondents have lost nine years without any reason despite of the fact that the award/order/judgment passed by District Judge has attained finality. The action of the collector was just to avoid payment and to prevent the respondents to reap the fruits of the first round of litigation. Apex Court in case titled Rajappa Hanamatha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa reported in AIR 2000 SC 2108, has observed as under:- "13. It is distressing to note that many unscrupulous litigants in order to circumvent orders of Courts adopt dubious ways and take recourse to ingenious methods including filing of fraudulent litigation to defeat the orders of Courts. Such tendency deserves to be taken serious note of and curbed by passing appropriate orders and issuing necessary directions including imposing of exemplary costs. As noticed, despite eviction order having become final nearly a quarter century ago, respondent No. 1 still could not enjoy the benefit of the said order and get possession because of the filing of the present suit by the brother of the person who had suffered the eviction order. As noticed, despite eviction order having become final nearly a quarter century ago, respondent No. 1 still could not enjoy the benefit of the said order and get possession because of the filing of the present suit by the brother of the person who had suffered the eviction order. Under these circumstances, we quantify the costs payable by the appellant to respondent No. 1 at Rs. 25.000/-." 24. Apex Court in case titled as Municipal Corpn. Delhi v. Kamla Devi, reported in AIR 1996 SC 1733, has observed as under:- "7.......Moreover, the frame of the suit and the language and terms in which the declaration and prohibitory injunction are asked for suggest a clear attempt to overreach the process of Court. The object clearly was to obtain a declaration that the assessment order dated January 28, 1991, is illegal and invalid from a Court outside Delhi. The fact that Kamla Devi (Plaintiff) chose to conceal the fact of her filing the appeal against the said assessment order is also indicative of the mala fides on her part. It is true that the Court has limited the prohibitory injunction only to properties in Ghaziabad but it has granted a declaration that the very assessment order is void and illegal which means that it cannot be enforced even within the limits of Delhi Municipal Corporation. In the Special Leave Petition, it is stated by the Corporation that the Bill of demand pursuant to the assessment order aforesaid was sent only to July 8, 1991, to the respondent whereas the suit was filed on April 19, 1991. Once this Court is satisfied that Kamla Devi has abused the process of law and misused the legal system, the objections put forward by the respondents counsel are of no consequence. This Court is entitled to act in such cases to prevent such abuse and misuse." 25. In the given circumstances, I deem it just and proper to saddle the appellant with the costs in the interests of justice. 26. Keeping in view of the date of Notification passed under Section 4 of the Act and the date of final award passed by the Collector and all the facts and circumstances narrated herein above, it will be proper and just to award costs in favour of the respondents and against the appellant. 27. Viewed thus, Rs.50,000/- (Rs. Fifty thousand) are awarded as costs. 28. 27. Viewed thus, Rs.50,000/- (Rs. Fifty thousand) are awarded as costs. 28. Accordingly, CIMA No. 241/2002 is dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/- (Rs. Fifty thousand) and CIMA No. 36/2002 is disposed of, as indicated above.