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2007 DIGILAW 2478 (MAD)

V. Selladurai, Proprietor v. The Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (OSD)

2007-08-07

A.P.SHAH, D.DINAKARAN

body2007
Judgment :- A.P. Shah, J. This appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned single Judge dated 20.12.2006 in W.P. (MD) No.4512 of 2006. The brief facts leading to this appeal are stated herein under. .2. The appellant is the original writ petitioner. The appellant is doing business at Singapore for the past 25 years and out of his earnings, he has purchased certain lands in his native village in his minor sons name and constructed a Kalyana Mandapam during 2000. Since the appellant is doing business at Singapore, he has been given the status of Non-Resident Indian. In view of the provisions of the Income-Tax Act, the income from Kalyana Mandapam is clubbed with his income and on that basis, returns have been filed with the Income Tax Department. During the assessment year 2001-02, the appellant filed the return in Form 2-D, showing loss of Rs. 2,03,829/- along with the valuation report for construction of the Kalyana Mandapam. The Assessing Officer issued notices on 212. 2003 and 12.02.2004 under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act after getting approval from the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Thanjavur asking the appellant to produce more particulars including the particulars of the stay in India and the bank particulars. 3. In pursuance of the above said notices, the appellant filed a revised return in Form 2D, in which he has shown a sum of Rs.7,13,966/-as loss. He claimed 10% depreciation on the value of the building, which was inadvertently omitted to claim in the original return. The Inspector of the Income Tax Department, who was deputed by the Second Respondent, fixed the value of the building at Rs.86,00,000/-. While estimating the value of the construction 10% rebate for personal supervision was allowed by the Inspector. These proposals were sent to the Joint Commissioner and approvals were obtained and based on that, assessment had been completed by the Assessing Officer vide his proceedings in GI No.77725/2001-02 dated 17.03.2004 in which the total loss was determined at Rs.8,77,479/-. 4. The second respondent again issued notice on 011. 2004 in which he has pointed out that 10% of the value of the building was allowed as rebate towards the personal supervision while arriving the cost of the building at Rs.86,00,000/- as against the original claim of 5% and therefore, he has proposed to rectify the assessment order. 4. The second respondent again issued notice on 011. 2004 in which he has pointed out that 10% of the value of the building was allowed as rebate towards the personal supervision while arriving the cost of the building at Rs.86,00,000/- as against the original claim of 5% and therefore, he has proposed to rectify the assessment order. The appellant filed a detailed reply on 312. 2004, in which the facts were explained and he also brought to the notice of the second respondent that the higher value fixed by the Department was accepted only after elaborate discussions with the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax on 01.03.2004. The appellant requested the Assessing Officer not to rectify the order in view of the explanation and the approval given by the Joint Commissioner and also because of the lesser percentage of difference in the cost of construction. It appears that the second respondent satisfied himself with the explanation and no proceedings were taken pursuant to that notice. .5. By notice dated 08.03.2006, the first respondent proposed to revise the assessment suo moto under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act for the very same reason that the percentage of rebate given was not correct. It appears that the notice was received by the son-in-law of the appellant, who in turn contacted the appellant over phone and the appellant requested him to get one month time for filing detailed objections. Accordingly, the son-in-law of the appellant sent a petition on 20.03.2006 requesting one month time for filing objections. The appellant has alleged that the first respondent orally informed the son-in-law of the appellant and the auditor that the time as requested by them could not be given as the period of limitation was expiring. He has further alleged that the son-in-law of the appellant was forced to file his objections on 27.03.2006, and then the first respondent straightaway proceeded to pass the impugned order by which he set aside the assessment with a direction to get the technical estimation of the cost of the construction from the Department Valuation Officer and to pass a fresh order in accordance with law since the 10% rebate for personal supervision is abnormal. The order of the first respondent was challenged by the appellant in W.P. (MD) No.4512 of 2006, which came to be dismissed by the learned single Judge, asking the petitioner to resort to the remedy of filing statutory appeal as provided under the Act. 6. Though the learned counsel appearing for the appellant raised several contentions before us, but only one is sufficient to allow the writ appeal. The main contention is that the order, which is impugned in the writ petition, has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Section 263 of the Income Tax Act provides for personal hearing. As already noted, the notice was received by the son-in-law of the appellant, who contacted the appellant in Singapore, who in turn requested him to get one months time for filing detailed objections. The son-in-law of the appellant sent a petition on 20.03.2006 requesting one month time for filing objections. Thereafter, the objections came to be filed on 27.03.2006. According to the appellant, his son-in-law was literally forced to file objections on 27.03.2006 and thereafter the impugned order came to be passed by the first respondent. It is not disputed by the learned standing counsel appearing for the Revenue that no personal hearing was given to the appellant or to his representative. In fact, no date was fixed for hearing and the first respondent went on to pass orders without granting any opportunity of personal hearing to the appellant. .7. In Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, 2003 (2) SCC 107 , the Supreme Court has held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion and the Court must consider the pros and cons of the case and then may interfere if it comes to the conclusion that the petitioner seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there is failure of principles of natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. In the instant case, admittedly, no personal hearing was granted to the appellant. There was, thus, clear violation of principles of natural justice. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the first respondent is set aside. In the instant case, admittedly, no personal hearing was granted to the appellant. There was, thus, clear violation of principles of natural justice. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the first respondent is set aside. The matter is remitted back to the first respondent, who shall give personal hearing to the petitioner and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. No costs. Consequently, miscellaneous petition is closed.